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Abstract
The focus of this thesis is on information society regulation in Europe and on the European 
Commission when forming legislative proposals and implementing laws by means of 
decentred and flexible regulation, respectful of difference, seeking to promote the 
engagement of diverse interested parties in the formation of laws affecting them. I seek to 
explain the above processes in a dynamic way, breaking away with a conceptualisation of 
regulation as (only) efficiently pursuing the public good and neutrally mediating among 
autonomous communities, and public administration as being (only) about reasoned choices 
and rational action. Bourdieu’s theoretical tools are employed to argue that although it would 
be within agents’ intention to design neutral rules and within regulatory law’s original 
function to promote participation and deliberation, law encapsulates a vision that outruns its 
function and agents perceive the social world in a way that outruns perception. To illustrate 
this, I look at the following case studies: Architectural solutions introduced by the industry in 
DVDs to prevent copying, domain name dispute resolution by ICANN, Internet filters used 
to block harmful material on the net, and the proposal to introduce patent protection in 
computer-implemented inventions in the EU. In a nutshell, in the above instances the 
European Commission strives to reproduce or preserve its juridical, technocratic, social and 
symbolic capital, while one of the main strategies supported by its juridical capital is to 
sustain the belief in the neutrality and objectivity of regulatory law. However, the ways in 
which the administration perceives the potentialities inscribed in capital are subject to 
unspoken general cognitive schemas shaped by nationality and professional background, and 
by the subjective construction of notions such as recognition, reputation and communality, as 
formed in everyday interaction in the Commission. Yet, cognitive schemas and capital are 
not conceived as static, but as open to experience. In this way, although regulation is viewed 
as manifesting the freezing of power relations, dynamism is injected as all definitions in the 
field are potentially subject to re-definition, by virtue of struggles amongst the administration 
and interest groups, which, although they occupy different fields, strive to influence 
regulation. Redefinitions then result in re-orderings in the field, as for example, new forms of 
capital may enter it or cognitive schemas may be altered.
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I
The European Commission and the Construction of Information
Society
Toute definition de la liberte donnera raison au determinisme.
Henri Bergson, Les Donnees Immediates de la Conscience.
The will to create is to create the fiction of a world that corresponds to our desires... 
associating everything we honour and find pleasant with this true world.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Nietzsche's Notebooks Fall 1887 9 [60].
Opening
The focus of this thesis is on decentralised regulation em ployed in the 
context of inform ation society in Europe. In this instance, decentralised 
regulation, for example, as in co-regulation, self-regulation and soft law, engages 
a variety of public and  private actors in the process of form ing proposals and 
im plem enting laws and the European Commission assumes an im portant role in 
providing expertise, hierarchical assistance (when required), and  support for 
forum s of discussion.
Against this background, the questions addressed in this thesis are: W hat 
is the effect of decentred regulation? H ow  does it w ork in practice? Does it really 
fulfil its prom ise to prom ote deliberation and participation? W hat is the role of 
the European Commission in the process? Is it really a neutral regulator 
objectively interm ediating am ongst interested parties? If not, w hat are its
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"interests'? Can they be defined in an non-economic sense and  beyond the limits 
of intentionality?
These general questions I w ish to address in the context of efforts to 
em ploy decentred instrum ents to regulate the inform ation society in Europe as 
w e are presented w ith  an example of efforts to prom ote reflexive and  heterarchical 
regulation, respectful of the diverse codes of conduct of interest groups and 
netw orks of actors. Relying on the conceptual tools of social theory, I seek to 
understand the form ation and function of these processes.
Alternative regulation and the information society in Europe 
The concept of inform ation society entails that the social is built around 
the processes underlying the exchange and commodification of inform ation.1 
Such trade in inform ation is often decentralised, as in the case of the Internet. In 
this instance, inform ation 'wants to he free.'2 It is routed in a sm art w ay to find its
1 Boyle, J. (1996) Shamans, Software, and Spleens. Law and the Construction of Information Society 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press), at p. 1-6. Note that Boyle makes the point that the 
information society is not only characterised by electronic information and the Internet, but also 
genetic information and biotechnology. In this thesis I limit my analysis on electronic information 
as I look at the official definitions produced by the European Commission and how these are 
debated.
2 Barlow, P. (1996) 'A declaration of the independence of cyberspace/ at 
http://  www.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html, (web page visited on 14 May 2003). This 
phrase ('information want to be free') is a popular aphorism circulating on the net.
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destination.3 It has no borders. It prom otes com m unication am ongst people 
around the w orld.4
The Internet for example, has been used to organise dem onstrations 
against the w ar in Yugoslavia and Iraq.5 It has further been em ployed to 
coordinate a petition against the proposal to protect com puter-im plem ented 
inventions by patent law in the EU, which received an overw helm ing response.6 
At the same time, trading in genetic and electronic inform ation has become a 
central feature of the economy leading to efforts to strengthen international 
intellectual property  in view of problem s such as software piracy.7
However, m uch debate surrounds w hether w e are m oving to a new 
paradigm  of social organisation, the inform ation society.8 The economy is trading
3 Cerf, V. G., Clark, D. D., Leiner, Lynch, D. C., B. Mv Kahn, R. E., Kleinrock, L., Postel, J., Roberts, 
L. G. and Wolff, S., 'A Brief History of the Internet by those who made the history, including 
Barry M. Leiner, Vinton G. Cerf, David D. Clark, Robert E. Kahn, Leonard Kleinrock, Daniel C. 
Lynch, Jon Postel, Lawrence G. Roberts, Stephen Wolff' available at 
http://www.isoc.org/intem et/history/, (web page visited on 14 May 2003). Also see Sassen, S. 
(2000) 'Digital networks and the state: Some governance questions' (2000) 17 Culture, Theory and 
Society 19-32.
4 Barlow note 2 above.
5 For the organisation of social movements against the war in Iraq see the article by Glasner, J. 
'Protests to start when war does' story published in Wired News in 19 March 2003 at 
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,58101,00.html, (web page visited on 14 May 2003). 
Wired News cites Howard Rheingold, author of Smart Mobs, a book investigating the impact of 
mobile computing, who claims that 'the quick pace at which protests are organized and publicized 
nowadays is almost entirely attributable to improvements in communications technology. Whereas in the 
Vietnam era, it took years for a viable, nationwide antiwar movement to coalesce, the recent protests against 
military action have come together quite rapidly on a worldwide scale.. Instead of having some hierarchical 
top-down coalition, it's possible to have loose coalitions of small groups that organize very quickly.. .These 
groups get the word out by attracting media coverage and augmenting their efforts with weblogs, e-mail, 
telephone campaigns and, more often in parts of Europe and Asia, cell-phone text messaging.'
6 PbT Consultants, 'The results of the European Commission exercise on the patentability of 
computer implemented inventions' (2000) available at
http: /  / europa.eu.int/ comm / internal market/ en/ indprop / comp/softanalvse.pdf, (web page 
visited on 14 May 2003).
7 Boyle note 1 above.
8 Webster, F. (second ed 1995) Theories of the Information Society (London: Routledge). Webster 
approaches the concept of information society from a technological, economic, spatial, cultural 
and occupational point of view. It is interesting to note that the Internet has attracted much hype 
when viewed from almost a religious point of view as a new organism or as a new eco-society
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in intangible goods and the citizen is engaged in politics in m ore direct ways,9 
bu t sceptics w ould say that inform ation has always been central to the 
organisation of societies.
Yet, both the EU and the US have considered the creation of inform ation 
society to be a policy priority, acknowledging the centrality of inform ation in 
today 's economy and polity and the im portance of innovation as being the 
driving force behind m odem  economies resulting in social re-organisation and in 
the transform ation of our socio-political experience. Innovation in particular is 
im portant as, fostering technological experim entation is at the heart of prom oting 
novel w ays to m anipulate and transm it information.
Accepting the centrality of innovation and inform ation further results in 
accepting that novel m odels of governance are required, as, w hen inform ation 
travels or is traded, virtues and distinctive problem s emerge from  its 
com m unication in a global and differentiated world.
Therefore, although the question as to w hether the creation of information 
society is a new  m odel of society m ay be difficult to answer, one cannot deny that 
the creation of a European information society is particular to the specific socio- 
historical circumstances of our time, around which our polity is organised, our 
laws are emerging, and notions such as innovation and inform ation acquire
with its own collective memory in electronic form, see for example 
http://w w w .aec.at/m em e/sym p/, (web page visited on 14 May 2003).
9 Castells, M. (first ed 1996) The Rise of the Network Society (Oxford: Blackwell), at p. 228. Castells 
insists that 'information technologies allow a direct, online linkage between different types of activity in 
the same process of production, management and distribution, establish a close, structural, connection 
between the sphere of work and employment artificially separated by obsolete statistical categories'.
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m eaning, and therefore the study of inform ation society in Europe should be 
concerned w ith uncovering these.
To illustrate this, the Internet in particular is positioned at the heart of 
efforts to prom ote the inform ation society in Europe, hence issues relating to its 
governance, content and privacy, intellectual property rights and the creation of 
global networks, are of prim e im portance as it presents us w ith  an example of 
decentralised organisation and  regulation. Yet, although it is a global network, 
co-ordination of local centres is required as in the creation of accepted global 
standards.
M oreover, national governm ents and the EU have to reinvent the ways 
they regulate conduct on the Internet. Decentralised, 'soft' instrum ents, such as 
self-regulation and co-regulation are em ployed alongside m ore traditional 
hierarchical regulatory instrum ents, such as com petition law, a process which 
nonetheless shows a tendency to prom ote ways to involve governm ents and 
various other interested parties acting in netw orks,10 m anifesting a novel role for 
the state and the nature of its interaction w ith  society.
Nevertheless, inform ation about the function and  needs of such networks 
is necessary, w hen the European Commission engages in provid ing  some form  of 
hierarchical co-ordination or assistance. In other w ords, a fragm ented world, 
consisting of communities and netw orks at a global level, has to rely m ore than 
ever on inform ation about local needs.
10 Black, J. (2002) 'Critical reflections on regulation' Centre for the Analysis of Risk and Regulation 
(CARR) Discussion Paper 4/2002, at p. 19, available at 
http://  www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/carr/publications.htm, (web page visited on 20 May 2003). On self­
regulation also see Ogus, A (1995) 'Rethinking self-regulation' 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 97- 
108.
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All these characteristics are particular to the European inform ation society 
and give birth  to an understanding of regulatory law  as being som ething m ore 
than the sum  of secondary rules and standards em anating from the positive 
character of the state, attributed to an efficient regulator or being an instrum ent 
for intervention in the economy.11 Regulatory law  is not only tied to a centre,12 
bu t is though to have to move to 'decentred/13'heterarchical' forms.14 Alternatively, 
regulatory law  is thought to have to be m ore 'flexible.'15
Various agents participate in its form ation and im plem entation, and 
various tools are em ployed to regulate conduct. M arkets and laws are not 
thought to be separate entities, bu t are interdependent.16 In the above instances, 
the term  regulation is used in a broad sense, and  as such is equated w ith 
governing. Hence, it is conceived as the sum  of w ays in  which public purposes are
11 Baldwin, R., Scott, C. and Hood, C. (eds) A  Reader on Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998).
12 Black note 10 above, at p. 24, questioning whether private law can be value neutral. She refers 
to Luhmann, who considers law as stabilising expectations, while regulation is not thought to be 
a separate system but the attempt of the realm of politics to influence other systems by using the 
medium of law, see p. 24-25. She further contrasts this view with pluralists, such as Cotterell, who 
argues that law's formal rationality and its consistency with a body of doctrine seems less vital 
today than it used to be, see Cotterell, R. (second ed 1992) The Sociology of Law: An Introduction 
(London: Butterworth). Finally, contrary to Hart and Kelsen, anthropologists and sociologists 
have long ago pointed to that rules governing conduct need not emanate from the state, amongst 
the many references see Gurvitch, G. (1947) Sociology of Law (Butler and Tanner); Gulliver, P. H. 
(1979) Disputes and Negotiations: A  Cross-Cultural Perspective (New York: Academic Press); Levi- 
Strauss, C. (1963) Structural Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, orig. 1958).
13 Black note 10 above.
14 Everson, M. (1998) 'Administering Europe?' 36 Journal of Common Market Studies 195-216.
15 Teubner, G. (1993) Law as an Autopoietic System (Oxford, UK; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell 
Publishers); Ayres, I. and Braithwaite, J. (1992) Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation 
Debate (Oxford University Press, New York).
16 Everson note 14 above; Black note 10 above. For a different view see Daintith, T. (1979) 
Regulation (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck), following economic analysis and thus considering that 
markets and regulatory law are different spheres of activity, the latter intervening to correct 
market failures. Also see Hayek, F. A. (1982) Law, Legislation and Liberty: A  New Statement of the 
Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy (London: Routledge); Mitnick, B. M. (1980) The 
Political Economy of Regulation: Creating, Designing and Removing Regulatory Forms (New York: 
Columbia University Press); Wilson, J. Q. (1980) The Politics of Regulation (New York: Basic Books).
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authoritatively decided on and im plem ented,17 w ith  various actors being active 
in the shaping of their content, and a variety of bodies involved in the process.
In its norm ative conceptualisation, regulatory law  is thought to have to 
m ove from substantial to m ore procedural and flexible regulatory instrum ents, 
prom oting soft law, inform ation and participatory rights and  the use of expertise. 
Law should be concerned w ith em pow ering people by creating forum s for 
discussion and guaranteeing the fair structure of such dialogue.
The basic assum ptions underlying this position is that law  can neutrally 
m ediate am ongst com m unities by providing the necessary objective legal 
procedures, that law  is only one structure am ongst other constraining the action 
of intelligible agents, or that it can help achieve social justice (by means of 
prom oting public policy goals) and access to justice.18
17 Pildes, R. and Sunstein, C. R. (1995) 'Reinventing the regulatory state' 62 University of Chicago 
Law Review 7-33. Doem and Wilks offer four definitions. According to the authors, regulation is 
often viewed in the context of Constitutional provisions that inform the division of powers between 
levels of government and the separation of powers between the executive body, the legislature 
and courts. Regulation may also be defined in a narrow way as delegated legislation. In this form it 
may include guidelines, rules of procedures, and voluntary codes. Alternatively, regulation may 
be conceived as a policy instrument, and as such is distinguished from other instruments such as 
exhortation, spending, taxation, or the direct delivery of services. Governing though should be 
viewed in an overall sense (including Constitutions, statutes, regimes) so as to be able to address 
questions as to the impact of regulation, and in particular as to how difficult it is to tell whether 
regulation is expanding or being reconfigured, see Doem, B. and Wilks, S. (eds) (1998) Changing 
Regulatory Institutions in Britain and North America (Toronto: Toronto University Press), at p. 4-6. 
Furthermore, the normative theory of market failure premised on the assumptions of economic 
analysis understands society and economy as being separate phenomena and prescribes that 
regulation is required to improve economic efficiency and correct market imperfections. In this 
instance, regulation encapsulates a new form of governance (regulatory state) as opposed to the 
redistribution functions of the positive state and is legitimised when market-failures occur. These 
are: Natural monopolies, externalities, public goods, asymmetric information, moral hazards, and 
transaction costs. Anyone of these six failures legitimises regulation. On these issues see Majone, 
M. (1997) 'From the positive to the regulatory state: Causes and consequences of changes in the 
mode of governance' 17 Journal of Public Policy 139-165; Ogus, A (1994) Legal Form and Economic 
Theory (Clarendon Law Series, Oxford, 1994); Baldwin, R. and Cave, M. (1999) Understanding 
Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Finally, regulation may be concerned with risk 
management, see Black note 10 above, at p. 7.
18 Teubner note 15 above; Ayres and Braithwaite note 15 above.
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Sim ultaneously though, this m ovem ent aw ay from com m and and control 
rules, em pow ering people to participate in forum s of discussion and relying on 
inform ation to regulate conduct, implies that the stage of form ation of legislative 
proposals and im plem entation acquire considerable im portance, m ore than ever 
before. It is in this context that this thesis examines the role of the European 
Commission in regulating the inform ation society.
The m ain argum ent advanced is that law, be it soft, non binding or merely 
at the stage of im plem entation, still engulfs a vision of the social w orld by means 
of encapsulating conceptions about, for example, the role of property and 
individuality. In other w ords, the European Com m ission has not lost its central 
role, bu t is actively pursu ing  its 'interests/ w hich are not exogenously given bu t 
are the product of history, and regulatory law  can never be neutral and objective, 
as it always excludes alternative visions of the social world.
This is because, although it w ould be w ithin  agents' intention to design 
neutral and fair rules pursuing well-defined goals and w ith in  regulatory law 's 
original function to prom ote participation and deliberation, law encapsulates a 
vision that outruns its function and agents perceive the social w orld in a w ay that 
outruns perception.
If one accepts that regulation is not the crystallisation of the concerted 
effort of knowledgeable agents engaging in problem  solving activity,19 or the
19 For this proposition see for example Black's work, Black, J. (1997) 'New institutionalism and 
naturalism in socio-legal analysis: Institutionalist approaches to regulatory decision making' 19 
Law and Policy 59-93; Black, J. (1998) 'Talking about regulation' Public Law 77-112; Black, J. (2002) 
'Regulatory conversations' 29 Journal of Law and Society 163-196; Black, J. (1997) Rules and 
Regulators (Oxford: Clarendon). The author retains intentionality as crucial in her analysis, since 
regulation is viewed as a problem solving activity. For the institutionalist argument, generally see 
Powel, W. and DiMaggio, P. J. (1991) The New Institutionalism in Organisational Analysis (Chicago:
8
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construct of pow erful interests20 or a reflexive instrum ent aim ing at prom oting 
participation and deliberation,21 or a technical adm inistrative project seeking to 
integrate m arkets,22 or a policy instrum ent in the hands of governm ents,23 bu t 
that m ost of the time entails the reproduction of common w ays of thinking about 
the social w orld, then the possibility opens up  to view  regulation from  a different 
perspective.24
In particular, looking at the early stages of identifying a social problem  as a 
legal problem  and transform ing it into a plausible legal proposal is very 
im portant, in order to understand w hat views are excluded, w hich are included, 
and why. We can further see w hether and to w hat extent the taken for granted 
conceptions about the social w orld are challenged by interest groups striving to 
influence regulation.
Similarly, exam ining the im plem entation of EU legislation reveals how  
'truth' claims furnished by science, benchm arks and indicators regulate our
University of Chicago Press); Koeble, J. (1995) 'The new institutionalism in political science and 
sociology' 27 Comparative Politics 231-244; Immergut, E. M. (1998) 'The theoretical core of new 
institutionalism' 26 Politics and Society 5-34; Grendstad, G. and Selle, P. (1995) 'Cultural theory and 
the new institutionalism' (1995) 7 Journal of Theoretical Politics 5-27.
20 The Internet is then viewed as being potentially dominated by powerful corporations in the 
future. For the importance of information to multinational enterprises see, Wallertsein, I. (1979) 
The Capitalist World-Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press/Maison des Sciences de 
l’Homme). Generally, structuralists focused on the ways in which structures impose a way of 
thinking and acting, see for example Althusser, L. (1984) Essays on Ideology (London: Verso). 
Structuralists derived inspiration from language and its function to describe for example a cultural 
setting, see Levi-Strauss note 14 above.
21 Teubner note 15 above; Ayres and Braithwaite note 15 above.
22 Majone, G. (1996) Regulating Europe (London; New York: Routledge).
23 For the use of law as a policy instrument see Daintith, T. C. (ed) (1988) Law as an Instrument of 
Economic Policy: Comparative and Critical Approaches (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter).
24 This perspective comes close to the one adopted by Hall, C., Hood, C. and Scott, C. (1999) 
Telecommunications Regulation: Culture, Chaos and Interdependence inside the Regulatory Process 
(London: Routledge).
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conduct by virtue of reproducing taken for granted assum ptions about, for 
example, w hat harm ful content on the Internet is.
I thus seek to look at the above processes as reproducing well-em bedded 
perceptions about the role of law as prom oting fair and neutral participation and 
about individuals as actively participating in com m unities and netw orks 
prom oting consensus w ithin le g a l 'informalism/ In this sense, w hen regulation is 
understood as governance 'is characterised by mechanisms by which a child, an 
economy or a community can be guided to produce desirable objectives whilst it 
simultaneously respecting their autonomy.'25
The following will elaborate on the theoretical underpinnings of this 
proposition. I will concentrate on theories of regulation in  general, putting 
em phasis on the role of the European adm inistration, w hile m aking sporadic 
references to issues relating to Internet governance, intellectual property  rights 
and harm ful Internet content regulation.
25 Rose, N. S. (1994) 'Expertise and the government of conduct' 14 Studies in Law, Politics & Society 
359-397; Generally see, Pavlich, G. (1996) 'The power of community mediation: Government and 
formation of self-identity' 30 Law & Society Review 707-733; Rose, N. S. (1987) 'Beyond the 
public/private division: Law, power and the family' 14 Journal of Law & Society 61-76; Rose, N. S. 
(1996) 'The death of the social? Re-figuring the territory of government’ 25 Economy & Society 327- 
356; Rose, N. S. (1996) 'Governing "advanced" liberal democracies/ in Barry, A., Osborne, T. and 
Rose, N. (eds) (1996) Foucault and Political Reason (London: UCL Press); Rose, N. S. (1999) Powers of 
Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Rose, N. S. and 
Valverde, M. (1998) 'Governed by law?’ 7 Social & Legal Studies 541-551; Rose, N. S. and Miller, P. 
(1992) 'Political power beyond the state: Problematics of government' British Journal of Sociology 
173-205. Informal or popular justice is the idea that mechanisms for dispute resolution in general 
can be developed outside formal legal procedures and litigation, see Fitzpatrick, P. (1988) 'The 
rise of informalism' in Matthews, R. (ed) Informal Justice? (London: Sage: 178-198); Fitzpatrick, P. 
(1992) 'The impossibility of popular justice’ 1 Social & Legal Studies 199-215; Fitzpatrick, P. (1992) 
The M ythology of Modern Law (London: Routledge); Harrington, C. B. and Merry, S. E. (1988) 
'Ideological production: The making of community mediation’ 22 Law and Society Review 709-735; 
Abel, R. L. (1982) 'The contradictions of informal justice’ in Abel, R. L. (ed.) The Politics of Informal 
Justice Vol 1: The American Experience (New York: Academic Press); Matthews, R. (1988) 
'Reassessing informal justice' in Matthews, R. (ed) Informal Justice? (London: Sage).
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Before proceeding, it is required to provide a few technical definitions. 
W ith regard to the term 'information society' the European Com m ission has 
extensively used the term  in its official papers and linked it to the technological 
convergence between mobile and satellite communications services eventually 
being offered by  fixed telecommunications, and to Internet and  digital TV 
becom ing the future platform s for m ultim edia services.
M ultim edia is defined as the convergence of image, sound and text all 
being delivered through a single w ire due to digitalisation, w hich has m ade it 
technically possible to transm it a vast am ount of information.26
M ore definitions involve term s such as 'digital data networks,' 'Internet' and 
'infrastructure.' Digital data netw orks are 'virtual' netw orks giving the im pression 
of being one single network, b u t are in reality ow ned and operated by different 
persons, a phenom enon intensified due to the liberalisation of infrastructure. 27
D ata netw orks are supported by physical infrastructure, which can be 
cable, copper wire, fibre optic or microwaves (as in the case of satellite 
transmission). Above this physical layer there is a data netw ork, being an 
indefinite num ber of com puters being interconnected and transm itting messages 
the one to the other by making a copy of the message at each com puter that goes 
through until, it reaches its final destination. These copies m ay take even hours to 
be transm itted in the next com puter.28
26 Cameron, J. (1998) "Patents, copyright, trademarks, and literary property course handbook 
series' 507 Practicing Law Institute 919-945.
27 ibid.
28 Millard, C. (1996) "A European perspective" 14 John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information 
Law 269-294.
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The m odel described perfectly fits the function of Internet, which is 
operated by  service providers that lease lines from telecommunications 
incum bents, hence the bulk of m y case studies are taken from  Internet regulation, 
as it represents a unique example of decentralised organisation and  a prom inent 
com ponent of the em erging inform ation society.
12
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A. CONCEPTUALISING REGULATION
1. From the regulatory state to the post-regulatory model of 
governance?
Various theoretical m odels lend themselves as a conceptual lens in order 
to understand the function of the EU, the role of the European Commission, and 
the proper character of regulatory law. For example, Majone has described the 
EU as a regulatory state,29 w ith  a view to understand its function in the context of 
the prom otion of the efficient m anagem ent of m arkets, intervening to correct 
m arket failures.
The EU is viewed as having lim ited powers, as it does not have the budget 
and  bureaucratic organisation to im pose policies. Hence, its pow er is restricted in 
the overseeing of selected spheres of competence such as economic and social 
regulation. For this reason, it is thought to be different than m odem  states, and in 
fact as being incapable of becom ing a m odern state organised around traditional 
models of democracy. Its function is technocratic and  its organisation should 
rem ain non-majoritarian.30
In Majone's conceptualisation of regulatory state, the latter abstains form 
the redistribution of resources.31 There is one single will, one interest: The
29 Majone note 23 above.
30 On these issues also see Moran, L. (2002) 'Review article: Understanding the regulatory state' 32 
British Journal of Political Science 391-413; Grabosky, P. N. (1995) 'Using non-governmental 
resources to foster regulatory compliance' 8 Governance 527-550.
31 Majone note 23 above.
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efficient function of markets. The adm inistration is above political considerations, 
and law is neutral and technical.32
However, this m odel is contested and looking at the function of 
committees is im portant to come to grips w ith the possibility of an  array of views 
about w hat the EU should be and w ho should participate in the m aking of 
regulatory laws and policies, struggling for recognition.33 'Comitology' 
committees in particular are established to ensure tha t M ember States keep an 
eye on the adm inistration in the course of im plem enting legislation. This m ay 
result in bringing in M ember States' view  of w hat constitutes a regulatory 
problem .34
Expertise is also draw n from a variety of committees apart from the 
comitology ones. Industry  bodies such as the European Industrialists 
Roundtable35 and w orking groups, such as the one supporting the use of open
32 ibid.
33 Vos, E. (1997) 'The rise of committees' 3 European Law Journal 210-229.
34 ibid. In this instance, the European Commission exercises its executive power to implement 
legislation. Such power is delegated by the Council and the European Parliament, but comitology 
committees, where Member States representatives sit, have to be consulted to keep an eye on the 
conduct of the European Commission. Comitology has been criticised as, issues which could have 
been debated in the Council (and the Parliament where appropriate), may have been 'baptised' 
technical and thus not debated. The European Commission has been further exposed to criticism, 
as commentators noted that its 2001 White Paper on Governance essentially proposes to 
substantially abandon comitology in favour of greater power to itself, see White Paper on 
Governance COM (2001) 428 Final available at http://europa.eu.int/eur- 
lex/en/com /cnc/2001/com 2001 0428en01.pdf, (web page visited on 20 May 2003). Critics of the 
White Paper have also noted that the proposals aim at placing greater dependence on 
independent agencies and thus implicitly suggest a shift towards more expert decision making 
within the control of the European Commission. However, the White Paper acknowledges that 
the initiation of regulatory policy can neither be only state-centred nor delegated to non­
governmental actors. For a critique of the White Paper on Governance see Scott, C. (2002) 'The 
governance of the European Union: The potential for multi-level control' 8 European Law 
Journal 59-79. There is a series of highly sceptical papers on the White Paper hosted on the EUI 
and Harvard web pages http: /  / www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01 /010601 .html, (web 
page visited on 14 May 2003).
35 Lawton, T. C. (2000) 'Uniting European industrial policy: A commission agenda for integration' 
in Nugent, N. (ed) (second ed 2000) A t the Heart of the Union: Studies of the European Commission
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source software, w here academics, software developers and  civil servants sit,36 
have actively participated in the shaping of regulatory policy. In this w ay 
unforeseeable risks are quickly identified and inform ation as to possible w ays to 
come up w ith  solutions is swiftly furnished.37
It appears then that the European Commission can no longer be view ed as 
efficiently m anaging economic affairs detached from the social milieu. Similarly, 
the adm inistration cannot be seen as the executor of legal m andates being 
constrained by the limits of constitutional and adm inistrative law. Real life 
adm inistration is highly perplexed, seeking to accom m odate various diverse 
views about the content of regulatory law  in conditions of scientific and 
economic uncertainty.38
The neo-functionalist thesis takes this latter poin t on board. It 
acknowledges a plethora of participant actors, bu t focuses on the possibility of a 
transfer of national loyalties from the national to the supranational level. In this 
context, the European adm inistration manifests the am algam ation of different 
national adm inistrative styles, which ultim ately supersede the national interest to 
serve European ideals, such as the creation of the single European m ark e t39
(Macmillan; St Martins), at p. 146. In the late 1980s, the European Industrialists Roundtable had 
considerable influence in the decision-making process in IT projects that were funded under 
ESPRIT and RACE, which focused on research in advanced communications and offered EU 
funding directed towards the development of new integrated digital telecommunication 
networks across the European Union.
36 http://eu.conecta.it/ee.htm, (web page visited on 14 May 2003).
37 Ladeur, H. K. (1997) 'The integration of scientific and technological expertise into the process of 
standard setting according to German law' in Joerges, C. et al (eds) (1997) Integrating Scientific 
Expertise into Regulatory Decision -Making (Baden-Baden: Nomos).
38 Everson note 14 above.
39 In European integration studies neo-functionalism is supported by Haas, B. E. (1958) The 
Uniting of Europe: Political, Economic and Social Forces, 1950 -  1957 (London: Stevens). Also see 
Shore, C. (2000) Building Europe, The Cultural Politics of European Integration (London: Routledge); 
Shore, C. (2001) 'European Union and the politics of culture' Bruges Group Occasional Paper No 42,
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W orking together to build  the single m arket w ould result in the 
developm ent of w orking practices im posing on recipients their logic, a European 
consciousness. In a nutshell, the aim  is to establish convergence and build  
consensus in the nam e of a European ideology. Therefore, netw orks of actors 
should be transparent and devoted to the m aking of regulatory law  genuinely 
oriented tow ards the European interest.40
Everson takes this point further by referring to H arlow 's w ork to argue 
that the adm inistrative legal discourse is increasingly accepting that the 
European polity is a space of play of diverse actors, thus the debate now  is 
w hether 'the European administration should be overseen by the detailed provisions of 
the Rechtstaat, the vaguer premises of the "common" rule of law, or the half-way codified 
house of an American type "Administrative Procedures Act".'
The above clearly recognises that the EU cannot longer be seen as a purely 
technocratic project, as there are m ultiple interests to be balanced.41 H ow  this
at http: /  / www.eurocritic.demon.co.uk/ppr43-2.htm, (web page visited on 14 May 2003); 
Egeberg, M. (1996) 'Organisation and nationality in the European Commission services' (1996) 3 
Public Administration 235-248; Spence, D. (1994) 'Staff and personnel policy in the Commission' in 
Edwards, G. and Spence, D. (eds) (1994) The European Commission (Harlow, UK: Longman Current 
Affairs).
40 Dehousse, R. (1997) 'Regulating by networks in the European Community: The role of 
European agencies' 4 Journal of Public Policy 246-255.
41 For the normative aspect of this process from the point of view of administrative law see 
Everson note 14 above, at p. 203. On these issues also see Harlow, C. (1996) 'Codification of EC 
administrative procedures? Fitting foot to the shoe or the shoe to the foot' 2 European Law Journal 
3-25 and Harlow, C. (2002) Accountability in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002). The problem is that the administration has little 'Constitutional' guidance from primary 
legislation (the EU Treaties), as to what the European public interest is in view of the increased 
politicisation of the European Union after Maastricht. In other words, there are competing 
interests to be balanced in the course of administering Europe, but how these should be balanced 
is not clearly provided in the Treaties. Everson notes that although Article 36 EC states the 
interest of Member States in social regulation, the four freedoms' direct economic integration, 
Article F (TEU) indirectly addresses the human right of fair administration, subsidiarity suggests 
that decisions should be made closer to the citizen and Articles 190 and 191 (EC) state that 
decisions should be well reasoned, these do not provide enough legal basis to direct
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should be done is not clearly provided in the Treaties, hence adm inistrative law 
should be concerned w ith  this problem.
Further contributing to the debate surrounding  the nature and role of 
regulatory law and of the European adm inistration, institutionalism  seeks to 
come to grips w ith  how  norm s encapsulated in institutional structures constrain 
and shape policy outcom es and regulatory decisions. Institutionalists conceive 
institutions as carrying values, often com peting ones, while law, formal 
organisations, unw ritten  norm s, all constrain action.42
M arkets and social norm s are also perceived as pow erful regulators of 
individual behaviour. For example, Reidenberg adopted  the term  'Lex Informatica'43 
to argue that technology im poses a set of rules that policy m akers should take into
administrative decision-making, thus leaving considerable space for discretion, see Everson at p. 
204.
42 For the historical institutionalist argument see Scott, C. (1995) 'Changing patterns of European 
community utilities law and policy: An institutional hypothesis' in Shaw, J. and More, G. (eds) 
(1995) New Legal Dynamics of European Union (New York: Clarendon Press), at p. 196. The author 
argues that within the historical institutionalist approach there is no agreed definition of the 
notion of institution, as it may entail formal organisations, informal rules and procedures. For an 
institutional analysis of the regulatory framework of privatised industries see Graham, C. and 
Prosser, T. (1991) Privatising Public Enterprises: Constitutions, the State and Regulation in Comparative 
Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press). The authors are concerned with the normative aspect of 
public law, understood as a structure constraining governments when implementing policy, but 
also accept the broad conceptualisation of government as encompassing various actors. Also see 
Prosser, T. (1999) 'Theorising utility regulation' 62 Modern Law Review 196-217, where the author 
argues that privatised industries, such as telecommunications, gas, and electricity, required 
constant regulatory intervention over many years by OFTEL, OFFER, and OFGAS, as the creation 
of truly competitive markets required breaking down the dominant market position of the 
incumbent firms. Prosser suggested that the principal-agent theory, as in a bilateral contractual 
relationship of one regulator and the regulatee, needs to be modified to include a variety of public 
and private actors involved, who interact on the basis of the constraints imposed by structures 
and in view of speculations as to what other players will do. For this approach on EU matters see 
Goldberg, D., Prosser, T. and Verhulst, S. (eds) (1989) Regulating the Changing Media: A  
Comparative Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press). In the same 
spirit, Gibbons looks at the regulation of the British media industry with a view to understand the 
processes informing decisions. Law is only one indicator to grasp the rationale behind regulation, 
while value systems and the processes of technological innovation should also be taken into 
account, see Gibbons, T. (second ed 1998) Regulating the Media (London: Sweet and Maxwell).
43 Reidenberg, J. (1998) 'The formulation of information policy rules through technology' 76 Texas 
Law Review 553-594. Also see Barlow note 2 above.
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account, as regulation is deem ed to fail in the event it is no t sensitive to them. 
Therefore, technology offers a set of potentialities, which frame policy m akers' 
choices.
The analysis of policy netw orks44 offers a new  understanding of governance 
alternative to hierarchies and markets. Prem ised on the assum ptions m ade by 
actor-centred institutionalism , it is based on the understanding  that netw orks are 
form ed to pursue com m on goals, while rational actors strive to maximise their 
preferences and to achieve certain policy outcomes.45 This school of thought seeks 
to explain the form ulation and im plem entation of policy by  looking at informal 
interactions between public and private actors, w ho strive to solve problems at a 
non-hierarchical level.
It is interesting to note that various studies on policy networks also stress 
the need to use a cognitive approach according to which, m em bers of a netw ork
44 A policy network is comprised of a number of actors who share common interests and 
exchange resources to pursue them, acknowledging that co-operation is the best way to achieve 
common goals, see Borzel, T. A. (1997) 'What's so special about policy networks? -  An 
exploration of the concept and its usefulness in studying European governance' European 
Integration Online Papers (EIoP) No 16, Florence: European University Institute, available at 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-016a.htm. Policy networks are best understood as 'webs of 
relatively stable and ongoing relationships which mobilise and pool dispersed resources so that collective (or 
parallel) action can be orchestrated toward the solution of a common policy,' see Kenis, P. and Schneider, 
V. (1991) 'Policy networks and policy analysis: Scrutinising a new analytical toolbox' in Marin, B. 
and Mayntz, R. (eds) (1991) Policy Networks - Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations 
(Frankfurt/M.: Campus), at p. 36.
45 Works on European governance using policy networks as an analytical tool to study the 
relationship between the European Commission and national and transnational interest groups, 
include: Peterson, J. (1992) 'The European technology community. Policy networks in a 
supranational setting' in Marsh, D. and Rhodes, R. A. W. (eds) (1992) Policy Networks in British 
Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press; Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press); Sandholtz, 
W. (1992) High-tech Europe. The Politics of International Cooperation (Berkeley: University of 
California Press); Mazey, S. and Richardson, J. (eds) (1993) Lobbying in the European Union 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press); Kohler-Kock, B. (1996) 'Catching up with change: 
The transformation of governance in the European Union' 3 Journal of European Public Policy 359- 
380 (Supplement); Christiansen, T. (1994) ’European integration between political science and 
international relations theory: The end of sovereignty* European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) No 
4, Florence: European University Institute.
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share collective ideas and values and seek to influence policy outcomes according 
to these.46
The central preoccupation of all of the above approaches is that the role of 
regulatory law and of the European Com m ission as a regulator is currently under 
transform ation. Against this background, Hancher and M oran argue that 
economic regulation of m arkets under advanced capitalism  is characterised by 
the interdependence of pow erful organisations.47 These organisations can no longer 
be thought to be confined in the realm  of a private sphere, as they increasingly 
fulfil public functions. In the same spirit, Ayres and  Braithwaite argue for the 
inclusion of interest groups in the processes of form ing regulatory proposals.48
In adopting this view, a pluralist conceptualisation of regulation as being 
the product of 'private governments/  such as corporations, is prom oted.49 
Regulatory law then should be sensitive to their needs. Black's discussion on 
'decentred' forms of regulation50 draw s attention to the fact that there is no clear 
distinction betw een the public and private sphere, in view of the complexity and
46 Sabatier, P. and Hank, C. (eds) (1993) Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach 
(Boulder; Colo: Westview Press); Singer, O. (1990) 'Policy communities and discourse coalitions. 
The role of policy analysis in economic policy making' 11 Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization 
428-458.
47 Hancher, L. and Moran, M. (1989) Capitalism, Culture and Economic Regulation (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press).
48 Ayres and Braithwaite note 15 above; Freeman, J. (1996) 'Collaborative governance in the 
administrative state' 45 UCLA Law Review 1-98, arguing that what is exactly included in such 
'reinvention' of regulatory mechanisms is quite ambiguous, but calling for the inclusion of 
interested parties. Also see Breyer, S. (1993) Breaking the Vicious circle: Towards Effective Risk 
Regulation (Harvard University Press); Ackerman, B. and Stewart, R. (1985) 'Reforming 
environmental law' 37 Stanford Law Review 1333-1367.
49 Hancher and Moran note 47 above.
50 Black note 10 above. Also see Scott, C. (2002) 'Private regulation of the public sector: A 
neglected facet of contemporary governance' 29 Journal of Law and Society 56-76; Black, J. (2001) 
'Decentring regulation: The role of regulation and self-regulation in a ’post-regulatory’ world' 
Current Legal Problems 103-146; Grabosky, P. N. (1995) 'Using non-governmental resources to 
foster regulatory compliance' 8 Governance 527-550; Gunningham, N. and Grabosky, P. N. (1998) 
Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
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fragm entation characteristic of m odem  societies, being the result of a variety  of 
legal norm s, actors, netw orks or differentiated systems, all being interconnected 
w ithin the European polity.
Interdependencies exist as no single actor has enough inform ation to 
effectively pursue its interest. Similarly, no regulatory law can effectively in trude 
other autonom ous social systems in a direct w ay, as it cannot fully com prehend 
system s' internal m ode of functioning. M oreover, netw orks have their ow n 
understanding of w hat a regulatory problem  is and  w hat solution is required 
based upon shared classificatory schemes constructing a culturally inform ed 
point of view. Therefore, regulatory law  should be engaged w ith  steering activity 
rather than im posing goals.51
This is crucial in  a w orld characterised by increased scientific uncertainty 
requiring the co-operation of the adm inistration w ith  private forces in  order to 
come up  w ith decisions inform ing regulatory policy and im plem entation. This 
understanding further provides the background feeding into current debates as 
to the nature of global governance.52 To this effect, a variety of instrum ents, other 
than com m and and control rules, should be p u t in place, such as non-binding 
soft law.53
A decentralised approach to regulation rem inds us that law  need no t only 
be initiated by a central governm ent, bu t also by the internal codes of conduct of
51 Scott, C. (2003) 'Regulation in the age of governance: The rise of the post-regulatory state' in 
Jordana, J. and Levy-Faur, D. (2003) The Politics of Regulation (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).
52 ibid. According to the author, the debate surrounding global governance generally links to the 
possibility of creating autonomous legal orders, see Held, D. (2002) 'Law of states, law of peoples' 
8 Legal Theory 1-44. It also reflects the fear that undemocratic structures of governance may 
emerge, see Weiss, L. (1998) The M yth of the Powerless State (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).
53 ibid.
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groups, netw orks and systems, self-regulating their conduct. For example, 
Consum ers International, a non-governm ental organisation (NGO), created a 
Consumer Charter for Global Business in  1997.54 Standardised contractual 
agreem ents can play the same ro le .55
Nevertheless, m ost of the time such internal codes of conduct require 
some form  of state assistance. Contractual rules are set by the parties, b u t state 
laws have to regulate their enforcement, as it m ay prove to be problem atic. To 
illustrate this, although the industry strived to develop software codes placed 
inside software aim ing at rendering illegal copying of DVDs m ore difficult, 
individuals m anaged to crack these codes, proving that hierarchical assistance is 
required, as technical solutions are not enough.
The above discussion on alternative and decentred forms of regulation 
further links to the dem and to create forum s for discussion, in order to effectively 
enable the participation of a m ultitude of actors.56 In such forum s each 
stakeholder will come to understand the concerns of others, as long as they are 
positively engaged in taking her interests into account.57 The following will 
further elaborate on the theoretical underpinnings of all the above propositions.
54 European Internet foundation (EIF) Soft Law Working Group, 'Governance and Regulation for 
the Digital Age: Issues and Choices for Europe' (2001) Preliminary Consultation Document, 
rapporteur for the European Commission C. Scott, at p. 6.
55 As regards the use of contract in particular, see Daintith, T. (1979) 'Regulation by contract: The 
new prerogative' Current Legal Problems 42-64; Vincent-Jones, P. (2002) 'Regulating government 
by contract: Towards a public law framework?' 65 M odem Law Review 611-628; Macaulay, S. 
(1963) 'Non-contractual relations in business: A preliminary study' 28 American Sociological Review  
55-83.
56 Ayres and Braithwaite note 15 above.
57 Dunlop, J. (1984) Dispute Resolution: Negotiation and Consensus Building (Auburn Publishing, 
Dover, Massachusetts); Harter, P. (1997) 'Fear of commitment: An affliction of adolescents' 46 
Duke Law Journal 1389-1423; Freeman note 48 above; Shearing, C. (1993) 'A constitutive conception 
of regulation' in P Grabowsky, P. and Braithwaite, J. (eds) (1993) Business Regulation and 
Australia's Future (Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology).
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2. Teubner and Foucault: Decentralised regulation and systems of 
control
The previous section engaged in dem onstrating that regulation occurs in 
m any different loci, as anthropologists have established long ago.58 To support 
this position, scholars w orking on regulation are inspired by various theoretical 
traditions, such as structuralism  and post-structuralism . Regulatory law  should 
then be concerned w ith  how  communities and  systems interact w ith  their 
environm ent, while acknowledging that formal law  is only one out of various 
instrum ents regulating conduct.
Teubner's norm ative conceptualisation of law  is a prim e source of 
inspiration feeding into the decentred approach. Teubner is concerned w ith  the 
harm s of com m and and control rules controlling and  upsetting the conduct of 
autonom ous social systems in a w orld characterised by  complexity, 
differentiation and com m unication.59 Regulatory failures are attributed to the 
insensitive intrusion of com m and and control rules to other social systems, 
resulting in the problem atic com m unication of the m eaning of such rules, a 
position inspired by Luhm ann's social theory.
U nderstanding how  m eaning is com m unicated requires coming to grips 
w ith  the role of the binary code of a system  in channelling com m unication.60
Codes are like generalised symbols, as m oney and law  are. For such a generalised
58 For anthropological research on regulation see in particular Nader, L. and Nader, C. (1985) 'A 
wide angle on regulation: An anthropological perspective' in Noll R. (ed) (1985) Regulatory Policy 
and the Social Sciences (Berkeley: University of California Press).
59 Teubner reminds us that Luhmann, by positioning the act of communication at the heart of a 
social system, moves away from rules and institutions.
60 Luhmann, N. (1979) Trust and Power (Chichester: Wiley).
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symbol to become the binary code of a system, it w ould have to be capable of 
processing inform ation, react to internal and external conditions, differentiate 
from other systems and sim ultaneously contain the necessary richness and 
flexibility to com m unicate w ith  them .61
The legal system is a netw ork of legal acts framed by  the legal/illegal 
binary code, and law  is understood as in the com m unication of legislative events 
taking place inside the system, fram ed by rules and  the binary code. Such events 
include not only state centred com m unicative acts, bu t also private contracts and 
unw ritten  codes of conduct.62
Teubner m akes a parallelism  w ith  the game of chess to explain that if it is 
view ed as an autopoietic system, then the focus of analysis is on the m ove and 
the chain of moves being fram ed by rules, and not on the rules themselves. 
Therefore, this is an ever-changing process as com m unicative acts create new 
structures and  vice versa.63
As for the processes of com m unication w ith  other systems, these cannot 
in trude directly each other's space, yet it is by ongoing processes of structural 
coupling that m eaning is re-constructed.64 Structural coupling is an  institutional 
overlapping created, for example, by events, legislative processes, and  systems of
61 Luhmann, N. (1995) Social Systems (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, orig. 1984).
62 Teubner, G. (1992) 'The two faces of Janus: Rethinking legal pluralism' 13 Cardozo Law Review 
1443- 1462.
63 Teubner, G. (ed), (1987) Autopoietic Law: A  New Approach to Lazo and Society (Berlin: de Gruyter). 
For the analogy of chess with law see
http://is.lse.ac.uk/complexity/StudyGroups/report97june.htm, (web page visited on 14 May 
2003).
64 Teubner note 62 above; Luhmann, N. (1992) 'Operational closure and structural coupling: The 
differentiation of the legal system' 13 Cardozo Law Review 1419-1441; Teubner, G. (1993) Law as an 
Autopoietic System  (Oxford, UK; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell Publishers); Teubner, G. 
(1989) 'How the law thinks: Toward a constructivist epistemology of law' 23 Law and Society 
Review 727-757.
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negotiation. The existence of such interdependencies creates interrelations 
leading to evolution.
As for the legal system in particular, it m ay not be feasible to fully 
construct the social m eaning originally com m unicated in the course of legal 
interpretation, as a second order observation65 is accompanied by a reduction of 
complexity. In the light of the required reconstruction of the m eaning of 
com m unication, any intervention into a different social system  should take into 
account the internal rules regulating its function, as external 'noise' has to be first 
interpreted. To engage in such reconstruction, law relies on sub-systems to 
furnish inform ation, for example by m eans of risk assessments produced by 
scientific committees.
Albeit the im portant contribution of Teubner's theory in understanding 
regulatory law  as a social phenom enon, the problem  in this account is that 
individuality disappears under the w eight of the logic of the system, the latter 
determ ining com m unication.66 Individuals are only understood as psychic 
systems consisting of a self-referential set of conscious states, caught in 
interaction w ith  social systems, which is regulated by a b inary  code and is 
conducted through observation.
65 Observations of the first order are directly about the object of observation. Observations of the 
second order are ways of communicating systematically about observations of the first order, them 
being observations of observations. Law is an example of such a second order observation, see 
Patterson, J. and Teubner, G. (1998) 'Changing maps: Empirical legal autopoiesis' 7 Social and 
Legal Studies 451-486.
66 Weisberg, R. (1992) 'Autopoiesis and positivism' 13 Cardozo Law Review 1693-1728; Wolfe, A. 
(1992) 'Sociological theory in the absence of people: The limits of Luhmann’s systems theory' 13 
Cardozo Law Review 1729-1743. For a different criticism see Goodrich P. (1999) 'Anti-Teubner: 
Autopoiesis, paradox, and the theory of law’ 13 Social Epistemology 197-235.
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Still, is it possible that all individuals, judges or regulators, respond in the 
same w ay w hen a system  functions and communicates meaning? Is it realistic to 
assum e that all civil servants w orking for the European adm inistration 
understand  a regulatory problem  and respond to it in the same way? Are there 
com peting visions of the binary code?
In other w ords, is it possible for the true /fa lse  code or the legal/illegal 
code to be interpreted in various w ays inside the very same system?67 If yes, 
why? Can we, hum ans challenge the binary code? If yes, why? U nder w hat 
circumstances? W hat is the effect of the binary code upon individuals' lives if it is 
no t challenged?
In Teubner's norm ative conceptualisation of systems theory, law  should 
operate as an 'external constitution' prom oting consensus-building, procedures of 
negotiation and  decision-making. However, can procedures be neutral?68 W hen 
procedures com m unicate information, can it be neutral? Is, for example, a 
scientific assessment neutral? Are there com peting visions of w hat a scientific 
assessment is and w hat it should contain?
Teubner argues that a move from  substantial to m ore procedural and 
flexible regulatory instrum ents should be m ade, by means of information, 
participatory rights and  the uses of expertise. In this respect, Teubner's position
67 Capps, P. and Olsen, H. P. (2002) 'Legal autonomy and reflexive rationality in modem societies' 
11 Social and Legal Studies 521-552. Also see Wolfe ibid.
68 Black, J. (2000) 'Proceduralizing regulation-Part I' 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 597-614.
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bears resemblances to Braithwaite's and Ayre's position, as they also emphasise 
reflexivity to allow for the co-operation of subsystems.69
In the same spirit, scholars like Shearing understand  law as the 
stabilisation of expectations following Luhm ann, hence, steering trust should be 
the concern of regulatory law, in view  of the character of m arkets, themselves 
largely relying upon trust and expectations.70 Therefore, pu tting  in place 
objective regulatory rules, in which parties w ould have confidence, is the 
prerequisite of using law  to further build trust on institutions such as markets.
This proposition is not unproblematic. Braithwaite and Ayres discuss the 
possibility of engaging interested parties in a fruitful conversation. This position 
assum es that all parties have equal am ounts of pow er to prom ote and finally 
have their view embraced by  regulation. However, are parties in a discussion 
forum  really equal participants and bearers of equivalent am ounts of bargaining 
power?
Can we discard the possibility of com m unication turning out to be 
difficult due to totally divergent conceptions of w hat a regulatory problem  is and 
how  it should be treated? W hat if an interested party  holds a view deeply
69 This is pointed by Moran, see Moran note 30 above. For a criticism of consensus building, 
which touches on the problems of power asymmetries and the possibility of the lowest common 
denominator being agreed in such forums see Rossi, J. (1997) 'Participation run amok: The costs of 
mass participation for deliberative agency decisionmaking' 9 Northwestern University Law Review  
173-249; Harrison, K. (1998) 'Talking with the donkey: Cooperative approaches to environmental 
protection' 2 Journal of Industrial Ecology 51-72; Rescher, N. (1993) Pluralism: Against the Demand for 
Consensus (Clarendon Press, Oxford); For a review of problems see Coglianese, C. (1997) 
'Assessing consensus: The promise and performance of negotiated rulemaking' 46 Duke Law 
Journal 255-1349; Coglianese, C. (2000) 'Is consensus an appropriate basis for regulatory policy?' 
in Orts, E. and Deketelaere, K. (eds) (2000) Environmental Contracts: Comparative Approaches to 
Regulatory Innovation in the United States and Europe (Kluwer Law International).
70 Shearing note 57 above.
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challenging em bedded and generally accepted views about the social world? 
Should it be included? Or should it be discarded as outrageous?
Finally, the assum ption that regulatory law  can be neutral begs m ore 
critical thinking. Is the steering of activity 'neutral'? Requiring agents to reflect 
over selected considerations and mobilise them  to find solutions to an identified 
regulatory problem  is not a neutral exercise. Identifying a regulatory problem  is a 
process loaded w ith  the discursive form ation of various disciplines encapsulated 
in benchm arks and assessments labelled as 'technocratic' and  'tedious management 
of everyday affairs.' For example, harm ful material on the w eb is thought to be a 
m ajor regulatory concern. Yet, how  did w e come to accept that this is a 
regulatory problem?
Com ing back to Shearing's proposition, even saying that trust m atters in 
the form ation of regulatory policies makes im portant assum ptions about our 
m ode of participating in the political milieu and form ing consensus, as it requires 
that w e belong in forums and networks. Being an 'insider' m atters m ore that ever.
By m eans of discarding the effects of power and the role of individuality in 
sustaining them, there are im portant implications for the conceptualisation of 
regulatory law.71 It m ay be that procedural law, despite its m andate to em pow er 
com m unities, and decentred regulation, regardless of its good intention to 
embrace m ultiple agents and opinions, fail to see the problem s inherent in any 
attem pt to separate procedures form norm s, unsuccessfully discuss the problem  
of pow er being unequally distributed in a forum  of discussion and do not 
question the possibility that agents' action m ay not always be rational.
71 In Luhmann's framework power is only tied to the political system.
27
The European Commission and the Construction of Information Society
3. Reading Teubner in the light of Foucault
I here seek to look in a critical w ay at the proposition that regulatory law 
can be objective, em pow ering communities and neutrally m ediating to steer 
activity by m eans of looking at Foucault's understanding of regulation.
Foucault rem inds us that the discursive understanding of history opens up  
the possibility of casting a critical eye on the pow er relations inherent in the 
m eaning of scientific and legal concepts embraced by regulation, thus helps us 
think of it as being the product of history, w hile unveiling the w ays pow er 
operates in disguise.
In the same spirit, Foucauldian inspired analysis draw s attention to that 
regulation, w hen understood as governance in the m ore general sense of 
ordering and controlling of social relations, should not be linked to the sovereign 
pow er of the sovereign ruler, as m anifested in the pow er to extract levies or 
im pose public punishm ent.
It draw s attention to the daily adm inistrative aspect of governing involved 
in the accum ulation of expertise and the im plem entation of rules. This is w hy 
'sovereign power' is not considered to play as im portant a role as 'disciplinary 
power,' w hich m ay emerge in the course of the everyday m anagem ent of public 
affairs and  in the discursive practices of know ledge and science. Foucault then 
views law  as being dependent on disciplines to furnish the know ledge claims it 
incorporates.72
72 Foucault, M. (1979) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Harmondsworth: Penguin, orig. 
1975); Gordon, C. (ed) (1980) M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 
1972-1977 (Brighton: Harvester Press); Bourdieu, P. "Social Space and Symbolic Power" in 
Bourdieu, P. (1990) In other Words. Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology (Oxford: Polity, orig. 1987).
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Surveillance, technical/operational assessments and regulation are the 
properties of disciplinary pow er, resulting in the production of obedient bodies. 
Hence, the study of governm ent, 'governmentality' puts em phasis on the historical 
conditions giving birth  to regulatory structures and on regulation as involving 
the reproduction of social understandings.73
Boyle's account of filters, used on the Internet to block harm ful material, 
as technologies of control is clearly inspired by  the Foucauldian position. He 
argues that, although filters are prom oted as 'value-neutral' technological systems, 
in reality this is a technology that inevitably supports a particular set of ideas and 
values, and excludes others.74
The very decision to treat harm ful m aterial as a regulatory problem  is an 
assessm ent m ade on the basis of the orthodox w ay to think about the notion 
'harmful.' Categorising content on TV as harm ful in order to m onitor children's 
and  teenagers' view ing habits implies that a set of statem ents as to w hat is 
appropriate and inappropriate viewing m onitors conduct. A nd although some 
interest groups' practice im ply the reproduction of the understanding that the 
web should be a free space of communication, this does no t seem to present us 
w ith  the orthodox w ay to think about the Internet.
The disciplinary power being embraced by law involves the normalisation of practices of whole 
populations at an everyday level. A study of such practices can be undertaken by means of 
looking at governmentality, in other words at how government has been made possible because of 
demographic changes resulting in the increase of population and the numerical calculability of 
subjects with the help of statistics and the emergence of the discipline of criminology, see 
Graham, B., Gordon, C. and Miller, P. (eds) (1991) The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality: 
With two Lectures By and an Interview With Michel Foucault (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf; 
Chicago University of Chicago Press).
73 For a work inspired by Foucault's thinking see Rose's work, Rose, N. S. (1999) Powers of 
Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
74 Boyle, J. (1997) 'Foucault in cyberspace: Surveillance, sovereignty, and hard-wired censors' 66 
University of Cincinnati Law Review 177-193.
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If one accepts the above, how  neutral are the procedures aim ing at 
steering activity? A nd how  unproblem atic is reflexive law? If one decides to 
em ploy a genealogical m ethod to uncover the ideas underlying (and excluded in) 
Teubner's framework, one w ould be required to look at the construction of 
notions and practices reproducing the belief in scientific objectivity, in the 
responsible em ancipated rational agent able to regulate itself, in law 's 
im partiality and neutrality, in the potential of consensus building am ongst agents 
w ith  a free will, in  the evils inherent in state control and the benefits of 
com m unity control and  regulation by means of tradition and  custom.
Looking at all these different statem ents w ould  result in the form ation of 
procedural justice as a novel object of s tudy  by m eans of uncovering the 
disciplinary effect of the underlying statem ents feeding into it. Population is 
again ordered and m anaged by means of constructing the responsible individual, 
w ho is view ed this tim e as having to participate in com m unities and networks, as 
if there is an ontological dem and for this.
Such a m anagem ent of population is particularly necessary in m odern 
societies w here governing becomes m ore difficult in view  of the scientific and 
technical complexity of issues upon which political decisions have to be m ade 
and due to the rationalisation of decision-making processes, as in the EU. 
Inform ation and its provision is crucial in order to regulate conduct, and while 
Teubner and Foucault agree on this point, the latter author rem inds us that 
inform ation links to pow er.75
75 Foucault argues that governmental rationality is bounded by its limited capacity to collect 
information and knowledge, Gordon C. (1991) 'Government rationality: An introduction' in
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Acquiring inform ation about a population is fundam ental, as it is by 
m eans of its rational m anagem ent that problem s are identified, assessed, 
categorised and then m onitored. The im portant step in the process of 
norm alisation is the identification of a social problem as a regulatory problem. This is 
because, once a problem  is identified, for example the need to categorise content 
on TV as harm ful in order to m onitor children's and teenagers' view ing habits, 
then a set of assum ptions is reproduced.
Such norm alisation need not be imposed by  a legal m easure sanctioning 
conduct, as there are indirect ways to steer activity. Regulatory instrum ents 
m ediating am ongst com m unities w ith the aim  of m aking them  act to solve an 
identified problem  m ay be an example of such indirect ways, as Foucault 
rem inds us that norm alisation is exercised in a decentralised m anner, and the fact 
that the norm ative content of m onitoring emerges from the codes of conduct of 
com m unities does not m ean that they do not have a norm alising effect. On the 
contrary.
To sum m arise the argum ent, the role of regulatory law  and of the 
European Commission as a regulator is currently under transform ation. There 
are alternative m eans to regulate social conduct than state law  and the European 
Com m ission appears not to be the sole agent active in the process of regulating. 
However, regulatory law  has not evolved to an unproblem atic, value neutral 
instrum ent. Coming to grips w ith  its nature, function and social im pact requires 
addressing in a critical w ay various questions.
Burchell, G., Gordon, C. and Miller, P. (eds) (1991) The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality; 
with Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf; 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
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4. Rethinking decentralised forms of regulation: A disguise of 
control?
Can w e design neutral procedures that w ould  facilitate the participation of 
interest groups, or is it difficult to actually separate procedures from  norm s?76 
W hat is the role of the European Commission? Is it m erely an arena for the 
com petition of societal interests, or does it pursue its ow n interests?77 If the 
European Com m ission pursues its interests, w hat are they? Can w e escape the 
determ inistic understanding of agents as pursuing  pre-defined goals? In a 
nutshell, can w e do aw ay w ith the limits of intentionality, neutrality  and 
objectivity?
If yes, then w hat are the implications for conceptualising alternative, 
heterarchical, m odes of regulation, w here the collection and  m anipulation of 
inform ation by  the adm inistration is crucial, especially w hen such decentred 
instrum ents aim  at regulating a decentralised m edium , such as the Internet, where 
inform ation, free and proprietary, is at the heart of its operation?
The argument
Bourdieu argues that action can be described in term s of the forms of 
capital people have access to, use, preserve or maximise in  different social 
fields 78 To reform ulate the above, capital, in other w ords pow er, can take several
76 Black and Boyle have already pointed to the difficulty inherent in such a separation. See Black 
note 68 above and Boyle note 74 and 1 above.
77 For a similar view see Kohler-Koch note 45 above.
78 Bourdieu, P. (1986) 'The forms of capital' in Richardson, J. G. (ed) (1986) Handbook of Theory and 
Research for the Sociology of Education (New York: Greenwood Press), at p. 241-258; Bourdieu, P. 
(1991) Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge: Polity in association with Basil Blackwell, orig. 
1977-1984).
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forms according to the context it operates. For example, as Bourdieu notes, 
studying the field of 'bureaucracy' shows that governm ents have various forms of 
capital, such as 'juridical' capital, 'informational' capital, 'economic' capital and 
above all 'symbolic' capital.79
In simple w ords, the argum ent is that the above represent the resources at 
hand, while the m ain 'strategy' deployed by bureaucracies, is to preserve or 
maximise these very resources. W hen form ing regulatory proposals and 
im plem enting laws relating to the regulation of inform ation society, agents, 
public servants w orking for a certain Directorate General (DG),80 try  to preserve 
or maximise capital, m aintain or enhance power.
M oreover, capital only presents potentialities, w hich have to be appreciated 
through m inds, through cognitive taxonomies developed in the course of 
upbringing and interacting in particular settings. These m odes of perception and 
appreciation are term ed by Bourdieu as habitus. Action then is understood as 
being both in bodies, (habitus, dispositions) and in institutions (fields, spaces of 
positions), thus overcom ing the dichotom y of action and structure.81
In a nutshell, em ploying Bourdieu's fram ew ork seeks to conceptualise the 
form ation of regulatory proposals and im plem entation of laws as a process in the 
course of w hich various DGs of the European Com m ission strive to maximise 
their position as a major think tank in a w ay com patible to institutionalised
79 Bourdieu, P. (1994) 'Rethinking the state: Genesis and structure of the bureaucratic field' 12 
Sociological Theory 1-18, at p. 5-10.
80 The DGs mostly relevant to Internet regulation are: DG Competition, Information Society, 
Research, Internal market, Enterprise, Justice and Home Affairs.
81 Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L. (1992) An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press), at p. 262.
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practices a n d /o r  individual cognitive understandings, while caught in 
interaction w ith  other agents inhabiting different fields of activity.
These agents also strive to influence regulation according to em bedded 
cognitive classifications about the social w orld. This is the field of struggles, 
defined as a space of play w ithin w hich the EU adm inistration and  affected 
groups strive to im pose a definition of 'regulation.'
Against this background, the thesis advanced in the following chapters is 
that Bourdieu' theory of action provides the theoretical tools allow ing for a 
conceptualisation of regulatory law  as being the result of the organisation of 
social forces ultim ately struggling to im pose a vision about the role of regulation.
Such an approach implies an analysis that focuses on the becoming of the 
construction of visions of the social w orld82 that legitimise change and the role of 
objective positions and agents' dispositions in this process. Hence, regulatory law 
can never be neutral, b u t encapsulates a vision. It can never be static, bu t is 
constantly subject to transform ation, m anifesting a tem porary crystallisation of
82 Becoming is a term used in philosophy to denote the open-ended understanding of things under 
observation (assuming that reality makes and unmakes itself all the time) as opposed to the 
philosophy of being, which seeks to discover the eternal essence of things. In ancient Greek 
philosophy this tension was depicted in the opposition between the Heracletian philosophy, which 
argued that change is the real essence of things and continuity a false impression (a famous 
aphorism by Heracletus is 'one does not go into the same river twice') and Eleates who positioned the 
essence of things in continuity and considered change as a false impression. Grosz situates 
Nietzsche, Bergson, Deleuze, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, Foucault Klossowski and 
Darwin amongst the thinkers who strove to conceptualise the world as open-ended, see Grosz, E. 
(ed) (1999) Becomings: Explorations in Time, Memory and Futures (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 
at p. 3. By using the term becoming I here argue that Bourdieu is part of the same intellectual 
tradition with the above-mentioned thinkers. It is important to understand that in Bourdieu's 
framework power is not a property of institutions, is not conceptualised as power in potentia as in 
Hegel, but has to be manifested. In this way Bourdieu adopts a Foucauldian and Nietzschean 
conceptualisation of power, as it is only by means of studying the effects of power, what it does, that 
it can be subjected to critique, see Hardt, M. (1993) G. Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). This is how the Nietzschean, Foucauldian and 
Bourdieusian perspective of power is, for example, different than Giddens' understanding of 
power, who views it as a property of agents, and not as a discursive formation.
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pow er relations. It is neither the product of a regulator detached form  the social 
m ilieu nor the creation of knowledgeable agents rationally pursu ing  their 
interests, as m ost of the time agents reproduce their taken for granted vision of 
the social w orld, owing its existence to cognitive schemas m aking action 
m eaningful.
W hat is m ore natural for someone w ith  legal training than the belief that 
the legal system  and legal institutions are effective? Or, that solutions to social 
problem s can be effectively, neutrally and objectively form ed by referring to legal 
texts and  precedent, hence losing sight of assum ptions reproduced in such 
docum ents, such as the im portance of property  or gender roles?
Therefore, regulatory law is assum ed to be a challenging and  interesting 
object of study  exactly because it encapsulates a set of values characteristic of a 
certain era in history. It is interesting because it gives us the opportun ity  to study 
the instances w hen such classificatory schemes are challenged by  groups, w ho 
w ant to have a say on regulation, have their vision of the w orld  supported  by 
regulatory law.
In other w ords, its fascinating character emerges as a result of the 
incorporation of instances of successful shifts of dom inant classifications. This is 
an enquiry that neither focuses on structures nor on agents, bu t on the process of 
com m unication am ongst these.
In a nutshell, regulatory law is thought to be the outcom e of the conflict 
and com position of a field of social forces characterised by internal antagonism s. 
As such, social institutions and value systems are always open to restructuring
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and  destruction by means of looking at the process of the actualisation of power 
relations in a field of possibilities. The following will explore this theoretical 
proposition.
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B. BOURDIEU'S THEORY OF ACTION FROM A PROCESSUAL
PERSPECTIVE
1. Habitus, field, capital: Some preliminary definitions
Bourdieu's theory of action seeks to resolve problem s relating to 
experience and intention by m eans of habitus. On the one hand, the objectivist 
moment constitutes structural constraints as in potential forms of pow er, and on 
the other hand  the subjectivist moment as in taxonomies crystallised in m inds, in 
Bourdieu's w ords habitus, refers to the process of actualisation of these 
potentialities. Therefore, these two m om ents stand in a dialectic relation, the one 
constantly com m unicating w ith the other in order to produce action.83
Bourdieu's focus of analysis is neither on the objectivist nor on the subjectivist 
m om ent. The focus of analysis is on the processes of com m unication betw een 
objective and  subjective positions, on the possibility of structures being re­
structured, pow er relations being reshaped, and hum an m inds being open to 
new  experience.
Bourdieu used the concept of habitus in an attem pt to 'render obsolete the 
antinomies presented by finalism and mechanism, explanations by reason, explanations 
by causes, conscious/unconscious, rational and strategic calculation and mechanical
83 Bourdieu, P. 'The dialectic of objectification and embodiment' in Bourdieu, P. (1977) Outline of a 
Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, orig. 1972); Bourdieu, P. (1993) The 
Field of Cultural Production: Essays on A rt and Literature (Cambridge: Polity Press, orig. 1992).
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submission to mechanical constraints, etcZ84 hence, the notion of habitus provides 
the theoretical tools to bring together both  contradictory positions.85
H abitus is 'the feel for the game (sens pratique), intentionality without intention, 
which functions as the principle of strategies devoid of strategic design, without rational 
computation and without the conscious positing ends.'86 In this sense, w hile recourse 
to rational pursu it of interests is a possibility, as utilitarian theorists w ould  argue, 
it is not the rule governing action, as 'we are empirical.'87 Hence, 'we have a break 
with the utilitarian theory, with which the concept of interest is commonly associated'88 
as 'the human mind is socially bounded, socially structure. '89
To exemplify this, Bourdieu w ould  argue that the civil servants w orking 
for the DGs engaging in forming proposals and im plem enting law s m ost of the 
tim e understand a regulatory problem  through the lenses of their juridico- 
administrative habitus. The adm inistration forms legal argum ents by  m eans of 
em ploying the right legal reasoning based on the right legal sources and 
providing expertise by means of reliable scientific data.
As for the juridical aspect, its principal characteristic is that legal 
argum ents are constructed as if their rationale is purely internal to law, and  the
84 Bourdieu, P. (1990) In other Words. Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology (Oxford: Polity, orig. 
1987), at p. 107.
85 ibid. at p. 125.
86 ibid. at p.107.
87 ibid. citing Leibniz.
88 ibid. The pursuit of the happy utilitarian society is to be achieved through the pursuit of 
happiness by individuals, while the happiness of individuals is to be achieved in part by their 
pursuit of general happiness. For more on this see Sen, K. A. (1977) 'Rational fools: A critique of 
the behavioural foundations of economic theory' 1 Philosophy and Public Affairs 317-344, at p. 319. 
The author rejects the view that action conforming to the interests of the agent who performs it is 
guided by the conscious and deliberate search for the satisfaction of this interest posited as an 
end. On the contrary, rational action is understood as being itself constructed. Rationality is 
bounded not because the available information and the human mind are limited, but because the 
human mind is socially constructed.
89 Bourdieu and Wacquant note 81 above, at p. 126.
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adm inistrator is form ing them  by virtue of studying law books, codes and case 
law, hence disguising 'the violence and destruction of his own actions/90 anchored in 
the reproduction of a set of assum ptions, w hich go w ithout saying.
Codification, form alisation and system atisation are crucial to create this 
effect, while agents in the field lose sight of their role in m aking the social world, 
as they view their conduct being solely directed by  legal doctrine and  scientific 
data. If one accepts that m ost of the time people do w hat is norm al to do 
reproducing common practices and taken for granted views of the w orld , it is not 
surprising that interest groups in consultation w ith  the European Com m ission 
com plain that civil servants do not understand their argum ents, as they fail to see 
the socio-economic implications of their proposals, while phrasing argum ents in 
obscure legal language and legal doctrine that makes no sense to them .91
However, habitus should not be understood as im plying fatalism .92 It is 
constantly subjected to experience, and therefore constantly transform ed by it. In 
this context Bourdieu's theory of practice is 'against positivistic materialism, as it 
furthers the argument that objects of knowledge are constructed, and not passively 
recorded, against intellectualist idealism, as it reminds us that the principle of this 
construction is found in the socially constituted system of structured and structuring 
dispositions acquired in practice and constantly aimed at practical functions. '93
90 Schlag, P. (1995) 'Law and the postmodern mind: Intellectualism' 16 Cardozo Law Revieiv H i­
l l  18, referring to his 1995 work, Schlag, P. (1993) 'Clerks in the maze' 91 Michigan Law Review 
2053-2069, and Cover's work, Cover, R. M. (1983) The Supreme Court, 1982 term - Foreword: 
Nomos and narrative' 97 Harvard Law Review 4-25. In these works Schlag discusses the role of the 
judge.
91 http: /  /swpat.ffii.org/players/index.en.html, (web page visited on 14 May 2003).
92 Bourdieu and Wacquant note 81 above, at p. 133.
93 ibid, at p. 121.
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Additionally, there is not a single pattern  of perception for all agents in the 
European Commission. Structural patterns of thinking about the social w orld 
m ay be derived from  the legal habitus, and  thus m ay be concerned w ith 
prom oting harm onisation, legal certainty and continuity. A lternatively, since the 
European Commission is staffed w ith  civil servants w ith  diverse professional, 
national, and educational backgrounds, it m ay be that agents in the field have 
various classificatory schemes, various w ays of thinking about a regulatory 
problem.
M oreover, interaction im poses a w ay of thinking, as in its course 
conceptions as to w ho is an insider and w ho is an outsider, w hose perform ance is 
successful and whose acts are celebrated, im pose a w ay of thinking by  m eans of 
im posing roles which should be perform ed, as interactionists taught us.94
2. Bourdieu and the multiplicity of organisation
Bourdieu's concept of habitus has been criticised as im plying rigid 
determ inism , leaving no place to accommodate the notion of social change and 
collapsing into objectivism, since the rationale behind agents' actions is found in 
the internalisation of objective structures in the bodies of individuals. In this 
context, Bourdieu has been attacked for subordinating agents to objective
94 Goffman, E. (1967) Interaction Ritual: Essays in Face-to-Face Behavior (London; Chicago: The 
Penguin Press: Aldine), at p. 4-45; Goffman, E. (1959) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New 
York: Doubleday; London: Mayflower); Mead, G. H. (1967) Mind, Self and Society: From the 
Standpoint of a Social Behaviourist (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, orig. 1934).
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structures, since the concept of habitus requires that agents do w hat is norm al to 
do, w ithout consciously m astering the content of their action.95
Nonetheless, other com m entators note how  Bourdieu's theory of practice96 
presents us w ith a genuine example of an attem pt to bridge the gap betw een 
objectivism and subjectivism,97 while it has also been argued that there are two 
strands in his social theory, one devoted to a theory of practice, w hich manages 
to overcome determ inism , and a second that points to the concept of habitus and 
thus falls back to objectivism 98
It is true that in Bourdieu's fram ework action is trapped in regularities and 
constraints, yet by describing the circumstances that lead to the genesis of the 
thing under observation, he provides the tools for looking into structuring and 
restructuring, as a continuous process of organisation and  disorganisation.
Therefore, his critics' m istake is that they separate action from m ovem ent 
in Bourdieu's theoretical framework. They are right in observing the statics that
95 For a review of the various interpretations of Bourdieu's work, see King, A. (2000) 'Thinking 
Bourdieu against Bourdieu: A practical critique of the habitus' 18 Sociological Theory 417-434. For 
authors who have criticised Bourdieu's concept of habitus see DiMaggio, P. J. (1979) 'A review 
essay: On Pierre Bourdieu' 84 American Journal of Sociology 191-115; Jenkins, R. (1982) 'Pierre 
Bourdieu and the reproduction of determinism' 16 Sociology 270-281; Brubaker, R. (1993) 'Social 
theory as habitus' in Calhoun, C., LiPuma, E. and Postone M. (eds) (1993) Bourdieu: Critical 
Perspectives (Chicago, 111: University of Chicago Press); Evans, T. M. S. (1999) 'Bourdieu and the 
logic of practice: Is all giving Indian-giving or is it "generalised materialism" not enough' 17 
Sociological Theory 3-31.
96 Bourdieu note 84 above, at p. 116. Generally see Bourdieu, P. (1990) The Logic of Practice 
(Cambridge: Polity, orig. 1979); Bourdieu note 83 above.
97 Taylor, C. (1993) 'To follow a rule' in Calhoun, LiPuma, and Postone note 95 above. Also see 
Potter, G. (2000) 'Bourdieu against Alexander: Reality and reduction' 30 Journal for the Theory of 
Social Behaviour 229-247, where the author argues for incorporating the notion of habitus in the 
concept of field in order to see the dynamism inherent in Bourdieu's model. Also see 
Vandenberghe, F. (1999) 'The real is relational: An epistemological analysis of Bourdieu's 
generative structuralism' 17 Sociological Theory 32-68, where the author argues that, rather than 
criticising the concept of habitus, one should engage in reconstructing Bourdieu’s theory by 
taking into account the relational logic that runs across his oeuvre. For a similar account see 
Wacquant, L. (1989) ' Towards a reflexive sociology - a workshop with Pierre Bourdieu' 7 
Sociological Theory 26-63.
98 King note 95 above.
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his theory implies, bu t are w rong to separate action from the process of its 
initiation and  reorganisation. The following will explore this proposition.
A lthough Bourdieu presents action and hum an m inds as being bounded 
by  social variables, it nevertheless leaves space for conceptualising the 
participation of creative forces that could result in changes that are no t the simple 
addition of the new  to the old. In this context Bourdieu's sociology 'free [s] us from  
the illusion of freedom'99 by  pointing to the institutional constraints that bound 
hum an m inds. Nonetheless, if one flips this argum ent, as Bourdieu him self has 
p u t it, 'it is the statics of the system that reveal its dynamics, as the statics are always 
contested and imply ferocious struggles when it comes to redefining them /100
Therefore, although regulatory law  is view ed as encapsulating and 
reproducing a w ay to view  the social w orld, in other w ords, a w ay  to understand  
the role of property, the role of minorities, the role of parents etc., this m ay 
always be subject to challenge. The very emergence of the concept of alternative 
regulation signifies this, as interest groups dem anded their inclusion in  the 
m aking of laws affecting their affairs, thus challenging the symbolic violence of 
centralised law m aking and  enforcement.
Also, the hot debate surrounding the w ay in which the Internet should be 
regulated is partly  because of different conceptualisations of the role of property  
and  inform ation in the em erging inform ation society. In this case, external 
conditions, such as the continuous technological experim entation currently 
taking place on the net and the m ushroom ing of Internet com m unities, allow  for
99 Bourdieu note 84 above, at p. 15.
100 ibid, at p. 15.
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new  entrants to enter the field under investigation bringing w ith  them  new 
dispositions, and as such their arrival results in changing the whole of the w eb of 
relations inside a field of study.
In view of the above, the statics of the system  are only a transitory 
m om ent in a perpetual becoming, as they are fiercely contested and the possibility 
is always open that action is initiated aim ing at m odifying the correspondence 
betw een objective positions, and transform ing the whole system  of relations 
inside the field. M oreover, struggles are being held at two levels: A t a m aterial 
and at a symbolic level, referring at the same tim e to practices and  to the vision 
that they encapsulate giving legitimacy to the reality that they encompass.
Alternative regulation m ay then be view ed as an instance w hen the 
dom inant w ay of thinking about regulatory law  is challenged by interest groups 
inhabiting different bu t open to com m unication fields of activity, bringing w ith  
them  new  dispositions and  new  forms of capital, striving to maximise w ealth, 
prestige, status, political participation and various other forms of capital 
inscribed in the fields they inhabit.
However, there are always taxonomies still left unchallenged or new  ones, 
which although they appear revolutionary, always strive to im pose the 'right' 
w ay to view the role of regulatory law, thus exclude other visions. To illustrate 
this, in the procedural and  reflexive regulatory fram ework, a set of assum ptions 
is reproduced as to the belief in scientific and legal objectivity, in the responsible 
em ancipated rational agent able to regulate itself and engage in consensus 
building bypassing brutal antagonisms.
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Nevertheless, agents are not mere puppets, as a functional m odel w ould 
suggest, bu t actors m ay act in accordance to their interests, linked to a specific 
field and a position in the field. Therefore, the concept of interest points to an 
infinity of im provisation allowing for an infinity of m oves, as the possibility is 
always left open that the above m entioned assum ptions reproduced in the 
reflexive and  procedural m odel are challenged. It follows that the fallacy of 
ascribing to hum an nature qualities such as the ones found in the notion of 
'interest' in economic terms, or in the idea of mechanistic acting as 
anthropologists w ould  assert, is avoided.
Economic theory w earing the facade of free will ends up seriously 
curtailing the notion of freedom  by injecting finalism  in the form ation of 
preferences. The same observation is to be m ade in the case of action being 
explained as the understanding of a mechanical series of acts. In this sense, since 
Bourdieu emphasises that hum ans w ould have acted otherw ise in different social 
conditions and under different historical circumstances, this is a 
conceptualisation that is very far from such finalism or mechanism.
Bourdieu him self attacks as naive the identification of interests as being 
solely material. Therefore, the pursu it of symbolic capital is one of the alternative 
strategies that agents m ay follow, and presents an exam ple of action that m ay 
run  counter to w hat w ould  be seen as being an economically sound decision.
The latter argum ent m akes sense if symbolic capital is understood as 
credit, and as such its accum ulation is highly im portant w hen it comes to 
legitimising contested visions of the world or m aintaining the existing ones
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inside the field. This is w hy one of the m ain 'strategies' of the European 
Com m ission is to maximise its position as a major think tank, and to this effect 
sustaining the belief in the neutrality and objectivity of regulatory law  is crucial 
for legitimising itself.
Symbolic capital is derived from the role of the European Commission as a 
m anager, as rationally adm inistering m undane procedures on the basis of 
efficiency and  rationality and by m eans of using scientific tools such as 
benchm arks, assessments and scientific models.
The European Commission then emerges as a neutral m ediator furnishing 
the tru th  of science. The orthodoxy of scientific reason is no t w ithout contest 
though. The precautionary principle shows that there is disquiet as to the virtues 
of science. Political and social factors should be taken into account w hen deciding 
on risks for example, as reliable scientific hard  data m ay take tim e to be furnished 
and  it m ay be too late to avert risks to health or the environm ent by that tim e.101
M aking a decision on the basis of scientific data entails m ore problems. In 
a fragm ented and  specialised w orld, w hen decisions rely on inform ation, having 
access to it becomes crucial. Therefore, including interest groups in the processes 
of forming proposals and im plem enting laws is im portant as only they can 
provide it.
Interest groups themselves have challenged the symbolic violence of 
centrally applied law, as this is thought to em anate from a centre insensitive to 
the needs of everyday people. It should be up to the users to decide for example
101 Vogel, D. (2001) 'The new politics of risk regulation in Europe' Centre for the Analysis of Risk and 
Regulation (CARR) Discussion Paper 3/2001.
45
The European Commission and the Construction oflnformation Society
w hether and how  they w ant to punish an unw anted intruder in a v irtual chat 
room  on the USENET system. Regulatory law  should facilitate the inclusion of 
interest groups,102 help create a thriving civil society,103 sustain social capital by 
m eans of prom oting networks and forum s for discussion.104
In this instance, the European Com m ission prom otes itself as offering the 
hierarchical assistance required in the m onitoring and enforcem ent stage, by 
m eans of assisting the drafting of codes of conduct for example. A culture of 
discussion based on the ethos of consensus build ing is em erging and  is being 
supported by neutral m ediation and expertise provision. The symbolic capital of 
the European Commission then consists of sustaining this belief and  prom oting  it 
as a m odel of political participation.
3. The becoming of regulatory change
Bourdieu understands creation as som ething that is experienced and  not 
sim ply thought, agency being the m otor of change. On the other hand, structural 
constraints are necessary to creative change, or this w ould have never taken 
place, they give form to inventive difference, or this w ould have never been 
communicated. Classificatory schemes and taxonomies m ake the w orld 
reasonable and assert that m ost of the tim e people do w hat is norm al to do, 
w ithout following a rational plan, being a strategy devoid of strategic calculation 
as Bourdieu pu ts it.
102 White Paper on Governance COM (2001) 428 Final.
103 For the efforts to create a sustainable information society in Europe see
http://www.jrc.es/iptsreport/vol32/english/ISS2E326.htm. (web page visited on 14 May 2003).
104 ibid.
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Nevertheless, this is not the only possible strategy to be followed. The line 
of action habitus suggests m ay be brought up  at the conscious level in times of 
crisis w here routine is disrupted. Hence the challenge in the dom inant w ay to 
view  the role of governm ents and of the European Com m ission I previously 
referred to.
However, the notion of interest is no t only defined in the strict economic 
sense bu t also involves symbolic struggles. Therefore, actors m ay act to preserve 
or increase their capital or to change the existing classificatory systems, bu t the 
interests they pursue should be understood no t in the usual sense of the w ord, 
bu t as involving everything that defines their ow n idea of themselves.105
Therefore, habitus does not encom pass rigid rules bu t only represents 
regularities, as it is always subject to experience and is constantly being 
transform ed by it. In the light of the above, habitus points to the existence of 
objective regularities that channel and delim it action in such directions that it 
w ould be m ade possible to communicate m eaning, which can be shared by other 
actors occupying the same field. Still, w hen agents act according to their habitus, 
even then action should be seen 'to be as remote from unconditional creation as from  
simple mechanical reproduction, as it is regulated improvisation.'106
Such an understanding of habitus allows for the form ation of fluid 
concepts, open to change. We depart from  rigid m ade concepts in order to 
discover the process of form ation of varieties of dom ination, w hich are always 
open to restructuring, reform  and even destruction, only to return  to the
105 Bourdieu, P. (1984) Distinction: A  Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, orig. 1979), at p. 477.
106 ibid.
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form ation of concepts that w ould have to be flexible. In this context, the fact that 
Bourdieu is pointing to regularities governing action is consistent w ith  the need 
to have concepts that are open, pointing to action.
The study of regulation should then be conducted w ith  a view  to 
understand  the social w orld by means of flexible concepts, as tru th  is m aking and 
unm aking itself all the time on the basis of a continuous reorganisation of pow er 
relations. Bourdieu's epistemological claims are far from the belief that rigid 
concepts can be used to arrive at truth, or that tru th  is a notion w ith  stable 
qualities, hence the fierce attack on objective interpretations of the w orld , on 
economism and  mechanism.
Truth for Bourdieu is something lived, experienced, som ething 
reproduced and contested, subject to objectified constraints and  grounded  on 
different interpretations that result in the m aking of choices that are not 
irreversible, encapsulated in regulatory law.
Thus, uncertainty is inserted in a w orld under constant change. 
Conceiving regulatory law as such is at odds w ith  both  the conceptualisation of it 
as som ething that can be pursued by clear criteria and as being positioned in a 
realm  beyond the one of everyday struggles. Bourdieu provided a fram ew ork 
that stood against such an approach to tru th  claims crystallised in law.
In this w ay he proposed a path  that leads to a dynam ic perception of the 
real, as today 's reality is being described as the reconstruction of yesterday 's 
reality, a process that involves perpetual interaction of objective and  subjective
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forces, w ith  know ledge revealing its plural character, and law  being a social 
construct encapsulating classifications characteristic of a particular era in history.
Bourdieu then pursues an epistemology of becoming that asks no t w hat is 
tru th  but, in a N ietzschean way, w hy, how  m uch, and  w ho w ants tru th , injecting 
contingency of a social and  historical nature into any relevant enquiry. However, 
such a conception of the 'tru th ' of social reality should be distinguished from  an 
understanding of it as being sim ply a political issue and as such m aking it 
impossible, as it is thought to be m ade by a hegem onic order.
By reading Foucault's understanding of the relation betw een pow er and 
know ledge as the latter collapsing in the former, law  is view ed as encapsulating 
in  a functional w ay social and historical determ inations.107 Hence the tru th  of 
social reality is thought to be unattainable, since the true nature of the social 
w orld rem ains positioned in a realm  that cannot be entered by  our intellect.
Knowledge m ay be plural, ever changing and dependent on an  angle of 
observation, bu t it is not impossible.108 Social reality is an experienced reality, it is 
fluid, relative and im m anent, crystallised in flexible concepts, only under the 
understanding that these are to change again.109 Bourdieu's conceptualisation of
107 For an epistemological analysis of this proposition see Alcoff, L. M. (1999) 'Becoming an 
epistemologist/ in Grosz, E. (ed) (1999) Becomings: Explorations in Time, Memory and Futures 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press), at p. 60. Alcoff argues that in the case of Allen's realist 
epistemology, truth is defined as consensus, 'being co-extensive with cultural norms and making no 
distinction to that which is justified here and now and to that which is true'.
108 ibid.
109 Bergsonian metaphysics advances this view. According to Bergson, the real is something that 
makes itself all the time and that is never made, endlessly changing and being pregnant with a 
multiplicity of potentialities. Reality is then seen to carry the inherent tendency to individualise, 
by the fact that it actualises potentialities, as well as associate, by the fact that all potentialities are 
as real as the actualised one. Such a view of the real cannot be consistent with a view that 
repudiates metaphysics by means of looking at knowledge as being something impossible, see 
Bergson, H. (1928) Creative Evolution (London: R&R Clark, orig. 1907), at p. 187-188; Bergson, H.
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social science constructs the social w orld and  understands agency as taking part 
in this process, bu t also aims at describing the social genesis of the principles of 
construction. He conceives the real as being a lived reality, having included in the 
object of know ledge the perception of it by  agents.
(1961) 'La conscience et la vie' VI Les etudes Bergsoniennes 7-29, at p. 28; Bergson, H. (1936) Essai sur 
les Donnees Immediates de la Conscience (Paris: F. Alcan).
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C. CONCLUSIONS
Bourdieu's theoretical fram ework invites us to rethink the process of 
com m unication betw een subjectivity and institutions w hen explaining the 
genesis of new  forms of regulatory law. I propose to understand regulatory law 
as being the result of the organisation of social forces and of the hom ologies 
am ong various fields of study, conceptualising it as allowing for creative 
difference, since categories of thought m ay be subjected to challenge.
Bourdieu's theory of practice provides a powerful theoretical fram ework 
capable of accom m odating the relationship between different fields, social 
institutions and various forms of m aterial and symbolic capital, while com bining 
empirical analysis w ith  a very dem anding theoretical apparatus. H e has applied 
his fram ework in the juridical field in order to consider the role of law  in the 
reproduction of social structures.
Law in this fram ework is conceptualised as carrying a dom inant vision of 
the w orld, which is thus given universality.110 Such an approach to law  is in 
sharp contradiction to both  formalism and structuralism , since the form er views 
law  as absolutely autonom ous form the social milieu, w hile the latter 
understands it as an instrum ent of dom ination.111
Bourdieu moves aw ay from structuralism , since he refuses to view  law  as 
collapsing into the field of pow er, and as such attributes to it a relative 
autonom y. Nonetheless, he attacks the rhetoric of the autonom y, neutrality  and
110 Bourdieu, P. (1986) 'La force du droit: Elements pour une sociologie du champ juridique' 
(1986) 64 Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 3-19.
111 ibid, at p. 1. Two of the examples that the author refers to are the pure theory of law by Kelsen 
and Althusserian structuralism.
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universality of law 112 and defines the juridical field as the space of com petition 
for the m onopoly of the right to articulate w hat is right.113 H e reform ulates this 
argum ent by suggesting that the juridical field implies struggles to articulate 
w hat fair distribution, nomos, and legitimate order are.
The inhabitants of this particular social space are agents w ho are 
com petent to interpret a body of texts. In the light of the above, using Bourdieu's 
theoretical tools can offer useful insights in respect to the w ays that pow er 
relations, which are unrecognised as such, are em bedded in systems of 
classification taken for granted by m em bers of society, thus law  is seen as 
engulfing not only w hat is legal and just bu t w hat is normal.
Nevertheless, the focus of the analysis of this thesis will be on the role of 
the European Commission and  of law  in the process of regulating the 
inform ation society in Europe. I am  particularly interested in the following 
regulatory techniques: Self-regulation (where com m unities function according to 
internal codes of conduct), regulatory instrum ents that take the form  of a mix of 
self-regulation and hierarchical intervention (with regulatory law  intervening in 
the m onitoring and enforcement stage) and regulatory instrum ents that denote 
the partnership between the state and private actors (with the aim  of achieving 
public ends).114
Since for the purposes of this thesis regulation is understood as in the 
processes underlying the identification of a problem  and its articulation in
112 ibid, at p. 5
113 ibid, at p. 4: ' he champ juridique est le lieu d'une concurrence pour le monopole du droit de dire le 
droit'.
114 These definitions are borrowed from Julia Black's work on regulation, in particular see Black 
note 68 above, at p. 600-601.
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proposals, green papers, consultations and other non-legally binding 
instrum ents, and as in the im plem entation of laws, then looking at decentralised 
regulatory techniques initiated by the European adm inistration is a task that 
implies different definitions.
In particular, it implies a different definition of the agents w ho have an 
interest to invest in the game, of the specific forms of capital that agents possess 
and  of the logic of the sub-field of inform ation society regulation, being part of 
the larger field of the EU bureaucracy. Finally, constructing the emergence of 
inform ation society regulation as a novel object of study should be the first step 
to understanding the operation of m y object of study.
This is undertaken in C hapter II of the thesis, which seeks to look into the 
emergence of the concept of inform ation society as a new  field of enquiry, w ith a 
view  to uncover the historical conjunction of events and theoretical paradigm s 
producing particular understandings as to the proper role of innovation, law  and 
m arket integration, feeding into its emergence.
Chapter III will m ove onto looking into the norm s regulating everyday life 
inside the European Commission. Here, the task is to come to grips w ith the 
classificatory systems em erging in the course of interaction and as a result of 
professional background and nationality, ascribing m eaning to the initiation of a 
proposal and the im plem entation of a legal measure.
Chapter IV will seek to identify the particularities of the legal habitus. This 
chapter will further question the possibility of introducing neutral procedures to 
regulate the Internet, by  means of looking at dispute resolution under the
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auspices of the Internet Corporation of Assigned N am es and N um bers (ICANN) 
and  the im plem entation of the Safer Internet Action Plan aim ing at com bating 
illegal and  harm ful m aterial on the net. The m ain question addressed concerns 
the properties of the legal habitus and the kind of assum ptions reproduced as to 
the role of regulatory law, the role of property  and the im portance of inform ation 
as a com m odity.
Chapter V will take this latter point further to grasp the w ay  in which 
dom inant classificatory schemes about the role of law  and property  have been 
challenged by  interest groups, by means of looking at the consultation launched 
by the European Com m ission following a proposal aim ing at introducing patent 
protection on com puter-im plem ented inventions in the EU. The O pen Source 
C om m unity projected a vision of intellectually property  rights as being sensitive 
to technological experim entation and com m unication. However, other business 
interests and  DG Internal M arket favoured strong protection.
A gainst this background, the focus of this chapter will be on enquiring on 
the possibility of engaging in discussion parties w ith  different conceptualisations 
about the social w orld  and asymmetrical am ount of capital available to them, in 
order to question the prospect of creating a sustainable civil society.
Finally, the conclusions will consolidate the findings of this thesis w ith 
regard to the proposition to introduce Bourdieu's fram ew ork to better 
understand  the processes underlying the use of flexible regulatory techniques by 
questioning the notions of neutrality, objectivity and intentionality.
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____________________________ II________________________
Innovation, Economy, Polity and the European Experience
History is more or less bunk. It's tradition.
We don't want tradition.
We want to live in the present and the only history that is worth a tinker's damn, 
is the history we made today.
Henry Ford, Interview in Chicago Tribune, 15 May 1916.
Creating the inform ation society in Europe and positioning the Internet at 
its heart interw eaves w ith  opening up  m arkets and prom oting innovation. 
A lthough the focus of this thesis is on the role of the European Com m ission in 
the course of regulation by means of flexible instrum ents, I will here concentrate 
on looking broadly at the processes leading to opening up  the telecom m unication 
m arkets in Europe, as it is then that im portant understandings w ere shaped as to 
the role of the European Commission, the nature  of regulatory law  and the 
character of interest group participation in the processes.
It m ay appear that there w as some kind of inevitability in liberalising 
telecom m unication m arkets and prom oting the Internet in Europe. Technological 
changes dictated a novel approach to be taken.1 Globalisation and new  economic
1 Recommendations of the Bangemann Group to the European Council: Europe and the Global 
Information Society, 26 May 1994, available at
http://sirio.deusto.es/abaitua/konzeptu/w3c%5Cbange.htm (web page visited on 15 May 2003); 
Also see European Commission Green Paper COM (87) final of 30 June 1987 on the Development 
of a Common Market for Telecommunication Services and Equipment: Towards a Dynamic 
European Economy, especially see the Introduction. Both papers advocated the need to liberalise 
the telecommunications sector so as to create incentives for the private sector to invest in the 
information society. For an account against a technology-driven approach see Flynn, L. (1995) 
Telecommunications and EU integration' 3 European Community Utilities Law and Policy 217-235,
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conditions required a different line of thinking as to the role of com petition in  the 
relevant m arkets.2
Interest groups lobbied the European Com m ission and  national 
governm ents to open up m arkets in view of the new  opportunities.3 Institutions 
shaped the strategies of agents, who subsequently drove telecom m unications 
reform  tow ards the direction of liberalisation.4 Regulatory law  and the European 
Commission have thus responded to these challenges.
Still, although new  technological im provem ents, such as digitalisation, 
w ere decisive in compelling change, new  economic conditions shaped political 
decisions and interest groups w anted to exploit new  opportunities, there are 
questions to be answered. For example, assum ing that innovation is a driving 
force in the above processes, how  is 'innovation' defined? W hy is innovation a 
good thing and how  m uch innovation do w e need? W hat are the desirable levels
at p. 221. In the same spirit, Gannon argues that although the European Commission argued that 
Europe had to catch up with the new industrial revolution while avoiding to repeat the mistakes 
that the European computer industry made in the past, resulting in lagging behind the USA and 
Japan, the official papers of the Commission do not explain the nature of these mistakes, see 
Gannon, P. (1997) Trojan Horses and National Champions (Apt-amatic books, 1997).
2 Recommendation of the Bangemann Group to the European Council and Green Paper on the 
Development of a Common Market for Telecommunication Services and Equipment, ibid.
3 On this approach see in particular, Sandholtz, W. (1998) 'The emergence of a supranational 
telecommunications regime' and Sandholtz, W. and Stone Sweet, A. (1998) 'Integration, 
supranational governance and the institutionalisation of the European polity' in Sandholtz W. 
and Stone Sweet, A. (eds) (1998) European Integration and Supranational Governance (New York: 
Oxford University Press). According to the authors, the EU initiates new policies when Euro- 
groups, networks and associations engaging in increased transnational exchange, share an 
interest in the adoption of new rules, Sandholtz and Stone Sweet at p. 137-138.
4 In this context, institutions, defined as political, social and legal cultures and Constitutional 
rules, should be seen as shaping the strategies of players. Strategies are then influenced 'by the 
complex relationship between the culture and world view of each player and the substantive and procedural 
contents of the EC Treaty which gives the players their location in terms of roles and powers,' see Scott, C. 
(1995) 'Changing patterns of European community utilities law and policy: An institutional 
hypothesis' in Shaw, J. and More, G. (eds) (1995) New Legal Dynamics of European Union (New  
York: Clarendon Press); Similarly, it has been argued that different national institutions gave rise 
to different patterns of policy making. In this context, it is very important to take into account the 
relations of power and the role of formal organisations and formal institutions in shaping change, 
see Thatcher, M. (1999) The Politics of Telecommunications (New York: Oxford University Press), at 
p. 307.
56
Innovation, Economy, Polity and the European Experience
of governm ental intervention and w hat should be the role of law? A re there 
com peting paradigm s as to the above?
There is certainly not one answer to these questions. M oreover, all these 
questions have posed and continuously pose real problems. As w e will see, 
during  the early steps of opening up  the telecom m unication m arkets in the EU, 
some M ember States w anted to make standards com pulsory, thus extending re­
regulation, while others w anted fast and extensive deregulation.5 Similarly, the 
role of the European Com m ission in the process w as contested, as a dangerous 
delegation of pow ers w as thought to be taking place. The industry  w as for 
liberalising, while the trade unions opposed it.6
Against this background, the aim  of this chapter is twofold. First, it seeks 
to show that definitions are the result of specific socio-economic circumstances. 
Hence, conducting a historical overview of the diverse experiences and 
com peting theoretical paradigm s leading to the genesis of an object of s tudy  is an 
exercise aim ing at looking into the set of different statem ents constructing it.
This is im portant as, by m eans of describing the processes behind the 
emergence and shaping of inform ation society regulation in Europe, w e are 
constantly rem inded that things could have been different, since under different
5 Thatcher, M. (2001) 'The EU Commission and national governments as partners: EC regulatory 
expansion in telecommunications 1979-2000' Centre for the Analysis of Risk and Regulation (CARR) 
Discussion Paper 2/2001, available at
http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/carr/Publications folder web files/Disspaper2.pdf, at p. 8.
6 On this point see Braithwaite, J. and Drahos, P. (2000) Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press).
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socio-economic circumstances a different set of statem ents could have inform ed 
the genesis of a new  field of study.7
Such an analysis is a pow erful tool to introduce ruptures, as it does not 
only bring attention to the discourses, w hich fed into the emergence of a new  
object of analysis, bu t also to the potentialities that w ere never actualised, in 
other w ords to the discarded possibilities.8 Engaging in such an enquiry requires 
being able to m ove between different disciplines and  deal w ith  never-ending 
sources. The problem  inherent in such an exercise is that overgeneralisations 
seem to be unavoidable due to space limits.9
Nevertheless, I believe that it is im portant to concentrate on the experience 
of the 19th and 20th century and look at the notion of innovation as understood in 
the history of economic thought, and in particular in the w ays that liberalism, 
economic theory and  conceptions as to the virtues of new  technologies and 
com petition interw eaved and consequently came under radical doubt, as early as 
in 1760, bu t also later in the First W orld W ar and during  the depression of the 
1930s.
My choice to look at innovation is prem ised on the assum ption that 
inform ation acquires particular im portance now adays because it is traded  and 
com m unicated, and in both these instances innovation and technological 
experim entation are crucial.
7 Bourdieu, P. (1994) 'Rethinking the state: Genesis and structure of the bureaucratic field' 12 
Sociological Theory 1-18; Foucault, M. (1972) The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Tavistock 
Publications, orig. 1969).
8 Bourdieu ibid, at p. 4.
9 As this chapter relates to broad themes about which there is extensive literature, I kept footnotes 
references to a minimum and referred to English language works.
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A second focus is on the im portance of m arket integration, expertise and 
ordoliberalism  as offering powerful paradigm s influencing the early attem pts to 
integrate m arkets in Europe. I chose to look at these paradigm s, as they had  an 
im pact on the w ay w e understand today the role of the European Com m ission as 
providing expertise and interest interm ediation, and  shaped an understanding  of 
regulatory law  as being neutral and objective, im plem enting the m andate of 
Constitutional principles and indirectly intervening in the economy.
A third focus is on sudden technological advances and globalisation, 
which gave rise to new  understandings as to the m erits of co-operation, 
providing the operating context of all of the above ideas. This is because, for an 
intellectual fram ew ork to successfully become dom inant, it has to find its efficacy 
in this real w orld and  in particular historical circumstances favouring a w ay of 
thinking.
Finally, I examine the legal instrum ents em ployed to open 
telecommunications m arkets in Europe, as this is the physical infrastructure of 
the inform ation society in Europe. This subsequently led to a series of efforts to 
prom ote interconnectivity, interoperability, global m arkets, privacy, data 
security, intellectual property rights and R&D co-operation, while positioned the 
Internet at the heart of the inform ation society in view of its unique technical 
characteristics and social impact.
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A. INNOVATION, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: THE EARLY DAYS
1. Economic theory and innovation
In 1733, John Kay, a 29-year-old inventor, was aw arded a paten t for his 
new  m achine for opening and dressing wool, the Flying Shuttle. H is invention 
turned out to be very successful and its w idespread adoption created pressure for 
the m ore efficient spinning of yam , w hich led to Sir Richard A rkw right's Cotton 
Jenny being patented in 1770.
Soon afterwards, machines to card and comb the wool to feed the new  
mechanised spinning machines were developed in the 1780s. By the tu rn  of the 
century all aspects of the production of cloth had  been autom ated. The cottage 
industry  of English textiles w as rapidly being replaced by machines, and  exports 
in textile rose sharply.10
The process of using machines w as being introduced to other industries, a 
prom inent example being the construction of the Bridgewater Canal by  the Duke 
of Bridgwater in 1759, w hich w ould bring coal by  boat from  his coalmines at 
W orsley to M anchester,11 and James W att's Steam Engine invented in 1765.
The above events brought about the new  experience of industrial 
revolution, which begun in England and spread around Europe. They m arked 
the genesis of the idea that innovation is im portant for economic grow th, w hilst 
linking economic progress w ith the freedom  to trade. Early attem pts to
10 Kurzweil, R. (1990) The Age of Intelligent Machines (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press), at p. 2; 
Landes, D. S. (1960) The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in 
Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (London: Cambridge University Press).
11 ibid.
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conceptualise the relationship am ongst these three notions are presented by 
Smith, Babbage and Rae.12
Back in 1776, A dam  Smith did aw ay w ith  the notion of m ercantilist 
protectionism  to argue that prices can be determ ined by means of com petition, as 
then they w ould change responding to m arket conditions. The classical view  of 
economics em phasised the role of risk-taking and innovative entrepreneur and 
took into account the im portance of the technology and organisation of firms 
(division of labour) in the process of competition, while assum ed that the 
division of labour results in technological innovation.13
Smith thought that capital accum ulation and  the w ealth of nations go 
hand  in hand. He argued that savings are accum ulated and then invested, due to 
the 'uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition,' 
w hich is thus 'the principle from which public and national, as well as private opulence 
is originally derived.'1^
Since individuals are assum ed to engage in saving and  w ealth 
m axim isation, any state intervention will reduce their incentives to save m oney,
12 The choice of these authors is influenced by Rosenberg's work, see Rosenberg, N. (1994) 
Exploring the Black Box. Technology, Economics and History (Cambridge, [England]; New York: 
Cambridge University Press), where he analyses the work of thinkers such as Charles Babbage, 
Karl Marx and Joseph Schumpeter. My choice of John Rae's work was influenced by Brewer, A. 
(1991) 'Economic growth and technical change: John Rae's critique of Adam Smith' 23 History of 
Political Economy l-12.Many other thinkers have brought attention to the importance of 
innovation, but I limit my references to authors whose work is primarily associated with it.
13 'This great increase of the quantity of work which, in consequence of the division of labour, the same 
number of people are capable of performing, is owing to three different circumstances; first, to the increase 
of dexterity in every particular workman; secondly, to the saving of the time which is commonly lost in 
passing from one species of work to another; and lastly, to the invention of a great number of machines 
which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work of many,' Smith, A. (1776) The 
Wealth of Nations (London: s.n.), Book I, Chapter 1, 'Of the division of labor' available via 
http:// www.bibliomania.com/2/1 /65/112/frameset.html, (web page visited on 19 May 2003), at
p. 2.
14 Smith, A. (1991) The Wealth of Nations (London: Everyman's Library, orig. 1776), at p. 343.
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hence economic grow th will slow dow n, as total saving is the sum  of individual 
saving. Therefore, according to Smith, governm ental intervention is not 
necessary, as the m arket w ould regulate itself, the com petitive process w ould 
pick w inners from losers eventually benefiting the society as a w hole.15
Charles Babbage16 w rote some 60 years after Smith, w hen the industrial 
revolution w as a far m ore m ature phenom enon and technological progress w as 
rapidly  advancing. Rosenberg argues that Babbage is the first observer calling 
attention in an explicit w ay to the causal links betw een economic forces and 
inventive activity.
Indeed, Babbage took the idea of the division of labour and tw isted it to 
argue that technical change is a consequence as well as a cause of the division of 
labour. Hence, he observed that investing in im proving machines is im portant for 
economic success. This is because, according to Babbage, as the application of the 
division of labour tends to produce cheaper articles, it increases the dem and, and 
gradually, by the effect of competition, or by the hope of increased gain, results 
in large capital being invested in big factories, as new  m achines autom ating all 
stages of production are introduced.
Moreover, skilled workers, w ho can use these machines, are hired, and 
engineers, w ho can on the spot fix the machines if at fault, are em ployed. Finally, 
the addition of a machine to light the factory at night using gas is built and  an
15 ibid.
16 Babbage was a pioneer mathematician, engineer (sometimes referred to as the father of 
computing as his Difference Engine No. One was the first successful automatic calculator and 
remains one of the finest examples of precision engineering of the time) and political economist. 
For more information see the web page of the Charles Babbage Institute at 
http://www.cbi.umn.edu/exhibits/cb.html, (web page visited on 15 May 2003).
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accountant's departm ent is added. This w ould  have to have clerks to pay  the 
w orkm en, communicate w ith the agents w ho purchase the raw  produce and  sell 
the m anufactured article.
The division of labour in this instance produces cheaper articles as it 
is not merely the precise amount of skill purchased, which is necessary for the 
execution of each process, hut throughout every stage - from that in which the raw 
material is procured, to that by which the finished produce is conveyed into the hands of 
the consumer - the same economy of skill prevails. The quantity of work produced by a 
given number of people is greatly augmented by such an extended arrangement; and the 
result is necessarily a great reduction in the cost of the article, which is brought to 
market.17
Babbage parallels the function of the division of labour in a factory w ith  
m ental division of labour:
We have seen, then, that the effect of the division of labour, both in mechanical and 
in mental operations, is that it enables us to purchase and apply to each process precisely 
that quantity of skill and knowledge which is required for it: we avoid employing any part 
of the time of a man who can get eight or ten shillings a day by his skill in tempering 
needles, in turning a wheel, which can be done for sixpence a day; and we equally avoid 
the loss arising from the employment of an accomplished mathematician in performing 
the lowest processes of arithmetic.18
17 Babbage, C. (1963) On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures, (Frank Cass & co London, 
orig. 1835), Chapter 20 'On the Division of Labour/ at point 269; Rosenberg, N. 'Babbage; Pioneer 
economist' in Rosenberg note 12 above, citing Babbage ibid, at p. 191 and 260.
18 ibid. The division of labour inside a factory represents its domestic economy. Thus, Babbage 
argues that there is no point in introducing laws restricting machinery exports to avoid providing 
foreigners with machinery that will threaten England's competitive advantage. Tf is contended that 
by admitting the exportation of machinery, foreign manufacturers will be supplied with machines equal to
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However, the relationship betw een technological innovation and the 
division of labour is not a one w ay one b u t cyclical. This is because, the division 
of labour results in capital accumulation, capital is used to prom ote innovation 
and  innovative activity produces m ore capital. Very im portantly, innovation is 
no t only the result of a genius m ind, bu t m ost of the time is b rought about by 
m eans of m inor im provem ents accomplished in the workplace.
At the same time though, the Scottish John Rae in his New Principles totally 
reversed Sm ith's causality that the division of labour results in  the invention of 
machines. In sum, Rae's analysis is centred on the role of invention as the 
prim ary and independent factor behind economic growth.
W ithout denying the im portance of capital accum ulation, and  while 
accepting that individuals w ould choose to invest their savings, Rae argued that 
the m otor behind this process is technological progress and argued that invention 
is the only pow er on earth that can be said to create. Thus, he m ade the case for 
governm ental legislation that w ould prom ote science, the discovery of new  arts 
and  im provem ents in the arts already practised in the country.19
Smith treated the invention of machines as a result, no t a cause, of the 
division of labour,20 Babbage observed that the one feeds into the other, while
our own. But in order to succeed in a manufacture, it is necessary not merely to possess good machinery, 
but that the domestic economy of the factory should be most carefully regulated.'
19 Rae, J. (1905) The Sociological Theory of Capital: A  Complete Reprint of the 'New Principles of Political 
Economy' (New York: The Macmillan Company; London: Macmillan and Co., ltd, orig. 1834), 
published under the title 'Statement of Some New Principles on the Subject of Political Economy. 
Exposing the Fallacies of the System of Free Trade, and of Some Other Doctrines Maintained in the 
"Wealth of Nations”'), especially see Book 1, Chapter 1. For an excellent introduction on Rae's 
thinking see, Brewer note 12 above, at p. 1-5; Ahmad, S. (1996) ’Smith's division of labour and 
Rae's "invention": A study of the second dichotomy with an evaluation of the first' 28 History of 
Political Economy 95-107.
20 Brewer ibid.
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Rae reversed the causality and attributed to technological innovation a prim ary 
role. Albeit the difference of opinion as to the level of im portance attributed  to 
machines, innovation w as thought to be a factor to be taken into account w hen 
discussing economic progress. But, the experience of the early days of industrial 
revolution was also underlined by the liberal credo w ith the science of economics 
and  liberalism interw eaving.21
2. The socio-political context
The freedom to pursue economic conduct became the cornerstone of 
liberal thinking.22 Economic freedom  w as viewed as a right and  law  w as 
understood as being entrusted w ith its protection. Therefore, the political and 
economic com ponent interw eaved, as individuals w ould  have the freedom  to 
influence the laws governing their conduct and at the sam e tim e possess the 
necessary freedom  of choice as to w hat to produce and  how  to produce it.
The bourgeoisie w as the prim e beneficiary, as it acquired new  rights and 
freedom s against the constraints im posed by the nobility. Nonetheless, the ruling 
elite in Europe also largely em braced the new  ideas. By the mid-1870s m any of 
the objectives of liberalism had  been attained, as reforms took place around
21 Gerber, D. J. (1998) Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press).
22 ibid, at p. 17. The literature on liberalism is extensive. On the 19th century liberalism see 
Bramsted, E. K. and Melhuish, K. J. (eds) (1978) Western Liberalism: A  History in Documents from  
Locke to Croce (London: Longman), especially see 'General introduction: Major strands of 
liberalism/ at p. 1-102; Salvadori, M. (1977) The Liberal Heresy: Origins and Historical Development 
(London: Macmillan), at p. 6-35. Ruggiero's account is a good starting point with good 
bibliographical references, see Ruggiero, G. (1981) The History of European Liberalism (Gloucester 
(Mass.): Peter Smith, orig. 1925), especially see 'What liberalism is / at p. 347-369.
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Europe. Economies flourished and technological and  transportation advances 
w ere im portant engines of progress.23
At the same time, society was being irreversibly transform ed. The m odes 
of production were altered, as factories were created to allow for large-scale 
production. However, this resulted in the emergence of a new  industrial society 
bearing little resemblance to Sm ith's understanding of a com petitive economy. 
Factories grew in size, em ploying hundreds or even thousands of w orkers and 
m anagers were paid  to m ake m oney for owners.
Artisans were now  w orkers paid at the lowest possible cost, while 
com petition had little to do w ith the m oral values of a com m unity. Finally, 
funding was im portant and banks em erged as partners, while trade became 
increasingly internationalised.24
As a result, a new  class w as created, w hose m em bers w here people w ho 
had  to change their traditional w ay of life and leave their com m unities.25 Laws 
protecting workers arrived late. For example, it w as not until the late 19th century
23 Weir, D. R. (1984) 'Life under pressure: France and England, 1670-1870' 42 Journal of Economic 
History TJ-%7; McCloskey, D. (1985) 'The industrial revolution 1780-1860: A Survey' in Mokyr, J.
(1985) The Economics of the Industrial Revolution (London: Allen & Unwin); Landes note 10 above, 
Chapters 1 and 2.
24 Gerber note 21 above, at p. 20-23. Of course, there were considerable divergences in Europe as 
to the extent and means of financing businesses. In the UK, up until the third quarter of the 19th 
century most of the firms were family firms, employed no more than 50 workers and were 
financed by family finance and loans. On the other hand, in Germany banks played an important 
role in financing businesses, on the German banking system see Franz, R (1910) 'The statistical 
history of the German banking system' Miscellaneous Articles on German Banking, US Senate 
Document 508, (Washington DC: GPO).
25 Landes, note 10 above. According to Landes, in 1912 in England, 12 per cent of people were 
employed in agriculture, while in 1951, this number dropped to five per cent. In France though, in 
1789, around 55 per cent of the population were farmers, and interestingly, in 1866, at the heyday 
of the first industrial revolution, the same number still applied, while in 1950 it only dropped to 
one third of the population. Landes argues that one of the reasons for this is the high tariffs 
introduced to imported goods back in the 19th century. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
engage in a comparative appreciation of the effects of industrialisation in different European 
countries. The aim is simply to sketch the general characteristics of industrialisation.
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that laws were passed in the UK providing for upper limits in w orking hours for 
w om en and children.26 The faith in the liberal dream  w as lost by some segments 
of the society, although standards of living w ere increased considerably, at least 
for the bourgeoisie.
However, the afterm ath of the great depression in the 1870s, w hich came 
as a result of the crash of the Vienna stock m arket coupled w ith  disastrous 
harvests and increases in w heat sales from N orth  America,27 w as that in tim es of 
crisis business w ould keenly welcome governm ental intervention back. A new  
govem m ent-business alliance emerged, resulting in keeping prices up  or 
increasing taxes in im ported products. M oreover, business organised in 
associations, in order to influence political decisions, and in cartels, so as to 
increase size and face international challenges.28
26 The British state was slow in enacting legislation. In 1847 the Ten Hours Act provided that 
women and children could work only ten hours a day (but what actually happened was that they 
were to work two hours on and two hours off while they could not leave the factory). In 1874 a 
maximum ten hours a day for men was introduced. Reacting to social injustice, several 
intellectual movements sought to give industrialisation a human face. Utopian Socialists, Fabian 
Socialists and the French Saint Simonians were all concerned with this. On these issues see, Taylor, 
K. (1982) The Political Ideas of the Utopian Socialists (London: Cass); Radice, L. (1984) Beatrice and 
Sidney Webb: Fabian Socialists (London: Macmillan); Iggers, G., Enfantin, B. P. and Barrault, E. 
(second ed 1958) The Doctrine of Saint-Simon: An Exposition; First Year, 1828-1829 (New York: 
Schocken Books, orig. 1828). As regards Utopian Socialists, Robert Owen was one of the members 
of this intellectual school. He was a factory owner in Scotland and believed that the modem  
factory system promoted heartless individualism, thus introduced such improvements as shorter 
working hours, healthier and safer working conditions, insurance plans financed by payroll 
deduction, after-hours recreation, schools for children and adults, while refused to employ child 
labour. Owen tried to establish a utopian community and built settlements, called 'Villages of 
Cooperation,' which were self-contained agricultural communities, where the unemployed could 
find employment, but had little decision-making power. Saint-Simon envisaged a society where 
an elite of philosophers, engineers, scientists and artists would lead industrialisation organised on 
the basis of 'rational' Christianity, with scientists as priests. He was particularly concerned with 
unemployment and while he defended private property as the reward for achievement, did not 
view it as a sacred or natural right, which can be inherited. Radical followers of his are Blanc and 
Proudhon. Finally, Fabian Socialists' main position was that social reforms would be accomplished 
through the right to vote. A full discussion on these positions falls outside the scope of this 
chapter.
27 Gerber note 21 above, at p. 25.
28 ibid, at p. 25-27.
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As a result of all these, liberalism, economic theory and conceptions as to 
the virtues of new  technologies and com petition w ere all under radical doubt. At 
the theoretical level, there were various responses to the inadequacies of classical 
economic theory. The Germ an historical school, neo-classical economics and 
Marxism, all attem pted to suggest novel theoretical paradigm s.29 Neo-classical 
economics and M arxism in particular took into account the role of technological 
innovation in the process, albeit the former only positioned it in the periphery of 
its analytical fram ework, while the latter attributed to it a prom inent role.
3. Casting a critical eye
Alfred M arshall in England established the neo-classical school of thought. 
Building on the aspect of rivalry, neo-classical economists view ed com petition as 
a state of affairs and  used the abstract m odel of perfect com petition to describe 
rivalry as being dependent on a dem and and cost equilibrium  determ ining w hich 
firm survives and w hich fails. Firms are conceived to be profit m axim ising agents 
rationally choosing to enter or exit a m arket according to a set of observed profit 
opportunities.
Firms then select an ou tpu t where m arginal costs equal the m arket price. 
As long as profit opportunities appear to exist, firms will continue to enter the 
market. Thus, in the long run, firms that rem ain will produce at the m inim um  
efficient scale. Since a dem and and cost equilibrium  is the prerequisite of
29 ibid. The previous discussion on liberalism and industrialisation did not touch on the very 
important issue of imperialism. Imperialism links to industrial revolution, as the colonies 
provided new markets and cheap raw material, see Ward, J. R. (1994) 'The industrial revolution 
and British imperialism, 1750-1850' 47 The Economic History Review 44-65. Again, due to space 
limits I cannot possibly elaborate on these issues here.
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competition, the neo-classical focus is on the effects of com petition and  on m arket 
structure, and not on the behaviour of firms.30
There are tw o points emerging from  the previous discussion: First, there is 
a circular effect betw een the notions of m arket equilibrium  and  utility 
maximisation. This is because w hen individuals maximise their utilities, they 
bring about the economic condition of equilibrium , and the economic 
equilibrium  itself is the required condition under w hich the m axim isation of the 
utilities of all individuals can be accomplished. This is w hy perfect com petition is 
good for entrepreneurs and for the society as a whole.31
Second, according to the neo-classical production theory, firms m ake 
rational optim isation decisions based on the calculation of profit m axim isation. 
To engage in such calculations, inform ation on prices is crucial, w hile the 
developm ent of new  technologies is m arginally im portant. Accordingly, 
technological change is an exogenous dim ension in the neoclassical models.
Karl Marx looked at technological innovation in a different way, 
attributing to it a central role in his analysis of economic phenom ena. His 
position is generally underlined by the assum ption that phenom ena under 
observation acquire m eaning only under specific socio-economic circumstances.
Hence, terms, such as value, m oney and  profit, do not have m eaning 
outside the context of a capitalist society. M oreover, hum an history in the 
capitalist w orld is the p roduct of struggles, w hich happen as a result of the
30 Brian, C. (2000) Shovelling Fuel for a Runaway Train: Errant Economists, Shameful Spenders, and a 
Plan to Stop Them All (Berkeley: University of California Press).
31 The utilitarian discourse as developed by Bentham and Mill would require an extensive 
analysis beyond the scope of this chapter.
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contradiction betw een the forces of production and the relations in production. 
The upshot of this is that class struggles are the fundam ental force injecting 
dynam ism  in the m aking of history.
At the same tim e though, Marx attaches great im portance to technological 
factors. Technological advance is central in his analysis, as it is thought to be the 
m otor behind the process of com petition am ongst firms. This is because, under 
the force of competition, firms are inexorably driven to adopt new  technologies 
that substitute capital for labour.
This process results in rising productivity, bu t the flip side of it is 
unem ploym ent. Nonetheless, the innovative potential of technologies w as not 
always seen as unlim ited. Marx hypothesises that in the end decreasing profit 
rate will stop economic growth. Accordingly, for him  the solution w as to choose 
a different economic order, as depressions w ere endem ic to the system.32
He analyses tw o major stages in technology history: The Manufacturing 
System , based on the division of labour, and  the Modern Industry, based on 
m achines incorporating scientific knowledge and  principles. Nonetheless, in his 
fram ework, full productive possibilities will be realised w hen m achines are 
em ployed in the construction and production of machines themselves.33
Marx also argues that businesses were prone to grow in size, as capitalists 
w ould accumulate capital and then invest it in  new  machines, resulting in the 
production of m ore capital, thus identifying a cyclical effect betw een innovation 
and capital accumulation. Rosenberg m entions that M arx's analysis borrow s
32 Rosenberg, N. (1982) "Marx as a student of technology' in Rosenberg, N. (1982) Inside the Black 
Box: Technology and Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), at p. 34-51.
33 ibid.
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m uch from  Babbage on this point. Marx him self makes explicit reference to the 
latter author in volum e III of Capital.
This is w hy he draw s attention to the fact that the introduction of 
technological im provem ents was a central preoccupation to capitalists, which 
effectively means that a machine had  a short life expectancy. As a result of this, a 
capitalist w ould have to make a new  investm ent and  then w ould have to recoup 
it as soon as possible, a process that m ay prove to be rather difficult.34
4. Transitions
Indeed, the late 19th century turned ou t to be a sluggish time for European 
economies. Textiles, iron, steel, chemicals, transportation, steam  engineering, all 
slowed down. Marxists gave dire prognosis as to the possible effects of 
stagnation and conceived it to be the sign of sustained creativity.35 Nonetheless, 
a t the same time, a new  w ave of innovations m ade its appearance. Electrical 
science and internal com bustion pow er provided new  opportunities and  m arked 
the beginning of the second industrial revolution and  the rise of new  industries.36
Specifically, inventions, such as the dynam o in the late 19th century, 
allowed electric pow er to become the leading generating force of factories. This 
technological im provem ent, taking the place of the steam engine, allowed
34 ibid. Rosenberg notes that Babbage quotes a Report of the Committee of the House of 
Commons on the Wool Trade (1806), which asserts that large factories can afford the risks and 
experiments to generate technological change that are not feasible for the 'little master 
manufacturers.'
35 Landes note 10 above.
36 ibid.
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factories to work w ith  greater efficiency and at a lower cost, im proving the 
economic grow th of the capitalist w orld.37
Initially, this technological im provem ent w as at the cost of thousand of 
jobs. However, the lower production costs enabled capitalists to invest heavily in 
the new  technology, a process, which w as not com pleted until after the Second 
W orld War, as it w as not before that time that new  jobs were created.
The beginning of the 20th century though w as m arked by another major 
event: The First W orld War. It was then that Europe witnessed the collapse of 
three empires, Germany, A ustro-H ungary and Russia. M oreover, regions and 
population in Europe were devastated, as it was the first industrial w ar. W eapons 
of mass destruction, such as chemical gas, were used, while machines guns, 
aeroplanes and subm arines were em ployed in great num bers. M ore than ever 
before, it w as m ade clear that the arm y possessing technologically advanced 
w eaponry had  a huge advantage over others.
The First W orld W ar perm anently changed the face of European politics. 
Soldiers w ho had  died in enorm ous num bers for their country could not be 
deprived of the vote. This is w hy the electorate expanded after the war. 
M oreover, after 1914, w om en began acquiring voting rights. The result w as the 
rise of Labour Parties. In Britain, for example, w here less than half of adult males
37 Rosenberg, N. (1972) Technology and the American Economic Growth (New York; London: Harper 
and Row); David, P. A. (1990) 'The computer and the dynamo: A historical perspective on the 
productivity paradox' The American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 355-361.
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could vote before the First W orld War, the socialist Labour Party m ultiplied its 
vote sevenfold in the election of 1918 38
Still adjustm ent to new  realities w as difficult. Times were hard  for the 
European economies in the 1920s and 1930s.39 The G reat Depression of the 1930s 
resulted in great num bers of unem ploym ent around Europe and steelworkers 
and m iners faced despair as factories closed. As a result of the First W orld W ar 
and the crisis of the 1930s, economic theory had  to face political and  social 
reality.
Protectionism, strong control of capital m ovem ents, fixed exchange rates 
and optional barriers were introduced to dom estic economies. It w as then that 
the foundations were laid for the m odem  welfare state. Post-war Keynesian 
economics prom ised to tam e the cyclical tendencies of capitalist economies. Full 
em ploym ent and social rights of citizenship w ere to be secured. Poverty w as to 
be alleviated and social security to be guaranteed. State interventionism  was 
introduced to national systems of w ork and welfare.
At the same tim e though, the w estern w orld  w as w itnessing in the 1930s 
another technologically creative m om entum , as new  innovations w ere invented. 
The application of chemical and electrical science and advances in the generation
38 Eichengreen, B. (1984) 'Innovation and integration: Europe's economy since 1945' in Fulbrook, 
M. (ed) (2001) Europe since 1945 (Oxford; Oxford University Press).
39 The literature on the reasons and consequences of the Great Depression in Europe is vast. For 
an interesting review see Clavin, P. (2000) The Great Depression in Europe, 1929-1939 (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan). For a view on the implications for Britain see Stevenson J. and Cook, C. (1994) Britain 
in the Depression (London; New York: Longman).
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and delivery of pow er were some of the events that gave birth  to the third 
industrial revolution.40
40 Landes note 10 above.
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A. MODERN THEORETICAL PARADIGMS
The events described in the previous section had  m ade clear one thing: 
Technological progress can be a good and an evil at the sam e time. Joseph 
Schum peter lived to see the upheaval em erging from the transition from  a 
technology, which has saturated its possibilities, to a new  technological 
paradigm . By 1930, technology had  already arrived in three clusters, all of them  
defining an era, bu t transition from  the one to the other prove to be difficult.41
Schum peter reconciled both  these facets by arguing tha t although 
instability is endemic to capitalism, transitory periods are difficult b u t tem porary. 
H e thus offered an alternative m odel to the orthodox neo-classical paradigm  and 
positioned technological innovation at the heart of economic analysis. As late as 
in the 1960s, neo-classical economics took the im portance of innovation on board 
arguing that state intervention aim ing at prom oting science can be justified if 
understood as a public good. In 1984 Rosenberg and Kline offered a different 
fram ework, w here innovation is conceived as a learning process.
The previous sections argued that innovation is im portant to econom y and 
society. I here look at the above m entioned different paradigm s w ith  a view  to 
show  the diverse options available to law  and policy as to the w ays innovation 
m ay be fostered.
41 The exact phases and what happens within them are subject to debate. I adopt Landes' 
chronology, ibid.
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1. Schumpeter and the technological imperative
Schumpeter w as strongly influenced by M arx's analysis.42 H e reiterated 
that technological change is the 'the fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the 
capitalist engine in motionZ43 He thus understood economic activity as functioning 
according to a technological teleological imperative. Therefore, for firms to 
survive they m ust engage in technological innovation. Unlike Marx, Schumpeter 
argued that new technologies continuously come into existence, form ing a 
sequence of techno-economic paradigm s, it being a process that results in the 
destruction of the old economic structure incessantly bringing about a new  one.
He terms this process 'creative destruction' and understands it as being an 
essential com ponent of capitalism.44 Transitions are not easy, b u t in  times of 
economic upheaval and in the face of uncertainty entrepreneurs discover new  
value, engage in new  types of investm ent and  bring about new  innovations.45
Schum peter reacted to the neo-classical static m odel of com petition to 
argue that com petition should be viewed as a dynam ic event and  not as a state of 
affairs, focusing on the behaviour of firms and not on m arket structure, as
42 Rosenberg, N. (1986) ’Schumpeter and Marx: How common a vision?’ in MacLeod, R. M. (ed)
(1986) Technology and the Human Prospect (London: Pinter), at p. 197-213; Elliott, J. (1980) ’Marx 
and Schumpeter on capitalism's creative destruction: A comparative restatement' 95 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 45-68, at p. 45-68; Catephores, G. (1994) ’The imperious Austrian: Schumpeter 
as bourgeois Marxist’ (1994) 205 New Left Review 3-30.
43 Schumpeter, J. A. (seventh ed 1987) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: Unwin 
Paperbacks, orig. 1942), at p. 83.
44 ibid.
45 Schumpeter predicted that capitalism would be replaced by socialism. 'The capitalist process not 
only destroys its own institutional framework but it also creates the conditions for another.... The outcome 
of the process is not simply a void that could be filled by whatever might happen to turn up; things and 
souls are transformed in such a way as to become increasingly amenable to the socialist form of life... In 
both of these respects Marx's vision was right' ibid, at p. 162. The argument to this conclusion is 
found in Chapters 11 -14, but this chapter will not elaborate further on Schumpeter's position on 
this as it falls outside its scope.
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otherwise economic theory w ould fail to come to grips w ith  reality and in 
particular w ith technological innovation.
This is because Schumpeter thought that technological progress is possible 
in w hat neo-classical economists describe as an inefficient economic 
environm ent, and stressed that com petition is a dynam ic process, in the course of 
w hich entrepreneurs seek new  profit opportunities in a w orld of constant change. 
Therefore, profits should not necessarily be considered as inefficiencies, bu t as 
entrepreneurs' response to changing m arket, organisational and  technological 
conditions.
It is im portant to note here that Schum peter saw innovation as the 
introduction of decisively new products. He defined the innovation process as in 
invention, a process of discovery of new  technical principles, innovation, a process 
of developm ent of an invention into a basically commercial form, diffusion, or the 
spread of an innovation into commercial use.46
As m entioned, Schum peter supported the view  that price com petition is 
less im portant than innovative products and  processes, w hich m ay require 
significant resources.47 But, w hat w ould then be the role of law  in this process? If
46 Smith, K. (2002) 'Measurement of innovation in Europe: Concepts, experience and results' 
Observatoire des Sciences et des Technologies (OST, Canda) Working Paper No. 17 (March 2002).
47 Schumpeter, J. A. (1983) The Theory of Economic Development: An inquiry into Profits, Capital, 
Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle (New Brunswick; Transaction Books, orig. 1934), at p. 61-67 
and 90-94. Schumpeter was influenced by Marx's analysis, as the latter author insisted on the 
importance of technological advance as being an essential element of competition among firms; 
Littlechild, S. C. (second ed 1986) The Fallacy of the Mixed Economy: An 'Austrian' Critique of Recent 
Economic Thinking and Policy (London: Institute of Economic Affairs); Hayek, F. A. (1949) 
Individualism and Economic Order (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), especially see Chapter 5 The 
meaning of competition, at p. 92-106;
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governm ents intervene to reduce the profits of winners, this m ay reduce the 
incentive for existing and prospective firms to innovate.48
The fact that he positioned innovation as central to understanding the 
function of the economy influenced both  the neo-classical thinking and  the chain 
linked m odel of innovation. The following will look into this.
2. Innovation as a process and as a good
In view of the above, neoclassical innovation theories took on board the 
im portance of innovation 49 However, in this m odel technology is equated w ith 
'science/ Therefore the argum ent is that if a m arket failure is identified, public 
financing m ay be required.50 This is m ost likely to be expected in fundam ental 
research, as at this stage the produced know ledge m ay be conceived as a public 
good.51
48 The focus of this approach is nonetheless different from the hands-off approach propagated by 
the Chicago school. While Schumpeter stressed the importance of giving entrepreneurs the 
incentive to innovate, the proponents of the Chicago school argue that regulation is not required 
since market foreclosure and monopoly power may be short lived, as markets behave as if they 
are competitive and are in long rim equilibrium. Nonetheless, both schools of thought stress that 
innovation may flourish in concentrated markets. Therefore, competition policy should not only 
base its analysis on the notion of market share, as production efficiency may require large firms, 
and as such a highly concentrated industry can be efficient. Moreover, monopoly power may be 
an incentive to engage in innovation, so governments should be careful not to take away this 
incentive, Audretsch, D. B., Baumol, W. J. and Burke, A. E. (2001) 'Competition policy in dynamic 
markets' 19 International Journal of Industrial Organization 613-634; Posner, R. A. (1979) 'The 
Chicago school of economic analysis' 127 University of Pennsylvania Law Journal 925-952. Posner, R. 
(fifth ed 1998) Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Aspen Law & Business).
49 Hofer R. and Polt, W. (1962) 'Evolutionary innovation theory and innovation policy: An 
overview' in A new economic paradigm? Innovation-based evolutionary systems, Discussions in 
Science and Innovation 4, An Occasional Paper in a Series on Australia's Research and Technology and 
their Utilization Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Science and Technology Policy 
Branch, at p. 12, citing Arrow, K. J. (1962) 'Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention' (National Bureau of Economic Research) and Stiglitz, J. E. (1993) Information and 
Economic Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
50 Baldwin, R., Hood, C. and Scott, C. (eds) (1998) A Reader on Regulation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press).
51 Hofer and Polt note 49 above.
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Yet, the im portance of innovation has also been acknow ledged by  a 
different theoretical paradigm : The 'chain-linked model of innovation' as developed 
by Rosenberg and Kline.52 This fram ework of analysis though stands critical to 
both  the understanding of innovation as science and  to the separation betw een 
innovation and diffusion processes, by  em phasising the role of 'tacit' and  'non- 
scientific' know ledge in production.
Following this line of thinking, Rosenberg and Kline argued that 
innovation is not a linear process, bu t one involving m any interactions and 
feedbacks, as innovation does not only depend on invention processes (in the 
sense of discovery of new  principles), bu t stressed the im portance of different 
form s of knowledge, for example production know -how  at the level of 
workforce.53
Hence, innovation is not conceived as being an isolated event, b u t is 
influenced by the w ider environment. Firms then are thought to be active 
participants in learning, as every firm has its ow n culture consisting of routines 
and  ideas of best practice, which influence the w ays that new  scientific ideas are 
understood and thus affect the direction and quality of innovation. This is w hy, 
understanding the im portance of the cultural background of a firm  as in practices 
that endure through time, is valuable in order to explain differences in 
perform ance and quality in respect to technological innovation am ongst 
countries.
52 Kline, S. J. and Rosenberg, N. (1986) 'An overview of innovation' in Landau, R. and Rosenberg, 
N. (eds) (1986) The Positive Sum Strategy: Harnessing Technology for Economic Growth (Washington, 
D.C: National Academy Press), at p. 275-305.
53 ibid.
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Therefore, 'the role of institutions, understood as firms, universities, research 
institutes, standards and technology transfer agencies, is highlighted since they are seen 
as constituting both the collective memory of past knowledge received and processed and 
the guardians of routines for handling and processing new informationZ54
Hence, the chain linked m odel of innovation is concerned w ith  providing 
incentives and pu tting  in place procedures, w hich w ould  enable the participation 
of various agents. Thus, policies should no t concern themselves w ith  the 
production of a particular product (for example microelectronics) b u t should 
prom ote education, p u t in place processes that w ould  aim  at establishing 
consensus as to the developm ent and im plem entation of technologies, and 
support experimental behaviour, for example in new  types of industrial 
organisation.55
54 Peterson, J. and Sharp, M. (1998) Technology Policy in the European Union (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan), at p. 48
55 Hofer and Polt note 49 above.
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B. THE STORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE OBJECTIVE OF 
MARKET INTEGRATION AND THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
By the 1960s Europe had  experienced two w orld w ars and successive 
clusters of innovations, the last being m arked by the invention and use of the 
transistor in 1948 and of the electric circuit on a chip. Technological progress had  
proven to transform  the m ode of living and thinking about the world.
At the theoretical level, com peting economic paradigm s lent them selves to 
understanding its im portance in different ways, although the neo-classical 
m odel, which represented the orthodoxy in the field, d id  not em brace its 
im portance in the fundam ental w ay that the Schum peterian and  the chain linked 
m odels of innovation did. Moreover, innovation could be conceived as being 
both  the product of scientific research produced in laboratories and the result of 
m inor modifications introduced by skilled w orkers in the w orkplace on the basis 
of tacit knowledge.
All these called attention to two fundam ental understandings: First, 
innovation is good for the economy and for society. Second, there are various 
w ays to prom ote it. For example, prom oting innovation can be done either 
directly by financing certain sectors of the economy w ith  the aim  to support a 
particular product, or indirectly, by prom oting collaboration, education, 
experimental behaviour and the exchange of knowledge by means of pu tting  in 
place neutral and objective processes aim ing at establishing consensus as to the 
developm ent and im plem entation of technologies.
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However, understanding how  the above perspectives acquired m eaning in 
the context of the European Union, requires looking into its political and  legal 
traditions. To this effect, the following will look at m arket integration as 
understood through the lenses of Jean M onnet's technocracy discourse prom oting 
expertise, elites and  functional interm ediation during  the early steps of 
liberalisation.
I here also discuss the influence of ordoliberalism in the early days of the 
European Com m unity, as it presents an alternative m odel of regulatory law 
based on the deploym ent of neutral and  objective procedures indirectly 
intervening in the economy. Finally, I look at the historical conjunction of events 
leading to efforts to create the common m arket and  the single m arket in Europe.
1. Ordoliberalism and market integration
The early days of European integration w ere considerably influenced by  
ordoliberalism, a school of thought established in Germ any in the 1930s. According 
to this school, economic phenom ena were thought to be form ed through political 
and  legal decision-making. The proponents of this theory, called ordoliberals, 
stood between the W estern and Soviet economic m odels to offer an alternative 
vision of liberalism, w hich sought to equally constrain private and  public 
pow er.56
Ordoliberal thinking w as elaborated at a tim e w hen G erm any w as 
w itnessing the catastrophic influence of private pow er during the W eim ar
56 Gerber note 21 above, at p. 239.
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period, therefore, the neutral and objective character of law w as seen as 
safeguarding against such abuse.57 Com ing to grips w ith  the role of law  in this 
fram ework requires first looking into the three m ain notions found at its heart: 
'Isolating abstraction,' 'thinking in orders' and 'economic constitution/
Eucken, one of the founders of this school of thought, attacked the 
historical m ethod, w hich w as prom inent in Germ any at the time, as 'economic 
reality compels the economist to formulate his first main problem as a historical one, but 
it also forces him in quite another direction.'58 Therefore, 'the simple direct 
contemplation of the facts of economic history'59 w as thought no t to be enough.
Economic reality partly  reveals itself by m eans of observing the everyday 
life of a household or a firm in a given place and  at a given time. Yet, such 
observations should serve as the basis for the deduction of abstract principles, 
w ith  the aim  of building ideal types for a particular society. It is only by  v irtue of 
'isolating abstraction,' the abstraction of especially 'significant characteristics,'60 that 
economic phenom ena can be truly explained. He therefore claimed that any
57 Walter Eucken, Franz Bohm and Hans Grosmann-Doerth are the founding members of the 
Freiburg school in the 1930s. Gerber notes that the Freiburg school is closely associated with Von 
Hayek's neo-liberalism and the idea of social market economy, although they present very 
different theoretical paradigms, for the former sees no role for the state to maintain competition, 
while the latter lays emphasis on the re-distributional role of the state, see Gerber above note 21, 
at p. 234, 236-237. But, it was while at Chicago that Hayek wrote what many consider his 
outstanding work, The Constitution of Liberty, published in 1960. In it, he further developed one of 
his most important themes: Laissez-faire was not enough. Government did have a clear role: 
Ensuring the development and maintenance of the institutions -- the laws and rules — that would 
ensure a competitive economy. However, Hayek also put emphasis on that governments did not 
have the necessary information to take decisions, see Hayek, F. A. (1960) The Constitution of Liberty 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).
58 Eucken, W. (1950) The Foundations of Economics: History and Theory in the Analysis of Economic 
Reality (London, Edinburg, Glasgow: William Hodge and Company Limited, orig. 1940), at p. 37.
59 ibid, at p. 38.
60 ibid, at p. 326
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attem pt to form ulate independent theories of production, exchange, distribution, 
and consum ption m ust be abandoned.61
'Ordnungstheorie' or 'thinking in orders' is a concept that interw eaves w ith 
isolating abstraction. Eucken recognises that there are two fundam ental orders: 
The transaction economy characterised by  economic freedom and the centrally 
administered economy characterised by organised economic activity.62 Choosing 
betw een one of these fundam ental orders requires adopting adequate measures 
to im plem ent its operating principle.
This is because w hen elements from  the two orders are mixed, then it 
w ould  fail to fulfil its promises and w ould  result in an economic disaster. This 
w ould happen, for example, if governm ental intervention were to be introduced 
to a system  of transaction economy, as, at the heart of the 'transaction economy' 
order, is the notion of economic competition. In other w ords, these tw o orders are 
thought to be incompatible, and the first step to explain economic failures 
requires recognising this.63
Nevertheless, ordoliberals argued that the economic system  could not be 
left to function w ithout constraints. They claimed that societies need an economic 
as m uch as they need a political Constitution, thus linking the legal to the 
economic system. Therefore, although they supported the idea of a m arket 
economy, they did not believe that m arkets just happen, bu t presuppose a set of 
political choices that make them  happen.64 Hence, the legal system  m ust create the
61 ibid, at p. 304-320
62 ibid.
63 ibid.
64 Gerber note 21 above, at p. 254 and 264.
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conditions to allow the chosen economic order to function effectively, and  w ould 
thus indirectly intervene in the function of open m arkets.65
If the desired order is a transaction m arket economy, then an  economic 
Constitution should be p u t in place to safeguard basic principles such as m onetary 
stability, open m arkets, private property, contractual freedom, liability and 
policy consistency,66 while regulatory principles (such as com petition law) 
flowed from and im plem ented the above m entioned constitutive principles.
Com petition law  in particular w as central to the ordoliberal vision, as anti- 
m onopoly policy w as thought to be at the heart of the economic system, since 
any other policies aim ing at fostering com petition could not be effective if firms 
w ould  raise barriers to entry or fix prices.67
The ordoliberal thinking thus endorsed the basic liberal m andate, which 
provides that economic freedom  is a right and  law  should p u t in place 
democratic institutions allowing for the participation of citizens in the decision 
m aking process. However, governm ental pow er and private pow er w ere view ed 
as being equally potentially dangerous. The former could curb the freedoms of 
individuals while the latter, in the form of big business, could equally hinder 
social integration around the principles of equal participation and  fairness.68
The law  w as then seen as safeguarding against abuses of pow er by both 
the sovereign and private forces. Central to this w as the assum ption that law is 
neutral and objective, functioning to pu t in place the structural conditions that
65 ibid, at p. 247,248, 264 and 347.
66 ibid, at p. 248.
67 ibid, at p. 250, citing Eucken, W., Eucken E. and Hensel, K. P. (1990) Grundsdtze der 
Wirtschaftspolitik (Tubingen: Mohr, sixth ed), at p. 251.
68 ibid, at p. 240-241
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w ould  allow the sm ooth function of the economy, hence its indirect character in 
regulating the economy.69
Gerber notes that m any Germ ans associated w ith or sharing an 
appreciation of ordoliberalism  were influential at the early stages of the 
form ation of EU economic policy.70 In particular, Hallstein w as one of the 
founders of the EEC Treaties and served as the first President of the European 
Commission. He had  been a law professor in Germany, being deeply influenced 
by  the ideas of Eucken and  being closely acquainted w ith Bohm and  Kronstein, 
tw o prom inent m em bers of the Freiburg school. Gerber argues that H allstein was 
clearly pursuing ordoliberal goals during the early attem pts to integrate m arkets 
in Europe.71
Moreover, von der Groeben w as one of the two drafters of the Spaak 
report, upon which the Treaties of Rome w ere based.72 Finally, M uller-Armack 
also exerted im portant influence in early policy making. He w as the founding 
father of the social market economy circle of intellectuals, a m ovem ent closely 
associated w ith  ordoliberals.73 He w as w orking for the Germ an governm ent, 
being responsible for Com m unity matters.
69 ibid, at p. 248, citing Bohm, F. (1937) Die Ordnung der Wirtschaft als geschichtliche Aufgabe und 
Rechtsschdpferische Leistung (Stuttgart: [s.n.]), at p. 7-9.
70 ibid, at p. 263.
71 ibid, at p. 264, citing Hallstein, W. (1972) Europe in the Making (London: Allen and Unwin; New 
York: Norton, orig. 1969), at p. 28: 'What the Community is integrating is the role of the state in 
establishing the framework within which economic activity takes place.'
72 ibid, at p. 263
73 ibid. There are differences between Muller-Armack's position and ordoliberals. Muller-Armack 
thought that social policies (such as co-determination of workers, progressive taxation, social 
transfers, minimum wages, subsidies for small and medium sized firms, subsidies for housing, or 
business-cycle stabilisation) should be provided for, while for Eucken social justice would be the 
consequence of a competitive order, see Wohlgemuth, M. (2002) 'Unification, Integration, 
Globalisation: The German social market economy facing a threefold challenge' working paper
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Although the creation of a com m on m arket in Europe has different 
underpinnings as w e will see in the following sections, ordoliberal thought was 
well suited to accommodate the pursu it of European integration through the 
creation of a common m arket based on the idea of a com petitive m arket 
economy, since such a position w as already central to ordoliberalism .74
2. The Common Market
The first attem pt to integrate m arkets in Europe w as in 1951, w hen the 
European Coal and  Steel Com m unity (ECSC) w as established by  France, 
Germ any, Italy and  the Benelux countries (Belgium, N etherlands and 
Luxemburg).75 This first form of co-operation came as a reaction to the havoc the 
Second W orld W ar inflicted upon Europe. The text of the Treaty w as based on a 
proposal by the French foreign minister, Schumann, w as drafted by  M onnet, a 
key figure in French politics,76 and w as underlined by the endeavour to deter 
disputes over scarce resources such as coal and steel.
The institutions p u t in place were: The High Authority, consisting of nine 
independent appointees of the six m em ber states (MS). This institution was 
m eant to be the m ain executive body w ith  decision-making pow ers and 
responsibility to im plem ent the Treaty. The Assembly, com prising of national 
Parliam ent delegates, The Council, whose m em bers w ere representatives of
Walter Eucken Institut, Freiburg and University of Witten/Herdecke., draft available at 
http://www.ciper.org/files/Wohlgemuth.pdf, (web page visited on 14 May 2003).
74 Gerber note 21 above, at p. 264.
75 Craig, P. and de Burca, G. (third ed 2003) EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (New York: Oxford 
University Press), at p. 7-10.
76 ibid. Monnet was influential in convincing the Americans to adopt the Marshall Plan to help 
rebuild Europe. The Monnet Plan was the French implementation of the Marshall Plan.
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national governments, and finally, a Court of Justice to interpret the provisions of 
the Treaty.77
The Treaties of Rome re-presented a later effort to foster co-operation on a 
larger scale. They were signed in 1957 and followed very m uch the institutional 
pattern  introduced to the ECSC. The significance of these Treaties lies on that a 
new  notion, 'common market,' w as for the first time employed. Spaak, the Belgian 
prim e minister, prepared a report, which proposed the European Atomic Energy 
C om m unity and the European Economic Com m unity. As a result of the Treaties 
entering in force, a regulated common m arket was established, w hich w as to 
function on the basis of purely economic criteria aim ing at prom oting m arket 
integration and elim inating tariffs and barriers to entry.
The common m arket w ould share the Assembly and the C ourt of Justice 
w ith  the ECSC, bu t a separate Council of M inisters and  a separate executive 
body, the Commission, w as p u t in place. Institutional rebalancing w as required 
though, as the new  com m on m arket w ould include economic activity in general, 
and  not only activity em erging from the coal and steel sectors. Therefore, the 
Council w ould have to approve all legislative proposals by  the European 
Commission, bu t the latter body, set at a supranational level, w as entrusted w ith 
the task of policy initiation, was the 'w atchdog ' of the Treaties and the negotiator 
of international agreements on its behalf.78
Nonetheless, it w ould  be w rong to consider that the first efforts to 
integrate m arkets in Europe were underlined by consensus as to the m erits of the
77 ibid, at p. 10-12.
78 ibid, at p. 12.
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liberal m andate to foster economic competition. M any Europeans saw  economic 
integration as the w ay to generate economic wealth, since national m arkets were 
too small to support economies of scale. Close to this was the idea that firms 
w ould  then have the necessary size to compete internationally.
Thus, economic integration was seen as the necessary prerequisite to 
com pete w ith  the Americans.79 In other w ords, m any Europeans back in the 
'foundational period'80 saw economic integration as the m eans to deal w ith  the 
economic and political pow er of the USA. Therefore, the notion of common 
m arket w ould encompass m ore considerations that the ones that purely  link to 
the com petition process per se.81
A n alternative framework, which w as particularly influential in the early 
days of the Com m unity, can be found in w hat has been term ed as the 'Jean 
Monnet approach.'82 The following will look into this.
3. Monnet and the 'technocracy discourse' of the early days of the 
Community
M onnet w as a key figure in French politics after the Second W orld War. In 
1945 the Monnet Plan provided that key sectors of the French economy, such as
79 Gerber note 21 above, at p. 348.
80 This term has been employed by Gerber, above note 21, at p. 346, who borrowed it from Weiler, 
see Weiler, J. H. H. (1991) 'The transformation of Europe' 100 Yale Law Journal 2403-2483.
81 ibid.
82 This idea is loosely based on Joerges' analysis, who acknowledges the importance of the 
intellectual frameworks provided by ordoliberalism and administrative functionalism in feeding 
into present models of governance in the EU, see Joerges, C. (2000) 'Conceptualising governance 
for the European "Gropraum' paper presented at 'Perceptions of Europe and Perspectives on a 
European Order in Legal Scholarship During the Era of Fascism and National Socialism' 
workshop at the European University Institute, Friday 29 September - Saturday 30 September 
2000.
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transportation, coal, electricity, steel and agricultural m echanisation, required 
reconstruction. The p lan  thus set goals for the French economy to accomplish by 
1950.
Later, fuel and  fertilisers were added to the list. U nder the M onnet Plan, in 
each key sector the details of the planning w ere left to the m odernisation 
com m ittees consisting of representatives of the Planning Commission. The key 
institution w as the Commissariat General du Plan, w hich w as a small and flexible 
adm inistration co-ordinating technical studies and organising the consultation of 
all parties involved. Committees of civil servants, the industry, scientific 
institutions, all presented opinions and tried to reach consensus incorporated in a 
Plan. However, this w as not binding bu t the governm ent w as responsible to 
adopt and  im plem ent it. This process came to be know n as 'planification.'83
Featherstone traces the origins of the M onnet Plan back to the French 
'dirigiste' tradition and to new  economic thinking.84 As for the former, it refers to 
the tradition of central governm ental planning in French history, from  the reign 
of Louis XIV to the present day. In its narrow er sense, 'dirigisme' refers to the 
governm ent's role in directing the French economy since 1945.85 This term  
interw eaves w ith  the notion of a strong, prestigious, cohesive and  above all
83 The General Planning Commissariat (Commissariat General au Plan, CGP) was created by Jean 
Monnet in 1947, as a small permanent body of expert civil servants attached to the Prime 
Minister's office and responsible for drawing up the Five-Year Plan, see Estrin, S. (1983) French 
Planning in Theory and Practice (London: Allen and Unwin).
84 Featherstone, K. (1994) 'Jean Monnet and the democratic deficit in the European Union' 32 
Journal of Common Market Studies 149-170, at p. 155.
85 Carlberg, R. (2001) "The persistence of the dirigiste model: Wireless spectrum allocation in 
Europe a la Francaise' 54 Federal Communications Law Journal 130-163, at p. 134.
90
Innovation, Economy, Polity and the European Experience
autonom ous from societal influences bureaucracy, w ith  prestigious schools being 
entrusted w ith  the production of the adm inistrative elite.86
Indeed, the M onnet Plan both  stressed the im portance of expertise and 
w as 'dirigiste/ in the sense that it favoured specific sectors of the economy. But, it 
also exhibited corporatist elements,87 as it p rovided  that policy-m aking w ould  be 
form ed by bringing together interested parties.88
U nderstanding the rationale that underlined the M onnet Plan in France is 
im portant, as it casts light on the ideas influential during  the early steps of the 
Com m unity. This is because the first attem pts to integrate m arkets in Europe 
bear the traces of the Monnet approach.89 As w e saw, the ECSC w as assisted by  an 
Assembly, which had  little pow er, mainly advisory and supervisory, w hile the 
H igh A uthority w as entrusted w ith  regulating the lim ited areas of policy falling 
w ithin  its supranational competences.
86 Gerber note 21 above, at p. 182.
87 For an introduction to corporatism see Katzenstein, P. J. (1985) "The historical origins of 
democratic corporatism' in Katzenstein, P. J. (1985) Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy 
in Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press).
88 Featherstone note 84 above.
89 Cini, M. (1996) The European Commission. Leadership, Organisation and Culture in the EU  
Administration (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press; New York: St. Martin's 
Press). Jean Monnet's approach is associated with 'functionalist integration,' see Mazey, S. (2001) 
'European integration: Unfinished journey or journey without end?' in Richardson, J. (ed) (second 
ed 2001) European Union: Power and Policy-Making (London: Routledge), at p. 27-50. At p. 28, the 
author characterises European integration as basically functionalistic, but also as being 
underlined by ambiguity: 'The "Community method" of functional integration advocated by Jean 
Monnet was an ingenuous device; crucially it enabled the (federalist inclined) founding fathers of European 
integration to side-step the politically intractable barrier of national sovereignty. Then, as now, there was 
no consensus over the precise form that European co-operation should take. The founding Treaties o f the 
European Communities did not resolve this issue; rather they represented an ambiguous compromise 
between intergovemmentalists and European federalists involved in the post-war debate on European co­
operation. The former viewed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM ) created by the Treaties, as 
functional agencies charged only with the coordination of national, economic strategies in designated 
sectors. However, European federalists hoped that these agencies would, over time, provide the basis for a 
more comprehensive kind of political integration.'
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This body w as structured along the lines of the French adm inistration.90 
Nevertheless, M onnet preferred small flexible structures. He asserted that the 
supranational competencies of the H igh A uthority could be best exercised by 
small teams, 'as a few  hundreds of European civil servants would be enough to set 
thousands of national experts to work.'91
Moreover, the perm anent staff w ould have to be assisted by national 
experts w ho w ould  spend small periods in the H igh Authority. The same 
rationale w as carried over to the new  institution, the European Commission, 
which w as p u t in place to support the creation and regulation of a com m on 
m arket as propagated by  the Treaties of Rome.
As Cini argues 'the discourse underpinning the new European Commission was 
that of the High Authority. This was a discourse that emphasised the importance of 
efficiency, expertise, elites and functional interest intermediation-one that had little to say 
on the subject of democratic accountability and democratic representation: One which we 
might call a 'technocracy discourse.'92
4. The Single European Act
The creation of a European common m arket encountered great resistance, 
as m em ber states, such as France, were not ready to give up sovereign control of
90 Featherstone note 84 above.
91 Page, E. G. (1997) People Who Run Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press), at p. 5
92 Cini, M. 1996) 'Organisational culture and reform: The case of the European Commission under 
Jacques Santer' EUI Working Paper EC (1996/00/25).
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resources to a supranational entity.93 Despite the above, things changed in the 
1980s and the Single European Act (SEA) entered in force in 1987.
Its prim ary objective w as to progressively establish an internal m arket 
w ithin a five years period of time. The SEA presented an opportunity  to 
overcome the crises, w hich have accompanied the creation of the 'common market' 
since 1951-57.94 Yet again, the role of the Parliam ent was limited. It w as no t until 
the M aastricht Treaty (TEU) that this w as challenged. The difficulties that 
em erged during the negotiations of this Treaty showed that there w as popular 
disquiet w ith the fact that the European Union seemed to be obscure and  far from 
the peoples of Europe.95
Nevertheless, in the 1980s the notion of common market and single market 
w ere well em bedded in the discourse of co-operation at a European level. The 
concept of single m arket, as introduced in the late 1980s, provided that m arkets 
w ould be opened, while the free m ovem ent of people, goods, services and  capital 
w ould  be the operating principles upon w hich competitive m arkets w ould  
function.
All MS then accepted happily the new  prospect of economic co-operation. 
One reason for this m ay be that there w as a w idespread feeling in Europe that
93 The 1960s signified an intergovernmental turn in the history of the European Union. De Gaulle 
in France supported the Luxembourg Accords, which required that unanimity (when required to 
reach decision) in the Council could be challenged if a national interest was at stake. This in 
essence meant that qualified majority voting became the norm and unanimity the exception, a 
development that marked a return to intergovemmentalism, see Craig and de Burca note 75 
above, at p. 13.
94 ibid, at p. 19-21.
95 Cini note 92 above, at p. 8.
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the global challenge w as too big to be taken independently by MS.96 Another 
explanation m ay be that there were considerable am biguities as to the m ain 
objectives of the Treaty and as to the m eans to attain  these.97 Britain for example 
conceived the SEA as a liberal charter, w hereas some com m entators questioned 
the feasibility of fulfilling economic objectives w ithout addressing social issues, 
as the two necessarily interweave.98
Yet, despite differences, consensus w as established as to the virtues of 
economic co-operation.
96 This line of thinking is repeated in recent documents by the European Commission, see for 
example the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
Committee of Regions and the Economic and Social Committee COM (1998) 718 of 20 January 
1999 on the Competitiveness of European Enterprises on the Face of Globalisation-How It Can Be 
Encouraged.
97 Craig and de Burca note 75 above, at p. 21.
98 ibid, citing Weiler note 80 above.
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C. SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE LIBERALISATION OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND PRO-COMPETITIVE 
COLLABORATION
Expertise, m arket integration and ordoliberalism , all fed into conceptions 
that underlined the foundational period. M oreover, sudden technological 
advances and globalisation," gave rise to new  understandings as to the m erits of 
co-operation, providing the operating context of these ideas.
1. Liberalising Telecommunications: Early steps
In the 1980s the context had  become m uch different w ith globalisation and 
the increasing pace of innovation requiring new  approaches to competition. It 
has been noted that it w as then that for the first tim e Europe 'attempted to achieve 
with national champions regionally what has been accomplished up to now within nation 
states: Using high technology to build competitiveness.'100
Yet, at that time, telecommunication com panies were public utilities 
controlling networks, services and terminals. They were considered as natural 
monopolies, the theoretical premises of this position being that only one supplier
99 Globalisation is defined as a set of processes resulting in the interdependence of previously 
separate national economies due to increased cross border investment, the modernisation of 
infrastructures in telecommunications and transport, the emergence of information based 
economies, the number of alliances between firms, and finally the new regional and global 
projects to free trade, such as the NAFTA and WTO, see Peterson and Sharp note 54 above, at p. 
17
100 On the attempts of Europe at a regional level to catch up with new developments in the high- 
tech industry see Sandholtz, W. (1992) High-tech Europe. The Politics of International Cooperation 
(Berkeley: University of California Press).
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should be left to enter the m arket, as com petition w ould be disastrous for 
competitors.
However, the underpinnings of natural m onopoly theory were not 
satisfied anymore, as digitalisation (in the form  of digital switches sending and 
receiving information), fibre optics and satellite transm ission, allowed for an 
enorm ous increase in the capacity of netw orks now  carrying both  voice and data. 
In this context, bo th  Japan and USA in the 1980s carried out regulatory reforms 
that allowed telecommunication companies to enter new  m arkets and  compete 
internationally.
In the light of the above, business and  users associations, began lobbying 
for liberalisation. Drahos and Braithwaite argue that one of the m ost prom inent 
features characterising the conduct of these groups w as their ability to organise 
in netw orks in order to prom ote the deregulation agenda. Hence, the 
International Telecommunications Users G roup (INTUG), w hich w as form ed in  
Europe in 1974, had  23 national Telecommunication Users G roups (TUGs) as 
m embers, 50 m ultinationals (MNEs), and about 20 academic and individual 
m em bers.101
W hen INTUG w as established, prom inent m em bers of it were American 
Express and the Bank of America, while tw o-thirds of its funds came directly 
form  MNE members. Even though INTUG w as established in Europe, its 
leadership w as dom inated by US companies and ideas. So the European Council
101 Braithwaite and Drahos note 6 above, at p. 342. The authors further argue that MNEs became 
members of national business organisations in order to support the deregulation agenda. The 
Bank of America, for instance, became a member of the Telecommunications Managers 
Association, the British Association and the British National Committee of the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), which is a world business organisation.
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of Telecommunications Users Associations (ECTUA) w as founded in order to 
present its European m em bers' interests in policy debates.102
Drahos and  Braithwaite capture the strategies em ployed by 
telecom m unication users organisations during  the very early stages of the 
deregulation m ovem ent to push  for user-oriented regulation, use of netw orks on 
a non-discrim inatory basis and freedom  of equipm ent choice. To this effect, they 
cite an  interview  w ith  INTUG chairm an Ernst Weiss in 1984, w ho said that
We are working in the corridors of power to gain acceptance for these points and 
to press their practical interpretation with the appropriate bodies involved with these 
issues. Specifically on the question of regulatory controls and monopoly authorities we 
are pressing our views with the OECD on non-discriminatory access to networks. We 
have a work group to carry out lobbying activity in the EEC. For maximum freedom of 
user choice of equipment, we have representatives working in a joint committee with the 
ICC. In addition INTUG is taking an increasingly active role in CCIT study group with 
our experienced delegation.103
Drahos and Braithwaite argue that user pressure w as so im portan t that the 
current degree of deregulation w ould  not have been accom plished w ithout it. Up 
until the 1980s, telecommunications w as not on the supranational agenda of the 
EC, and cooperation took place in an organisation outside the EC, the Conference 
Europeenne des A dm inistrations des Postes et des Telecom munications (CEPT). 
CEPT w as the m eeting point of m inisters responsible for public
102 ibid.
103 ibid.
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telecommunications companies (PTTs) and w as highly intergovernm ental in 
nature.104
The first m oderate steps as regards closer co-operation and liberalisation 
were taken between 1979 and 1987.
2. Pre-competitive collaboration: Esprit
The first initiatives at a European level to take advantage of the new  
opportunities presented by inform ation technology, and  thus foster innovation 
and  competitiveness, were presented by program m es, such as Esprit and Race, 
that urged European companies to collaborate in  R&D. Davignon, the 
Commissioner responsible for the internal m arket and  industrial affairs from 
1977 to 1981 and for both  industry and science and  technology from 1981 to 1985, 
w as the one w ho envisaged that national governm ents, the European 
Com m ission and  the industry could w ork together in order to foster the 
com puter and telecommunications industry in Europe.
After close collaboration w ith  industrialists, research laboratories and 
universities, the European Commission proposed a research program m e, the 
Esprit pilot phase, and announced that its m ain objective is to provide incentives, 
which w ould result in the production of technology in micro-electronics, 
software, office autom ation and inform ation processing, that w ould  allow 
com peting w ith the Japanese and the Americans.105
104 Thatcher note 5 above.
105 Peterson and Sharp note 54 above, at p. 166
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In particular, in 1980-81 Davignon invited the heads of Europe's leading 
electronics and Inform ation technology com panies the 'Big 12'106 to 'Round Table' 
meetings to discuss the establishm ent of a new  'precompetitive' research program  
based on collaboration am ong European companies, as well as w ith  universities 
and research institutes. The idea behind it w as that the Big 12 w ould  be able to 
exchange views and information. The Com m unity funded 50 per cent of the cost 
of the research and businesses show ed a high level of interest, as collaboration 
w as thought to im prove their competitiveness.
Esprit sought to foster pre-com petitive technology, thus avoiding the 
political and legal problem  that the initiation of a particular industrial policy 
from  the European Commission w ould  raise. M oreover, pre-com petitive 
technology w as defined as R&D that w ould  need five to ten years in  order to be 
commercialised. It w as then that the European Com m ission adopted  Regulation 
418/85, exem pting from article 81 of Com m unity com petition law  certain kinds 
of R&D collaboration.
The Regulation im posed a limit in the duration of the agreem ent and 
dictated that no exemption could be granted in cases where the com bined m arket 
share of firms that collaborate exceeded 20 per cent.107 The pilot program m e was 
accepted w ith  enthusiasm  and led to the signing of the m ain phase of the 
program  in June 1983, and the approval of a second phase in April 1988.
106 The Big 12 were ICL, GEC and Plessey from Britain; AEG, Nixdorf and Siemens from 
Germany; Thomson, Bull and CGE from France; Olivetti and STET from Italy; Philips from the 
Netherlands
107 Peterson and Sharp note 54 above, at p. 167-168.
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Following this, the Council asked the European Com m ission to make 
legislative proposals. However, up  until 1987 legislation d id  not have a binding 
character. The proposals drafted in 1980 provided for the harm onisation of 
standards and the liberalisation of m arkets for one type of term inal equipm ent, 
bu t the 1984 Recomm endation did no t have b inding effect.108
This initiative w as followed by a Council Directive on m utual recognition 
of standards of term inal equipm ent. A lthough these were m odest steps, they set 
the stage for liberalisation and  positioned the European Com m ission, national 
governm ents, PTTs and the industry  as im portant actors in a supranational 
arena.109
Certain ideas and  understandings crystallised at that time. Innovation 
w as conceived as im portant to economic welfare and  Esprit can be view ed in the 
context of pu tting  in place the right institutions to prom ote it through 
collaboration. Digitalisation had  changed the scene, while m arket integration was 
thought to be crucial in order to compete in the international arena.
Com petition law  w as em erging as a prom inent tool of regulation, while 
national cham pions had  largely failed.110 Finally, the European Commission
108 ibid.
109 ibid, at p. 5.
110 European political leaders in the 1960s attempted to use industrial policies at a national level 
that would improve their countries' competitiveness in the international arena: This was the time 
that the term 'national champions' was coined, see Gannon note 1 above. In France this idea took 
flesh by means of 'grand projets' aiming at promoting particular sectors of the economy. Generally, 
the idea of employing 'grand-projets' to promote information and communication technologies is 
associated with high-tech Colbertism. This is a term coined to describe interventionist policies, 
which aimed at influencing the conduct of the so-called industries of the future. The concept of 
general interest was though to include the shaping of future technologies. On these issues see 
Cohen, E. (1995) 'France: National champions in search of a mission' in Hayward, J. E. C. (ed) 
(1995) Industrial Enterprise and European Integration: From National to International Champions in 
Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press), at p. 29; Cohen, E. (1992) Le Colbertisme 'High- 
Tech': Economie des Telecom et des Grands Projets (Paris: Hachette); Ergas, H. (1987) 'The Importance
100
Innovation, Economy, Polity and the European Experience
established itself as a regulator in the field of telecom m unications regulation, 
bringing all interest together and providing expert knowledge. All these set the 
stage for telecommunications liberalisation, which w as an industry  at the heart of 
the inform ation society.
3. Telecommunications Liberalisation: The legal dimension
An Action Program  in 1983111 led to the drafting of a Green Paper in 1987 
on the liberalisation of the telecommunications industry, w hich again stressed 
the im portance of im proving competitiveness and achieve the internal m arket.112
The legal tools em ployed to open up  the relevant m arkets in Europe were 
Articles 81 [85], 82 [86] and  86 [90] of the EU Treaty. These Articles are the 
fundam ental articles of EU com petition law. U nder Article 81, the EU Treaty 
prohibits agreements, undertakings, decisions or practices, w hich m ay or in  fact 
affect trade w ithin the European Com m on M arket.113
However, 81 [85] (3) provides for the exem ption of an  activity from the 
prohibitions of the article, if the activity 'contributes to the production or distribution 
of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress.' Yet, restrictions to 
com petition m ust give consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit' and m ust be 
'indispensable to the attainment of objectives.'
of technology policy' in Dasgupta, P. and Stoneman, P. (eds) (1987) Economic Policy and 
Technological Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
111 Communication from the Commission to the Council on Telecommunications: Lines of Action, 
COM (83) 573 final.
112 Green Paper COM (87) of 30 June 1987 on the Development of a Common Market for 
Telecommunication Services and Equipment.
113 The numbers are those of the Amsterdam Treaty, pre-1999 numbers are in [], for example, 86 
[90] (3).
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Article 82 [86] prohibits a market actor from abusing a dominant position within 
the common market ‘in so far as it may affect trade between member states. ’ Article 86 
[90] applies the prohibitions of Articles 81 [85] and 82 [86] to ‘public undertakings and 
undertakings to which member states grant special or exclusive rights. ’ However, Article 
86 [90] (2) provides that market actors ‘entrusted with the operation o f services o f 
general economic in te r e s tshall benefit from a derogation of competition articles if 
application would obstruct the performance of the particular task assigned to them. 
Article 86 [90] (3) provides that the European Commission should ensure the application 
of the provisions of Article 86 [90] and shall, where necessary, address appropriate 
Directives or Decisions to Member States.114
In 1985, in British Telecommunications,115 the European C ourt of Justice 
(ECJ) decided that com petition applied in the telecom m unication sector and that 
the European Com m ission had  the exclusive right to decide on any derogation to 
be granted. The court affirmed that that the 'provision of a public network' could be 
considered as an activity of general economic interest, thus qualifying exem ption 
under Article 86 [90] (2) derogation, nevertheless recom m ended that Article 86 
[90] (2) should be narrow ly interpreted.116
As for the pow er to issue Directives under this Article, the controversial 
element is that they present an exceptional instance w hen the European 
Commission exercises legislative powers. The decision-making process stops at
114 http:/  /europa.eu.int/comm/competition/legislation/treaties/ec/art86 en.html.
115 OJ L 360/363 (1985).
116 ibid.
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the level of the College of Commissioners, as these Directives do no t have to go 
through the Council.117
This is the legal context that underpinned the European Com m ission's 
legislative initiative to draft the Terminal Equipm ent Directive118 and the 
Com petition in Services Directive in 1988,119 as provided in Article 86 [90] (3). 
The European Com m ission considered a step-by-step liberalisation and 
m aintained exclusive rights for the provision of infrastructure and voice 
telephony w ith  the prospect of liberalising them  eventually after having opened 
services and equipm ent to com petition first.
The Telecommunication Services Directive was challenged in the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) by several m em ber states, b u t the court 
confirmed both the legality of the Com petition in Services Directive and the 
European Commission's pow er to issue such directives and initiate action if MS 
do not comply.120
It has been argued that by issuing the Directive liberalising the term inal 
equipm ent supply m arket and by opening data and  value added  services to 
com petition under Article 86 [90] of the Treaty of Rome, the European 
Commission w ould avoid the possibility of the Council delaying it for years due 
to disagreem ent am ongst its members on the details.
117 Craig and de Burca note 75 above; Scott note 4 above.
118 Commission Directive 88/301/EEC of 16 May 1988 on Competition in the Markets in 
Telecommunications Terminal Equipment, OJ L 131,27 May 1988.
119 Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on Competition in the Markets for 
Telecommunications Services OJ L 192,24 July 1990.
120 Belgium, France, Italy and Spain all challenged the Services Directive. For the special role of 
the ECJ in the co-initiation of policies with the European Commission, see Flynn note 1 above; 
Sandholtz and Stone Sweet note 3 above, at p. 154.
103
Innovation, Economy, Polity and the European Experience
Therefore, although the European Com m ission claimed that it only acted 
in this w ay in order to ensure the effective application of Article 86 [90], some 
com m entators argued that it took the initiative to create industrial policy and 
open the m arket to liberalisation while there w as strong opposition to it.121
Thatcher though argues that w e should view the liberalisation of 
telecommunications in Europe as the result of a consensus established over time 
betw een the European Com m ission and national governments. D isquiet em erged 
as a result of disagreem ent as to the legal tools em ployed and as to the tim ing of 
liberalisation, not because of the actual decision to open m arkets in Europe.122
There w ere disagreem ents between MS from the South (for example 
France and M editerranean countries) and the North (for example Britain and 
West Germany), the latter favouring a liberal approach w hile the former 
exhibited protectionist tendencies.123 The liberals w anted fast and  extensive 
liberalisation, while the other group w anted re-regulation and  com pulsory 
standards.
A com promise w as achieved by agreeing to liberalise public voice 
telephony by 1998, give derogations to countries w ith  underdeveloped 
infrastructure and allow  the 'Southern' countries to im pose licence conditions for
121 Sandholtz W. and Zysman J. (1989) T992: Recasting the European bargain' 42 World European 
Politics 95-128; Schmidt, S. K. (1996) 'Sterile debates and dubious generalisations: European 
integration theory tested by telecommunications and electricity' 16 Journal of Public Policy 233-271, 
at p. 244; Fuchs, G. (1994) 'Policy-making in a system of multi-level governance. The Commission 
of the European Community and the restructuring of the telecommunications sector' 1 Journal 
European of Public Policy 177-194.
122 Thatcher note 104 above.
123 ibid, at p. 8.
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basic data services, while a small com m unity preference w as allow ed for public 
procurem ent (three per cent).124
M oreover, the 'Southern ' group of countries w anted to safeguard against 
the possibility of com petition harm ing public objectives. To this effect, the 1987 
Green Paper acknow ledged universal service as providing a legitimate reason to 
constrain competition, essential requirem ents, such as safety and protecting 
networks, were laid dow n, while MS were allow ed to regulate in order to ensure 
that these w ere fulfilled.125
Thus, while there w as consensus as to the basic idea of opening markets, 
the extent to w hich these w ould be opened w as subject to debate. But, above all, 
disquiet w as raised because of the form of legal instrum ents used to open 
markets. Even the British w ho favoured liberalisation opposed the em ploym ent 
of legal tools by  the European Commission in  order to push  it ahead.
The m ost controversial of Directives w as the Services Liberalisation 
Directive and  the opposition from  the Council w as unanim ous. Nonetheless, the 
European Commission further m ade it clear that it w ould no t tolerate PTTs 
blocking the opening of m arkets w hen it objected to the form ation of a joint 
venture am ong 22 PTTs in order to compete in the data and value-added services 
m arkets w ith Am erican companies.
In 1989, the European Commission adopted the Services Liberalisation 
Directive bu t delayed its application, while trying to w in support for it. Finally, 
in 1990, the Directive came in force as well as the O pen N etw ork Provision (ONP)
124 ibid.
125 ibid, at p. 7.
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Council Directive,126 while the latter w as regarded as crucial to the liberalisation 
process.127
However, the ONP Directive and  efforts to prom ote standardisation 
signified that de-regulation go hand in hand  w ith  re-regulation. This will be the 
focus of the next sections.
5. Re-regulation and harm onisation
We saw that considerable efforts w ere undertaken to introduce 
com petition and create the single m arket to services and equipm ent.128 
Nonetheless, regulation w as seen as playing a very im portant role. First, the 
Green Paper on the Liberalisation of Telecommunications Industry  called for 
following European or international standards for the sake of interoperability,129 
som ething that both  Esprit and Race130 aim ed at prom oting, by directing research 
to broadband com m unications' technology.131
126 Council Directive 90/387/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the Establishment of the Internal Market for 
Telecommunications Services through the Implementation of Open Network Provision OJ L192, 
24 July 1990
127 ibid.
128 See above note 118 and 119.
129 Mutual recognition depended on European standards set by CEPT and then adopted by the 
EC. This organisation though was dominated by PTTs. The result was that the process of 
adoption was very slow, Thatcher note 104 above, at p. 5.
130 The 1983 Communication, note 11 above, focused on the creation of a Community 
telecommunications market and endeavoured to promote standard setting that would guarantee 
the development of future networks. It then put in place a working group that planned the 
introduction of new technologies in the following 20 years, drew attention to the need to provide 
aid to less favoured regions and finally set a program for the development of future technologies. 
These were promoted in the mid-1980s by means of supporting information technologies 
(through the ESPRIT Programme) and subsequently by means of supporting the building of a 
digital and later a broadband telecommunications infrastructure (through research in Advanced 
Communications for Europe under RACE), see Communication from the Commission to the 
Council on Telecommunications: Lines of Action, COM (83) 573 final.
131 Peterson and Sharp note 54 above.
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In view  of PTTs' natural m onopoly, standard  setting132 w as controlled by 
them  at a national level, bu t any attem pt to open the telecom m unication m arket 
could be jeopardised w ithout com m on standards. Therefore, the European 
Com m ission furthered the policy that these should be prom oted in  order to 
bypass the problem  of national standards that inhibit trade in the 
telecom m unications market.
The European Commission thus recom m ended to the Council a Directive 
on the M utual Recognition of Type Approvals. MS w ould have to m utually  
recognise the standards in the types of term inal equipm ent approved by  the 
European Commission. The Council approved the Directive in 1986,133 and  thus 
opened the w ay for the preparation of a list of priorities for standardisation every 
year by to the European Commission.
In 1986, the Council drafted a decision on standardisation in the field of 
inform ation technology and telecom m unications134 acknow ledging that 
standardisation in the field w ould have to be prom oted through com petent
132'Standard' is a technical specification approved by a recognised standards body for repeated or 
continuous application, compliance with which is not compulsory; 'International standard' is a 
standard adopted by a recognised international standards body; 'Technical specifications' are 
specifications contained in a document which lays down the characteristics required of a product, 
such as levels of quality, performance, safety or dimensions, including the requirements 
applicable to the product as regards terminology, symbols, testing and test methods, packaging, 
marking or labelling; 'Common technical specification' is a technical specification drawn up with a 
view to uniform application in all Member States of the Community; For definitions see Council 
Decision 87/95/EEC of 22 December 1986 on Standardisation in the Field of Information 
Technology and Telecommunications Of L 36, 7 February 1987.
133 Council Directive 91/263/EEC of 29 April 1991 on the Approximation of Laws of Member 
States concerning Telecommunications Terminal Equipment, including the Mutual Recognition of 
their Conformity.
134 Council Decision 87/95/EEC of 22 December 1986 on Standardisation in the Field of 
Information Technology and Telecommunications OJ L 36, 7 February 1987. 'Information 
technology' has been defined in the document as the systems, equipment, components and 
software required to ensure the retrieval, processing and storage of information in all centres of 
human activity (home, office, factory, etc), the application of which generally requires the use of 
electronics or similar technology.
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European standards organisations and specialised technical bodies in  view  of the 
need to have com patible operating systems, exchange of inform ation and  data.
In the annex of the decision,135 the Council makes it specific that the policy 
furthered by the Decision aims, am ong other things, 'at contributing to the 
integration of the internal Community market in the information technology and 
telecommunications sector, and improving the international competitiveness of 
Community manufacturers by allowing for greater market uptake in the Community of 
equipment manufactured to recognised European and international standards.'136
The Green paper on the Liberalisation of Telecommunication M arkets also 
proposed the creation of an independent European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute137 w ith  netw ork operators, telecom users and  equipm ent 
m anufacturers being m em bers of the Institute. The Council approved the 
creation of ETSI, w hich w as created in 1988 and w ould w ork on priorities 
proposed by the European Commission.
One of the priorities proposed w as the Integrated Services Digital 
N etw ork (ISDN), as ISDN digital netw orks w ould be capable of carrying the 
future m ultim edia applications due to their capacity. Eventually, the Council 
approved a non-binding recom m endation on the future introduction of ISDN.138
135 ibid, Annex: Measures for Standardisation in the Field of Information Technology and 
Telecommunications.
136 ibid, at Section 1, setting the aims of the decision.
137 Another technical body on telecommunication standards set at European level was the 
European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT), but 'it lacked the 
permanent, specialised technical expertise and representation from the Telecommunication companies that 
the proposed ETSI would have,' see Sandholtz note 114 above, at p. 235
138 Council Recommendation 86/659/EEC of 22 December 1986 on the Coordinated Introduction 
of the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) in the European Community Of L 382, 31 
December 1986.
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This w ould  be developed in the pre-com petitive context of Race, which 
supported  the creation of broadband com m unication systems.
The recom m endation by the Council again raised the issue of international 
competitiveness and furthered the argum ent that ISDN could offer the 
opportunity  to adjust existing netw orks to future challenges that w ould  require 
them  to carry sound, text and picture.
Furtherm ore, the European Com m ission argued that a co-ordinated 
investm ent in ISDN w ould  allow the creation 'of a European market in telephone and 
data-processing terminals capable of creating, by virtue of its size, the indispensable 
development conditions which will enable the European telecommunications industries to 
maintain and increase their share of world marketsZ139
Standard setting is a direct w ay to influence the w ays that technology 
evolves and it has been part of the competitiveness policy of the European Union. 
A lthough the standard setting process w as seen as a pre-requisite to the creation 
of the single m arket in telecommunications, there are diverse opinions as to 
w hether standardisation really prom otes competitiveness, the argum ent being 
that no incentives are provided for innovation.
O n the other hand, open standards offer cheap products and m ay be seen 
as conducive to innovation, while proprietary standards 'lock' the market. 
Looking back at the tim e w hen IBM set the proprietary standard, we will see that
139 ibid.
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it w as the first to move in the m arket and thus set the pace for developm ent for 
the others w ho followed.140
In other w ords, although standards m ay seem to encapsulate the objective 
and uncontested tru th  of scientific claims, they are not value neutral as they 
prom ote a w ay to understand the role of technological innovation and  how  it 
should be diffused, and reflect a particular public policy approach. But, to this 
point I will return  later in the thesis.
6. More re-regulation
The European Com m ission w ould have to m onitor any abuse of dom inant 
position, cross-subsidisation of services and equipm ent and  discrim inatory 
granting of access to incum bents' networks. O pen N etw ork Provision (ONP) 
regulation w as a key concept to achieving the above as it required that service 
providers w ould have access to the netw ork anyw here in the EC on the basis of 
established rules of usage and com m on tariff principles.
The harm onisation initiative taken by the Council resulted in the adoption 
of a Fram ework Directive on the O pen N etw ork Provision in  1990,141 as it
140 The reason why this happened is that the IT industry is characterised by product 
interoperability. Product interoperability in the computer industry is defined as the fact that a 
computer must be compatible with the microprocessor and any necessary peripheral hardware 
(such as printers, keyboards, monitors and modems). The operating system must be compatible 
with the microprocessor, and the application programs must be compatible with the operating 
system. Only if these compatibility requirements are fulfilled will the consumer be able to use the 
computer. Thus, hardware and software developers' choices are driven by compatibility 
requirements if they want to develop a commercially successful product. As a result, consumers 
are more likely to buy a Microsoft computer system, since they know that most current and 
future applications are likely to work on that system, rather than on a competing system. It 
follows from that point that the effect described is cyclical, and economists refer to this as the 
'tipping effect,' on these issues see Lemley, M. A. (1996) 'Antitrust and the Internet standardisation 
problem' 28 Connecticut Law Review 1041-1094.
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acknowledged that com petition in services w ould  not have been possible if 
incum bents controlling telecom m unication infrastructure w ould  no t let new 
entrants have access to their telecom netw orks and  services.
In view of the above, the proposed legal fram ework envisioned facilitating 
access by means of standardised tariff principles and technical interfaces of 
netw ork connections am ong m em ber states. The im plem entation of ONP 
m easures w ould  be realised by setting objective conditions for netw ork use that 
w ere transparent, published appropriately and guaranteeing non-discrim inatory 
access.142
7. Information society in Europe
The Green Paper in 1987 on the Liberalisation of the Telecommunications 
Industry stressed the im portance of proceeding w ith  liberalisation in  order to 
im prove competitiveness and achieve the internal m arket,143 leading to similar 
initiatives in the mobile, cable and satellite sectors.144
141 Council Directive 90/387 of 28 June 1990 on the Establishment of the Internal Market for the 
Telecommunications Services through the Implementation of Open Network Provision OJ L192, 
24 July 1990.
142 Boam, C. (1997) 'Giving the phoenix wings: the Deutsche Telecom/FranceTelecom/Sprint 
alliance' (1997) 50 Common Law Conspectus 426-467.
142 Council Directive on the Establishment of the Internal Market for Telecommunications Services 
through the Implementation of ONP, note 126 above.
143 European Commission Green Paper COM (87) final: Towards a Dynamic European Economy. 
Green Paper on the Development of a Common Market for Telecommunication Services and 
Equipment of 30 June 1987.
144 European Commission Green Paper on a Common Approach in the Field of Mobile and 
Personal Communications in the European Community, COM (94) 150 (1994), Green Paper on a 
Common Approach in the Field of Satellite Communications in the European Community, COM 
(90) 490 (1990), leading to the adoption of the Liberalisation Directive for Satellite 
Communications, adopted according to article 90 of EU Treaty in 1994. The same year, again 
under Article 90 the European Commission adopted a draft Art. 90 Directive for Consultation 
concerning the Liberalisation of Telecommunications use of cable TV networks. The Directive 
aimed at liberalising cable TV networks from 1 January 1996 onwards.
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In the same spirit, the Delors Paper145 and the Bangemann Report146 
propagated the need to liberalise in order to take advantage of the new 
information economy. The 1994 European Action Plan147 positioned 
telecommunications at the heart of the inform ation society and called for 
transform ation that w ould allow private forces to effectively participate in the 
new  developments.
To this effect, the European Com m ission stressed the im portance of 
com petition law, as the latter w as regarded to play a central role in creating the 
new  regulatory environm ent in view of its flexibility, adjusting to the needs of 
new  and fast changing industries.
Ordoliberal ideas w ere brought on the EU plane, as com petition law w as 
indeed understood as an im portant tool to integrate m arkets.148 It w as view ed not 
only as essential in setting the conditions for a dynam ic com petitive 
environm ent, bu t also as a m echanism  w hich w ould contribute to the creation of 
trans-European networks, them  being one of the aim s of the EC Treaty, as 
provided in Article 129 B.
This w as also explicitly m entioned in the XXIV com petition policy report 
at point 65,149 which also stressed that private pow er m ay potentially be as 
dangerous as public pow er, thus legitimising indirect regulation by m eans of re­
145 European Commission White Paper COM (93) 700 of 5 December 1993 on Growth, 
Competitiveness, and Employment: The challenges and the Ways forward to the Twenty First 
Century.
146 Recommendation of the Bangemann Group to the European Council note 1 above.
147 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament and to the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions COM (94) 347 Europe's Way to 
the Information Society: An Action Plan.
148 Bangemann report note 1 above.
149 Report on Competition Policy note 1 above.
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regulation.150 In a nutshell, the approach adopted aim ed at balancing 
deregulation and liberalisation. It thus took the stand that com petition law is of 
major im portance, bu t sector specific legislation will have to be p u t in place in 
order to assure the sm ooth transition to the new  environm ent and  safeguard 
public service goals.
Therefore, the 1994 Action Plan favoured the creation of a new  regulatory 
environm ent that w ould  deal w ith  issues such as data security, privacy, data 
protection, intellectual property  rights and open access to m edia and educational 
usages of the new  technology.
The G7 Ministerial m eeting on the inform ation society151 clearly stated that 
there are eight principles that underline the concept of inform ation society: a) 
Prom oting dynam ic com petition b) Encouraging private investm ent c) Defining 
an adaptable regulatory fram ew ork d) Providing open access to netw orks e) 
Ensuring universal provision of open access to citizens f) Prom oting equality of 
opportunity  to the citizen g) Prom oting diversity of content h) Recognising the 
necessity of w orld w ide co-operation w ith particular attention to less developed 
countries.
These principles were to apply by prom oting: a) Interconnectivity and 
interoperability, b) Developing global m arkets for netw orks, services and 
applications, c) Ensuring privacy and data security d) Protecting intellectual 
property  rights, e) Co-operating in R&D and the developm ent of new
150 ibid.
151 Conclusions of G7 Summit 'Information society conference/ European Commission Doc. 
95/95/2  (1995).
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applications, f) M onitoring of the social and  societal im plications of the 
inform ation society.
The stage w as thus set for the inform ation society in Europe w ith  1998 
being the year of full liberalisation of the telecom m unications m arket, while the 
following years the Internet emerged as an indispensable com ponent of the 
inform ation society, in  view  of new  opportunities for participation, deliberation 
and  technological experimentation.
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D. CONCLUSIONS
In the 1990s Europe had a new  vision, inform ation society. Innovation 
and  its prom otion stood at the heart of the project, while re-regulation was 
thought to be necessary to prevent businesses from abusing their pow er and to 
enable citizens to participate in the new  inform ation economy.
The idea that innovation is im portant has been conceptualised through the 
lenses of diverse theoretical paradigm s in political economy. Be it a public good 
or a dynam ic process, it has been understood by authors such as Schum peter and 
Marx as being the modus vivendi of the capitalist system. Technological progress 
though acquired particular im portance in view  of new  digital technologies, 
which seemed to provide huge opportunities for investm ent.
Nevertheless, innovation in the context of the EU should not be 
understood solely in term s of prom oting innovation per se, bu t as interw eaving 
w ith  a set of different preoccupations, such as m arket integration and 
international competitiveness.
Looking at public policies designed at the European level to prom ote 
technological innovation shows that in the 1990s the idea w as m ature that 
innovation in civilian technologies w as the key to w ealth and  falling 
unem ploym ent. In the context of increasing globalisation, technological change 
w as accelerated, as m arkets opened and businesses looked to innovation as a 
m eans to compete internationally.152
152 This is an argument supported by Peterson and Sharp's work on the political economy of 
technological innovation in Europe, see Peterson and Sharp note 54 above.
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Innovation can be conceived as being both  the product of scientific 
research produced in laboratories and the result of m inor modifications 
introduced by skilled w orkers in the w orkplace on the basis of tacit knowledge.
It can also be prom oted either directly by financing certain sectors of the 
economy, or indirectly, by  prom oting collaboration, education, experim ental 
behaviour and the exchange of knowledge by  m eans of putting  in place neutral 
and objective processes aim ing at establishing consensus as to the developm ent 
and im plem entation of technologies. The initiation of the Esprit and Race 
program m es and  the adoption of legal m easures in the direction of 
standardisation and open interfaces in software program m es can be understood 
in this context.
There are further reasons w hy the EU embraced the opportunity  to 
prom ote collaboration. A pragm atic reason w as that national cham pions had  
largely failed and  that Europe w as lagging behind the USA and Japan, resulting 
in a w idespread feeling in Europe that the global challenge w as too big to be 
undertaken independently by  MS.
Integrating m arkets w as viewed as essential to come to grips w ith  the 
malaise of technological sluggishness and gave birth  to new  understandings as to 
the merits of co-operation, providing the operating context of efforts to prom ote 
collaboration. Directly influencing technologies, as w ith  the adoption of the ISDN 
open standards w as thought to be another w ay to achieve the above, although 
technological standards can never be neutral, bu t always encapsulated choices.
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Nevertheless, ordoliberalism  required that law  indirectly influences the 
economy, by m eans of providing an objective and  neutral fram ew ork of rules. 
This vision w as significant in shaping conceptions of co-operation in the 
foundational period of the EU and in later years. We saw that com petition law 
w as understood as being an im portant tool in  the course of m arket integration. It 
w as viewed not only as essential in laying the foundations for a dynam ic 
competitive environm ent, bu t also as a m echanism , contributing to the creation 
of trans-European networks.
M oreover, the idea that a fram ework is required to allow for the sm ooth 
transition to the new  liberalised environm ent echoes the ordoliberal idea that 
private pow er m ay potentially be as dangerous as public pow er, thus 
legitimising indirect regulation.
But prom oting fairness, protecting w ork and  welfare, social security and  
social rights of citizenship, w ere the accom plishm ent of post-w ar Keynesian 
economics, which prom ised to provide the tools to tam e the problem s endem ic to 
capitalist economies. To this effect, ensuring universal provision of open access to 
citizens, prom oting equality of opportunity  to the citizen, supporting diversity of 
content and recognising the necessity of w orld w ide co-operation w ith  particular 
attention to less developed countries, are am ongst the principles that underline 
inform ation society regulation in Europe.
Finally, inform ation society was characterised by a discourse that 
em phasised the im portance of efficiency, expertise, elites and functional interest 
interm ediation, a 'technocracy discourse, ' as the European Commission established
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itself as a regulator in the field of telecommunications regulation by m eans of 
bringing all interests together and providing expert knowledge.
In a nutshell, diverse ideas and understandings underlined the emergence 
of a new  field. Innovation w as conceived as im portant to prom oting economic 
welfare. Digitalisation has changed the scene requiring an adjustm ent to the 
exigencies of fast evolving technologies and flexible instrum ents were thought to 
be required to regulate them.
The ordoliberal vision of open m arkets ordered by an economic 
Constitution w as well suited to accommodate the above. At the same time, co­
operation at the EU level w as viewed as being necessary, as m arket integration 
w ould confer the economies of scale required to com pete internationally. Finally, 
the European Com m ission established itself as a regulator, w ith efficiency, 
expertise, elites and functional interest interm ediation being the core 
characteristics of its role at the initial stages of opening m arkets, while the legal 
tools em ployed to open these w ere Articles 81 [85], 82 [86] and 86 [90] of the EU 
Treaty.
All these traditions and perceptions m ade possible the emergence of 
inform ation society, whose regulation w as European in scope.
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Figure 1
Information Society in Europe 1992-2002: Timeline of main policy
milestones
—  1993: White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employnent (December 1993)
1994: Bangemann Report “Europe & the Global Information Society” (June 1994)
- Action Plan: “Europe’s Way to the Information Society” (July 1994)
- Set up of ISPO (Information Society Project Office, December 1994)
  1995: - G7 conference on the Information Society (February 1995)
- Set up of the Information Society Forum (February 1995)
—  1996: - Green Paper “Living and Working in the Wo. Society” (July 1996)
Communication “Information Society: From Corfu to Dubfin the New 
Entering Priorities (Jiiy 1996)
—  1997: - Bonn Ministerial Conference on “Gobal Information 
Networks” (Ju* 1997)
Green Paper on the “Convergence of the Telecommunications, 
Media and Information Technology” (July 1997)
1999: - Green Paper on “Public Sector
Information: a Key Resowcefor Europe”
-1999 Communications Review 
- eEurope Initiative (December 1999)
Action Plan on Safer Use of internet
-  2000: - Lisbon European Counci (March)
- eEurope Action Plan (June)
,-2002: -eEurope 2005
Action Plan (June)
1994 1968:4th Resevch & Techno. 
Dev. Framework Programme (FP4)
19982002:5th Research & Techno. 
Dev. Framework Progranme (FP5)
Source: http://w w w .euractiv.com /cgi-b in/cgint.exe/2024616-25?targ=l&204&QIDN=500446 
Last update: 7 June 2002.
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Habitus: Inside the European Commission
To perceive means to immobilise...
We seize, in the act of perception,
something, which outruns perception itself.
Henri Bergson, Essai sur les Donnees Immediates de la Conscience
The previous chapter looked at the historical conjunction of events and 
theoretical paradigm s giving birth  to present understandings as to the qualities 
of inform ation society, the role of the European Commission, the character of 
regulatory law, and  the im portance of innovation.
I here concentrate m y analysis on everyday life inside the European 
Commission, in order to uncover cognitive schemas attributing m eaning to 
everyday w orking practices. Thus, having injected agency and their interests, I 
seek to breathe life in the understanding of regulatory law. Uncovering systems 
of perception and  appreciation, or, to use Bourdieu's terminology, habitus, serves 
the purpose of unravelling the w ays in w hich action, for example the adoption of 
a piece of regulatory law, is fram ed by limits, which are set by  our ow n m inds.
In this instance, sociology frees us from the illusion of freedom 1 by 
inviting us to think about the taxonomies incorporated and reproduced in 
practices lim iting action, albeit by  sim ultaneously recognising the possibility that 
these very taxonomies m ay be challenged by  the agents w ho reproduce them. 
The latter point will be the subject of the following chapters, w hile this focus of
1 Bourdieu, P. (1990) In other Words. Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology (Oxford: Polity, orig. 1987), 
at p. 15.
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this present chapter is on the cognitive schemas, w hich render the social w orld 
meaningful.
'Habitus' refers to dispositions acquired from  early social experience. 
These dispositions are attuned to the structure and divisions of a social field as 
experienced by the individual. They are internalised in practices and  objects 
w ithin this field. Thus, interpersonal relations are never, except in appearance, 
lim ited to individual relationships, and the tru th  of interaction is never entirely 
contained in interaction.2
Despite the criticism directed against the notion of habitus,3 the basic 
argum ent of this chapter is that habitus is a concept, which can provide the 
theoretical tools to overcome the lim itations of the neo-institutionalist,4 neo­
functionalist,5 and  transactionalist6 approach to understand the param eters
2 Bourdieu, P. (1977) Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, orig. 
1972), at p. 81.
3 Having elaborated on this point in Chapter I of this thesis, I will not take this up further here.
4 See for example Abeles, M. et Beliers, I. (1996) 7 La Commission Europeenne: Du compromis 
culturel a la culture du compromis' 46 Revue Frangaise des Sciences Sociales 431-455. For a general 
review of neo-institutionalism see Powel, W. and DiMaggio, P. J. (1991) The New Institutionalism in 
Organisational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press); Koeble, J. (1995) 'The new 
institutionalism in political science and sociology' 27 Comparative Politics 231-244; Immergut, E. M. 
(1998) 'The theoretical core of new institutionalism' 26 Politics and Society 5-34; Grendstad, G. and 
Selle, P. (1995) 'Cultural theory and the new institutionalism' (1995) 7 Journal of Theoretical Politics 
5-27. For an overview and criticism of this theoretical position see Chapter I of this thesis.
5 See for example, Shore, C. (2000) Building Europe, The Cultural Politics of European Integration 
(London: Routledge); For the sociological underpinnings of functionalism and neo-functionalism 
see Parsons, T. (second ed 1991) The Social System  (London: Routledge, orig. 1951). In European 
integration studies, neo-functionalism underlined the idea that expert solutions can be provided to 
political problems, see Haas, B. E. (1958) The Uniting of Europe: Political, Economic and Social Forces, 
1950 -  1957 (London: Stevens). Haas' analysis focused on how loyalties shift as "integrative habits' 
are developed as a result of prior cooperation. Therefore, experts share a professional consensus, 
which, by means of becoming a system of thought, assumes the role of a force in its own right. 
For a criticism of this approach see for example Cram, L. (2001) 'Imagining the Union: A case of 
banal Europeanism?' in Wallace, H. (ed) (2001) Whose Europe? Interlocking Dimensions of Integration 
(London: Macmillan, 2001), at p. 343-362. A more elaborate discussion on these issues falls 
outside the scope of this chapter.
6 See for example McDonald, M. (2000) 'Identities in the European Commission' in Nugent, N. 
(ed) (second ed 2000) A t the Heart of the Union: Studies of the European Commission (Macmillan; St
Martins).
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underpinning the action of the European Commission. This is because on the 
basis of this notion I can argue that regulators are not (only) efficiently pursuing 
the public good (in the nam e of a 'European common market' ideology), and  public 
adm inistration is not (only) about reasoned choices and rational action, which 
follows the logic of preferences and national loyalties.
In addition, formal structures do no t dictate the course that action m ay 
take, b u t offer a set of potentialities, w hich have to be appreciated through the 
classificatory lenses of habitus, thus structures frame action. Finally, habitus is a 
concept that invites us to think m ore about the taxonomies w e take for granted, 
often reproduced in legal texts and  reflecting pow er relations.
O n the basis of the above, the assum ption underlining this chapter is that 
m ost of the time people routinely reproduce practices, based on acculturation 
into certain social groups such as social classes, a particular gender, family, and 
nationality. M oreover, cognitive schemas m ay be developed after socialisation in 
a group, (group habitus), as a result of the m eaning attached by  a com m unity to 
communality itself.
Therefore, the action of agents, 'fonctionnaires'7 or Directorates Generals 
(DGs), is fram ed by diverse cognitive schemas active at different levels. This is 
because m odes of perception m ay become institutionalised across DGs, 
alternatively m ay operate at the level of individual DGs and Units, or finally m ay 
exist at the level of individuals. The intuition behind recognising multiple habitus 
is that in this w ay it is possible to overcome the rigidity of the notion by leaving
7 Throughout this chapter I am using the French word for civil servants as this is commonly 
employed in the European Commission.
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space for improvisation. The theoretical underpinnings of this proposition will be 
elaborated in the first m ain section of this chapter.
Then, the focus of the second m ain section of this chapter is on uncovering 
practices, w hich underline the m eaning attached to community by  the officials 
w orking for the European Com m ission in order to look into shared 
understandings as to m odes of cooperating in w orking parties and shared files, 
prom otion procedures and mobility, w hile reputation, how  it is valued and 
acquired, is a them e that runs across all relevant sections.
Subsequently, the third section seeks to uncover cognitive schemas at the 
level of individuals (based for example on sex) and at the level of DGs, based on 
m odes of perception and appreciation institutionalised in Units or even whole 
DGs, as a result of com m on experience deriving its properties from  nationality 
and professional background. H aving uncovered these, the last section offers 
some concluding remarks.
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A. HABITUS AND MULTIPLE HABITUS: ALLOWING FOR
IMPROVISATION
1. The notion of habitus
H abitus m akes the social w orld seem objective and com m on sense, by  
means of us reproducing it through taken for granted practices. It structures 
actions and perceptions, which results in its embodiment, in it becom ing a 'bodily 
hexis' being expressed in the m anner in w hich individuals physically express 
themselves. As Bourdieu puts it, habitus is 'realised, embodied, turned into a 
permanent disposition, a durable manner of standing, speaking, and thereby of feeling 
and thinking,'8 which w e m isunderstand as a form  of natural affinity.
Habitus is a notion, which does no t only link to individuals' bodies, bu t also 
to groups. In particular, Bourdieu argues that the 'objective homogenising of group 
or class habitus, which results from the homogeneity of the conditions of existence, is 
what enables practices to be objectively harmonised without any intentional calculation 
or conscious reference to a norm.'9 This hom ogenising is produced by collective 
dispositions, which are 'internalisations of the same objective structures.'10
It follows from the above that in order to understand m em bership in a social 
class or group, the researcher has to come to grips w ith  the com m on system of 
dispositions prem ised on the common experience bringing the m em bers of a 
social class or a group together by m eans of providing a com m on cognitive lens 
through which the w orld makes sense.
8 Bourdieu, P. (1990) The Logic of Practice (Cambridge: Polity, orig. 1979), at p. 53.
9 Bourdieu note 2 above, at p. 80.
10 ibid, at p. 81.
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For this reason, class or group habitus is 'a subjective but not individual system 
of internalised structures, schemes of perception, conception and action common to all 
members of the same group or class and constituting the precondition for all 
objectification and apperception. 'n
This does not m ean that individuals have identical experiences, bu t that 
they share homologous ones,12 which implies that individual differences arise, as 
individuals socialise in particular settings such as families, schools and work. 
Nevertheless, group habitus unites these individual experiences into a coherent 
position, while allowing for difference, by m eans of group habitus co-existing 
w ith  an individual habitus.
In simple w ords, people belong in the sam e group because they share 
com m on experiences allowing them  to experience the social w orld  in  m ore or 
less the same way, nevertheless, there are alw ays differences in perception, 
exactly because group habitus co-exists w ith  individual habitus.
2. The possibility of introducing multiple habitus
Bourdieu's analysis is in certain ways close to Goffm an's symbolic 
interactionism. I thus here seek to identify both linkages and diversions between 
the two positions, in order to substantiate the claim that capturing the unfolding 
of social reality in the environm ent of a complex organisation such as the
11 ibid, at p. 86.
12 ibid.
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European Commission requires the incorporation of observations as to patterns 
of praxis regulating m em bership and interaction in a group. The following will 
seek to elucidate the theoretical underpinnings of this proposition.
Goffman argued that dignity, honour and  pride are im portant variables 
regulating everyday interaction and therefore the observation of sentim ents such 
as being asham ed or full of pride, should be an integral part of an  analysis 
seeking to explain encounters.13
Discussing the im portance of m aintaining social face,14 Goffman draw s 
attention to that individuals attribute m eaning to social life by  m eans of the 'social 
code of any social circle/15 as individuals are expected to live up  to it. Therefore, 
during interaction, the actor sustains the im ages conveyed by this social code 
through expression, an act that m ay be undertaken at a conscious or unconscious 
level, as it m ay be intended or not.
H e also argues that the self m ay be grasped not only in the context of 
constant efforts to sustain a social face by living up  to expectations derived from 
a social code, bu t m ay also be constructed during playing in a gam e consisting of 
rituals, which the agent has to observe.16
Goffman notes that different social groupings (according to age, sex or class 
for example) express themselves in distinctive ways reflecting w hat is thought to
13 Goffman, E. (1967) Interaction Ritual: Essays in Face-to-Face Behavior (London; Chicago: The 
Penguin Press: Aldine), at p. 4-45.
14 ibid, at p 9-10, where Goffman describes the process behind the creation of social face.
15 ibid, at p. 9.
16 Goffman, E. (1959) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Doubleday; London: 
Mayflower), at p. 22-30 and 70-76, particular see the 'Social Self' at p. 44-45. On the importance of 
symbols also see Mead, G. H. (1967) Mind, Self and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social 
Behaviourist (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, orig. 1934). However, note that Mead denies 
structural constraints and views action as providing for unlimited improvisation.
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be a proper w ay of expression according to a particular cultural configuration. 
Therefore, to be a given kind of person, is not m erely to possess the required 
attributes, 'but also to sustain the standards of conduct and appearance that one's social 
grouping attaches thereto.' This is w hy acculturation in a group implies the 
existence of coherent patterns of appropriate conduct, which should be 
perform ed, 'consciously or no t.'17
Interestingly, he further argues that individual actors have a variety of 
roles available to them  and  therefore m ay choose am ongst them  in the course of 
interaction. This variety of roles exists as the individual carries w ith  it a 
continuity of lines and faces, which owe their existence to events and situations 
outside the im m ediate interaction order.18
Therefore, although the focus of his analysis is on the micro level of 
interaction, his w ork also engages in exploring the w ays in w hich social order is 
sustained, as it accepts that there are structural limits to individuals' action. The 
agent does have choice concerning the lines and faces, bu t w ithin  limits im posed 
by a particular order.
Com ing back to Bourdieu, symbols and rituals are central in his 
theoretical framework, particularly in his notion of symbolic capital, on which I 
will extensively touch in the following chapter. As regards the notion of habitus, 
by  insisting on the im portance of identifying bodily hexis and  unspoken patterns
17 ibid.
18 Goffman note 13 above, at p. 7.
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of action, as for example in his study on the 'Kabylie' house in Algeria,19 he saw 
pride as regulating interaction and symbolic representations reproducing 
distinctions (m an/w om an, co ld /w arm , lig h t/d ark , ou tw ard /inw ard ) as being 
encapsulated in symbols, rituals, bodily gestures and objects.
In this respect, Bourdieu certainly comes close to Goffm an's position, to 
which he explicitly refers in various passages throughout his work. Nevertheless, 
he attacks symbolic interactionism  for failing to take into account the effects of 
power, as it focuses on the com m unication of m eaning while neglecting to study 
structural relations of pow er reproduced therein.
This is because he thinks that enquiring on unspoken cognitive patterns 
of thought should be able to address the question of w hether these are 
challenged or not. Nonetheless, a deeper analysis of this point will be 
undertaken in the following chapter, which endorses Bourdieu's position that the 
notion of pow er should be central to the analysis of social phenom ena.
Com ing back to Goffman, he makes two very interesting points, which 
will be taken on board  for the purposes of the present analysis. First, as we saw 
in the previous paragraphs, he argues that to be a given kind of person, it is not 
enough to have the necessary characteristics, bu t also to sustain the social code of 
the social group you belong to. M oreover, he casts light on the possibility of m ultiple 
roles co-existing and guiding conduct, thus allowing for im provisation from the 
part of the agent involved in an interaction, a point w hich is nevertheless m ade
19 Bourdieu, P. (1979) Algeria 1960: Essays (Cambridge [Eng.]; New York: Cambridge University 
Press).
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by Bourdieu himself, as already noted. Both these points will be taken up  in the 
following section.
3. From observing interaction and identifying structures to 
enquiring on the conditions of their emergence
In this chapter I seek to identify m ultiple habitus, cognitive schemas, 
w hich give m eaning to social practices. I thus look at the notion of habitus, 
understood as being constructed on the basis of common experience prior to 
joining the European Commission and on the basis of com m on experience after 
joining it.
The latter approach understands habitus as being the result of a process 
of crystallisation of com m on understandings underlying recognition, respect and 
communality. The form er seeks to come to grips w ith cognitive schemas 
emerging as a result of, for example, a particular nationality or professional 
background. I thus focus m y analysis on both  levels, in an attem pt to 
accommodate the complexity of lived experience.
By identifying m ultiple roles, habitus, and  em ploying ethnographic data 
(prim ary and secondary) I seek to overcome the difficulties inherent in the notion 
of habitus, that is its rigidity, by means of allowing space for im provisation in the 
multifaceted environm ent of a m odem  organisation such as the European 
Commission. It is by  stressing the possibility of people engaging in m ultiple roles
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(and the possibility of identifying m ultiple habitus) and by em ploying 
ethnographic data that I propose to look inside the European Commission.20
Nevertheless, bo th  Bourdieu and Goffman leave one question w ithout 
adequate answer. W hy do people remain m em bers of a com m unity, despite 
differences in individual classificatory systems? We saw that Bourdieu 
emphasises the im portance of common experience bringing individuals together 
in a group.21 Goffman m aintains that abiding by  the social code of a group by 
m eans of conforming to other people's expectations is regulating interaction to an 
im portant extent.
This does not answ er w hat sustains the existence of a community per se. This 
logically precedes Goffm an's question addressing the quality of interaction, and 
follows Bourdieu's question addressing the genesis of a group, as w ithout 
community there is no interaction and w ithout interaction there is no need to fulfil 
expectations.
To reform ulate the above, a com m unity m ay be a village, a non­
governm ental organisation or the European Commission. Respect and 
recognition are pow erful regulators of the life inside these 'villages.' Nonetheless 
it seems that there m ust be m ore than respect and  recognition regulating life 
inside them, as by m eans of these we cannot explain w hy individuals actually
20 This will be done by means of adopting an ethnomethodological approach, as proposed by 
Garfinkel, distinguishing the interpretation used in the construction of 'common sense' against 
scientific rationalities, on these issues see the Methodological Appendix of this thesis.
21 Bourdieu, P. (1987) 'What makes a social class?: On the theoretical and practical existence of 
groups' XXXII Berkeley Journal of Sociology 1-18.
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sacrifice individuality to stand up to other people's expectations in the nam e of 
communality.
One answ er m ay be that individuals routinely reproduce their habitus 
before joining a community. However, this does not explain w hy com m on 
experience m ay not be enough to keep them  in the same group, in other w ords to 
establish the bonds necessary to inspire m em bership despite differences. In some 
groups initial differences m ay converge, bending in the passage of time, while 
never totally disappearing, while in other groups differences w ould result in 
them  breaking up.
As regards the latter situation, Bourdieu w ould say that in this instance 
individuals challenge pow er relations. A lternatively, Goffman w ould think that 
there is a clash am ongst habitus, so an individual chooses a different role.
I have a different explanation to propose: Individuals stay in a group 
because they are dependent on each other. Shared experience brings people 
together, bu t it is necessity that keeps them  together, albeit differences. Dependency 
gives b irth  to the need to live up to expectations, regulating whether an individual 
w ould choose a different role. The need to compromise underlines w hether pow er 
relations will be challenged or not.
Durkheim  and Weber,22 for example, stressed the voluntary aspect of 
mem bership in a com m unity, em phasising obligations and beliefs. Nonetheless,
22 See for example Durkheim, E. (2001) The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, orig. 1912) and Weber, M. (second ed 1992) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism (London: Routledge, orig. 1904); Also see Simmel, G. 'Group expansion and the 
development of individuality/ in Levine D. N. (ed) (1971) Georg Simmel: On Individuality and Social
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m y proposition goes to the opposite direction, as by stressing the im portance of 
identifying w hether the bonds bringing together m em bers of a com m unity are 
underlined by dependency and compromise, I im ply that agents, no m atter 
w hether they know  it or not, reproduce pow er relations.
Therefore the proposition that dependency and com promise are powerful 
regulators of life in a com m unity stays w ithin  the intellectual tradition 
understanding social patterns as reflecting pow er relations, w hile stressing that 
these patterns m ay be tacitly reproduced, as the notion of habitus requires.
This is because the habitus of dependency and compromise reflects the 
pow erful insider/ou tsider division, and therefore em bodies pow er relations 
crystallised in dom inant understanding of m ost valuable forms of 'social capital/ 
Enquiring on the properties of social capital will be the subject of C hapter V.
For the purposes of this chapter, it is enough to say at this po in t that social 
capital em bodies exogenous resources that agents have in order to build  
perm anent netw orks of people consisting of m ore or less institutionalised 
relations of m utual acquaintance and recognition.23 Therefore, this form  of capital 
has a m ultiplication effect on other resources, as by having a large netw ork of 
people it is easier, for example, to maximise economic wealth, political re-election 
or succeed in pu tting  on a theatrical play.
Social capital then stresses the im portance of relations of m utual
acquaintance and recognition. Still, such relations can only exist in a group or a
Forms: Selected writings of Georg Simmel (Chicago, 111; London: University of Chicago Press, orig. 
1908)..
23 Bourdieu, P. (1986) 'The forms of capital' in Richardson, J. G. (ed) (1986) Handbook of Theory and 
Research for the Sociology of Education (New York: Greenwood Press).
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netw ork, w hich exhibits cohesion. A nd for cohesion to be established, neither a 
com m on purpose nor the need to m aintain social face are enough, b u t ties of 
dependency have to be identified.
This proposition comes relatively close to recent developm ents in  netw ork 
theory. M any netw ork theorists s tudy  the degree of cohesion in groups and the 
form ation of subgoups by means of looking at patterns of interaction. Therefore, 
in a spirit similar to interactionists, netw ork theorists look beyond the attributes 
of individuals (class, blood ties, kinship etc) to consider relations and  exchanges 
am ong social actors. This, for example, m ay be m easured according to the 
num ber of ties an agent has w ith other agents in a community.
Gulati and  Garguilo in particular m odel the emergence of alliance netw orks 
as a process driven not only by exogenous interdependencies forcing 
organisations to pool resources w ith  others bu t also by  the m em ory of 
organisations which consists of em bedded, institutionalised, understandings on 
competencies and reliability of prospective partners.
Gulati and Garguilo refer to this as 'relational embeddedness,' and argue that 
in studying em beddedness the im portant question to ask is w hether a netw ork is 
closed and thus m ay be seen as a subculture or counterculture. One w ay  to see 
this is to observe face-to-face interaction and indirect ties in order to assess the 
degree to which actors are involved in cliques w ith  other actors inside the same 
netw ork.24
24 Gulati, R. and Garguilo, M. (1999) 'Where do interorganisational networks come from?' 104 
American Journal of Sociology 1439-1493; Freeman, L. C. (1979) 'Centrality in social networks: 
Conceptual clarification' 1 Social Networks 215-239: Gulati, R. and Singh, H. (1998) "The 
architecture of cooperation: Managing coordination uncertainty and interdependence in strategic
133
Habitus: Inside the European Commission
However, the habitus of dependency and  compromise im plies that agents 
are not rational. They do not rationally pursue m em bership in  netw orks or 
groups in order to attain certain goals, but, no m ater w hether they know  it or not, 
they have to co-exist, have to take others into account, a process w hich entails no 
cost-benefit analysis, bu t appears to be a 'normal' routine. Such ties underline 
cohesion and reproduce understandings, w hich m ost of the tim e are taken for 
granted, unless such routine is disrupted and  thus the taxonomies it encompasses 
emerge at the conscious level, potentially resulting in their challenge.
The reasons w hy individuals m ay depend on others vary. For example, ship 
owners in the Greek islands have crews on their ships, w ith  w hich they have 
family ties and  w ith  w hom  they tend to w ork  together for life. M oreover, ship 
ow ners set up  an informal 'social security' system, so, if an accident happens, if 
anything goes w rong, they w ould take care of the family of their employee.
However, in return, whatever they ask has to be done the w ay  they w ant it, 
w hen they w ant it. Therefore, the m eaning attached to w ords such as reputation, 
co-operation or favours will be totally different from  the one attached to the same 
notions by a group of people w ho w ork together for a short period of tim e and, 
once their contract is over, will never see each other again.25
alliances' 43 Administrative Science Quarterly 781-814; Borgatti, S., Hesterly, W. S. and Jones, C. 
(1997) 'Exchange conditions and social mechanism' 22 Academy of Management Review 911-945; 
Gargiulo, M. (1993) 'Two-step leverage: Managing constraint in organizational politics' 38 
Administrative Science Quarterly 1-19. On embeddedness see Granovetter, M. (1985) 'Economic 
action and social structure: A theory of embeddedness' 91 American Journal of Sociology 481-510.
25 This will be distinguished from the notion of trust in Chapter V of this thesis. On trust see, 
Gambetta, D. (ed) (1998) Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). 
There is an electronic edition of this book available on the website of the Department of 
Sociology, University of Oxford, at http: /  / www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/papers/trustbook.htmL (web 
page visited on 14 May 2003). Especially see the contribution by Luhmann, N. (1998) Familiarity,
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M oreover, agents m ost of the tim e reproduce such practices w ithout 
questioning them  as they are sim ply taken for granted, being the 'normal' w ay to 
settle things, reflecting dom inant understandings as to the role of family, 
com m unity, social face and pride.
W hat the above is m eant to show is that social face, respect, recognition and 
its qualities, emerge as a result of institutionalised or less institutionalised 
relations of dependency am ongst the m em bers of a com m unity. Looking into 
practices show ing w hether there is such a bond am ongst m em bers is thus 
im portant in order to establish cohesion. W hether there is cohesion in a group, is 
to be understood by m eans of uncovering practices which 'tie' m em bers of a 
group together, by  m eans of creating relations w here the one needs the other, in 
order to do a job, create a good reputation etc.
This, I term  the habitus of dependency and com promise, w hich consists of 
cognitive schemas regulating how  things are done inside a com m unity, as it is 
only if bonds of dependency are strong, w hen group ties are strong, that 
individuals' subjective feelings, such as recognition and respect or creating and 
m aintaining a social face, w ould  regulate life. In cases w here such bonds are 
weak, such subjective feelings will play a weak role.
Thus, enquiring on the effects of structures and interaction in different 
settings w ould lead to different results as to the levels of cohesion and as to how  
strong is the m eaning attached to the insider/ou tsider taxonomy. The following 
will further look into this last point.
Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives, at p. 94-107, also available at
http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/papers/luhmann94-107.doc
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4. Inside the European Commission
If one accepts the above, then understanding the regulating principles 
underlying relationships inside the European Commission, requires m oving 
beyond the compelling pow er of everyday routine, to look into the cognitive 
schemas through which everyday w orking practices acquire m eaning. To this 
effect, the focus of analysis shifts from observing practices to understanding the 
principles giving m eaning to the reproduction of these practices.
The argum ent then is that the classificatory scheme attributing m eaning to 
m any of the practices inside the European Commission is the one reproducing 
the insider/outsider duality. Being in a group, in other w ords being an 'insider/  
requires sustaining a self-image expected by  the other m em bers of the group, as 
Goffman taught us. Being an 'insider' m atters and reflects pow er relations as it 
implies w ho is to be a successful case handler for example. In other w ords, being 
an insider means that one w ould have to accept tacit understandings about the 
qualities of 'success' and 'prestige.'
The degree to w hich such understandings will be accepted depend on 
w hether people w orking for the European Commission have to take others into 
account, further building cohesion, a view that challenges the proposition that 
this comes as a result of serving com m on ideals.
In m y empirical research, the approach of this chapter is close to Heclo 
and W ildaw sky's analysis, since, in their study on the British Treasury, they 
consider that socialisation and cohesion should be established by looking at w ho 
m atters most, how  people are related, who owes to w hom , how  obligations are
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repaid and how  reputation is valued. To this effect, they observe practices 
underlying prom otion, m obility and w orking in shared files.26
The first m ain section of this chapter will concentrate on these, w ith  the 
relevant analysis being based on prim ary and secondary data. The focus of the 
analysis will be on show ing w hether the European Com m ission exhibits 
cohesion, by means of looking into the above practices w ith  the aim  to uncover 
relations of dependency and  compromise, and  then show how  subjective feelings 
regulate life inside this 'community.'
The thesis advanced in the following sections is that the European 
Commission is a coherent group and the ta d t  understandings reproduced in the 
course of everyday interaction as to the properties of 'success' include belonging 
in networks, as this is prom oted as a virtue and  as such the unspoken dom inant 
definition of 'successful' interw eaves w ith  the insider/ou tsider taxonom y, further 
bypassing other com peting understandings of w hat professional success is, such 
as the one reproduced in the im age of isolated, detached from external influences 
bu t well educated fonctionnaire w ith  a good drafting hand.
This is not to say that, for example, the national/professional background 
of civil servants is not im portant. On the contrary. There is evidence that 
m anagem ent styles m ay differ because of the above-m entioned criteria. For 
example, DG Com petition presents an interesting example of a Directorate 
General, which is overpopulated by lawyers and  had  m any G erm an Director
26 Heclo, H. and Wildavsky, A. (second ed 1981) The Private Government of Public Money: 
Community and Policy inside British Politics (London: Macmillan).
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Generals, a fact that shows the interest taken by the Germ an Governm ent in 
com petition law.27
Moreover, DG Inform ation Society is considered to be one of the m ost 
collusive w ith  private interests DG. One explanation for this m ay be that m ost of 
the fonctionnaires w orking for it had  been trained as scientists and  had  w orked 
for the industry before joining the European Commission, thus have certain 
sym pathy for the dem ands of the industry  by virtue of them  speaking the same 
'scientific language' w ith  national groups affected by the Research and 
Developm ent policies of the European Commission.28
I therefore here look into the w ays individual schemas m ay become 
institutionalised in whole Units or even DGs. To this effect, nationality and 
professional background is im portant to look at, as the w ork of various author 
has revealed.29
All these points will be taken in tu rn  in the following sections.
27 Cini, M., McGowan, L., Nugent, N. W., Paterson E. and Wright, V. (1998) Competition Policy in 
the European Union (London: Macmillan).
28 Jourdain, L. (1996) 'La Commission Europeenne et la construction d'un nouveau modele 
d'intervention publique' 43 Revue Frangaise des Sciences Sociales 59-82.
29 For example see, Shore note 5 above; McDonald in Nugent note 6 above; Page, E. G. (1997) 
People Who Run Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
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B. LIFE INSIDE THE COMMISSION
1. Spatio-numerical concentration
Men on a ship have to co-operate despite differences and personal 
disagreements. They have to co-exist, as m istakes are fatal. Nevertheless, co­
existing on a ship means being p art of a team, w hich m ay in tu rn  result in coming 
closer w ith  all these people w ho you initially m ay have even disliked, for the 
simple reason that alone you are nothing, you need others to do alm ost 
everything.
Does this m odel apply to an adm inistration such as the European 
Commission? I here seek to answer this question.
a The spatial context
The gripping effect of spatial concentration is the starting point to uncover 
the conditions underlining w orking relations. M en on a ship are surrounded by 
water, w ith heavy seas rem inding them  of their isolation and  distant smells of the 
existence of safe harbours. In this instance, the effect of the spatial setting has a 
gripping effect on them , im posing its logic by dictating rules of co-existence.30 
Looking at the spatial setting of the European Com m ission will similarly serve to 
explore the influence of surroundings upon people w orking for the European 
Commission.
30 Symbolic interactionists stressed the importance of observing the spatial setting, see for 
example Goffman note 13 above at p. 22-30. Heclo and Wildavsky note 26 above, at p. 1. 
Generally, an enquiry on the spatial setting is commonly undertaken by anthropologists and 
ethnomethodologists. For such an approach, amongst myriads others see Shore note 5 above, at p. 
3; Latour, B. (1996) Aramis or the Love of Technology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
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Brussels is really a small place, having one million inhabitants. It is 
com m only referred to as the capital of Europe, although it is not the true hom e to 
all of the European U nion's m ain institutions. The European Parliam ent is 
located both  in Brussels and Strasbourg. The European Central Bank is located in 
Frankfurt, the Court sits in Luxembourg and the European Council moves 
around the M ember States, while the European Commission, is located in 
Brussels, w ith the exception of only a few Units located in Luxembourg.
Interview excerpt:____________________________________
‘Being fa r  from  Brussels feeCs Cifce Seingfarfrom reat Cife.31
Nevertheless, Brussels is not only hom e to European Union institutions. It 
also attracts international institutions, agencies, lobbyists and  firms, which have 
m oved their headquarters there to be close to w here decisions are taken. From  
the point of view of aesthetics, the result of this is a paradoxical co-existence of 
ugly m odem  office blocks built in the 1960s, along w ith  beautiful early 1900s art- 
nouveau buildings and m edieval churches.
Nonetheless, it is undeniably a city w ith tru ly  an international character, 
and the presence of innum erable European U nion flags hanging from steel and 
glass buildings at the city centre reinforces this feeling. I w as surprised to find 
out that the Flemish and Vallon bilingual residents are ready to answer to a 
question addressed to them  in English, as if it is the m ost natural thing, while at
31 Interview with a Head of Unit at DG Information Society, conducted on 22 January 2002.
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the very popular Kitty O'Shea's Irish pub, next to Berlaymont w here the 
European Com m ission used to be located, the staff only speak English, as this is 
com m only used by  customers coming from  various national backgrounds.
The dem ography of the city has changed because of the presence of the 
institutions of the European Union: 28 per cent of the population are non- 
Belgians, and  half of this percentage comes from non-European Union countries, 
especially from Zaire and N orth Africa,32 m aking it a vibrant m ulti-lingual and 
m ulti-ethnic society. Nevertheless, central Brussels is divided into two m ain 
areas, the Lower and  U pper Towns.
The Lower Town comprises the m edieval d ty  centre, built around G rand 
Place and  its beautiful narrow  streets, while the U pper Town, to the southeast, is 
the traditional base of Brussels' French-speaking elite, hom e to m useum s and 
shopping areas.
The European Commission is situated in a small area w ithin a small city, 
which, after eight o'clock in the evening, gives you the feeling of a haunted place. 
The one DG from the other is usually w ithin w alking distance. Undeniably, the 
worst-case scenario w ould be to have to take the m etro for a short 15-minute 
journey.33 Spatial concentration and how  it links to cohesion has recently been 
given explicit recognition in Prodi's proposal to locate Commissioners and their
32 Shore note 5 above, at p. 161.
33 See the map in Appendix One of this chapter.
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cabinets in the sam e buildings w ith their DGs, as up  to now, the Com m issioners 
occupied the Breydel building at the centre of Brussels.34
Overall, it is m ainly in  the Schum ann and Leopold area w here the 
European Com m ission is concentrated.35 There, the visitor is struck w hen 
confronted w ith  the bare tru th  of steel, glass, and concrete purpose-built 
buildings. I agree w ith  com m entators, who, w ith  a touch of cynicism, noted that 
the European Union buildings in Brussels 'do not reflect a new Euro-nationalism, but 
attempt instead to project a type of conservative managerialism. All of the main EU 
offices could easily be mistaken for the glass and steel headquarters of any major 
corporation, which lack human touch and scale.'36
Up until 1991, the European Commission w as geographically concentrated 
in one building, Berlaymont, which then had  to be evacuated due to leaking 
asbestos. It w as designed by the architect De Vestel, in association w ith  Jean 
Gilson, Jean and  A ndre Polak, and w as draw n in the shape of a cross w ith  a 
central core and  four w ings of various dimensions.
It had  three floors, m eeting rooms and  a complex system  for vertical 
circulation, w hile the four underground levels housed 1600 parking spaces, 
conference rooms, a TV studio, a cafeteria and restaurant, shops and  warehouses. 
It w as m ore than 200000 square metres. The technical design w as bold, b u t w as
34 Whitman, T. (2000), Building a better mousetrap: Romano Prodi's plans for the European 
Commission' Harvard Focus Europe, available at
http://hcs.harvard.edu/-focu s/TobieWhitman.html, (web page visited on 10 May 2002).
35 For a visual aid to better understand the concentration element of this analysis, see the map in 
Appendix One of this chapter, where the exact location of the Breydel building and the other 
buildings of the European Commission is provided.
36 Geyer, R. 'Europe needs a capital city with a difference' story published in May 2002 in the 
European Voice, available at http: /  / www.european-voice.com/, (web page visited on 15 May 
2002).
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considered as a fine example of Belgian m odernist architecture and  a symbol of 
European unity.37
The first European officials entered the build ing in 1967, bu t by  1991 the 
European Com m ission's services had  expanded w ith  the extension of the 
European C om m unity from  six to nine, and  then twelve members. Therefore, 
Berlaymont only housed a part of the European Commission's services, 
essentially the Commissioners, their cabinets and  the services w ith  w hom  they 
are closely linked. O ther services had m oved to nearby buildings, nevertheless 
33000 civil servants used to w ork there.38
Interview excerpt:_______________________________________
When the BerCaymont was stiCC in use when I  joined the Commission in 1985, we
would cdC meet for Cunch at the same place, in the self-service under the 
BerCaymont. But these days are gone. 9{ow the (DQs are too far away and there is 
no ‘6ig’ seCf-service anymore. In the meantime, the Commission has grown and 
the offices are now spread over Brussels. In addition, at that time the only means 
o f communication we had were our personaC phone, fourfa?^ machines for the 
whole o f CDQ Competition, and copy machines, where you had to copy page per 
page. In such circumstances, personal contact was more important than today, 
where email e?(change is the main means o f communication.39
37 http://www.berlaymont2000.com/index-3.htm, (web page visited on 10 May 2003).
38 ibid.
39 Interview with a Head of Sector at DG Competition, conducted on 23 January 2002.
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Figure 1 
Berlaymont and Breydel
7 January 1985
Aerial view of the Berlaymont
Renovating the Berlaymont
17 September 2001
Breydel, headquarters of the Commission 
19 October 2002
Source: http;//europa.eu. int/c omm/mediatheque/photo/select/aerial eah tm
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b Socialising
Brussels is a small place and there is no t m uch to do, the G rand Place and 
the Bourse area presenting a compact central area w here you m eet your 
colleagues and have dinner or a beer in one of the m any elegant restaurants and 
bars, possibly am ong the best in Europe, covering the need of officials and 
employees to entertain quests and clients. Bars, restaurants and  m useum s are 
situated w ithin the city centre, enclosed w ithin  the petit ring, w hich follows the 
path  of the 14th century city walls.
Irish pubs are very popular w ith  junior fonctionnaires and  stagiaires40 for 
example. There, w e talked about the things that everybody talks about, m ainly 
about the internal politics of the Unit, the DG or the European Com m ission in 
general. We gossiped about colleagues, w arned about people, discussed business. 
There are always com m on problem s to talk about, for example, relations w ith  
superiors, prom otion, or the different kinds of recruitm ent, the latter being an 
issue on which you never touch on w hen an 'outsider' is present.
After sometim e at the European Com m ission you copy your colleagues 
and they copy you. You find yourself talking about the same things that 
everybody talks about, although you w ould  have not thought so at the 
beginning. This osmosis of differences happens as a result of the simple need to 
co-exist. The example of a m eta-language, to which Abeles and  Beliers41 refer, is 
typical of the above tendencies, as w ords have been inserted in the French and
40 I am using the French words for the English word trainee, as this is commonly used in the 
European Commission.
41 Abeles et Beliers note 4 above, at p. 440.
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English vocabulary having no m eaning outside the context of the European 
Commission.
Examples of the latter trend include the w ords 'egalite des chances, ' 'agenda,' 
and 'speaking brief.' Moreover, it comes as no surprise w hen a G erm an speaks 
French to a D utchm an in the European Commission. Similarly, it is commonplace 
to see a G erm an/Englishm an replying in French, although the question 
addressed to her w as in Germ an or English respectively.42
On the basis of the above, Shore's ethnographic research has found that 
various factors contribute to the form ation of a 'self-recognising ethos.'43 The 
author observes that there is 'ghettoisation' of EU staff in certain neighbourhoods 
in Brussels. As a result of this, EU officials tend to socialise am ongst themselves 
and do not m ingle w ith the local population. Therefore, officials in Brussels tend 
to occupy a position similar to diplom ats and  colonial adm inistrators, 'they are in 
Brussels, but not o fit.'u
This ethos is further reinforced by high salaries and free education for 
officials' children in the prestigious European Schools, and  by  the fact that 
officials tend to be recruited for life. Shore then concludes that there is an  'esprit 
de corps/ which is developed as a result of interm ingling in the same
42 ibid.
43 Shore, C. (1996) European Union and the politics of culture Bruges Group Occasional Paper no 42, 
at http://www.brugesgroup.com/mediacentre/index.live7article-13, (web page visited on 15 
May 2003). The ethnographic research upon which this paper was based, was carried out in 
Brussels between 1995 and 1996.
44 ibid.
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environm ent, resulting in the form ation of a sense of mission to serve European 
ideals even am ong new  recruits.45
c The numerical context
Spatial concentration presents another im portant factor to m ake an 
assessm ent as to cohesion, as the small size of the European Com m ission (around 
20000 employees) m ay further contribute to the am algam ation of practices.46
The size of the European Com m ission is smaller than m any national 
adm inistrations. In reference to the DGs relevant to m y analysis, DG Internal 
M arket's staff on active du ty  (perm anent and  tem porary) is 289 employees, at DG 
Com petition the num ber is 384 employees, at DG Research 815, at DG Enterprise 
709, and finally at DG Inform ation Society 593.47
The following charts show the breakdow n of DGs by  size and  the 
percentage of officials w ith  specialised degrees. In figure three, this is done by 
reference to intram ural staff, (this is staff covered by  staff regulations such as 
perm anent officials, tem porary officials, and  locally engaged staff), w hile the 
ABCD grades in figure four are categories reflecting the type of qualification.
45 ibid, noting that his opinion is in accordance with Edwards and Spence, see Edwards, G. and 
Spence, D. (eds) (1994) The European Commission (Harlow, UK: Longman Current Affairs).
46 One could argue that it is the 'Jean Monet approach' of organising the High Authority (the 
predecessor of the European Commission) around small and flexible teams that has left its mark 
in the current structure, see Chapter II Section C of this thesis.
47 Report by the Inspectorate-General of 7 July 1999 'Designing Tomorrow's Commission - A 
Review of the Commission's Organisation and Operation/ available at
http://europa.eu.int/com m /reform/decode/screening en.pdf, annex 6, (web page visited on 15 
May 2002). Since the report is based in data collected in 1998, there is no information on DG 
Justice and Home Affairs.
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Figure 2
Size of DGs in the European Commission
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Note: For the purposes of comparison I have included DG Personnel, as it is the largest DG of 
the European Commission
Source: Report by the Inspectorate-General of 7 July 1999 'Designing Tomorrow's Commission 
- A Review of the Commission's Organisation and Operation,' available at 
httpyyeuropa.eu.inl/comiq/reform/decode/8creening en.pdf
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Figure 3
Percentage of A, B, C, and D officials
□  Category B 
22%
■  Category A/ LA 
, 43%
□  Category C 
34%
■  Category D 
1%
B Category PJ LA ■  Category D □  Category C □  Category B
Note: A grade entrants can join the European Commission either without professional 
experience (at A8 level) or w ith a minimum of two years' experience (A7/A61evel). In order to 
sit some A7/A6 competitions, candidates may need a specialised degree in law, economics, 
accounting or statistics and relevant professional experience. Note that a Head of Unit is an A3, 
a Director is an A2 and a Director General is an A l. Candidates for B grade posts must have 
successfully completed a course of advanced secondary education and obtained a final 
certificate or diploma. They must also have had at least two years' experience in a field  related 
to the activity being applied for. Staff in category 6  is mainly responsible for executive tasks 
and participates in  every area of EU activity. Staff in category C is mainly responsible for 
secretarial and clerical work, w hile Category D staff is engaged in manual or service duties.
Source: Report by the Inspectorate-General of 7 July 1999 'Designing Tomorrow's Commission 
- A Review of the Commission's Organisation and Operation/ available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comiq/reform/decode/8creening en.pdf
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2. Cohesion and phronesis: Uncovering relations of dependence
The previous section presented us w ith  selective inform ation as to the 
spatial and num erical context of w orking for the European Com m ission in 
Brussels and how  they m ay affect cohesion. Nevertheless, I here argue that it is 
not sim ply because people, for example, eat together that they acquire common 
bonds.
It is that the practice of eating together has a com m on m eaning in the light 
of their habitus, w hich is developed as a result of a socialisation process. This 
idea discards the assum ption that, once officials are appointed, they will tend to 
acquire a loyalty to the EU institutions rather than  to their respective nation 
states, an argum ent supported  by integration theorists.
This section's proposition is that, even if you do not initially feel part of a 
group such as the European Commission, you will end up  being, because you 
need others. If one accepts this, the argum ent is then simple: People w orking for 
the European Commission have to take others into account, and  this is w hy they 
are a distinctive group, not because they serve some com m on ideals. The 
following will explore this proposition.
a The form al organisational characteristics o f the European Commission
Before considering the norm s that regulate everyday exchanges, I will here 
com m ent on the formal organisational characteristics of the European 
Commission.
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Indeed, formalism and hierarchy are om nipresent, denoting the 
F ranco/G erm an influence on the institution.48 The term inology used is similar to 
the one em ployed in a French Ministry. The organisational divisions of a DG, 
('directions generates'direction' and 'sous direction'), follow the French tradition. 
M oreover, the institutions of the cabinet, body of advisers and  aides to the 
Commissioner and the ranks ('conseiller,' 'directeur,' 'chef de cabinet'), all reflect 
French ministerial organisation, which has also been adopted by m any Southern 
European countries.49
Passing the 'concours,' (competitive entry examinations) is required in 
order to be em ployed by  the EU Commission. This is similar to the one in France, 
w hich w as introduced in this country a century ago. Finally, the ABCD50 grading 
of civil servants, again follows the French system, which w as introduced across 
the w hole French civil service in 1948.51
Hierarchies are rigid w hen it comes to the approval of the drafts and 
proposals prepared by  a fonctionnaire. An A  academic level official needs the 
approval of about five persons for her drafts, as these will have to go through the 
Head of Unit, or sometimes the Head of Sector, the Director, the (deputy or) Director 
General, before him  the assistant of the Director General, the person in the cabinet of 
the Commissioner responsible for a fonctionnaire's file and  the Commissioner.52
Moreover, as an  official you are always dependent on the Legal Service 
and  the Secretariat General. This is because formal approval of procedures is
48 Page note 29 above, at p. 7.
49 ibid.
50 See figure three.
51 Page note 29 above, at p. 7.
52 On the ABCD system see figure three, at p. 29.
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required from  the Legal Service, while both  the Secretariat General and  the Legal 
Service report directly to the President of the European Commission.53
The 'life of a file' inside the European Com m ission is also strictly prescribed 
by  formal rules. File allocation is done by the H ead of Unit, while this is only 
decided at the level of the cabinet of the President of the European Com m ission 
in the event m ore than one DG considers that a particular file falls w ithin  its 
competence. Once a file is w ithin the responsibility of a DG (or the joint 
responsibility of m ore DGs), it then sends a questionnaire to M ember States (MS) 
and on the basis of the inform ation it collects, it sets a w orking party , w hose 
m em bers are representatives from MS, the industry, and  other interested 
parties.54
Parallel to this, DGs and Services are consulted, bu t case handlers do not 
themselves have to decide w hen and w ho to consult on their drafts. Inter-service 
consultations are formalised, as there is a special informatics instrum ent 
(CISNET) for it. The relevant 'dossier' moves around DGs w ith  an attached note 
on it, which sets the requirem ent of com m ents being given w ithin certain time 
limits. Meetings w ith  lobbyists are m anaged at an  informal basis. Finally, once a 
draft proposal is finalised, it is transm itted to the cabinets and then to the College 
of Commissioners for approval.55
53 Since the Legal Service and the Secretariat General report directly to the President of the 
European Commission, it is through these services that he can potentially keep an eye on 
European Commission's activities. Nonetheless, as Cini notes, the old days of the active and at 
times interventionist Secretariat General are over, on these issues see Cini, M. (1996) The European 
Commission. Leadership, Organisation and Culture in the EU Administration (Manchester; New York: 
Manchester University Press; New York: St. Martin's Press).
54 Interview with a Head of Unit at DG Information Society, conducted on 22 January 2002.
55 ibid, at p. 152 and 154.
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Figure 4
Decision-making process in the EU 
Example 1: Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Attacks 
against Information System
Private Com (2002) 173 2002/0086/CNS
Proposal for a council framework decision on attacks against information systems
Private Fields Of Activity:
Justice and Home Affairs
Legal basis:
Commission: Traite/UE/art 29,30 par 1, 31,34 par 2
Procedures:
Commission: Consultation procedure
Type of file:
Commission: Proposal for a Decision
Comments:
This proposal does not relate only to acts directed at Member States. It also applies to 
conduct on the territory of the European Union, which is directed against information 
systems on the territory of third countries. This reflects the Commission’s 
commitment to tackle attacks against information systems at a global as well as I 
European Union level.
Private 19-04-2002 Adoption By Commission
Primarily responsible DG Justice and Home Affairs
Jointly responsible DG Information Society
Optional consultation European Parliament
Addressee for formal act Council
Responsible Erkki Liikanen; Antonio Vitorino
Documents: COM/2002 /173 /FINAL 
IP/2002/601/
Procedures: Consultation procedure
Type of file: Proposal for a Decision
Legal basis: Traite/UE/art 29,30 par 1, 31, 34 par 2
Numero Celex 52002PC0173
Source: COM (2000) 385, 2000/0189/COD
http://europa.eu.int/prelex/detail dossier real.cfm?CL=fr&DosId=158278
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Example 2: Proposal for a Directive of the Parliament and the Council 
concerning Personal Information and the Protection of Privacy in the Context of
Electronic Media.
Private COM (2000) 385, 2000/0189/COD
Proposition de directive du parlement Europeen et du conseil concemant le 
traitement des donnees personnelles et a la protection de la vie privee dans le 
domaine des communications electroniques
Private Domains
Diffusion de l'information
Questions Generates
Base(s) juridique(s):
Commission : Traite /  CE /  ar195
Procedures:
Commission: Procedure de codecision
Type de dossier
Commission: Proposition de Directive
Commentaires:
La directive proposee est destinee a remplacer la directive 97/66/CE concemant le 
traitement des donnees a caractere personnel et la protection de la vie privee dans le 
secteur des telecommunications qui devait etre transposee pour le 24 octobre 1998. Cette 
proposition ne vise pas a modifier profondement le contenu de la directive existante, 
mais simplement a adapter et a actualiser ses dispositions pour tenir compte des 
evolutions recentes et previsibles dans le domaine des services et des technologies des 
communications electroniques.
Private 12-07-2000 Adoption Par Commission
Responsable DG Societe de l'information
Associe Centre commun de recherche; DG Affaires economiques,finan.; DG 
Agriculture; DG Commerce; DG Concurrence; DG Developpement; 
DG Education et culture; DG Elargissement; DG Emploi et affaires 
sociales; DG Energie et transports; DG Entreprises; DG 
Environnement; DG Fiscalite Union douaniere; DG Justice, Aff. 
interieures; DG Marche interieur; DG Politique regionale; DG 
Recherche; DG Relations exterieures; DG Sante, protection 
consomm.; Secretariat General
Consultation
obligatoire
Comite econom. et social
Consultation
facultative
Comite des regions
Dest. acte formel Conseil; Parlement europeen
Responsable Erkki Liikanen
Documents: IOC E /2000 /365 /223
Procedures: Procedure de codecision
Type de dossier Proposition de Directive
Base(s) juridique(s): Traite/CE/art 95
Source: COM (2000) 385, 2000/0189/COD
http://europa.eu.int/prelex/detail dossier real.cfm?CL=fr&Dos!d=158278
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Figure 5 
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b Blurring hierarchical relations: Negotiating and co-operating in a 
microcosm o f unclear hierarchies
If one chooses to move beyond form al structures in order to understand  
how  people are really related, how  obligations are repaid, how  reputation is built 
and w hat the norm s regulating the above are,56 a different set of observations 
w ould be valuable.
Therefore, understanding decision-m aking57 as being the ordered 
orchestration of formal procedures giving b irth  to a proposal or a draft, sim ply 
misses the point. I think there is a m ore com plicated reality underlining the 
process through which a piece of legislation is initiated. I therefore here engage 
in illustrating the reasons w hy hierarchical relations m ay get blurry.
As a dv il servant w orking for the European Commission you are called to 
negotiate and co-operate w ith  various other persons in a microcosm of unclear 
hierarchies. Good personal relationships w ith  the hierarchy and in particular 
w ith  the colleagues in the cabinet of the Com m issioner can prove to be extremely 
useful in the event a proposal is blocked at the level of the cabinet of the 
Commissioners, or resistance emerges at low er levels of the hierarchy.
Interview excerpt:___________________________________
I t  can Be very stressful fo r  young fone tionnaires___We have agreed in
OfovemBer on the JramezvorhJDecision and Begun ivorfqng since WpriC, and then
56 Heclo and Wildavsky note 26 above.
57 Decision-making rests within the European Commission, while decision taking is the 
responsibility of the College of Commissioners. My focus is on the former. For this distinction see 
Cini note 53 above, at p. 154.
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somebody destroyed everything fo r  no good reason. 9{piv, I  have to taCfcto one 
member o f  the cabinet and try to g e t him to speaf^to the Commissioner.58
In other w ords, good relations w ith  the cabinet can prove to be crucial, as 
there are times that a fonctionnaire w ould  need to mobilise them  to 'sell' a 
proposal directly to the Commissioner, circum venting opposition from  lower in 
the hierarchy. M any informal discussions w ere focused on how  som ebody w ould 
speak to a m em ber of a cabinet, to convince him  to speak to the Commissioner, 
w ho then m ight w ant to speak to the Director General.
H owever, informal chats are significant for the colleagues in the cabinet of 
the Com missioner too. This is because a fonctionnaire can provide direct 
background inform ation, not 'censored' by  the Director General. M oreover, good 
relations w ith  the Director General are im portant for the same reason.
Interview excerpt:_____________________________________
fo o d  reCations zvith the (Director QeneraC are aCso usefuC as, in the event the
(Director or (Head o f  U nit are azvare o f  this, they zviCCnot easiCy take the risfcof 
bCoching your proposal, therefore very important meetings are these in ivhich 
your (Director QeneraC participates and fo r  zvhom you have prepared the
briefings.59
58 Interview with a Head of Unit at DG Information Society, conducted on 22 January 2002.
59 Interview with an A5 official at DG Competition, conducted on 24 January 2002.
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c M obility
The previous excerpt shows that negotiating renders hierarchies blurry. 
M obility though is another variable to be taken into account to m ake a relevant 
assessment.
Page's analysis is im portant to this respect, as he concludes that there is 
considerable mobility in senior posts. H is data indicate that 61 per cent of his 
sam ple had  previously w orked in another Directorate General.60 In a 
Com m unication from  Vice-President Kinnock to the European Com mission,61 the 
above figures seem to hold true for today 's situation.
According to the data in this com m unication, about 1000 officials of all 
grades change DG or departm ent each year. The figure for 1999 is 1058 out of 
approxim ately 20000 officials w orking for it. For the period betw een 1990 and 
1999, the num ber of officials w ho changed posts in the context of 
interdepartm ental m obility am ounted to 8669. Nevertheless, this num ber 
excludes m obility w ithin a DG, as accurate num bers do no t exist. Finally, as 
regards officials in top m anagem ent posts, such as grade A 1 and  A 2 officials, 
they have to regularly move.62
M obility is considerable, and the Kinnock com m unication seeks to 
formalise this trend by means of setting benchm ark periods: As a rule, officials
60 Page note 29 above, at p. 35. His observations are based on biographical data of 207 senior 
officials, compiled from biographical entries in the (1992, 1993) European Companion (London: 
TSO).
61 Communication from Vice-President Kinnock to the Commission of Guidelines on Mobility, 
adopted by the Commission under SEC (2002) 146 on 12 February 2002, at p. 3. It is important to 
note that mobility is voluntary, with one exception: The case of sensitive posts, where officials 
have special expertise or handle sensitive information. Otherwise, officials stay in their posts for a 
fixed period.
62 This has been recently confirmed by the Commission Communication SEC (2000) 2305/5 of 21 
December 2000 on the Appraisal, Selection and Appointment of Senior Commission Officials.
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should consider changing jobs once they have spent at least two, b u t not more 
than five years in the same post. The Com m unication further asserts that newly 
recruited officials should acquire broad experience at the beginning of their 
career.
A reasonable period for a new  official to rem ain in her first post w ould be 
three years. Nonetheless, individuals aged 55 and above, w ho w ish to rem ain in 
their post, m ay do so.63 In reference to mobility, I was told that:
Interview excerpt:_____________________________________
Mobility is in principle not rebated to promotion. When you move to another
*DQ or another U nit in the same *DQ you keep yourgrade. (The e?(ceptions are 
the designation o f 'Directors and tDirector generals: Such designation is a 
promotion Because the titCe corresponds to a specific grade and salary.
Sis regards mobility the system functions as follows: Vacant positions are 
advertised on the intranet describing the grade/profile e jec ted . S id  colleagues 
can apply. O f course informal contacts can prove valuable in this case. u t, you 
should note that fo r  someone to be transferred to another Unit, the Mead o f  
U nit has to give her consent, dhe only case o f  transfer zvithout consent happens 
in case o f  restructuring parts o f  Units (for example when a U nit merges w ith  
others), so, since files ‘move’ officials have to move zi/ith them.64
63 Communication from Vice-President Kinnock to the Commission note 61 above, at p. 6
64 Interview with an A5 official at DG Research, conducted on 29 May 2002.
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The above is m eant to elucidate the im portance of preparatory  stages. My 
view  is that m uch is done at an informal level by means of an  inform al chat. 
Hierarchies of course, are never fully skipped, as the dossiers concerned have to 
be signed. Nevertheless, they m ay be less involved in the initial stages.
M obility further reinforces this, as a fonctionnaire does no t know  w ith 
w hom  she will be w orking tom orrow. Good contacts w ith  other people from 
other Units and DGs m ay prove crucial then. One w ould  be tem pted to ask 
though: W hy are national networks not enough? The answ er is simple: One 
cannot choose the people she w orks w ith  and  moreover, because of the w orking 
arrangem ents of the European Commission one is called to co-operate w ith 
various people.
This is not to say that such national netw orks do no t exist. French 
nationals for example are thought to be very well netw orked, although the 
people w ho have graduated from the elite French Universities, the Grandes Ecoles, 
present an interesting example of a netw ork w ithin a netw ork, not to m ention the 
hierarchies inside this sub-network (Ecole Superieur, Ecole N orm ale and Ecole 
Poly technique).
d Promotion
Relations of dependency m ay further be form ed as a result of the 
particular rules and practices governing prom otion procedures. W hen Jacques 
Delors was President of the European Com m ission (1985-95), a reform  of rules 
took place: To become a H ead of Unit (A3 level) one w ould  no longer have to
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gradually go up  all the levels in the hierarchy (From A 7 to A3). Now, even an A7 
can become a H ead of Unit on the basis of m erit.65
Interview excerpt:________________________________________
Hhe reform was undertaken in the name cfflexibility, as it wouCd allow the capable
to go  up in the hierarchy faster than the others. However, in reality the reform aimed 
at controlling the people who occupy the !A3 post (Heads o f  Unit) so as to ensure 
their willingness to respect and serve the ideals that underline the political mandate 
o f  the Commissioner, slaving the right contacts and ideas is important in order to 
Become a Head o f  U nit now, as such an appointment requires the approval o f  the
Commissioner.
(But, Before the reform, Si level fonctionnaires would inevitably one day Become 
IHeads o f  Unit, as going up the hierarchy was prescribed in administrative rules, 
zvith no active involvement o f  political figures, such as the Commissioner. *1his 
actually resulted in some (Head o f  Units not always Being receptive to some o f  the
Commissioner’s ideas.66
Hence, new  types of netw orks were created, as once again having the right 
contacts m ay prove to be crucial w hen it comes to prom otion. In this instance, 
prom otion and reputation become intertwined.
65 Edwards, G. and Spence, D. (eds) (second ed 1997) The European Commission (Harlow, UK: 
Longman Current Affairs).
66 Interview with a Head of Sector at DG Competition, conducted on 23 January 2002.
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Interview excerpt:_______________________________________
Imputation is measured in terms o f  education, past eiqperience, influence, and
reputation.67
'Influence and reputation/ m ean that, for example, know ing people from 
the cabinet is im portant. There are various w ays to build it, as a fonctionnaire 
w ith  a good reputation is:
Interview excerpts:____________________________________
Somebody luho Has sufficient knowledge, motivation, politicaljudgement,
negotiating skills and reaCism.68 
A  specialist zufto nonetheless can play by the rules and play so good that he gets
promotions/appointments.69
The above denote that personal achievements and specialisation are 
im portant, bu t not enough. Reputation can be built by  participating in meetings 
like the ones organised on specific files (these are called ad hoc inter-service 
meetings), on horizontal issues (one example are the m eetings organised at DG 
Com petition on collective dominance and access to networks), as well as by means of 
internal notes copied to a large num ber of colleagues.70
At these instances, a fonctionnaire can prove her professional skills and 
her negotiating qualities. Weekly meetings are also significant in this respect.
67 Interview with an A5 official at DG Enterprise, conducted on 22 January 2002.
68 Interview with an A4 official at DG Internal Market, conducted on 24 January 2002.
69 Interview with a Head of Sector at DG Competition, conducted on 22 January 2002.
70 Interview with a Head of Sector at DG Competition, conducted on 23 January 2002.
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These are organised by  the H ead of Unit and  serve the purposes of co-ordination 
and of keeping everybody inform ed about the w ork carried out in the Unit. 
During these m eetings, everybody has to report about the tasks perform ed in the 
previous week and  the ones that w ould be perform ed in the following. After all, 
the principal du ty  of a H ead of Unit is task allocation and  co-ordination.
Hence, bringing fame to one's Unit by taking risky initiatives m ay be 
considered not to be good enough, as this person w ould  create lots of enemies. 
M oreover, if som ebody does a bad job, the Unit or the DG is exposed. If 
som ebody m akes a public comment everybody is exposed. You have to be 
cautious.
Interview excerpt:______________________________________
X  tookinitiatives. 9 k  was the, firs t to organise XXXX . .. I t  was during his time
that the U nit Became famous. P ut then he Became dangerous fo r  some peopk.
People Begun talking Behind his Back. . . 71
e Transdepartmental dialogue
The above im ply that cohesion does not build  up sim ply because 
fonctionnaires frequently socialise w ith each other. It is no t the result of them  
being 'trained' to co-exist by w orking together despite their differences. It is 
exactly that all of the above acts acquire m eaning in the light of shared 
understandings as to how  relations are built and  reputation is valued. These 
understandings underline and produce practices such as, for example, eating
71 Interview with a Head of Sector DG Competition, conducted on 23 January 2002.
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together or setting up  an ad hoc m eeting or a forum , as we will see in the 
following paragraphs.
The strategy of netw orking described earlier builds cohesion as it is 
underlined by practices, which tie m em bers of a group together, as structural 
conditions m ake people in a group dependent on each other in order to do a job. 
M oreover, such dependency produces shared understandings as to w ho is 
'successful'
To illustrate this, being educated and having a good drafting hand  does 
not seem to be enough. Belonging in netw orks is prom oted as a virtue and  as 
such the unspoken dom inant definition of 'successful' interweaves w ith  the 
insider/ou tsider taxonom y, sidestepping other understandings of w hat 
professional success is, such as the one reproduced in the image of isolated, bu t 
well educated fonctionnaire.
In the light of the above, inter-service m eetings and  collaboration, as in  the 
case of dossiers shared by m ore than one DGs, present another instance, which 
m ay reinforce the finding of dependency. The DGs of the European Com m ission 
are caught in constant com m unication and collaboration especially in the field of 
inform ation society regulation. This is because, due to its nature, inform ation 
society regulation falls w ithin the competence of various DGs.
Following this intuition, the following paragraphs will make the point that 
committees contribute to the habitus of dependency, although it is not w ithin m y 
purposes to chart the different committees relevant to inform ation society 
regulation.
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The degree of officials' active participation m ay depend on the type of 
group concerned and, of course, on the subject m atter. There are num erous and 
of m any types. There are formal internal committees like the O pen N etw orks 
Provision Com m ittee (ONP), the National Regulators A dvisory G roup (NARA); 
G roups run  bu t not controlled by the European Com m ission (e.g. the EU 
Cybercrime Forum); Internal task forces consisting of various services 
representatives.
M oreover, committees can be formal or ad-hoc ones, w ith  ad  hoc ones 
having the advantage that one is not obliged to spend tim e w ith persons she does 
not choose, w ith  an agenda she does not set. In principle, the agenda is defined 
before the m eeting takes place (as m eetings are usually problem  solving ones).
There is self-selection by those initiating the m eeting and selection by  the 
Director or Director General as regards the 'passive' participants. A small inter­
service task force m ay have five participants; Com m ittees of MS have 
approxim ately 15-25 members.
Nevertheless, opinions vary as to the extent to w hich interdepartm ental 
dialogue m ay bring about true co-operation.
Interview excerpt:___________________________________
In  essence one is inclined to discover that you have to compromise to ensure
daily efficiency and avoid problems/-Cosing time. HJhis is especiaCCy the case since 
not aCC (DQs/persons have the same high degree o f  coCCaborative
ftransdepartmentcd, attitude and sometimes this does not change despite Cong
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draining’ in such routines.72
Co-ordination m ay prove to be difficult, b u t in other instances meetings 
w ould run  smoothly, resulting in a fruitful exchange. Conflicts can be for two 
m ain reasons: Personal conflicts, and policy conflicts, as some issues are m ore 
contentious than others. This depends on the controversial nature of the file 
concerned.
A very technical, politically neutral file w ould not norm ally be 
problematic. A politically sensitive file m ay be changed considerably and  in some 
cases be completely blocked. Different DGs m ay approach and understand  an 
issue from a totally different angle, as it w as the case w ith  the debate 
surrounding the issue of data retention.
Interview excerpt:____________________________________
CriminaC Caiv represents an interesting conflict (flprinciples, as the Caw
enforcement peopCe o f  (DQ Justice andSCome affairs profoundCy disagree ivith  
the civit CiBerties peopCe. ‘But, it is not onCy the (DQ Justice andSCome affairs 
invoCved in the (Data (Retention (FiCe.
'The (DQs invoCved are: ‘DQ Justice and (Home Affairs, (D(J Internal Market, 
and (DC} Information Society. W e ((DQ Information Society) are (the sausage, ' 
trying to compromise things in respect to issues that relate to privacy and the
Internet.. . 73
72 Interview with a Head of Unit at DG Information Society, conducted on 22 January 2002.
73 Interview with a Head of Unit at DG Information Society, conducted on 22 January 2002. In 
May 2002, The Parliament passed the Communications Data Protection Directive (EU
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W hat happens is that, on the one hand you have the 'Caw enforcement'peopCe 
and on the other hand Internet service providers and teCecom operators in a 
strange position, as although they do not w ant Caws to impose on them 
ohCigations, whiCe teCecom operators used to retain data themseCves, since they 
are often victims o f  fraud, (6ut o f  course no6ody (qiew that, as it is an iCCegaC 
act). (Then you have the civiC rights peopCe who cCaim that this is a surveiCCance 
situation. I  want to f in d  a compromise soCution, may he accept that providers 
need some data to he retained, what data depends on the business modeC. I f  this 
practice [data retention] is legitimised hy Caw, then the Caw shouCd not impose
heavy ohdgations on them.74
Again, reputation is im portant in the course of negotiations in the event of 
conflicts, and it is a m atter of pride to have your opinion taken into account. I 
have seen various internal notes proving this point. At the level of H eads of 
Units, conflicts, as depicted in such notes, can be very intense and  m ost of the 
time the message is 'you did not take me into account/  while at the level of Directors 
Generals the tone changes and is far softer. After all, having w on a battle will 
increase one's bargaining pow er in the next conflict.
2002/58/EC) 351 to 133, despite an aggressive campaign by civil liberties groups. The Directive 
provides that 'Unsolicited email, better known as spam, has been outlawed by the European Union. 
Internet-fed identification programs, better known as cookies, will be tolerated if  people are informed of 
them, And EU governments can order the retention of customer data beyond useful billing purposes' for 
the history of the Communication Data Protection Directive see 
http://www.theregister.co.Uk/content/6/23268.html,
www.theregister.co.uk/content/6/25483.html, (web pages visited on 14 May 2003).
74 ibid.
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The fact that, although transdepartm ental dialogue is an im portant 
com ponent of decision-making, it m ay prove problematic, has been recognised 
by the European Commission in its recent report w ith the title 'Designing 
Tomorrow's Commission/75 The report states that European Com m ission 
departm ents currently devote 5.7 per cent of intram ural hum an resources to the 
internal consultations closely associated w ith  it. This comes to som ething like 
1280 m en per year, w ith  880 m en per year being in category A.
However, the report recognises that coordination is not as effective as it 
could be, 'due to a lack of clarity as regards the split of responsibilities between 
departments, the over-assertiveness by departments in some cases, and authoritarianism 
on the part of certain team leaders in others -  which has the effect of distorting 
interdepartmental consultations and creating certain organisational problems which slow 
down response tim es/76
Therefore, the report further proposes that there should be a clear 
separation of responsibilities, and that the 'lead' departm ent and  the other 
departm ents consulted should be given autonom y and responsibility. To this 
effect, the Secretariat-General should be given a greater part to play.
f  File keeping
An issue relevant to the above is file keeping. In cases w hen 
transdepartm ental dialogue is required, m undane adm inistrative practices
75 'Designing Tomorrow's Commission - A Review of the Commission's Organisation and 
Operation/ note 47 above.
76 ibid. Interestingly enough, the report further mentions that some DGs have expressed their 
concern in reference to their relations with Member States' private offices, as they considered that 
there is excessive interference by them in the internal management of DGs.
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relating to w here files are kept m ay be very im portant. This is because such 
'details' can be quite contentious since they im ply w ho controls the file.77 The 
following (long) interview extract will elucidate how  pow er is exercised in the 
event a file is shared or inter-service consultation consultation takes place.
Interview  excerpt:__________________________________________
When a (DCf has principal responsibility o f  a file, while the other (DQs are
consuCtecC, the influence o f  the Catter comes from  the fa c t  that the Commission is 
a coCCegial body. A l l  Commission decisions have to 6e submitted to the CoCCege 
o f  Commissioners zidth an attachment o f  the opinions o f  the other (DCjs 
consuCted. A  fcasehandCer, can therefore 'bCock! other (DQs proposals, but then 
he takes the risfcthat the cabinet o f  the Commissioner in charge o f  the consuCted 
(DQ zoouCdraise the issue and try to bCocfcthe decision at the CeveCcf the CoCCege
o f  Commissioners.
I t  is therefore aCways better to try to convince your colleagues or at least to 
minimise the points o f  disagreement. A  way to do this is to organise biCateraC 
meetings to try to f in d  a compromise—
The case-handCer has thefiCe in his office and set the agenda o f  meetings w ith  
other (DQs. (However, inter-service consultations must be launched via the 
(Head o f  U nit and be signed by the (Director. A  case-handCer’s reputation and  
his good reCation zvith the (Head o f  U nit and/or (Director can thus prove 
crucial. ‘Then, fo r  e?(gmp(e, because o f  strong criticism by other (DQs, a (Director
77 Cirri, McGowan, Nugent, Paterson and Wright note 27 above, at p. 154.
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may decide to stop initiatives o f  fiis ojficiaCs, to avoid starting a ‘w ar’ on that 
subject. On the other hand, i f  it is the case o f  a ft u f  battle, ' a Director may try 
to protect the competences o f  his DQ,
M though inter-service consuCtation is very often, shared fifes are not the ruCe,
6ut the exception - you ivere invoCved in one ivhen you worked on the XXXX  
report-, ‘Even in this case, the controC is not ready shared, since one o f  the two 
DQs has the 'master copy ’ and the other ivillhave to make comments, 
dfowever, since we can onCygo the Commissioner w ith a cover (fich e , signed6y 
6oth Director Qenerals, cooperation is required up to a certain extent (eg. to 
reach agreement on substantive issues - since each side can convince its Director 
Qenercd that the issue is sufficientCy important and that he should push the 
Director Qeneral o f  the other DQ to take into account the comment). On the 
contrary, on techniccd and drafting issues it is not possiSCe to block^the 
coCCeague holding the ‘master copy.} In  order to avoid this unbalance, in the 
initial XXXX reports, we had divided the chapters amongst us to avoid one DQ
having the whole master copy.78
In reference to the exact location of keeping files inside a DG, the system 
varies strongly. At DG Com petition, in the Unit I worked for, the case-handlers 
kept their files in their office, a practice which, I believe, reflects the fact that that 
rapporteurs have im portant independence in this particular DG.
78 Interview with a Head of Sector at DG Competition, conducted on 30 May 2002.
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However, the files regarding infringem ent procedures w ere kept by the 
secretary, possibly because access to files and appeals procedures against the 
European Commission were relatively frequent, and the European Commission 
w ould then have to transm it the file to the court. In the M erger Task Force, I w as 
told that the secretaries m ake copies of all docum ents for the case handlers. In 
other DGs again practices vary  considerably.
This brings m e to m y next point: A lthough the previous presented 
examples show ing how  dependency and compromise regulate life inside the 
European Commission, the following will touch on the characteristics of the file 
system, in order to show  that, although relationships of dependency result in the 
establishm ent of a certain degree of cohesion, personal m anagem ent styles m ay 
exhibit difference.
For example, at DG Com petition, each file gets a 'case number.' A-grade 
officials are know n as 'case-handiers,' because everybody is allocated a case, for 
which she is responsible. There is a database, ELIE, w hich she has to update after 
each step, and  productivity can thus be m easured and  com pared. One should not 
forget that DG Com petition is a DG w ith  considerable w orkload, processing 
large num bers of cases or dossiers, and therefore such w orking practices are 
m eant to ensure efficient planning.
This is w hy a 'priority number' is assigned to a case as soon as it arrives. 
Simultaneously, at DG Com petition, they apply a set of w orkload indicators. In 
this way, the am ount of time required to process a case can be estim ated, and the 
w ork allocated to officials. In the research field, some program m e m anagem ent
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departm ents have also developed w orkload indicators, w hich enable the H ead of 
Unit to anticipate resource requirem ents and distribute the w orkload.79
In other DGs the system  can be different. In DG Inform ation Society for 
example, there are no 'case numbers' bu t lists of tasks of each officials in the Unit. 
Often, the 'tasks' are not related to specific files, bu t rather a 'specialisation.' It is 
im portant to note though that, in  any event, files cannot be m oved from one 
official to another w ithout protest (officials have adm inistrative 'property rights' 
over their files). So, w hat happens w hen a Directorate is restructured is that 
officials and their files m ove from  one Unit to another.
The fact that officials have a nearly 'property right' in their files implies that 
they try to specialise so that they are considered as experts in certain dom ains, 
although for linguistic reasons another official can be asked to w ork on a specific 
issue. W hatever the case, specialisation is extremely im portant, as it plays a role 
for prom otions.
Nonetheless, the responsibility of the casehandler varies strongly across 
DGs. DG Com petition officials have considerable responsibility on their files. 
Rank-and-file officials sign their ow n notes and  are expected to present their 
dossiers before the Commissioners. In other DGs, I w as told that this is seldom  
the case.80
The M erger Task Force at DG Com petition presents an interesting and 
unique example of organisational flexibility. A lthough the norm al situation in the
79 The above has also been recognised in the 1999 report by the Inspectorate-General, which listed 
good and innovative working practices applied within the Commission, see 'Designing 
Tomorrow's Commission - A Review of the Commission's Organisation and Operation/ report by 
the Inspectorate-General note 47 above, at p. 16.
80 Interview note 78 above.
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European Commission is that w ork is perform ed w ithin Units w ith  clearly 
defined responsibilities, in the Merger Task Force there are no Units: The whole 
Directorate (about 40 rapporteurs) acts as one Unit, and  the H eads of Unit act as 
case-managers. This m odel implies that the competence of the rapporteur m ainly 
depends on knowledge of m ethodology, procedure and  approach (i.e. how  to 
conduct an investigation) and less on specialisation in a particular sector. 
Therefore, w orkload can be m anaged m ore efficiently.81
Moreover, differences, which m ay reflect one's nationality or professional 
background, are apparent in practices relevant to everyday practical 
m anagem ent of particular files. Good file keeping requires that correspondence 
and papers are organised in chronological sequence and that it contains all 
formal correspondence (not personal notes) and  notes to the file (e.g. after a 
telephone conversation), bu t of course this is no t always the case.
Case handlers are chosen by the H ead of Unit, bu t, again, the criteria for 
this vary depending on each H ead of Unit. Some follow 'organigram m esothers 
are m ore pragm atic and  take into account language skills and availability of the 
relevant official. DG Internal M arket uses w ork program m es for example, to set 
out in detail the activities to be carried out at Unit level. This way, the provision 
of funds for activities in the budget can be done m ore effectively.82
Finally, in reference to the use of intranets, teleworking and 
videoconferencing, practices also vary. For example, DGs Enterprise has 
prom oted transparency in the provision of inform ation using the Intranet to
81 'Designing Tomorrow's Commission - A Review of the Commission's Organisation and 
Operation/ report by the Inspectorate-General note 47 above.
82 ibid.
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disseminate and update  inform ation (e.g. by  pu tting  the m inutes of Directors' 
meetings on the intranet w ithin 24 hours) .83
83 ibid.
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C. INTRODUCING RUPTURES
The previous section w as m eant to introduce the reader to the possibility 
of looking at divergences in the practices of different DGs and Units. H ere I seek 
to identify how  officials m ay have m ultiple roles stem m ing from different 
m anagem ent styles, different nationality and  language, different gender or 
professional background. This is an enquiry, w hich concentrates on identifying 
schemas owing their existence to the socialisation process of officials prior to 
joining the European Commission.
1. Nationality and professional background
a Nationality
N ationality and how  it m ay affect decision-making has been a contentious 
issue. The very concept of Commissioner is a good starting point to discuss the 
above. This is because, although they are appointed by major parties in their 
Member States, their role is to both serve the European interest and  provide a 
channel of com m unication between the G overnm ent in their country and the 
European Commission.
Then, there is the difference between cabinets and  DGs. M cDonald's 
anthropological analysis shed light onto how  cabinets are perceived by 
fonctionnaires as being the ones w ith pow er and  prestige, since they have the 
final say in drafts and proposals produced by the officials. A nd they are also 
m ost certainly the place w here national affiliations and national loyalties w ould
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be found, as they have regular contacts w ith  national lobbyists, national 
adm inistrations and the perm anent representations of MS in Brussels.84
On the individual level, I think that it w ould  be w rong to forget that m ost 
European Com m ission officials come from  a national educational, adm inistrative 
and political system. As Christiansen notes, officials, w ho have a European 
educational form ation as a result of being educated at the College of Europe, the 
European Institute of Public A dm inistration or the European University Institute, 
are a 'small albeit growing minority/85
Generally, the link w ith national adm inistrative systems has been the 
subject of a num ber of recent studies.86 The following sections will argue that 
nationality m ay m atter, as there are occasions w here individual identifications 
m ay become institutionalised in Units, and  even w hole DGs. M oreover, w e will 
see that not only nationality, bu t also professional background m ay have the 
sam e effect.
DG Com petition presents us w ith  an interesting example that m ay help 
elucidate the above, as its Directors Generals so far have all been German,
84 McDonald, M. (2000)' Identities in the European Commission' in Nugent note 6 above, at p. 52- 
53. According to McGowan, at the level of Commissioners' cabinets, there is a specialist, for 
example a competition specialist, who may try to protect the national interests of the 
Commissioner's home country. The specialists meet twice a week, and these meetings are called 
special chefs meetings. The recommendations from these meetings are referred to the weekly 
meetings of the chefs de cabinets. If agreement is reached among the chefs de cabinet, then the 
College of Commissioners usually accepts their recommendation. In this way decision-making is 
linked to the overall framework of EU economic policy, see McGowan, L. (2000) 'Safeguarding 
the economic constitution: The Commission and competition policy' in Nugent note 6 above, at p. 
154-155.
85 Christiansen, T. (1997) 'Tensions of European governance; Politicised bureaucracy and multiple 
accountability in the European Commission' 4 Journal of European Public Policy 73-90.
86 For example see, Egeberg, M. (1996) ’Organisation and nationality in the European Commission 
services’ (1996) 3 Public Administration 235-248; Trondal, J. (2001) 'The parallel administration of 
the European Commission: National officials in European clothes?' Arena Working Papers 01/25; 
Bellier, I. (1994) ' La Commission Europeenne: Hauts fonctionnaires et culture du management' 
(1994) 70 Revue Frangaise d'Administration Publique 253-262.
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a fact, which reveals the interest taken by Bonn in competition policy matters. 
DGCOMP, which is structured along the lines of the German Federal Cartel Office, 
comprises eight directorates....It has total of over 400 staff, of whom around half A  (area) 
grade officials (including 25 or so national experts on secondment in Brussels). Some 
44% are allocated to work under Articles 85 and 86 [81 and 82 under the Amsterdam 
Treaty, which came into effect in May 1999), 12% to the Merger regulation, 3% to work 
under Article 90 [86], 21% state aids, 9% international regulations and the final 11% 
are clerical officers.87
M oreover, the majority of officials have a legal background, w ith  lawyers 
outnum bering the economists by a ratio of seven to one.88 This last point is 
particularly im portant if understood in the light of Me D onald 's finding that 
there is a tacit rank betw een lawyers, economists and officials w ith  a natural 
science background. Lawyers are highly valued and  view ed as having the 'right' 
kind of training and use the 'right' kind of language to deal w ith  proposals and 
drafts.
After all, the juridical element is central to the organisation of an 
adm inistration, as w e will see in the following chapters on capital. This is because, 
if one accepts that the principal function of law  is to pu t social phenom ena into 
categories and classify actions as right or w rong, it is im portant to already 
possess this m ode of thinking as a fonctionnaire.
In the mid-1990s, the conflict betw een the 'horizontal' ethos of DG 
Enterprise (then under the German Commissioner, Bangemann), w hich favoured
87 McGowan note 84 above, at p. 154-155
88 ibid.
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the application of com petition rules, and  the 'dirigiste' approach of DG Research 
(its Com m issioner being the French Edith Cresson), which supported  targeted 
projects favouring specific industries, is well docum ented and  shows the 
possibility of different DGs possessing divergent views on the same issue.89
This w as recognised by Romano Prodi, w ho, after the 1999 events that 
forced the European Commission to resign over allegations of fraud, nepotism  
and m ism anagem ent, proposed reforms concerning the rotation of senior 
Commission officials am ong Directorates Generals, which have long been 
'colonised' by  nationals from certain m em bers states, France, being one example of 
a state being over-represented in DG Agriculture.90
Indeed, the European Commission decided to introduce fixed term s for 
Directors Generals, w hich resulted in the rem oval of large num bers of senior 
officials all in one go, (although m any of them  occupied new  posts at similar 
levels).91
89 Bomberg, B. and Peterson, J. (1999) 'The development of RTD policy: Making history and 
setting budgets' in Bomberg, E. and Peterson, J. (1999) Decision Making in the European Union (New 
York: St. Martin's Press). DG Enterprise was DG II (Industry) at the time. It became DG Enterprise 
in 2000.
90 Whitman note 34 above.
91 As one of my interviewees told me 'The Parliament approves every year the percentage of 
fonctionnaires to serve at each grade. For example, at the A4 grade there is normally the 
allocation of 10-15 per cent of fonctionnaires.' Interview with a Head of Sector at DG 
Competition, conducted on 30 May 2002.
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Interview  excerpt:______________________________________________
IProdis line is that fonctionnaires sfumCcC serve fiv e  years in one -post and then move.
Prodi promised to take away the linfcbetween the post and nationality, which is an
unspoken operating principle.
*But then again national percentage has to 6e observed which means that a certain 
percentage o f  civil servants who would join the Commission is allocated to every
Member State.92
To better understand these tensions it is im portant to look at statistics. 
Page argues that by studying the statistical tables he produced, we see that, 
although there is no evidence of a single MS occupying top positions in the 
different DGs, (DG Personnel's position is that they m ake every effort to  avoid 
having tw o top posts in the hierarchy being occupied by m ore than two officials 
of the sam e nationality),93 w e cannot avoid noticing that Germany, for example, 
is om nipresent a t DG Com petition and  DG Enterprise.
92 Interview with a Head of Unit at DG Information Society, conducted on 22 January 2002.
93 Page refers to this as a practice not publicly accepted by the Commission. As Page mentions the 
practice of reserve posts (certain posts are thought to belong to certain Member States) has been 
outlawed by the Court of First Instance in March 1993. The case involved the challenge of the 
appointment of a director at DGIX (Fisheries) who was an Italian candidate and had no 
experience of fisheries policy, although he has been working for the Commission since 1970 and 
was an Economist. The other candidates were a German, a Dutchman and an Englishman, who 
challenged the decision on the basis of their application being turned down as a result of them not 
having the right nationality for the post (their argument was based on the fact that the three 
Directors who left the posts were a French an Italian and a Spanish and the committee which 
turned down the plaintiffs' application, itself proposed the names of three people, a French, an 
Italian and a Spanish). Nonetheless, the Court did not reject the argument that the Commission 
should be sensible to the need to maintain a national representation balance but disagreed with 
the way that the balance was achieved, see Page note 29 above, at p. 56.
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Table 1
N um ber of top officials according to nationality based on data 
compiled in 1992 and 1993 94
B D k N1 F D Gr Irl I L P E U K Total
DG 6 1 8 13* 2 1 9 3 1 4 6 54
Enter
DG 3 1 1 4 9* 2 1 3 1 2 1 3 31
Comp
DG 7 1 4 1 12* 16 1 5 56
Res
DG 2 2 3 1 5 4 1 8 1 6 11* 55
InfSoc
DG 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 10
Int.M
Updating the above based on data compiled in 1995 and 199695 1 find that
B DK N L F D GR IRL I L P E UK Total
DG
Enter
3 3 10 9 4 3 7 2 2 3 8 54
DG
Comp
4 2 2 5 8 2 1 4 1 4 6 39
DG
Res
~7~7 3 1 7 1 7 1 ~ T 7 11 55
DG
InfSoc
3 1 ~T~
_____
4 1 8 5 11 41
DG
IntM.
___
1 2
_ _
7 1 7 4.. 1 1 3 2 35
Key: B=Belgium, Dk=Denmark, Nl=Netherlands, F=France, D=Germany, Gr=Greece, 
Vitaly, L=Luxemburg, P=Portugal, E=Spain, UK= United Kingdom.
Note: Since 2000, the European Commission has been restructured and DGs were renamed. 
Before the reform, DG C om petition  was DG IV (Competition), DG Inform ation Society  was 
DG XIII (Telecommunications), DG Enterprise was DG III (Industry), D G  Internal M arket 
was DG XV (Internal Market) and DG Research  was DG XII (Research). Moreover, DG 
Enterprise now consists of the former DG for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs), 
DG Industry and the Innovation Directorate.
Source: The update is based on the In terinsitu tional D irectories o f  the European Union 
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1995 and 1996) 
and Euro Who's Who: Who is Who in the In stitu tions o f the European Union and in the O ther 
European O rganisations  (Brussels: Editions Delta, 1996).
94 These figures are based on Page's statistics, ibid. His data is com piled from the (1992, 1993) 
European Companion (London: TSO) and (1991) Euro Who's Who: Who is Who in the Institutions of the 
European Union and in the other European Organisations (Brussels: Editions Delta). The asterisks 
denote three more top officials than it w ould  be expected if all different nationalities were evenly  
spread throughout the EU, ibid, at p. 57.
95 N ote that unfortunately there is not bibliographical data for all top officials.
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M oreover, France, UK and Italy are dom inant at DG Inform ation Society, 
while at DG Research, Italians, Germ ans and French are the m ajority in top posts, 
a fact that can be explained in view of the strong research tradition in these 
countries. Page in particular notes that the dom inance of Germans and  Italians at 
DG Research is likely to be the result of the fact that significant num bers of senior 
officials are em ployed in Germ an and Italian research institutes.96
DG Com petition and  DG Enterprise are considered to be the m ost liberal 
DGs.97 As for DG Internal M arket, Me D onald argued that it views itself as the 
'real Europe/98 as it w as instrum ental in the creation of the Single European 
Market. Contrary to this, DG Inform ation society is considered to be the m ost 
interventionist and  the m ost collusive w ith  big business.99 One w ay to explain 
this is by looking at the professional background of officials in  this DG.
b Professional background
As Jourdain notes, a big num ber of the officials of DG Inform ation Society 
has a scientific background, having been trained as electronic or 
telecommunication engineers. M oreover, m any of them  have w orked both  in the 
industry and in national adm inistrative systems. On the basis of the above, they 
are close to lobbyists, in the sense that they have certain sym pathy for them  by 
virtue of speaking the same 'scientific language' w ith  national groups affected by
96 Page note 29 above, at p. 58.
97 Lawton, T. C. (2000) 'Uniting European industrial policy' in Nugent note 6 above, at p. 42.
98 McDonald ' Identities in the European Commission' in Nugent note 6 above, at p. 52-53.
99 Lawton note 96 above, at p. 141-142. The author argues that these ideological divisions 
(liberal/interventionist) were emphasised to him by officials themselves during interviews, see p. 
146 note 14.
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the Research and Developm ent policies of the European Com mission.100 
Therefore, these officials regard themselves as mediators. One of Jourdain 's 
interviewees argued that:
'I feel above all French and a specialist in my domain; this is why I feel at ease here 
at DG XIII (Telecommunications), as I do not have to work for the Eurocrats o fD G IV  
(Competition).. We come from the sector in reference to which we create policies and this 
why, to a certain degree, we also represent the actors of this sector.'101
Jourdain further argues that this specific set of dispositions is 
characteristic of both  DG Inform ation Society and DG Research, w hich results in 
being m ore open to establishing a dialogue w ith  affected parties. To exemplify 
the above, the author further notes that DG Research engaged in creating a 
network, which w as active in producing scientific papers and  collecting 
information. To this effect, DG Research p u t in place a 'reflection forum /  which 
w orked on the relationship betw een science, technology and  society and  had  
contacts w ith various national research centres.
he Monde Diplomatique and various journals published the articles of this 
network. The result of this practice w as that the European Com m ission was 
considered to be one of the leading producers of know ledge in the area, 
publishing proposals and  analysis on the sector of Research and Development.
100 Jourdain, L. (1996) 'La Commission Europeenne et la construction d'un nouveau modele 
d'intervention publique' 43 Revue Frangaise des Sciences Sociales 492-527, at p. 500. DG Information 
Society was initially set up in as a Task Force by Davignon (Commissioner of DG Research) 
whose responsibility was the management of the research programme ESPRIT. This Task Force 
was transformed in DGXIII (Telecommunications) in 1986. DG XIII (Telecommunications) was 
renamed DG Information Society in 2000.
101 ibid, at p. 500, the translation being mine.
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Examples of tensions (1): The 'Attacks against Information Systems'file
If one accepts the above, there is no w onder w hy currently DG 
Inform ation Society finds it difficult to speak the same language w ith  the 'law 
enforcement people' of DG Justice and Hom e affairs.102 The latter has the 'Attacks 
against information systems' file w ith  the form er being consulted, and the 
European Commission has adopted a proposal for a Council Framework 
Decision on this issue.
The 'law enforcement people' of DG Justice and  H om e affairs understand  the 
legal/illegal and right/wrong taxonomies in a w ay, w hich clashes w ith  the m ore 
pragm atic and interest group-oriented m ind set of officials w orking for DG 
Inform ation Society.103
The Framework Decision addresses new  m ost significant form s of criminal 
activity against inform ation systems, such as hacking. Thus, it sought to 
approxim ate criminal laws across the European Union to co-ordinate action 
against this new  form of crime.
Nonetheless, the two DGs disagreed on the extent of criminalisation, as 
DG Inform ation society w as m ore sensitive to privacy issues, w hich prove to be 
controversial, since the question is raised as to w hether there should be a limit in 
the dissem ination of software that contains encryption, a technique allowing 
people to scramble their com m unications and files to prevent others from  
reading them.
102 The Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force on 1 May 1999, assigned new powers to the 
European Union by allowing the European Commission to convert its Justice and Home Affairs 
Task Force into a DG, whose Commissioner is Vitorino Antonio, (nationality: Portuguese, 
profession: lawyer).
103 Interview with a Head of Unit at DG Information Society, conducted on 22 January 2002.
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Examples of tensions (2): Competition law enforcement
W ith the m erger regulation in place since 1990, a M erger Task Force 
(MTF) was created in DG Com petition to deal w ith  merger investigations. In 
1995, this became the new  directorate B, w hich is divided into four Units 
although there is no functional specialisation am ong them. Its officials are in 
constant collaboration w ith  other Directorates, as the prohibition or clearance of a 
merger raises questions as to a num ber of policies of the Union.104
The European Commission blocked in 1994 a proposed joint venture 
(JV), the MSG M edia Services GmbH.105 The proposed JV w ould  be the result of a 
m erger between Bertelsmann, which is a book and sound recording group, Kirch, 
which is a film and TV program m e producer in the pay  TV market, and  Deutsche 
Telecom, the national telecom operator. The JV w ould develop decoders and 
technological services for pay  TV.
The MTF in DG Com petition opposed the m erger, because it w ould 
control the entire Germ an language m arket, w hile Deutsche Telecom w ould  be in 
a position to control the EU m arket for the supply of cable netw ork services. The 
same concerns were raised about the m arket for the provision of technological 
services and generally about the future of pay  TV in Germany.
This decision proved to be particularly controversial, since DG 
Inform ation Society favoured the merger, as it w ould create a player capable of 
com peting internationally. A similar 'dirigiste' approach w as taken by DG
104 Cirri and L. McGowan, Competition policy in the European Union (London: Macmillan, 1998), 
at p. 120.
105 Media Services Group, M. 649 (1994) OJ L 364.
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Enterprise. Finally, the Com petition Com m issioner Karel Van M iert m anaged to 
w in the support of the College of Commissioners and the m erger w as prohibited.
The decision w as heavily criticised as the issue w as raised, as to w hether 
regulatory intervention w ould im pede the grow th of the m ultim edia sector. 
Despite the objections raised, the MTF followed the same line and prohibited the 
Nordic Satellite D istribution (NSD) jyio6 and the Dutch 
R TL/V eronique/Endem ol (Holland M edia Group-HM G) m erger,107 the m ain 
concern being the possibility of restricting access to television netw orks.108
Recently, the MTF followed the sam e line of argum entation in the 
proposed A O L/Tim e W arner merger, as it w as finally decided that the 
concentration w ould be compatible w ith  the European economic area only under 
certain conditions.109
2. Gender and national stereotypes
The above elucidated differences in perception that m ay emerge as a result 
of different nationality and professional background/education . However, Me 
Donald argues that differences m ay also arise because of different gender and 
national stereotypes. She makes reference to classificatory schemes found in 
dualities such as rational/irrational, reasons/emotions, realism/idealism, work/leisure, 
work/family.110
106 Nordic Satellite Distribution, M 490 (1996) OJ L053/20.
107 Holland Media Group-HMG, M 420 (1996) OJ L134/32.
108 Cini, M. '(1999) 'Discretion and politicisation in the EU competition policy: The case of merger 
control' (1999) 12 Governance 175-200, at p. 189.
109 AOL /  Time Warner, M.1845 (2000) OJ C130, especially see recital 95, point (a).
110 McDonald ' Identities in the European Commission' in Nugent note 6 above, at p. 52-53, and 
65-66.
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These schemas m ainly reflect differences betw een Southern and N orthern 
Europe, bu t they can also sometimes assert differences betw een individual 
countries such as France and England for example.
The author then further argues that her ethnographic research reveals how  
differences in gender, nationality and language betw een an English boss and a 
French female w orking in his team, resulted in the confirm ation and 
reproduction of the rational/em otional duality.
Therefore, w hen she had  problems at hom e, her boss w ould say that 'she 
seems to get emotional about everything anyway.' Cultural m isunderstandings were 
further stressed w hen the Englishman asked her to stop calling him  'Monsieur' 
and instead call him  'Jim.'
M cDonald further gives m any examples of how  the British view  the 
continent as 'all emotion and no rationality.' In the same spirit, she argues that the 
British and Danes view  hierarchies as linking to honour and  reputation, w ith 
m anagem ent having little to do w ith formal structures. The British for example 
have a civil service tradition where everyone is part of a team, and all available 
inform ation is shared because of this. The rigid hierarchical system  providing for 
constant checks on one's drafts, (with French origins as I explained earlier), can 
be difficult to be understood for some people from  the 'North.'111
111 ibid, at p. 67. Also see McDonald, M. (2000) "Accountability, anthropology and the European 
Commission" in Strathem, M. (2000) Audit Cultures: Anthropological Studies in Accountability, Ethics 
and the Academy (London: Routledge). Here the author argues that civil servants from the 'North' 
understand in a different way the lack of hierarchical structure of everyday work inside the 
European Commission resulting in networking, as they see uncertainly and corruption in such 
practices, while people from the 'South' may see pride, support and loyalty (as when debts are 
repaid). While I accept that classificatory schemes relating to nationality are important, the 
argument in the previous sections was that interaction result in the building up of relationships of 
dependency amongst civil servants, despite nationality and professional background.
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3. Recruitment
Disparities m ay also exist because of another factor: The different types of 
recruitm ent, as these m ay reveal the existence of differences even w ithin  an 
individual DG. In the early days of the European Commission, the Jean M onnet 
approach w as that the perm anent staff w ould  have to be assisted by  national 
specialists w ho spent small periods in the H igh A uthority. Today's structure of 
the European Union seem to establish that the same approach is followed, as the 
various recruitm ent practices suggest.112
Recruitment practices include comitology, which requires bringing in 
national experts in the event pow ers are delegated to the European Commission, 
and  secondment, w hich gives the right to national civil servants to w ork  for the 
European Com m ission for a short time. In particular, as regards the latter m ode 
of recruitm ent, the idea behind bringing national adm inistrative expertise into 
the European Com m ission w as that a link w ould  be created w ith  hom e 
adm inistrations, enabling the exchange of expertise.
Seconded officials tend to be in A grade jobs and  are approxim ately 12 per 
cent of the workforce betw een grade A4 to A8 level.113 Page though draw s 
attention to the fact that the European Parliam ent and the European civil service 
staff unions have both  been critical to the practice of secondment, as it w as 
thought that the independence of the European Com m ission is at stake.
112 On the Monnet approach see Chapter II of this thesis.
113 Page note 29 above, at p. 60.
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Therefore, they claimed that the European Com m ission 'should not renationalise 
the management of certain sectors. ' 114
Parachuting is a different type of recruitm ent equally, or m aybe even more, 
contested than secondment. Parachuting relates to the 'political' prom otion of 
officials, as these are appointed directly to a senior EU position from  o u ts id e /115 
Nevertheless, this type of appointm ent should no t be thought as being related to 
the clientelistic political systems of Southern Europe, as evidence show s that 
countries such as N etherlands for example tend to have m ore 'parachutists' than 
Italy or G reece.116
M ost of the tim e countries which have just joined the European Union, 
em ploy this m ethod of recruitment. However, people w ho are recruited in  this 
w ay are different than the average fonctionnaire in that they are m uch older and 
have already had  a career in their countries.
Finally, the European Commission extensively use specialists under 
contract. These are term ed 'external resources' and  are em ployed outside the 
norm al operating budget of the European Com m ission.117 In some DGs, such as 
DG Research and DG Inform ation Society, auxiliaries, interim  staff and  service 
providers account for 20 per cent of the employees.118
114 ibid.
115 ibid, at p. 80.
116 ibid, at p. 82.
117 ibid, at p. 61.
118 'Designing Tomorrow's Commission - A Review of the Commission's Organisation and 
Operation/ report by the Inspectorate-General, note 47 above, at p. 17.
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Figure 6
Percentage of ‘intramurals,’ ‘other intram urals’ and ‘extra intram urals’
1 0 0 %
Note: This chart shows the percentage of 'intramurals/ 'other intramurals' and 'extra 
intramurals/ 'Intramurals/ are employees covered by the staff regulations (such as permanent 
officials, temporary officials, locally engaged staff), 'other intramurals' are employees such as 
auxiliaries, interim staff and service providers while 'extramurals' can be persons employed by 
the Commission as consultants for example.
Source: 'Designing Tomorrow's Commission - A Review of the Commission's Organisation 
and Operation/ report by the Inspectorate-General, 7 July 1999, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/reformydecode/screening en.pdf
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D. CONCLUSIONS
Com ing to grips w ith  cognitive schemas regulating life inside the DGs 
responsible for inform ation society regulation requires looking at socialisation 
prior to and after joining the European Commission. W ith reference to the latter, 
understanding the habitus of the European Commission entails com ing to grips 
w ith 'dependency' and 'compromise' as fram ing action. As regards the former, the 
relevant analysis focused on dispositions w hich agents carry w ith  them  prior to 
joining the European Com m ission and w hich m ay become institutionalised in 
Units or whole DGs.
Cognitive schemas m ay be developed after socialisation in a group, (group 
habitus), as a result of the m eaning attached by  a com m unity to communality 
itself. Hence, the focus of m y analysis w as on uncovering practices, which 
underline the m eaning attached to community by  the officials w orking for the 
European Commission.
To this effect, I sought to unravel shared understandings regulating life 
inside the European Com m ission by looking at modes of w orking in w orking 
parties and  shared files, prom otion procedures and mobility, and  finally by 
examining how  reputation is valued and acquired.
To substantiate this argum ent, I first looked at the spatial and  num erical 
context of the European Commission in Brussels. Cohesion is indeed inscribed in 
objects and m odes of living, which feeds into the feeling that fonctionnaires, 
while live in Brussels, they are not 'of it,' having developed a distinctive self- 
recognisable ethos.
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Nevertheless, this ethos is not the result of the compelling pow er of 
routine and objects im posing their logic upon  individuals. It is the ethos itself, the 
particular bond that brings together fonctionnaires, w hich renders m eaningful 
routine and objects. Identifying the quality of this bond then is crucial in order to 
understand the particular m eaning attached to practices such as the initiation of a 
draft proposal.
To m ap the properties of this bond, I first engaged in illustrating the ways 
in which hierarchical relations m ay get blurry, as a civil servant w orking for the 
European Com m ission is continuously called to negotiate and co-operate w ith 
various other persons. For example, good personal relationships w ith  the 
hierarchy and in particular w ith  the colleagues in the cabinet of the 
Commissioner can prove to be extremely useful in the event a proposal is 
blocked at the level of the cabinet of the Com missioners, or resistance emerges at 
lower levels of the hierarchy.
This is because informal chats w ith  a m em ber of a cabinet, to convince him  
to speak to the Commissioner, w ho then m ight w ant to speak to the Director 
General, m ay prove to be invaluable. The flip side of this of course is that 
informal chats are significant for the colleagues in the cabinet of the 
Commissioner too, as a fonctionnaire can provide direct information.
Bonds are further built as a result of the fact that there is considerable 
m obility of fonctionnaires around DGs and Units, as this means that one does not 
know  w ith w hom  she will be w orking tom orrow . Prom otion rules and  practices 
further require building up reputation and contacts. Finally, w orking in shared
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files additionally reinforces relations of dependency, as one is inclined to 
discover that com promise is necessary to ensure daily efficiency and  avoid 
problems.
In a nutshell, the argum ent of the first m ain section of this chapter was 
that you soon discover that alone you are nothing at the European Commission, 
as you need others to do alm ost everything. This becomes a pow erful cognitive 
lens regulating life inside the Commission, which I term ed the habitus of 
dependency and compromise.
This is not to say that agents do not carry systems of classification that owe 
their existence to socialisation prior to them  joining the European Commission. 
O n the contrary, in m y analysis such param eters, such as nationality, disciplinary 
background and m ethods of recruitm ent, are om nipresent, as they result in 
differences in style m anagem ent, as Germ ans for example w ould  give a different 
m eaning to state intervention than Italians.
N ationality and professional background m ay even become 
institutionalised in Units, and  even w hole DGs. DG Com petition, for example, 
w hose Directors Generals so far have all been German, is thought to be a 'liberal' 
or even 'ordoliberal' DG119 adopting a hostile approach to both  state action aim ing 
at directly intervening in the economy and private power.
Contrary to this, DG Inform ation Society is viewed as collusive to private 
forces and views itself as having to present the interests of the sector in reference 
to w hich it creates policies. This m ay be explained by the fact that fonctionnaires
119 On ordoliberalism see Chapter I Section C of this thesis.
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in this DG have a scientific background and have previously w orked for both 
national adm inistrations and the industry, thus feel close to private interests.
However, gender and national stereotypes m ay also operate as a cognitive 
lens at the level of individuals. Therefore, different classificatory schemes, as the 
ones found in the rational/irrational, reasons/emotions, realism/idealism, work/leisure, 
work/family dualities, m ay result in different approaches as to w orking styles.
In a nutshell, by  identifying m ultiple classificatory systems I sought to 
overpass the rigidities inherent in the notion of habitus. Cognitive schemas m ay 
operate at the level of groups, bu t still perceptions am ongst m em bers m ay show 
divergence, as individuals carry classificatory systems ow ing their existence to 
socialisation before joining the group. Finally, although m ost of the time 
fonctionnaires do w hat is norm al to do, these cognitive schemas m ay emerge at 
the conscious level, as chapter V will seek to show.
An enquiry on agents' classificatory systems should also address 
questions relevant to the possibility of them  being altered, as they are constantly 
subject to experience. This latter point is to be taken up  in the next chapter, 
w hose focus is on showing that the possibilities inscribed in formal structures 
acquire m eaning only w hen appreciated by means of agents' habitus.
The argum ent will be that the concept of habitus acts as a catalyst in order 
to understand change in the field as being random ly distributed in a formal 
structure, as it rem inds us that there is always the possibility of the taken for 
granted taxonomies encapsulated in structures being disputed.
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IV
The Doxic Element: Internet Regulation
A Jot necessity, not desire —no, the love o f power is the demon o f men.
Let them have everyth ing  
—health, food, a place to live, entertainm ent -  
they are and remain unhappy and low-spirited: 
fo r  the demon w aits and w aits and w ill be satisfied.
Friedrich Nietzsche, (Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality).
The previous chapter engaged in identifying cognitive schemas, structural 
patters of perception giving meaning to everyday life inside the European 
Commission. To this effect the argum ent supported was that observing interaction 
serves the purpose of identifying the properties of the insider/outsider taxonomy, as 
encapsulated in the habitus of dependency and compromise, while enquiring on the 
professional and national background of fonctionnaires serves the purpose of 
pinpointing other multiple roles available to agents.
Cognitive schemas, habitus, encapsulate power relations as they embrace 
views, which often go without saying, excluding alternative visions. For example, 
training in law results in the appreciation of a legal problem from a different 
perspective than the one an engineer working as a civil servant would adopt. It
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further results in the reproduction of certain assumptions as to how  a legal 
document should look like and w hat kind of arguments should be used.
Moreover, acting in order to be a 'successful' insider requires belonging in 
networks, further reproducing tacit understandings of how a successful 
fonctionnaire should behave, which operates as a powerful cognitive lens regulating 
the initiation of a legal document.
This chapter will engage in showing how habitus interweaves with the notion 
of capital. This is because, a Bourdieusian perspective on understanding the 
formation of regulatory law requires coming to grips w ith it as being the product of 
agents maximising capital, in other words the resources at hand available in a 
particular field of study, such as wealth, prestige or their position as a think tank. 
However, when a DG maximises its position as a major think tank, the appreciation of 
possible ways to perform this is done through classificatory schemes of cognition 
attributing meaning to w hat a 'think tank' is and w hat it should do.
There are two points emerging from the previous discussion. First, action is 
underpinned by the reproduction of power. Second, forms of power available to 
agents, for example organisational capital, are reproduced according to tacit 
understandings about, for example, what regulatory law should entail.
Against this background, Bourdieu's notion of capital offers a view radically 
different to understanding regulatory law as objective and neutral and to conceiving 
action as being initiated to achieve certain policy outcomes, as in the latter case the
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question still left w ithout answer is why, after all, does the European Commission 
pursue certain policy outcomes?
The argum ent here is that the European Commission seeks to preserve or 
maximise juridical, informational/technocratic, social and m ost im portantly symbolic 
capital. Based on the assumption that power is at the heart of action, the thesis 
advanced is that it is predominantly engaged in struggles in order to remain a 
crucial locus of governance.
To this effect, the European Commission seeks to enhance its position as a 
major think tank and the best way to do this is by sustaining the belief in the 
neutrality and objectivity of law by virtue of its juridical capital, which gives 
legitimacy and universality to the point of view that regulatory law encapsulates, a 
process disguising the effects of power.
To illustrate this, I here give examples draw n from different areas of Internet 
regulation. I will begin w ith architectural solutions as developed by the industry, to 
turn to scarce resources in the Internet, w ith special emphasis on the dom ain names 
allocation system, and conclude with a reference to the Safer Internet Action Plan.
In the above instances, the dominant view is that the role of law should be 
procedural, confined to putting in place the correct procedures to enable the 
participation of communities in the making of rules that affect them. This view 
inextricably links to the general discussion about w hat the proper role of law is in a 
highly perplex social world, bu t also draws attention to the decentralised character
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of the Internet, which is uniquely positioned to accommodate the dem and for free 
speech and information flows.
Therefore, neutral procedures entailing no normative content and understood 
in the context of flexible regulatory instruments, are conceived to be the w ay to 
escape the gripping effect of command and control rules, which intrude and upset 
the lives of social systems and individuals.1
Yet, procedural law is the model for the way the neutralisation and 
objectification effect operates. Therefore, the focus of this chapter is on studying the 
extent to which decentralised forms of regulation have been effective in weakening 
mechanisms of control. I will follow this intuition by looking into whether power 
may be exercised in novel and less visible ways and thus be misrecognised or re­
configured. The thesis advanced is that neutral procedures can never be neutral, as 
regulatory law always encapsulates taxonomies reproduced when agents maximise 
capital, albeit the often unintentional character of this process.
1 For a general theoretical and empirical articulation of the position that moves away from the 
command and control approach to law and regulation, see for example, Teubner, G. (1993) Law as an 
Autopoietic System (Oxford, UK; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell Publishers); Beck, U. (1992) The 
Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage Publications); Ayres, I. and Braithwaite, J. (1992) 
Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford University Press, New York); 
Craig, P. (1998) 'Democracy and law making in the EU' in Craig, P. and Harlow, C. (eds) (1998) 
Lawmaking in the European Union (London, Boston: Kluwer Law International); Scott, C. (1998) "The 
proceduralisation of telecommunications Law Adapting to Convergence' (1997) Journal of Information 
Law and Technology 1-16.
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A. PROCEDURALISATION, DECENTRALISATION AND 
INTERNET REGULATION
Proceduralisation implies shifting into a new paradigm  challenging the
command and control approach to regulation. The reason for performing such a 
shift is partly because rule-formation becomes decentralised under the pressure of 
globalisation, and partly because it is becoming dependent on specialised 
knowledge, Internet regulation being an example uniquely positioned to endorse 
both of the above justifications.
Proceduralisation though is a term that encompasses many different 
approaches: It can take the form of relocation of governmental functions, for 
example, to the market or the civil society. It may also denote the partnership 
between the state and private actors w ith the aim to achieving public ends. It can 
indicate the shift from state regulation to community self-regulation, w ith state law 
retaining the role to establish the general conditions of negotiation.
Finally, it may point to the inclusion by governments of interest groups in the 
decision making process.2 In all these cases, regulatory law is called to provide the 
procedures and structures that would enable the participation of affected groups. 
The position that understands proceduralisation as self-regulation is theoretically 
articulated in Teubner's understanding of law as an autopoietic system.3
2 This categorisation of forms of proceduralisation was developed by Black, see Black, J. (2000) 
Troceduralizing regulation-Part I' 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 597-614, at p. 600-601.
3 Teubner, G. (1993) Law as an Autopoietic System (Oxford, UK; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell 
Publishers); Teubner, G. (1989) 'How the law thinks: Toward a constructivist epistemology of law' 23 
Law and Society Review 7TJ-7S7) Teubner, G. (ed) (1987) Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and
199
The Doxic Element of the Field: Internet Regulation
The author furthers the argum ent that rule-formation becomes decentralised 
under the pressure of globalisation. This means that society becomes highly 
fragmented resulting in the developing of global law, which is being generated by 
the proto-law of various communities, global networks of economic, cultural, 
academic, or technological nature.
The internal codes of private interests, labour law, hum an rights and 
environmental law are, according to the writer, paradigm s of this process of global 
law creation, as these systems show a tendency towards world-wide self-regulation, 
producing the new living law of the world.
According to Teubner, 'we find parallel to political legislation -many forms of rule- 
making by "private governments" on a global scale which in reality, have a high "public 
characterV 4 Therefore, Teubner agues that law should be 'reflexive law,' as it should 
take the form of mechanisms that would help communities and networks internalise 
imperatives, which were previously externally imposed. The role of law is to 
encourage communities to reflect over selected considerations, by providing 
information on them,5 while being sensitive to the mode these will be internalised, 
as this will be shaped by the internal codes of conduct of communities.
Society (Berlin: de Gruyter); Teubner, G. (ed) (1997) Global Law Without a State (Aldershot: Dartmouth 
Publishing). For a more elaborate analysis of Teubner's position see Chapter I Section A. 2 and A. 3 
of this thesis.
4 Teubner, G. (1997) 'Global Bukowina: Legal pluralism in the world society' in Teubner (ed) Global 
Law Without a State ibid.
5 G. Teubner 'Substantive and reflexive elements of modem law' (1983) 17 Law and Society Review 239; 
G. Teubner 'After legal instrumentalism? Strategic models for post-regulatory law' in G. Teubner 
(ed), Dilemmas of law in the welfare state (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986, 1985); G.
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The same of argum ent is supported by the highly contestable theory of 
international lex mercatoria. According to the proponents of this theory, its source is 
found in contractual standardisation, which is either imposed by the industry leader 
or is the result of collective consent, as it is the case with the standard terms 
developed under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce.6
How is the above relevant to Internet regulation? Teubner himself recognises 
how the Internet presents a new paradigm  of regulation based on the living law of 
communities, as, due to its decentralised character, it has escaped the grip of state 
control and presents an example of decentralised regulation offering the potential 
for democratisation and for the creation of a global civil society able to oppose 
globalised markets. The Internet then is viewed as opening up new chances for re­
politicisation and re-individualisation.7
Teubner 'Juridification-Concepts, aspects, limits, solutions' in G. Teubner (ed), Juridification of the 
social spheres (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1987).
6 For a criticism of this approach see Muchlinski, P. T. (1997) 'Global Bukowina examined: Viewing 
the multinational enterprise as a transnational law making corporation' in Teubner Global Law 
Without a State note 3 above. Muchlinski refers to Sornarajah's work, who argues that one of the most 
contested aspects of international lex mercatoria links to the question of whether business interests 
can generate law when they sign investment agreements with foreign governments. Sornarajah's 
arguments are in line with Teubner's concept of 'living law' as he argues that in this instance firms 
generate rules. Yet, he points out that in the case of foreign direct investment in the 19th century, since 
there was no legal frame in place, private interests created the applicable legal rules by means of 
contracts with states and by using international commercial arbitration, which in turn favoured the 
application of international minimum standards. The debate from the part of less developed 
countries (LDCs), in respect to whether these minimum standards indeed form international custom, 
is a well-known one. At the heart of the debate one finds the argument that minimum standards are 
the evolution of principles, which were generated by the practices of European colonial powers. 
Nonetheless, the host state had to comply with such standards, Somarajah, M. (1994) The International 
Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press).
7 Teubner, G. (2000) 'Global private regimes: Neo-spontaneous law and dual constitution of 
autonomous sectors in world society?' in Ladeur, K. H. (ed) (2003) Globalization and Public Governance 
(Cambridge; Cambridge University Press), citing Menzel, U. (1998) Globalisierung Versus
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Nonetheless, the literature on Internet regulation as developed in the USA, 
has different theoretical underpinnings. It is premised on the understanding that 
information should be free for all and that the technical infrastructure is in itself a 
means of regulating cyberspace technology. In both cases, the argum ent is m ade that 
the state should abstain from regulating, w ith various commentators adopting a 
decentralised understanding of law, emphasising the effectiveness of markets and 
social norms as regulators of individual behaviour.
In 1996, this led Barlow, co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, to 
argue that the Government should adopt a hands-off approach, as legal concepts of, 
for example, property, expression and identity, may be effective in the real world 
bu t do not apply in the Internet.8 In the light of the above, Barlow argued that 'we 
believe that from ethics, enlightened self-interest, and the commonweal, our governance will 
emerge.'9 In the same spirit, Reidenberg adopted the term 'Lex Informatica'10 to argue 
that technology offers a set of potentialities, which frame policy m akers' choices. 
Similarly, Johnson and Post argue for a decentralised, emergent law.11
Fragmentierung (Frankfurt; Suhrkamp), available at http: /  /www.uni- 
frankfurt.de/fb01 / teubner7spontaneus.pdf, (web page visited on 16 May 2003).
8Barlow, P. (1996) 'A declaration of the independence of cyberspace/ at 
http://  www.eff.org/~barlow/Declar ation-Final.html, (web page visited on 14 May 2003).
9 ibid.
10 Reidenberg, J. (1998) 'The formulation of information policy rules through technology' 76 Texas Law 
Review 553-594.
11 Johnson, D. R. and Post, D. (1996) 'Law and borders: The rise of law in cyberspace' 48 Stanford Law 
Review 1367-1402; Johnson, D. R. and Post, D. (1996) 'And how shall the net be governed? A 
meditation on the relative virtues of decentralized, emergent law' (1996) Cyberspace Law Institute Paper 
9/5/96, available at http://www.cli.org/emdraft.html, (web page visited on 16 May 2003).
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The authors' claim is that Internet technology provides the possibility to 
create a self-regulated community, whose function should be prem ised on the 
notions of collective conversation and responsible participation. Consequently, 
Internet regulation has to be formed by virtue of voluntary observance of basic rules 
by network administrators with a dispute resolution system in place to adjudicate 
disputes.
Finally, Lessig's argument is that cyberspace is regulated by laws, social 
norms, markets and 'code' (software), w ith law seeking to influence the other forms 
of regulation (social norms, markets and codes).12 Lessig lays emphasis on the role of 
code in regulating the cyberspace, but accepts that it may be altered by law, thus 
attributing to the latter two modalities of regulation a significant role in regulating 
the net. Based on this understanding, Lessig embraces a pessimistic vision, as he 
argues that copyright and patent protections can be expanded to the point of 
impeding the development of new ideas on the Internet.13
The common thread that runs across all these approaches is that the Internet, 
due to its decentralised character, appears to be the model for a new form of 
governance. The vast network at issue owes its distinctive character to that there is 
no real time transmission. This is happening since the information is not transmitted
12 Lessig, L (1999) Code and Other Laws in Cyberspace (New York, N.Y.: Basic Books); Lessig, L. (1997) 
'What cyberlaw might teach' Technology Law Review Working Papers, available at 
http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Working Papers/97 Lessig 1/index.htm, (web page visited on 16 
May 2002).
13 Lessig, L. (2001) The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World (New York: 
Random House).
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as a whole, but is broken into packets of bits, which are routed from computer to 
computer to find their final destination through the most efficient path, according to 
the carrying capacity and the traffic.
The above process is underlined by autonomous and independent actions of 
each computer, which solely co-ordinates its actions. It is because of this 
autonomous function that when we speak of the Internet, we always stress the 
decentralised character of it and the absence of any form of central regulatory 
authority.14
Having concluded a review of argum ents that support the proceduralisation 
of Internet regulation, and having touched on the particular characteristics of the 
Internet that makes it susceptible to a decentralised view of regulation, attention 
should be brought to the criticism by two commentators: First is a criticism that 
generally addresses the problems that may surround the issue of technisising 
regulation.
In this respect, Black15 reminds us that, as regulatory literature becomes 
technisised by virtue of focusing on implementation issues w ith the debate on 
values being left to welfare economists, then we fail to address questions relevant to 
w hat the content of procedures should be and who should determine it.
14 Cerf, V. G., Clark, D. D., Leiner, B. M., Lynch, D. C., Kahn, R. E., Kleinrock, L., Postel, J., Roberts, L. 
G. and Wolff, S., 'A Brief History of the Internet by those who made the history, including Barry M. 
Leiner, Vinton G. Cerf, David D. Clark, Robert E. Kahn, Leonard Kleinrock, Daniel C. Lynch, Jon 
Postel, Lawrence G. Roberts, Stephen Wolff' available at http: /  / www.isoc.org/intemet/history/, 
(web page visited on 14 May 2003).
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The implications of the above is that we tend to forget that it m ay be quite 
difficult to actually separate rules from norms. The second criticism is particularly 
concerned w ith Internet regulation. Boyle16 adopts a Foucauldian perspective to 
dismiss the claim that proceduralisation of Internet regulation will be a panacea to 
all its problems, as such an approach misses the point that the state uses new 
techniques to re-invent itself, and as such may adopt new forms of control.
It is indeed difficult to separate procedures from norms, as the following 
section will seek to show. But why? The institutionalist argum ent is that agents 
intentionally seek particular profits and engage in a problem solving exercise 
picking one out of available solutions. A Foucauldian perspective points to the ways 
power and normalisation operate in disguise. Bourdieu takes this last point further 
to look at agents and the ways they unintentionally reproduce or challenge the 
effects of normalisation. Therefore, procedural law cannot fulfil its promise to 
provide neutral and objective structures, as it tacitly reproduces dom inant 
classifications.
The following will elaborate on the theoretical properties of this last point by 
looking at the characteristics of the following species of capital available to the 
European Commission: Juridical, technocratic/informational and symbolic. As social
15 Black note 2 above, at p. 598. For a similar approach see Black, J. (1996) 'Constitutionalising self­
regulation' 59 Modern Law Review 24-56; Prosser, T. (1999) "Theorising utility regulation' 62 Modem  
Law Review 196-217.
16 Boyle, J. (1996) Shamans, Software, and Spleens. Law and the Construction of Information Society 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press); Boyle, J. (1997) 'Foucault in cyberspace: Surveillance, 
sovereignty, and hard-wired censors' 66 University of Cincinnati Law Review 177-193.
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capital will be the focus of the following chapter I abstain from elaborating here its 
function.
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B. DOXA, ORTHODOXY, HETERODOXY: A THEORETICAL
DISCUSSION
1. Enquiring on the properties of juridical capital
In reference to juridical capital, Bourdieu argues that its attributes imply that 
every decision is based on a precedent, and that a rational approach is applied that 
guarantees the continuity, certainty and objectivity of decisions. Moreover, the 
constitution of a field w ith a juridical element is inseparable from the monopoly of 
professionals over the production of a particular category of products called 'legal 
products/  The legal competence determines the conflicts and the specific form that 
these should have in order to be proper legal battles.17
According to Bourdieu, the juridical field is the space of competition for the 
monopoly of the right to articulate w hat is right, that is for the fair distribution 
(nomos) or the right order. This field is occupied by agents, who have the 
competence and social technique to interpret a body of texts.18 Therefore, the legal 
rule is like the reservoir of authority, which guarantees, in the way that a central 
bank would, the authority of juridical acts, although there is arbitrary violence in the 
exercise of such authority.
The judicial situation functions like a neutral place, which operates a 
neutralisation by means of the de-realisation implicated in the transformation of the
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direct confrontation of interested parties in one amongst mediators.19 In this way, a 
direct conflict between the parties who have a direct interest in the legal action, has 
to be regulated by professionals, who have in common the knowledge of the law of 
the legal game, that is of the laws, written or not, of the field.20
2. The sub-field of Internet regulation in Europe: Challenging the 
habitus of dependency and compromise
However, the monopoly to impose symbolic violence is not always left 
unchallenged. The field of struggles is inhabited by agents who, although they 
occupy other autonom ous fields, nonetheless strive to influence the content of 
regulation.21 Internet regulation is a good example to study the effects and extent of 
such struggles, due to its decentralised character.22 This is because, it presents an 
instance when the properties of the juridical capital of the European Commission are 
being challenged, as both NGOs and private interests support the self-regulation 
model challenging the legitimacy of centralised command and control rules imposed 
by a body of professionals.
17 Bourdieu, P. (1986) 'La force du droit: Elements pour une sociologie du champ juridique' 64 Actes 
de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 3-19, at p. 9. For a translation of this article see Bourdieu P. (1987) 
'Force of law' 38 Hastings Law Journal 805- 853, translator's introduction by Richard Terdiman.
18 ibid, at p. 4 of the French version (the translation being mine).
19 ibid, at p. 9.
20 ibid, at p. 10.
211 have elaborated on the notion of the field of struggles in Chapter I Section A 4 of this thesis.
22 On these issues see Cerf, Clark, Leiner, Lynch, Kahn, Kleinrock, Postel, Roberts and Wolff note 14 
above. Also see Sassen, S. (2000) 'Digital networks and the state: Some governance questions' (2000) 
17 Culture, Theory and Society 19-32.
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W hat has been disputed and thus entered the realm of 
orthodoxy/heterodoxy is w hat I have termed in the previous chapter as the habitus 
of dependency and compromise, as affected groups dem anded their inclusion in the 
process of information collection and policy debates, thus broadening the circle of 
dependent parties in the process of decision-making.
The above require further explanation though: Dependency and compromise, 
the fact that people working for the European Commission have to co-exist, occurs 
as a result of the need to collect information, identify problems, categorise findings. 
This is w hat underlines the workings of every administration and manifests itself as 
a basic operating practice. However, it acquires particular meaning in the context of 
dependency and compromise and this is why there is a 'European administration' or a 
'European way of doing things/  in other w ords a European way of identifying 
problems, collecting information, and categorising.
It is well documented how the European Commission has been directly 
approaching affected groups. Meetings between Commissioners, Commission 
officials and pressure groups, trade unions, governments, lobbyists, political parties, 
are a routine. The European Round Table of Industrialists is a good example of the 
above trend, as the European Commission formally institutionalised its contacts 
with it. This is why commentators have noted that, the European Commission acts 
as a 'broker' seeking access to specialised knowledge.23
23 Mazey, S. and Richardson, J. (eds) (1993) Lobbying in the European Union (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press). Also see Christiansen, T. (1997) Tensions of European governance: Politicized
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The role of the European Commission in regulating the information society 
has been transformed in view of these new understandings, as it is now understood 
in terms of setting in place the required legal framework to enable the smooth 
transition to the new environment.
3. Symbolic capital, informational capital and doxa
The previous section argued that the habitus of dependency and compromise 
has been challenged, as new entrants dem anded their inclusion in the circle of 
dependent parties. I here seek to identify the deeply embedded perceptions, which 
go without saying (the doxic element), and to this effect a discussion of the properties 
of symbolic and informational capital is first required.
Bourdieu argues that juridical capital is an objectified and codified form of 
symbolic capital, which consists of the power to shape mainstream understandings. 
In particular, symbolic capital designates the symbolic power of a group or an 
individual,24 while authority, knowledge, prestige, reputation and academic degrees 
are its possible forms.
bureaucracy and multiple accountability in the European Commission' 4 Journal of European Public 
Policy 73-90.
24 As Weber noted 'those privileged through existing political, social, and economic orders' never wield their 
power naked. They 'wish to see their positions transformed from purely factual power relations into a cosmos 
of acquired rights and to know that they are thus sanctified.' Weber, M. "The meaning of discipline/ in 
Gerth, H. and Mills, C. W. (eds) (1991) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge).
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Therefore, the granting of an elite degree is a rite of institution,25 since it 
differentiates those destined to occupy eminent social positions from those who will 
not. Symbolic capital though is a notion that m ay better reveal its properties if 
understood as interweaving w ith the concept of symbolic violence and principles of 
division.
If the administrative function is conceived as an im portant form of the 
symbolic violence of the state, (or, in our case, of the sum  of institutions of the EU 
political system), then the notion of symbolic capital acquires considerable 
importance, as it implies the imposition on recipients of principles of division based 
on symbolic representations. Bourdieu elaborated on the notion of 'principles of 
division' in Distinction.26 In a nutshell, these are principles on which different social 
groups base their perception of w hat constitutes an 'insider' and an 'outsider/ a 'well- 
educated' and 'ill-educated' person, an 'expert' and a 'layman.'
Moreover, the notion of symbolic violence is meant to intertwine w ith the 
concept of 'misrecognition.' The latter notion implies the process by which power 
relations come to be perceived by individuals by rendering the world reasonable 
and thus legitimising the existing power relations to those subject to power. This 
approach reveals the potential of power being exercised in less visible ways, being 
encapsulated in w hat is thought to be 'normal' and 'appropriate/ therefore
25 Bourdieu, P. (1991) 'Rites of institution/ in Bourdieu, P. (1991) Language and Symbolic Power 
(Cambridge: Polity in association with Basil Blackwell, orig. 1977-1984), at p. 117-127.
26 Bourdieu, P. (1984) Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, orig. 1979).
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misrecognised power allows for the reproduction of the social order by setting the 
framework of action.
Thus symbolic capital operates through misrecognition as authority and the 
power to shape mainstream understandings is often premised on taken for granted 
perceptions of the social world. To illustrate this, the symbolic capital of a judge for 
example, rests on the assumption that she objectively and neutrally applies the law.
To employ the latter reflections in the context of Internet regulation in 
Europe, it is im portant to note that Bourdieu, in 'Force de droit,' insists that the 
inhabitants of a juridical field seek to establish the legitimacy of interpretations 
favourable to maintaining order. One of the most im portant strategies employed to 
do this is by means of linguistic strategies, which result in imposing the illusion of 
objectivity, as it is from this that law derives its authority.
Based on this reflection, the following sections will argue that when 
regulatory law becomes a rationalist endeavour, we are trapped in observing the 
final product of a process. The effects of power remain disguised, and similarly, the 
fact that the symbolic violence of the state can still be exercised in invisible ways by 
the administration remains unnoticed.
In 'Force de droit,' Bourdieu attacks Austin's argum ent that law has the 
inherent capacity to do things with words, an effect that Bourdieu terms the 'law's 
power of form' understood as the formalisation and codification capacity of the legal 
text. Bourdieu attacks the argum ent that law derives its authority by virtue of rules
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inherent in language as, according to him, authority interweaves w ith the symbolic 
power of the state delegated to a particular individual.
Nonetheless, Bourdieu accepts the importance of the written formalisation of 
legal texts in creating the tacit faith in the basic principle of the juridical order, law's 
impartiality and neutrality.27 The implications of the above are conceptualisations 
that link to the notions of 'pubic good' and 'neutral regulator' who works in the name 
of efficiency, intervening to correct market failures. I would like to add to this that, 
'procedural rationality' or 'risk management' for example, are underlined by the same 
presumptions in the sense that they promise neutrality.
Regulation then is viewed as providing an impartial management of practical 
matters. As such, it reveals the potential of constituting one of the main strategies to 
sustain juridical order, as then the argum ent is that the European Commission 
pursues its 'interests' by giving neutral value to them. The logical question then is: 
What are the 'interests' of the European administration?
The most fundamental interest consists of accumulating and preserving 
symbolic capital, which implies the power to shape mainstream understandings by 
supporting an authoritative opinion and thus sustain its position as a major think 
tank. Sustaining the belief in the neutrality and objectivity of regulatory law is 
crucial to achieve the above.
27 On these points see Bourdieu note 18 above, and in the translated version see the excellent 
introduction by Richard Terdiman.
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Accumulating or preserving technocratic/informational capital is also 
im portant for this purpose. According to Bourdieu, the main quality of this form of 
capital consists in the ability of authorities to collect information and treat it through 
classification systems (for example according to sex and age) inscribed in law, and 
through bureaucratic procedures.
I would think that the concentration of this form of capital is crucial so that 
the juridical capital performs one of its main tasks: Fitting the social w orld in legal 
categories, which ultimately implies imposing common forms of visions and 
division, forms of thinking and forms of classification.28
4. The doxic element
So far I identified the interests of the European Commission. However, 
maximising these is subject to minds, cognitive schemas. There are times though 
that minds coincide w ith structures, and it is then that we are presented with the 
doxic element of the analysis. Structure exists outside the individual as a set of 
pressures. It is created, reproduced and altered, by agents. Yet, doxa rem inds us that 
agents can lose perspective of that structures are their own creation.
This is the hegem onic/doxic strength of structure: The lack of awareness of 
subjective influence on w hat appears as objective reality, which is further 
encompassed by habitus, as there is a quasi-perfect correspondence between the
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objective order and the subjective principles of organisation. In this instance, the 
natural and social world appears self-evident and is uncontested.
For example, when 'bureaucracies create social problems by recognising them and 
providing information and advice/29 they set the agenda, as certain problems are 
included while others are excluded, and as such they impose a certain vocabulary 
framing the debate, 'present(ing) us with an ought by merely stating an is.'30
However, when a bureaucracy itself engages in the production of proposals 
and regulatory measures by applying a rational analysis while undertaking the 
impartial management of practical issues, it tacitly accepts and reproduces the belief 
in the objectivity and impartiality of regulatory law, while failing to see that its 
decisions is the product of specific socio-historical circumstances.
To this point I will come back later, but first the following will anchor the 
discussion in the context of Internet regulation.
28 Bourdieu, P. (1994) 'Rethinking the state: Genesis and structure of the bureaucratic field/ 12 
Sociological Theory 1-18, at p. 5-10.
29 ibid.
30 ibid.
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C. INTERNET REGULATION: REINVENTING THE WAYS IN 
WHICH POWER MAY BE EXERCISED
1. Law, code and Internet regulation
Regulating the Internet is not an easy task. As it grows more and more 
popular, there is a widespread impression that it is a virtual Wild West where 
opportunists w ould jum p at any chance. There are various reasons for this. One of 
the problems concerns practices viewed as anti-competitive conduct, as it is the case 
when search engine providers favour particular sites.31
A different problem emerges as, since the Internet is a transnational 
communication medium, there is little that can be done to prevent users from 
arranging their illegal actions, so that they evade domestic regulations by taking 
advantage of foreign regulatory regimes. Even the effectiveness of European data 
protection laws is reduced when personal information can be stored in offshore data 
havens.32 Moreover, intellectual property rights are threatened by peer-to-peer 
communication systems such as Kazaa, and Morpheus.
31 Love, J. and Nader, R. (1998) 'Microsoft's ambitions and antitrust policy' Remarks at the Cato 
Institution Policy Forum on Antitrust and Microsoft, April 20, available at 
http://www.essential.org/antitrust/ms/catoapril20.html. (web page visited on 16 May 2003). The 
authors argue that when Microsoft bought Web TV, 'it changed the travel menu so that Expedia, the 
Microsoft travel service, appeared first in the travel menu. Travelocity web site lost is prominent menu location, 
and was moved to page six, next to Tom's Travel, in an alphabetical listing. How many people in the audience 
ever look at page 6 when they use an Internet search engine? What if Microsoft could determine what 
information appears on page one when a person searches for information about a certain M P or about 
legislation concerning digital copyright?
32 Froomkin, M. (1999) "The Internet as a source of regulatory arbitrage' in Kahin, B. and Nesson, C. 
(eds) (1997) Borders in Cyberspace, Information Policy and the Global Information Infrastructure 
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press); Grewlich, K. W. (1999) 'Good governance in the age of cyberspace' 1 
Info 264-270; Loader, B.D. (ed) (1997) The Governance of Cyberspace (London; New York: Routledge); 
Murray, A. and Scott, C. (2002) 'Controlling the new media: Hybrid responses to new forms of
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The above link to the problem of anonymity. This does not concern the www, 
where a host service has the means to know the content provider. Anonymity allows 
users to send e-mail to a USENET newsgroup w ithout the recipient knowing their e- 
mail address, because an intermediary (the anonymous remailer) has removed this 
information by means of a technique called encryption.33
Nonetheless, NGOs, business and the European Commission seem to react in 
diverse ways as to what the right way to approach the particular problems emerging 
in the context of the new media is. For example, w ith reference to the problem of 
anonymity, the European Commission, and in particular DG Justice and Home 
Affairs, argues that other key areas of public policy, such as the fight against illegal 
content, financial fraud or copyright infringements, may stand in conflict w ith the 
right to freedom of expression, privacy and data protection, which support 
anonymity.
Therefore, the right to anonymity may be restricted since, according to the 
European Convention of H um an Rights, fundamental rights may be subject to 
certain limitations for specified reasons including the prevention of crime, w ith the
power' 65 Modem Law Review 491-516, at p. 494-495; Post, G. (1997) 'Governing cyberspace' 43 Wayne 
Law Review 155-171.
33 For the problem of encryption techniques see Castells, M. (2001) The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on 
the Internet, Business and Society (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press), at p. 181-183. 
Disappearing Inc. and ZipLip created self-deleting email, which encrypts users' information. Zero- 
knowledge Systems created a software package, which aims at providing the user with five 
pseudonyms, while the company itself does not have the means to know the real identity of users. 
Freedom encrypts e-mail and web browsing by sending them through intermediary routers. Similar 
techniques are employed by Anonymizer.com and Idzap.com, see Castells, at p. 182.
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principle of proportionality being the crucial test that any restrictive measure should 
pass in order to be applied.
Yet, Internet communities believe that since the Internet reveals on the one 
hand, the potential of free expression and exchange of ideas and on the other hand, 
the possibility of greater involvement in politics, then its regulation should be left in 
the hands of the various communities that inhabit this virtual global city. The 
argument further suggests that it should be up to the users to decide for example 
whether and how they w ant to punish an unw anted intruder in a virtual chat room 
on the USENET system.
Business groups also support self-regulation, The efforts of the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC)34 present an example of this. Most recent efforts point 
towards the direction of establishing a global action plan on e-commerce and an ICC 
working party is currently working on this issue,35 with global self-regulation being 
the central aim. ICC has been successful so far in having its standard on privacy 
marks prevail to the one developed under the auspices of the International 
Organisation for Standardisation (ISO).36,37
34 ICC is the world business organisation representing enterprises from all sectors in every part of the 
world, http: /  / www.iccwbo.org/index.asp, (web page visited on 16 May 2002).
35For more information on these issues see www.iccwbo.org/home /menu electronic commerce.asp. 
(web page visited on 16 May 2003).
36 The ISO is a network of national standards institutes from 140 countries working in partnership 
with international organisations, governments, industry, business and consumer representatives, 
http:/  / www.iso.ch/iso/en/ISOOnline.frontpage, (web page visited on 16 May 2003).
37 Braithwaite, J. and Drahos, P. (2000) Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press).
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Nevertheless, the possibility of users' self-regulation is considered as an 
anathema by business actors, since it may imply the potential of their patents and 
copyright being infringed, and generally delaying the development of the conditions 
that would guarantee the flourishing of e-commerce.
It is in this context that the industry strived to develop architectural solutions, 
as it was the case with codes placed inside software, which aimed at rendering the 
copying of DVDs more difficult. The problem was that the architectural solution 
introduced also resulted in only certain players and discs being capable of 
decrypting the necessary files to play a DVD.
This is why, in December 1999, a 15 year old Norwegian, Jon Johansen, who 
participated in the open source development of the Linux operating system, 'reverse- 
engineered' the Content Scrambling System (CSS) encryption code on DVDs and e- 
mailed the decoder, called DeCSS, to the Internet. The alleged reason was that 
'reverse engineering' was used to create a new software for a DVD player for Linux- 
based machines,38 so that it would be compatible w ith the existing ones. As such, the 
argum ent was that it was conducted for the purpose of interoperability. The DeCSS 
code spread among Linux developers on the Internet, as 2600 Magazine and other 
publishers had it on their website, with an article on its importance and links to
38 Reverse engineering involves taking apart the features of a programme in order to see how it works 
and how its performance can be improved. In the EU, reverse engineering is allowed for legitimate 
purposes (interoperability and the correction of errors). In the USA the right of users to reverse 
engineer has been recognised in 1992 in Sega Enterprises Ltd v Accolade Inc., and Atari Games Corp. 
v Nintendo of America Inc. The Linux operating system (OS) is competing with Microsoft's OS.
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other locations publishing it, bu t the problem is that it was also used to 'break' the 
code of DVDs to illegally copy them on CDs.39
Lessig's position is well known as regards the above developments.40 In 
particular, he argued that the various constraints built into software by their
Linux is an open source system, which means that everybody has access to its code to modify it, as 
opposed to the proprietary standards of Microsoft's OS.
39 Johan Johansen was prosecuted in Norway and eight major motion picture studios sued among 
others 2600 Magazine in the US under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, see Universal Studios 
Inc. v Reimerdes et al., 00 Civ. 0277 (LAK). In August 1991, the court held that DeCSS violates DMCA 
Section 1201(a)(2), which prohibits the unauthorised offering of products that circumvent 
technological measures controlling access to copyrighted works. In November 1991, the trial court 
rejected the defendants' fair use defence to providing a circumvention measure. Then an amicus curiae 
brief was filed in the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in January 2001, addressing fair use 
and First Amendment issues. Again the 2600 magazine was not successful. Nonetheless, in 
November 2001, in DVDCCA v. Bunner (H021153, Super. Ct. No. CV786804), the court upheld an 
order issued from a lower court that prohibits publishing or linking to DeCSS code. The DVD Copy 
Control Association (DVDCCA) had brought an action for injunctive relief under the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act, Civil Code section 3426.1, against defendant Andrew Bunner and numerous other 
Internet website operators to prevent future disclosure or use of the code. The above is meant to 
show the debate that surrounds the relevant issues in the other side of the Atlantic. For more 
information and legal filings in the 2600 case, it is worth visiting the Electronic Frontier Foundation's 
web page, the well-known civil liberties organisation defending the 2600 magazine, 
http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/MPAA DVD cases/. It is interesting to note that on 7 January 2003, 
in Norway, the court ruled that Jon Johansen, known in Norway as 'DVD Jon/ had not violated the 
law when he reversed engineered the (CSS) encryption code. Nevertheless, prosecutors are expected | 
to file an appeal, Reuters 'Norway teen cleared in DVD piracy case' 7 January 2003, available at 
http: /  / www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=2006337, (web page visited on 
16 May 2003).
40 Lessig Code and Other Laws note 12 above, at p. 190. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully 
comment on Lessig's work, which gives a rich account of the various forms of regulation on the net, 
but a brief reference is required. Markets, law, architecture and norms all constrain action and thus 
form distinctive forms of regulation. Moreover, hybrid forms of regulation can exist, being the result 
of two or more of the 'pure' forms of regulation. For example, law and architecture can co-exist, when 
the building of a particular type of software is supported by law in pursuit of public regulatory 
objectives. For a criticism of Lessig's work, particularly on the issue of whether law is an important 
regulatory mechanism in cyberspace, see for example Post, G. 'What Larry doesn't get: Code, law and 
liberty in cyberspace' (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 1439. In the first lines of the introduction the 
author argues that: 'Some suggest that this [cyberspace] is all too important to be "left to the market," that the 
choices cyberspace forces upon us involve fundamental, even "constitutional" values that commerce will ignore 
or even destroy. Lawrence Lessig's Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace is surely the most elegant articulation 
of this view: Politics and collective decisionmaking, not the invisible hand, will give us a cyberspace where these 
values are protected. I want to try here to articulate a different vision of the space. Fundamental values are 
indeed at stake in the construction of cyberspace, but those values can best be protected by allowing the widest 
possible scope for uncoordinated and uncoerced individual choice among different values and among different
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designers may be conceptualised as a form of regulation. Nevertheless, the 
aftermath of the above was that in cyberspace nothing is ever impossible. Systems 
such as CSS make illegal copying more difficult, maybe even impractical bu t not 
impossible. In other words, design or code41 proves not to be enough to regulate 
conduct.
As such, the above example presents us w ith an instance w hen hierarchical 
controls may be required to be enacted to create a hybrid of regulatory control of the 
kind M urray and Scott call the 'design/hierarchy' hybrid.42 This hybrid illustrates the 
symbiotic relationship of law and code in regulation. As the weakness of code is that 
it may always be decrypted or engineered, it needs an element of legal/hierarchical 
regulatory assistance to add strength to the design regulation.
In the light of the above, M urray and Scott remind us43 that architectural 
controls are supported not only by the industry, bu t also by the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation (WIPO) Treaties as enacted within the European Union by 
the Directive on Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information
embodiments of those values. We don't need "a plan" but a multitude of plans from among which individuals 
can choose, and "the market," and not action by the global collective, is most likely to bring that plenitude to 
us.'
41 Lessig Code and Other Laws note 12 above.
42 Murray and Scott note 32 above, at p. 502, 506, 513. Murray and Scott build upon Lessig's work to 
argue that the emphasis should be placed on the variety of regulatory hybrids, which may come into 
existence as a result of a combination of individual forms such as law, norms, markets and 
architecture, because novel configurations of power are better grasped through the study of hybrids.
43 ibid, at p. 513.
221
The Doxic Element of the Field: Internet Regulation
Society (Information Society Directive),44 and in the United States through the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 45
In particular, Article 11 of the WIPO treaties urges parties "to provide adequate 
legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective 
technological measures that are used by authors in connection with their exercise of rights 
under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, 
which are not authorised by the authors concerned or permitted by law.' Against this 
background, the Information Society Directive may be viewed as supporting 
architectural solutions creating a hybrid regulatory structure.
However, the DeCSS decoder is available on the net and has m ade it possible 
for DVD material to be pu t directly onto the web. Currently there are many web 
pages that give precise instructions as to how  codes can be broken and DVDs be 
copied in users' hardware.46 Companies updated the encryption technology bu t the 
Internet community produced more advanced decryption codes. Nonetheless, if one 
takes into account the thriving num ber of websites specialising in distributing 
decoding technology, it seems that architectural solutions and hybrid 
hierarchy/design based regulatory structures are not always successful.47
44 Directive 2001/29/EC, Article 6.
45 Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 Section 1201(a)(1) and 1201(a)(2).
46 www.divx-digest.com/index.html.www.divx.com are two examples that may help elucidate the 
point made, www.digital-digest.com/nickyquides/flaskmpeg.htm seems to be the perfect web page 
for beginners! (Web pages visited on 16 May 2003).
47 Murray and Scott note 32 above.
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The previous aimed at showing the problems surrounding self-regulation. Self­
regulation is not the norm  but an element of hierarchical control is required to 
strengthen the application of design. Moreover, the above allows us not only to 
identify an instance when communities active in cyber-world push for decentralised 
regulation, but also to come to grips with the ways in which different self-regulatory 
codes of conduct may oppose each other (for example the free speech on the web 
position v. the intellectual property rights position), in other words, two different 
codes of conduct of two communities are in conflict.
In such a situation, we should not forget that, when a hierarchical element is 
introduced (as in the Information Society Directive) to strengthen architectural 
controls when these fail to regulate conduct, then the Directive inevitably would 
have to make a normative choice by means of endorsing one of the two positions.
The above expose the problems inherent in any attem pt to design neutral 
procedures. However, they imply an understanding of regulatory law in particular 
and norms regulating conduct in general as being mechanically reproduced by 
agents seeking specific gains. The European Commission and private interests make 
choices according to calculations as to potential costs and benefits.
I think that such an understanding of regulatory law and norms misses the 
following point: Action in general most of the time outruns our intentions, and 
regulatory law in particular outruns regulators' plans. The practical outcome of 
intentional thought encapsulated in action outruns intention, as the latter, be it in
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neutral procedures or efficient market integration, most of the time reproduces tacit 
understandings. This is the juridico-administrative habitus.
2. The juridico-administrative habitus: The effect of universality and 
objectivity
The administration, when drafting legal proposals and implementing laws, 
forms legal arguments by means of employing the right legal reasoning based on the 
right legal sources and providing expertise by means of reliable scientific data. As for 
the juridical aspect, its principal characteristic is that legal argum ents are 
constructed as if their rationale is purely internal to law, and the administrator is 
forming them by virtue of studying law books, codes and case law. Codification, 
formalisation and systematisation are crucial to create the effect of neutralisation.48
This is because the administrator, in the course of producing a legal 
document, views herself as disinterested and neutrally interpreting the law, failing 
to acknowledge assumptions about the social world reproduced therein. In this way, 
notions such as property and competition, for example, are conceived to be 
unproblematic. Another characteristic of legal thinking is the belief in that law is an 
effective tool to successfully order social relations.49
Everyone who studied in a law school recalls the particular way law is 
taught. A legal exam is an exercise testing a student's ability to construct coherent
48 Bourdieu note 17 above.
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argumentation based on continuous reference to legal texts and cases in order to 
substantiate every single word of the argum ent if possible. A sophisticated 
exposition of arguments is further desired in order to denote mastery of the national 
language employed.
This last point is im portant in order to understand how training in law directs 
students to think of words as cult objects, in a self-referential self-fertilising aesthetic 
of legal thinking deriving meaning only from the existing legal corpus. Such a cult of 
words explains how legal arguments further derive authority not only from the 
sources they use, bu t also from the form the argum ent takes, from the way words are 
used, to make an argum ent that looks the way it should look.
Thus, a person trained in law believes in the efficacy of law because he 
believes in the power of words inscribed in books, cases and legal texts, and in their 
ability to help society evolve. Bourdieu, in his discussion of the neutralisation effect of 
the juridical language, also draws attention to the grammatical persistence of 
passive and impersonal constructions in legal texts.50
As for the technocratic element in the juridico-administrative habitus, it 
further contributes to the effect of universality. Bureaucracies create social problems 
by collecting and treating information, but expertise and the categorisation of
49 ibid.
50 ibid.
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findings can never be 'neutral' as assessments, benchmarks and instrum ents aiming 
at managing everyday affairs only formalise truth claims.
Bourdieu then comes close to Foucault, who reminds us that law has the 
power to formalise disciplinary power claims, which are historically contingent, but 
are nonetheless universalised, as the 'truth' of science is conditioned upon 
historically contingent constructs as to w hat "property' and 'legality' are for 
example.51 The management of m undane everyday affairs always entails choices, 
which have been discarded, possibilities, which failed to be actualised, as 
knowledge is contingent, context dependent.
Therefore, self-regulation is not a panacea to all problems surrounding control, 
as a mix of self-regulation and hierarchical intervention is often required. And be it 
hierachical or heterarchical, as in command and control rules or procedures, 
regulation always entails one vision and excludes others. The following will take 
this point further by looking at a different instance when a mix of hierarchical 
control and self-regulation was employed, domain names allocation.
The aim is to question the nature of the hierarchical element in hybrid forms of 
regulation, to identify the role of the European Commission in the process and to 
finally address the question of how easy (or difficult) it is to actually separate
51 Foucault, M. (1979) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Harmondsworth: Penguin, orig. 
1975); Gordon, C. (ed) (1980) M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 
1972-1977 (Brighton: Harvester Press); Bourdieu, P. 'Social space and symbolic power' in Bourdieu, P. 
(1990) In other Words. Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology (Oxford: Polity, orig. 1987).
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procedural rules from norms and how Bourdieu's framework m ay cast light on 
coming to grips w ith this question.
3. Scarce resources: Domain names allocation
With reference to the role of the European Commission in the above 
mentioned processes, both DG Competition and DG Information Society argue that, 
although the decentralised character of the Internet epitomises the argum ent for self­
regulation, scarce resources and bottlenecks present a case where a mix of self­
regulation and hierarchical intervention is proposed.52
A particular scarce resource on the Internet is the dom ain names allocation 
system. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Num bers (ICANN)53 
controls the allocation in a non-hierarchical fashion, according to the dem ands of the 
community. The problem with domain names is that although they can consist of up 
to 61 characters, usable dom ain names are almost entirely the .com top level ones.54
52 Murray and Scott note 32 above, at p. 506 and 511.
53 ICANN is a non-governmental not for profit agency. In June 1998 the US Department of Commerce 
released a White Paper on the administration of internet names and numbers, which aimed at 
transferring the administration of internet domain names and IP addresses from the US Federal 
Government into the hands of a private non-profit, internationally representative organisation, which 
would be self regulated. Governments would not intervene in its powers and structure. Instead, the 
private sector would form an organisation based on consensus among the industry. ICANN works 
together with WIPO, which provides the expertise required for the development of effective 
procedures. On these issues see Mueller, M. (1999) 'ICCAN and Internet governance: Sorting through 
the debris of self-regulation' 1 Info 497-520.
54 Murray and Scott note 32 above, at p. 497.
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Hierarchical solutions were employed by ICANN and its predecessors, 
Network Solutions,55 in the form of dom ain name related dispute resolution. The 
need for dispute resolution was persistent in view of 'cybersquatting.' This emerges 
when individuals register popular domains to subsequently sell them to the holder 
of the trademark.
Nonetheless, the Internet community failed to impose sanctions on these 
persons. Although courts could intervene in cases where 'cybersquatters' had 
misappropriated another's trademark, enforcement could prove problematic due to 
regulatory arbitrage. Therefore, a regulatory regime was pu t in place, which would 
apply no matter w hat the jurisdiction of the parties is. In this context, ICANN 
treated the dom ain name space as a separate jurisdiction, and all dom ain name 
holders have the obligation to submit themselves to its arbitration procedure, which 
is conducted online and is characterised by low costs.56
In particular, in October 1999, ICANN adopted its Uniform Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP).57 Part of the registration process for getting a 
dom ain name includes acceptance of the UDRP, while a dom ain name owner can 
lose its rights to the domain name if it violates it.58 Section 4 of the UDRP explains
55 Network Solutions Inc. is a private for profit company.
56 Murray and Scott note 32 above, at p. 506-507. The authors also note that: 'The previous Network 
Solutions Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy required the complainer to obtain a court order. This 
meant it was in many cases cheaper to buy the disputed domain name from the defender than to pursue an 
action to recover the name, especially if the dispute had an international element.'
57 http: /  / www.icann.org/udrp /udrp-policy-24oct99.htm. (web page visited on 19 May 2003).
58 UDRP § 3.
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the m andatory administrative proceeding that any domain name owner would be 
subject to.
This proceeding occurs when a third party complainant asserts that the 
dom ain name owner has used a dom ain name that is identical or confusingly similar 
to the complainant's mark, that the dom ain name owner does not have rights or 
legitimate interests in the name, and that the dom ain name has been registered and 
used in bad faith.59 The UDRP lists four non-exclusive factors to be considered in 
determining bad faith.60 If all of the above conditions are met, the remedies sought in 
UDRP proceedings are the cancellation of the dom ain name or the transfer of the 
dom ain name to the complainant owner of the mark.61
Nonetheless, there is strong criticism of the role of ICANN as commentators 
have noted that it 'favours trade mark holders over domain name holders who fail, for 
whatever reason to comply with US trademark law.'62 The so-called 'sucks' cases prove to
59 UDRP § 4(a), available at http:/  /  www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm, (web page 
visited on 23 May 2003).
60 UDRP § 4(b)(i)-(iv) For the purposes of Paragraph 4(a)(iii): the following circumstances, in particular but 
without limitation, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain 
name in bad faith: (i) circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have acquired the domain name 
primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the 
complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for 
valuable consideration in excess of your documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; 
or(ii) you have registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from 
reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that you have engaged in a pattern of such 
conduct; or(iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a 
competitor; or(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, 
Internet users to your web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the 
complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of your web site or location or of a 
product or service on your web site or location.
61 UDRP § 4(i).
62 Murray and Scott note 32 above, at p. 507, citing Froomkin, M. (2000) 'Wrong turn in cyberspace: 
Using ICANN to route around the APA and the Constitution' 50 Duke Law Journal 17, at p. 96-101;
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be quite controversial. It has been argued that free speech on the web was seriously 
curtailed, after domain names were transferred to tradem ark holders following 
arbitration.63
A different problem occurred w ith establishing the criteria, which should 
underline the confusion test. For example, in Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Walsucks and 
W almarket Puerto Rico,64 one of the arguments supporting the transfer of the 
dom ain names to Wal-Mart, was that walmartcanadasucks.com, wal- 
martcanadasucks.com, walmartuksucks.com, walmartpuertorico.com and 
walmartpuertoricosucks.com, are 'confusingly similar' to its trademark. In particular in 
section (6) of the decision the panellist found that
Respondent has registered the domain names 'walmartcanadasucks.com/ 'wal- 
martcanadasucks.com,"walmartuksucks.com'and walmartpuertoricosucks.com.' These 
domain names share common characteristics. In each case, Complainant's 'Wal-Mart'
Perry, D. (2000) Trademarks as commodities: The famous roadblock to applying trademark dilution 
law in cyberspace' 32 Connecticut Law Review 1127-1161, at p. 1127,1155-1157.
63 On these issues see Murray, A. (2003) 'Regulation and rights in networked place' forthcoming in 
Journal of Law and Society. The author argues that normally a purely non-commercial use of the 
trademark for the purpose of criticism should be an absolute defence, as in this instance the arbitrator 
has to strike a fair balance between property rights and the right to free speech. Nevertheless, the 
UDRP provides a poor understanding of what constitutes a fair defence. This is because the non­
commercial use defence can only be used if a trademark has not been tarnished (associated with
obscenity) and if consumers have not been misleadingly diverted from the trademark holder's business. 
Murray argues that these two conditions substantially impoverish the fair use defence, as arbitrators 
found that search engines were likely to identify the 'sucks.com' sites in response to, for example, a 
'Wal-Mart' query. Internet users might then visit these sites, a process diverting potential customers 
from Wal-Mart. Thus, arbitrators pointed to the particularities of search engines, which, if taken into 
account, should lead to a different analysis than the one conducted in the physical world, see Dixons 
Group Pic v Mr. Abu Abdullaah, D2000-1406, (WIPO January 18, 2001). For the tamishment doctrine 
see Bently, L. and Sherman, B. (2001) Intellectual Property Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press); 
Strasser, M. (2000) "The Rational basis of trademark protection revisited: Putting the dilution doctrine 
into context' 10 Fordham Media & Entertainment Law Journal 375-425.
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trademark is followed with an indication of place (Canada, Canada, UK and Puerto Rico, 
respectively). In Wal-Mart v. Walmarket Canada, it was determined that 
'walmartcanada.com' and 'Wal-Mart' are confusingly similar. The Panel accepts this 
determination. The addition of a hyphen to form 'wal-martcanada.com' does not affect this 
finding......
Respondent has appended the term '-sucks' to domain names that are, in the absence 
of that term, confusingly similar to Complainant's mark. The addition of the pejorative verb 
'sucks' is tantamount to creating the phrase 'Wal-Mart Canada sucks' (and comparable 
phrases with Respondent's other '-sucks' formative domain names). The elimination of the 
spacing between the terms of the phrase is dictated by technical factors, and by the common 
practice of domain name registrants. The addition of a common or generic term following a 
trademark does not create a new or different mark in which Respondent has rights.65
Very importantly, the arbitrator held there was strong evidence of bad faith 
since the respondent registered the disputed domain names for registered the web 
pages for a commercial purpose, thus he canot invoke fair use or legitimate 
noncommercial use perm itted by paragraph 4 (c)(iii) of the Policy. Similarly, some 
other sucks cases decided (freeservesucks.com, natwestsucks.com, 
directlinesucks.com, dixonssucks.com and standardcharteredsucks.com) were all
64 Wal-mart Stores, Inc. v. Walsucks and Walmarket Puerto Rico, D2000-0477 (WIPO July 20, 2000), 
available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0477.html.
65 ibid at section six.
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registered by the same respondent who had asked for money for return of the 
name.66
Nevertheless, for natwestsucks.com, for example, to pass the confusion 
threshold, in section five of the decision the panel concluded that 'Some will treat the 
additional 'sucks' as a pejorative exclamation and therefore dissociate it after all from the 
Complainant; but equally others may be unable to give it any very definite meaning and will 
be confused about the potential association with the Complainant.'67
In the light of the above, arbitrators seem to have stretched the UDRP criteria 
in order to meet the test of trademark confusion. In a different case, disquiet was 
raised as a result of the arbitrator's finding that 'guiness-really-sucks' is 'identical or 
confusingly similar' to the Guinness trademark.68
Interestingly enough, in this case the element of bad faith was established as 
the respondent was thought to have registered the disputed dom ain names for 
retaliatory purposes because he was angered by the complainant's registration of the
66 Case No. D2000 - 0636 (Natwestsucks), Case No. D2000-0583 (Directlinesucks.com), Case No. 
D2000-0584 (Dixonssucks.com), Case No. D2000-0585 (Freeservesucks.com) and Case No.D2000-0681 
(Standardcharteredsucks.com) available at http:/  /arbiter.wipo.int/domains/index.html.
67Case No. D2000 - 0636 (Natwestsucks) available at http: /  /arbiter.wipo.int/domains/index.html
68 Case No.D2000-0996 available at http:/  /arbiter.wipo.int/domains/index.html. In this case, the 
respondent has registered the domain names guinness-really-sucks.com; guinness-really-really- 
sucks.com; guinness-beer-really-sucks.com; guinness-beer-really-really-sucks.com; guinness- 
sucks.com; guinessreallysucks.com; guinessreallyreallysucks.com; guinessbeerreallysucks.com; 
guiness-beer-sucks.com; guinessbeersucks.com With specific reference to Paragraphs 4 (i) of the 
UCRP, the administrative panel decided that they are confusingly similar to a trademark or service 
mark in which the complainant has rights. Therefore, the respondent has no rights or legitimate 
interest in respect of said domain names or any of them and he has registered and is using said 
domain names in bad faith. Accordingly, the said domain names should be transferred to the 
Complainant. As regards the conditions of "bad faith' and 'legitimate interest' the panellist followed 
the line of argumentation exposed in Wal-Mart. As for the test of similarity, the panellist went on to
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dom ain name, guinnessucks.com. Therefore, the panellist accepted that the 
complainant has m ade out a prima facie case that the respondent registered the 
dom ain names w ith the intention of harassing the complainant to enforce its 
trademark rights and to tarnish the Guiness trademark.69
Criticising the legal basis of the decisions is not enough to reveal the 
problems inherent in the process of arbitration.70 Questioning who participates in 
the panel is crucially im portant for this purpose. According to Froomkin the 
problem with arbitration is that ICANN allows the complainants, who m ost of the 
time are trademark holders, to engage in 'forum shopping/  in other words choose the 
arbitration provider.71
The vast majority of disputes are being adjudicated by arbitrators from  WIPO 
(with most of its members practising lawyers) and from the National Arbitration 
Forum (based in Minnesota72 with most of its members being retired judges).73
point out that there may be some non-English-speaking readers who may not be familiar with the 
word 'sucks/
69 Case No.D2000-0996 available at http: /  /arbiter.wipo.int/domains/index.html. 'In support of its 
argument that the said domain names were registered by the Respondent as a result of the earlier administrative 
proceedings, the Complainant has submitted a print-out of a page on the Respondent's said w w w  site and 
alleges the following statement was posted on that www site during the period from June 1 through July 14, 
2000:
'I went to register the domain name, GUINNESSSUCKS.COM, but guess what, that domain name is already 
owned by someone. Guess who. That's right. Guinness beer owns it themselves. I'm glad I'm not the only one 
who thinks they suck. THEY THINK THEY SUCK THEMSELVES!! . . .  So anyway I did go and register a 
few names about Guinness beer and Pillsbury. Tell me what you think....Coming Soon to a website near you!!"
70 See for example Murray note 63 above; For statistical data and a very useful categorisation of the 
problems see a study by Mueller available at http://dcc.syr.edu/markle/markle-report-final.pdf. 
(web page visited on 16 May 2003). A discussion on the interpretation of legal taxonomies such as 
'bad faith' falls outside the scope of this chapter due to space limits.
71 McWilliams, B. 'Domain arbitration already drawing critics' story published on 8 March 2002, 
including an interview with M. Froomkin, Professor of law, University of Miami available at 
http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/3 317461, (web page visited on 16 May 2003).
72 www.arbforum.com/domains, (web page visited on 19 May 2003).
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Another provider is eResolution,74 based in Montreal, while the CPR Institute for 
Dispute Resolution is the fourth provider available to parties.
Froomkin believes that accredited registrars should select which forum  will 
handle cases involving their domain customers. This is because, while 'on paper this 
process should be fair, I foresee a serious danger. Since plaintiffs get to choose the arbitration 
provider, this creates an economic incentive for companies to compete on being pro-plaintiff if 
they want business.'75
The purpose of the previous analysis was to draw  attention to that trivial 
decisions as to who is the arbitrator may be crucial. This latter point will be further 
taken up in the following section.
4. Analysis of the problems
a Establishing the difference between the joint partnership model and the self­
regulation model.
Let me summarise the issues conveyed so far. Pure forms of self-regulation, as 
in the case of having to abide by codes of conduct, are not the norm. Most of the 
time, some form of hierarchical assistance is required in the monitoring and 
enforcement stage. The value of this point is proven by examples such as the dispute
73 Empirical research on the composition of arbitration panels has been carried out by Murray note 63 
above.
74 www.eresolution.ca / ,  (web page visited on 19 May 2003).
75 Froomkin, M. (2002) 'ICANN'S Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy: Causes and (partial) cures' 67 
Brooklyn Law Review 608-718, at p. 671 and 689. Also see the interview Froomkin gave to
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resolution mechanism introduced by ICANN and the architectural solutions 
developed for DVDs.76
Nonetheless it would be wrong to consider that private interests solely support 
such a decentralised form of governance. For example, the European Commission 
plays a major role in the co-ordination of Internet management and in initiating 
consultations between itself, the private sector and civil society.
To this effect, the European Commission 'should develop, in conjunction with 
ICANN, effective codes of conduct (supported by legislation as appropriate), to cover the 
allocation and protection of domain names, action to combat fraud and cybersquatting, and 
access to personal data and the security and protection thereof'77
Furthermore it is expected to promote effective alternative dispute resolution 
procedures to reinforce the domain name registry codes of conduct; Conduct calls 
for a periodical evaluation of whether legislative action and self-regulatory
intemetnews.com note 71 above; Weinberg, J. (1997) 'Rating the net' 19 Hastings Communication & 
Entertainment Law Journal 453-482.
76 Encouragement by the state for industry self-regulation initiatives is sometimes labelled 'co­
regulation.' As the term is being used in the current EU debate it refers to the setting of standards or 
norms being carried out by non-state actors while monitoring and enforcement is conducted by 
regulatory authorities. On these issues see Murray and Scott note 32 above; Liikanen, E. (2000) 'Co­
regulation: A modem approach to regulation' SPEECH/00/162, speech of the Commissioner E. 
Liikanen at the Meeting of the Association of the European Mechanical, Electrical, Electronic and 
Metalworking Industries (Orgalime) Council, at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p action.gettxt=gt&doc=SPEECH/00/16210 1RA 
PID&lg=EN, (web page visited on 16 May 2003).
77http://wipo2.wipo.int/process2/rfc/rfc3/annexes/annexl4.html. Also see
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/eif/InternetPoliciesSite/IntemetGovemance/EPResolutionl5March2001 
■html, (web pages visited on 14 April 2002). During ICANN's first steps, to temper disquiet from the 
part of the EU as to the affinity between the US Commerce Department and ICANN, the US 
promised the Europeans that they would have three of the nine seats on the corporation's Interim 
Board.
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measures have actually achieved the desired effect; Aim at making the European 
regulatory strategies in the above areas best practice across the world Internet.
To w hat extent though is the developm ent of joint codes of conduct, for 
example, a sign that the European Commission has a real influence in the way these 
will be developed? Various commentators have noted that ICANN has failed to 
fulfil its promise to provide a forum for self-regulation. The White Paper produced 
by the US government called upon ICANN to open up the .com, .net, and .org TLDs 
to competing registrars and pu t in place a dispute resolution system together with 
WIPO.78
However, by having WIPO provide the necessary expertise to develop the rules 
of conduct in order to make the Internet a safer place in view of the problem of 
cybersquatting, simultaneously meant that a maximalist definition of intellectual 
property rights entered the vocabulary of ICANN.79
As for ICANN's board, it is true that 9 out of its 18 members were to be elected 
by virtue of an election where the Internet community at large could participate. The 
rest were appointed by supporting organisations, such as the Address Supporting 
Organisation, the Protocol Supporting Organisation and the Domain Name 
Supporting Organisation.
78 Mueller note 53 above.
79 The Europeans always complain that the US government heavily influences ICANN through the 
Commerce Department. On these issues see Froomkin, M. 'A commentary on the WIPO's 
management of Internet names and addresses: Intellectual property issues/ 19 May 1999, available at 
http://personaliaw.miami.edu/~amf/commentarv.htm, (web page visited on 16 May 2003); also see 
Mueller ibid. The author describes how the US Commerce Department, EU officials and various big
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Castells argues that the romantic vision of Internet community regulating itself 
according to its needs was tempered by the reality of powerful lobbyists and 
networks influencing the election of particular candidates in ICANN's board. This is 
why government representatives who sit in ICANN's board expressed their disquiet 
when Andy Mueller was elected, as he was member of the (in) famous Chaos 
computer club in Berlin, representing Internet communities' interests.80
Nevertheless, in 2002 ICANN suggested that there should be no more at large 
elections, as it considered that the experiment in global online democracy is noble, 
but deeply unrealistic, and currently the issue is under discussion.
As for the dispute resolution in particular, Froomkin argues that ICANN has 
completely failed: 'ICANN has so far demonstrated a complete failure to monitor the 
activities of the dispute providers, and has taken no action when they write rules that are 
biased for plaintiffs. The most likely reason for that disinterest is that ICANN, which heavily 
represents trademark and other business interests, is not troubled by those rules, just as it 
was not troubled by the UDRP. The lobbies that dominate ICANN would be much quicker to 
demand action if the bias ran the other way, and were a rogue provider to materialize, one 
can reasonably expect that ICANN would be quick to take action against it.'81
The basic point emerging from the previous discussion is that one may 
encounter difficulties in establishing w hat the difference between the joint
corporations like IBM were influential in selecting the initial Board Members of ISOC, ICANN's 
predecessor.
80 Castells note 33 above, at p. 32.
81 Froomkin note 75 above, at p. 671, 689, 692.
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partnership model and the self-regulation approach is. The former position 
understands the state as retaining bigger powers that extend beyond monitoring 
and enforcement, and as such is one among the m any actors that directly intervene 
in the shaping of regulation. Self-regulation may require the state to pu t the 
framework necessary to enable monitor and enforcement, which implies that 
regulatory authorities retain responsibility for ensuring that controls are effective 
and intervene where controls fail.82
However, although regulatory authorities argue that their role in the latter case 
is limited, in reality there is more than that. ICANN and the problem that emerged 
in relation to domain name alocation is one example that may help illustrate the 
latter point, as m undane decisions in reference to who is the judge in the arbitration 
procedure may be crucial and it seems that national governments and the EU do 
have a say on these issues as they are influential as to what course such decisions 
will take.
b A  Bourdieusian perspective 
Why is the above happening? Is it because interest groups capture legislators 
or regulatory agencies? Or, because regulatory law collapses in the realm of politics? 
Contrary to these approaches, the argum ent of this chapter is that regulatory law is 
doomed not to live up to its promises, as it is impossible not to bear the traces of the
82 Governance and regulation for the digital age: Issues and choices for Europe, Preliminary 
Consultation Document from the EIF 'Soft Law' Working Group, rapporteur Scott, C., at p. 6.
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operational logic of a field of study w ith a juridical element: Telling right from wrong 
by way of fitting social problems in legal categories.83 Law, be it 'procedural' or 
'substantive' always entails normative choices.
This is why, Bourdieu's theoretical framework offers a view radically different 
to understanding regulatory law as objective and neutral and to conceiving action as 
being initiated to achieve certain policy outcomes,84 as the question still requiring an 
answer is: Why, after all, does the European Commission pursue certain policy 
outcomes?
The m ain argum ent of this chapter is that the European Commission seeks to 
preserve or maximise juridical and most im portantly symbolic capital. Based on the 
assumption that power is at the heart of action, the argum ent is that the European 
Commission is predom inantly engaged in struggles in order to remain a crucial locus 
of governance.
To this effect, the European Commission seeks to enhance its position as a 
major think tank and the best way to do this is by sustaining the belief in the 
neutrality and objectivity of law by virtue of its juridical capital, which gives 
legitimacy and universality to the point of view that regulatory law is to 
encapsulate.
Thus, we break away with notions such as utility maximisation and 
procedural neutrality. And, we cast a radical doubt on the notion of rational agency,
83 Bourdieu note 17 above.
84 For this approach see for example the policy networks analysis. On this see Chapter I. A.
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as maximising power is not an exercise undertaken always at a conscious level, but, 
most of the time, is performed by means of practices who reproduce taken for granted 
assumptions.
If one accepts that maximising continuity, power and status is the motor 
behind action, then the aim of the European administration is to harmonise, 
integrate markets, objectively put notions such as economy and property in legal 
categories. The tools to achieve these are, codification and objectification of practices 
by means of textual analysis, reliance on precedence, invention of new legal 
categories, trust in legal institutions. The operating parameters of the above are, 
formality, rule of law, and an increase in legal certainty by means of providing the 
tools for rational predictions of outcomes.85
However, by virtue of providing for certainty, objectivity, rationality and 
continuity, a set of assumptions are simultaneously reproduced, which are taken for 
granted such as the ones reproducing the centrality of intellectual property rights, 
or, as the following section will show, particular understandings underlying the 
categorisation of material as harmful.
The above logic has also the effect of giving such subjective structural 
patterns universality. Thus, the basic characteristic of a field w ith a juridical element
85 Note that a full discussion on Bourdieu's theory of action would have to engage the role of 
structural patterns of cognition (habitus) in appreciating the potentialities inscribed in formal 
structures (capital). This discussion is the subject of the following chapter. I here concentrate on the 
identification of the operation of the doxic element of the field, an instance when structures coincide 
with patterns of cognition.
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is to give universality to claims encapsulated in legal procedures, although we tend 
to forget that these very claims are reproduced because agents reproduce them.
M onitoring and enforcement present an instance when structural patterns of 
thinking are encapsulated in tedious procedural rules, which may in reality be 
loaded with options influencing future developments. This is because, although 
choices were 'naturally' m ade by the European Commission for example, as they 
presented at the time the orthodox way of doing things, this does not mean that they 
did not preclude the possibility of other, different, 'heretic' ways existing alongside.
These choices are encapsulated in legal rules, and, if one accepts the above 
argument, then there can be no 'neutral' legal rules merely confined in monitoring 
and enforcement or facilitating the participation of communities, as a problem is 
never a problem. It usually is a multifaceted problem and it is only one of its facets 
that will eventually be actualised by means of entering the monitoring stage. An 
example of this is the ICANN arbitration procedure.
As we saw, the European Commission thinks that supporting effective 
alternative dispute resolution procedures to reinforce the dom ain name registry 
codes of conduct is necessary. What does 'effective' mean? Should an accredited 
panel choose the arbitrators or should the solution be found in allowing competition 
among alternative arbitration fora? The answer in the future will be one of the two 
alternatives, it cannot be both, and this means that one is excluded.
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The choice is premised not on the basis of pursuing the public good or 
individual preferences, but on patterns of praxis characterised by the juridical 
element of the field, dem anding a rational approach safeguarding certainty and 
continuity by means of objective procedures, which, despite their objective 
character, reproduce assumptions about the role of intellectual property rights in 
protecting investment in view of the new global challenges.
All of these points will be followed through in the next section by virtue of 
another case study: The Safer Internet Action Plan, which seeks to tackle the 
problem of illegal and harmful content on the net. Why is 'harmful material' a 
problem and what is the process behind identifying a problem? Moreover, how is 
'harmful' defined in the preparatory and implementation stage? The following 
section will seek to answer these questions, w ith a view to identify the 'taken for 
granted' element in the answers furnished.
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D. THE INTERNET ACTION PLAN: THE DIFFICULTY IN 
SEPARATING PROCEDURES FROM NORMS
1. The Safer Internet Action Plan
In January 1999 the European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union adopted a m ultiannual Action Plan on promoting safer use of the Internet by 
combating illegal and harmful content on global networks.86 The Safer Internet 
Action Plan87 (the Plan) is managed by DG Information Society and is part of the 
European Union's Fifth Research and Technological Development (RTD) 
Framework Programme (1998-2002)88
It covers the period 1999-2002, aims at promoting safety on the Internet and 
presents us w ith the European Union's response to the problem of illegal, harmful 
and racist content on the Internet. In March 2002 the European Commission decided
86 Council Recommendation of 24 September 1998 on the Development of the Competitiveness of the 
European Audiovisual and Information Services Industry by Promoting National Frameworks aimed 
at Achieving a Comparable and Effective Level of Protection of Minors and Human Dignity O J L 
270, 24 September 1998, at p. 48. The Recommendation followed the Communication on Illegal and 
Harmful Content COM (96) 487, available at
http:/ /  europa.eu.int/ISPO/legal/en/intemet/communic.html and the European Commission 
Green Paper COM (96) final on the Protection of Minors and Human Dignity in Information and 
Audiovisual Services COM (96) 483 available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/avpolicy/regul/new srv/gp re en.htm. (web pages visited on 19 May 
2003).
87 Decision No 276/1999/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 January 1999 
adopting a Multiannual Community Action Plan on Promoting Safer Use of the Internet by 
Combating Illegal and Harmful Content on Global Networks O J L 33, 06 February 1999, at p. 1. Also 
see the Internet Action Plan web page at http: /  /www2.echo.lu/iap, (web page visited on 19 May 
2003).
88 For the details of this plan see http: /  / www.saferintemet.org/, (web page visited on 19 May 2003).
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to fund the Plan w ith an additional budget of 13.3 million for two more years 
covering the period 2002-04.89
The Plan is developed along three basic lines: It propagates the need to create 
a safe environment by means of self-regulation (particular by creating a European 
network of hot-lines and encouraging self-regulation based on codes of conduct), it 
supports the development of filtering and rating systems and the adoption of 
international agreements on rating systems, and finally it seeks to inform parents, 
teachers and children of the potentials and drawbacks of the Internet.90
The Plan is closely related to the activities and priorities of the Multimedia 
Content and Tools Key Action (KA3) of the Fifth Framework Programme.91 
Therefore, it presents a good example of the complex consultation process, which 
aims at collecting expert knowledge.92 The following section will m ap the 
committees engaged in the process of information collection.
2. Committees and the importance of collecting information
The European Commission is surrounded by myriads of committees 
providing advice on both the development of legislation and on its
89 http:/  / www.welcomeurope.com/news info.asp?idnews=378. (web page visited on 16 May 2003). 
The proposal of the European Commission has been adopted by the EP and the Council, IP/03/774 
EU Moves Against Illegal and Harmful Content Online.
90 ibid.
91 http: /  / www.cordis.lu/ist/ka3 /iap.html, (web page visited on 19 May 2003).
92 The scope of the following section is limited in charting the committees that are an internal part of 
the EU system. The collection of information vie informal channels of networks falls outside the scope 
of this chapter due to the space limits.
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implementation.93 As regards the former, independent experts who are draw n from 
throughout the European Union, bu t do not represent the interests of any Member 
State or scientific institution, sit in 'expert' or 'scientific' committees.
The Comite Scientifique et Technique (CREST) and the European Research 
Advisory Board (EURAB) are examples of such committees. Moreover, the same 
consultative role can be played by Task Forces, (whose members come from various 
DGs, but can draw  upon external advice), and think tanks established by the 
European Commission such as the Joint Research Centre.
The European Commission also convenes special 'Reflection Groups' or 
'Independent Expert Panels' whose members are high-level European personalities to 
advise on particular issues such as the future macro-organisation of the Framework 
Programme. Moreover, the Research Group of the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER) also provides upstream consultation (on the 
development of legislation), and is a high-level committee set up by the Council of 
Ministers, representing the interests of Member States.
The above was m eant to map the formal consultation through which a 
problem is identified, an idea emerges in the first place and finally finds its way to a 
European Commission proposal. In other words, the aim was to trace the formal 
channels leading to the emergence of the idea that multimedia in general and the
93 Technological Options Assessment (STOA) Programme of the European Parliament, PE 167 
327/Fin.St., October, 1998 (PE 167 327/ Fin. St.).
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usage of filters in particular should be dealt w ith in the context of the Fifth 
Framework Programme.
The European Commission has considerable power to effectively engage in 
the identification of problems, as it possesses a powerful internal mechanism 
structured along the lines of a major think tank. Nonetheless, the implementation 
stage reveals more ways in which the European Commission can be influential. This 
point will be taken up in the following section.
3. Implementing the Plan
a Self-regulation and the development of codes of conduct
As regards the distribution of illegal content on the Internet, it is up to 
Member States (MS) to enforce the law, since w hat is illegal offline remains illegal 
online. The industry is viewed as playing an im portant role in helping reducing the 
circulation of illegal content (especially content such as child pornography, racism 
and anti-Semitism) through self-regulation (such as codes of conduct and 
establishment of hotlines) in compliance w ith and supported by the legal system.94
Under this action line, the European Commission should develop guidelines 
for codes of conduct at a European level, build consensus for their application, 
support their implementation and monitor progress. Parallel to the establishment of 
codes of conduct, a system of visible 'Quality-Site Labels' for Internet Service
94 Green Paper on the Protection of Minors and Human Dignity in Information and Audiovisual 
Services of 16 October 1996 COM (96) 483.
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Providers (ISPs) will be developed, aiming at assisting users in identifying providers 
abiding to these codes of conduct.95
ISPs will have to remove material from their servers upon request.96 
Clarifying the rules that determine what kind of material should be removed will be 
subject to an independent national consortium of service providers, where 
membership will probably be voluntary. An example of relevant organisations that 
work at the EC level is the Internet Content Rating For Europe (INCORE), whose 
members include broadcasters and people such as the head of the Internet Watch 
Foundation 97 This group, registered in England, reviews complaints from the public 
and takes action by requesting Internet service providers to remove the allegedly 
illegal material from their servers.98
95 Intermediate evaluation of the Safer Internet Action Plan Volume 1, Final report, 31 May 2001, 
conducted for the European Commission by Business development research consultants, at p. 18-22. 
The report is available at
http://europa.eu.int/information society/programmes/evaluation/pdf/reportliap en.pdf, (web 
page visited on 19 May 2003).
96 As for liabilities and obligations of Internet Service providers (ISPs), according to the 1997 Bonn 
Ministerial Declaration intermediaries like network operators and access providers should, in 
general, not be responsible for content. Otherwise intermediaries would be made subject to 
unreasonable, disproportionate or discriminatory rules. Therefore, third party content hosting 
services should not be expected to exercise prior control on content if there is no reason to believe it is 
illegal. The Electronic Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC) endorsed this approach. Nonetheless, 
although the exemptions provided for may protect the ISPs from liability, they may still be made 
subject to a court injunction to terminate or prevent access to infringing material. Furthermore, MS 
may establish procedures governing the removal or disabling of access to information.
97 www.internetwatch.co.uk, (web page visited on 16 May 2003).
98 The issue of Comitology falls outside the scope of this section, due to space limits but a short 
reference is required. When the administration implements legislation exercising executive power 
then comitology committees, (where national representatives sit, chaired by a European Commission 
official who does not vote), keep an eye on the process. These comitology committees are also called 
'downstream committees. Generally on the debate that surrounds the issue of Comitology see Joerges, 
C. (2001) 'Law science and the management of risks to health at the national, European and 
international level-stories on baby dummies, mad cows and hormones in beef' 7 Columbia Journal of 
European Law 1-19; Joerges, C. 2001) 'Deliberative supranationalism: A defence' European Integration
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b Developing filtering and rating systems
As for harmful content on the Internet," the main objective of the Plan is to 
make content easier to identify. This can be done through a rating system, which 
describes the content in accordance with a generally recognised scheme (for 
instance, where items such as sex or violence are rated on a scale) and by filtering 
systems, which empower the user to select the content she wishes to receive. The 
European Commission funds various projects that aim at encouraging the 
establishment of European rating systems and familiarising users w ith their use. 
Nonetheless, there are various problems that surround the issue of filters.
c Analysis: Problems with using filters to block harmful material 
There are three different kinds of filters used to block harmful content. One of 
the techniques is called blacklisting. It works on the basis of twelve categories 
(violence/profanity, nudity, sexual acts, gross depictions, racism/ethnic impropriety, 
satanic/cult, drugs, militant/extremist, gambling, questionable/illegal, alcohol/tobacco).
Online Papers (EIoP) No 8, Florence, European University Institute; Bignami, M. (1999) 'The 
administrative state in a separation of powers Constitution: Lessons for European community rule 
making from the US' Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 5/1999; Lenaerts, K. and Verhoevenm A. 
(2000) 'Towards a new framework for executive rule-making in the EU? The contribution of the new 
comitology decision' (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 645-686; Neyer, N. (2000) 'The regulation 
of risks and the power of people: Lessons from the BSE crises' European Integration Online Papers 
(EIoP) No 4, Florence: European University Institute; Dogan, N. (1997) 'Little procedures with big 
implications' 20 West European Politics 31-60.
99 Harmful content is both content which is allowed but whose distribution is restricted (adults only, 
for instance) and content, which may offend certain users. This is provided in section three of the 
Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions on Illegal and Harmful Content on the Internet COM (96) 487 and in 
the Green Paper on the Protection of Minors and Human Dignity in Audiovisual and Information 
Services note 86 above.
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Parents can selectively  block access to any or all 12 categories by checking boxes in  
the program m e m anager. H ow ever, whitelisting softw are w orks on  the reverse  
principle, as it b locks out all Internet content, except expressly authorised sites.
Figure 1
European Community S&T Policy “Trialogue”
Celhile, JRC/IFIS, ETANTask Forces ESTA, IRDAC
Expert Committees
CREST
STOA
National Governments RTD &  Energy Cmte
Council o f  
Ministers
Cellule_______ [Cellule de Prospective (Forward Studies Unit), European Commission]
COREPER [Committee of Permanent Representatives]
CREST [ Comite Scientifique et Technique]
ESTA European Science and Technology Assembly
ETAN European Technology Assessment Network
IPTS Institute for Prospective Technological Studies
IRDAC Industrial R&D Advisory Committee
JRC Joint Research Centres
RTD Research and Technological Development
STOA Science and Technology Options Assessment, European Parliament
Source: Technological Options Assessm ent (STOA) Programme of the European Parliament, PE 
167 327/Fin.St., October, 1998 (PE 167 327/ Fin. St.).
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Neutral labelling is a new industry-wide standard, the Platform for Internet 
Content Selection (PICS). All sites with an Internet address m ust carry a PICS label, 
which 'tags' sites w ith a 'neutral' label that supports different types of information: 
Ratings (for instance, generally evaluating language, nudity, sexual content, 
violence), or pointers (identifying contents according to their relevance or interest 
for various constituencies of users). To be viewed, the site m ust both carry a PICS 
label and be w ithin the parameters set by parents on the home computer.
Ratings can be established by content providers themselves (such as 
entertainment companies operating family-oriented web sites) or by third parties 
(such as religious groups or parents' associations). Each family decides which rating 
systems it wishes to use and then decide w hat kind of material is acceptable and 
w hat is not by setting the parameters.100
Nonetheless, when the individuals who participated in the evaluation report 
of the European Commission101 were asked about w hat they believe the current 
scope of the Plan is, they agreed that it does cover, and should cover, child 
pornography, chat rooms, violence, racist and xenophobic ideas, hate speech, and 
adult pornography.
However, the Plan is not so strongly seen as covering satanic and cult ideas, 
drugs, medical information and advertising. Yet, participants said that these areas 
should be included, w ith the possible exception of advertising. In reviewing the
100 Evaluation Report note 95 above, at p. 69.
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current scope, participants identified a num ber of areas, which it was felt that the 
Plan had a remit to include (but none were especially strongly supported across all 
respondents): Computer crime, financial scams in relation to the consumer, 
hooliganism, terrorism, incitement to law-break, gambling, security and hacking, 
email, newsgroups.102
The above point to the particular problems in reference to producing 
adequate lists of categories, which would encapsulate consensus as to definitions 
such as 'harmful material.' A relevant question may concern whether it should be 
given a w ide definition and include advertising in general for example.
The problem linking to this concerns the difficulty inherent in any effort to fit 
content in suitable categories. Rating system designers have to devise rules-based 
systems, which would be sensitive to the complexity of content. Still, how rate a 
reportage on the Holocaust, which contains descriptions of sexual violence in 
concentration camps?103
Moreover, as Boyle argues, although the PICS is a 'system touted as "value- 
neutral", in practice we might believe that the PICs technology would be disproportionately 
used to favour a particular set of ideas and values and exclude others.'104 In the light of this 
position, one could argue that similarly the Plan is not sensitive to other 
worldviews, such as the one supporting free speech on the web.
101 These are people who participated or who would be interested in participating in the future in 
projects funded by the European Commission, Evaluation Report ibid.
102 ibid, at p. 35-36.
103 http: /  /libertus.net/libertv/censorware.html, (web page visited on 16 May 2003).
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This is because, if for example there is a law regulating the use of the web at 
schools and libraries, filters may be employed as technologies of control, as the 
choice of filtering categories may result in blocking web sites presenting information 
known to be of concern to people w ith conservative religious or political values.105
Against this background, I argue that the Plan may set the framework of 
future developments as we should not underestimate how im portant it is to identify 
a problem, set the vocabulary of the debate by collecting information on it and set 
general directions according to which agents will be mobilised to find solutions to 
the identified problem This is a fine example of the ways informational/technocratic 
capital is reproduced.
Furthermore, there is still scope for im portant decisions to be taken at the 
stage of implementation, as, for example, the term 'harmful material' can be given 
various definitions. For this reason, it may be very difficult to actually separate 
procedures from norms, as in reality procedures may frame choices and frame the 
subject matter of the discussion in such a way that it could be argued that they entail 
normative content. This is because they encapsulate unspoken patterns of thinking 
about for example, the qualities of harmful material and the role of regulatory law.
In the case of the Plan, regulation is viewed as providing an impartial 
management of practical matters. The position of this chapter is that the European
104 Boyle 'Foucault in cyberspace' note 16 above.
105This is an argument supported in the US see http: /  /responsiblenetizen.org (web page visited on 16 
May 2003).
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Commission pursues its ' interests' and sustains juridical order by giving neutral 
value to them.
Based on the assum ption that power is at the heart of action, the most 
fundamental interest consists of accumulating and preserving symbolic capital, 
which consists of the power to shape mainstream understandings and thus sustain 
its position as a major think tank. Preserving the belief in the neutrality and 
objectivity of regulatory law is crucial to this effect, bu t now, influencing future 
developments is done in indirect ways.
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E. CONCLUSIONS
The main question addressed in this chapter concerned the role of law in 
regulating the Internet in Europe, while the focus was on the role of the European 
Commission in the process. I sought to identify the forms of capital available to 
agents, discuss the challenges to the dom inant conceptualisation of centralised law 
formation and implementation, and finally come to grips w ith 'doxa' by drawing 
attention to the ability of law to universalise and objectify.
The m ain thesis advanced was that the European Commission seeks to 
preserve or maximise juridical, technocratic and most importantly symbolic capital, 
as the European Commission strives to remain a crucial locus of governance.
As for the deeply em bedded perceptions presented by doxa, the argument 
was that the taken for granted assum ption is the belief in the neutrality and 
objectivity of regulatory law, which is reproduce by the agents who inhabit m y field 
of study (the European Commission). In this instance agents view themselves as 
engaging in the rational management of practical issues, while failing to see that 
regulatory law and the views it encapsulates can only be the product of history.
To illustrate this, I first I looked at intellectual property rights, focusing on 
architectural solutions introduced in software by the industry. I chose this case 
study as it is thought to present an example of a new form of decentralised 
regulation challenging the command and control approach. In particular, the 
argum ent was that w hat has entered the field of discussion was the habitus of
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dependency. The challengers were new entrants, such as private forces, who 
envisaged a more active role for themselves in the course of enacting laws affecting 
their interests.
However, hierarchical intervention is required in the monitoring and 
enforcement stage. The problem of scarce resources in general, and domain names 
allocation by ICANN in particular, prove this point.
The focus of this section was on studying the extent to which decentralised 
regulatory techniques have been effective in weakening mechanisms of central 
control. The view supported was that power may be exercised in novel and less 
visible ways, and thus be misrecognised, as procedural rules may in reality be 
loaded with options, which may influence future developments.
A third case study on the regulation of harmful and illegal content on the 
Internet took this last point further by arguing that preparatory stages are im portant 
as it is then that a regulatory problem is identified and the vocabulary of the debate is 
set by collecting information on it and set general directions for interest groups to 
follow in order to find solutions to the identified problem Moreover, im portant 
decisions may be taken at the stage of implementation, as, for example, definitions 
can be given a wide or narrow interpretation.
Regulation is then conceptualised as manifesting the freezing of power 
relations, w ith a certain point of view having been given precedence over others and 
as such, feeds back to the operation of categorisation. In the light of the above, it
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m ay be difficult to actually separate procedures from norms, as in reality procedures 
may frame choices and frame the subject m atter of the discussion in such a way that 
it could be argued that they entail normative content.
However, this is an exercise inseparable from the construction of the field of 
struggles. In this instance, regulation is conceived as involving various agents who, 
although they inhabit different fields of activity, try to have their view of the world 
injected in regulation. This process implies that any categories encapsulated in it, are 
subject to redefinition. Regulatory law is then viewed as posing a temporary limit to 
conflicts.
The following chapter will thus seek to shed light on the ways in which 
interest groups strive to influence the content of regulation, while engaging in 
discussing the role of structural patterns of cognition in appreciating the 
potentialities inscribed in formal structures.
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V
Social Capital: The Construction of Intellectual Property Protection
Never trust a person who does not like wine.
K. Marx (written on the wall of a restaurant in South Italy).
Nloral behaviour can be achieved as a result of habit.
We become just by doing just acts, 
self-controlled by doing controlled acts, 
fearless by doing courageous acts.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.
While the previous chapter concentrated on the ways juridical, informational 
and symbolic capital may be maximised, I here seek to focus on social capital. To 
begin with a short definition, by maximising this form of capital one exploits its 
power by virtue of building a network of people to achieve common goals. Hence, 
the notion of social capital is at the heart of efforts to create a sustainable 
information society by means of promoting forums of discussion engaging various 
interest groups in decision-making.
However, not all efforts to create a civil society were informed by genuine 
attempts to build consensus on the basis of relations of trust. Various theorists 
would explain this in diverse ways. Some would say that rational agents do not 
realise that it is to their benefit to co-operate. Others would think that our values are
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in crisis. Yet, a Bourdieusian perspective to the problem may offer a different 
explanation.
Distrust may emerge as a result of first, structural asymmetries in networks 
and second, because of different patterns of perception and appreciation of a social 
problem, in other w ords different habitus, am ongst alliances of agents forming part 
of the civil society. Usually such different patterns reflect differences between the 
orthodox way of understanding social problems and new ones challenging 
mainstream modes of conception.
As for the problem of structural asymmetries, problems occur as not all 
agents have the same am ount of social capital. Moreover, other forms of capital, 
such as economic or organisational capital, may be converted to social capital and 
vice versa, which in practice denotes that agents w ith big resources are better 
situated to advance their position.
Against this background, this chapter will first look at various different 
conceptualisations of social capital w ith a view to explain how Bourdieu's 
understanding is different. Then, I will move onto examining how networks have 
been influential in shaping the information society in Europe w ith emphasis on one 
specific case study: The proposal to introduce patents in software-implemented 
inventions in the EU. The focus will be on analysing the reasons why the libre 
software community and the European Com m ission/big businesses/patent lawyers 
alliance failed to reach agreement in this case. Finally, the conclusions will 
consolidate the findings of this chapter.
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A. SOCIAL CAPITAL
In very simple terms, social capital denotes that 'people do better when they are 
somehow connected/1 because of ' information, trust and norms of reciprocity inherent in 
social networks/2 This broad definition encompasses the fundamental assumptions 
made by the many theorists who have chosen to engage the notion of social capital 
in their analysis.
Nevertheless, as different intellectual traditions feed into the articulation of its 
theoretical properties, when it comes to laying dow n the details, the definitions 
employed diverge depending on the theoretical angle one chooses to view the 
problem of information, trust and norms of reciprocity. In the light of the above, the 
following will engage in reviewing the main social capital theorists w ith a view to 
cast light on the focal assumptions made and on the differences w ith Bourdieu's 
claims.3
Nevertheless, the following does not intend to provide exhaustive reference 
to the various authors whose work focused on the notion of social capital.4 The 
choice of authors is premised on the need to discuss the theoretical traditions 
feeding into the various conceptualisations of social capital and as such, I only chose 
authors who I consider as being representative for this purpose.
1 Woolcock, M. (1998) 'Social capital and economic development: Toward a theoretical synthesis and 
policy framework' 27 Theory and Society 151-208, at p. 161.
2 ibid, at p. 153.
3 ibid, at p. 156.
4 For such an exhaustive analysis see Woolcock ibid.
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1. Coleman, Hirschman, Putnam and Fukuyama
Coleman's understanding of social capital5 is underlined by the assumptions 
encapsulated in the notion of instrumental action. Hence, social networks are formed 
after a cost-benefit analysis takes place. In other words, rational agents realise that it 
is to their advantage to forge them to collectively pursue their individual interests, 
and such a decision implies the calculation of possible returns being derived from 
collective action.
Moreover, social capital is considered to be a public good, since it tends to be 
undervalued by agents and as such not produced. This is because, w hen there is no 
incentive to generate its production, the usual free-rider problem occurs and then it 
has to be supplied when private initiative fails.6
However, the logical question then is: Why does the supply of social capital 
fail to reach desired levels? Coleman argues that in primordial societies social 
structure was based on family and relationships between persons. Social relations 
were regulated by social norms, reputation and moral force, in other words social
5 Coleman draws from Granovetter, while making explicit reference to him. Granovetter argued that 
economic action can best reveal its properties if understood not as markets or hierarchies but as social 
relationships, see Granovetter, M. (1973) 'The strength of weak ties' 78 American Journal of Sociology 
1360-1380. In this framework, the analysis is on personal ties or networks. Such an approach is 
reminiscent of Mead's and Goffman's interactionism, see Chapter III Section A of this thesis. It should 
also be noted that it is Simmel who first positioned at the heart of sociological analysis the problem of 
interaction. According to Simmel society exists because individuals enter into interaction, which 
emerges as a result of the need to attain common purposes, see for example Simmel, G. 'Group 
expansion and the development of individuality/ in Levine D. N. (ed) (1971) Georg Simmel: On 
Individuality and Social Forms: Selected writings of Georg Simmel (Chicago, 111; London: University of 
Chicago Press, orig. 1908). Generally, these ideas are embraced by network theory, on this see chapter 
III Section A. A full discussion on network theory falls outside the scope of this chapter, as the focus 
is on social theorists who elaborated on the notion of social capital.
6 Coleman, J. (1993) 'The rational reconstruction of society' 58 American Sociological Review 1-15.
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capital. In m odem  societies though, laws and formalised instrum ents in general 
result in the loss of social capital.
For example, in reference to raising children, as it has moved increasingly out 
of the household and parents no longer depend on children to care for them, ties 
inside families have broken. However, such loss of social capital is not desired by 
policy makers, as the costs of undeveloped human capital accrue to the state.
Coleman explains that 'just as physical capital is created by changes in materials to 
form tools that facilitate production, human capital is created by changes in persons that 
bring about skills and capabilities that make them able to act in new ways. Social capital 
however comes about through changes in the relations among persons that facilitate action/7
He then sees all three forms of capital (physical, hum an, social) as facilitating 
productive activity, and most importantly, he argues that social capital in the family 
and the community plays an im portant role in the creation of hum an capital in the 
rising generation, as parents care for their children's education, thus minimising the 
chance of them dropping out of school.8
However, due to the loosening up of social structures w ith a memory of 
strong relationships amongst individuals, agents nowadays capture only a small 
part of its benefit, so when conducting a cost-benefit analysis, they often under­
invest in social capital. In view of the state's interest in maximising a child's value, it
7 Coleman, J. (1988) Social capital in the creation of human capital' 94 American Journal of Sociology 
(Supplement), at p. 100. Also see Coleman, J. (1990) Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1990).
8 Coleman Social capital in the creation of human capital ibid, at p. 109 and 119.
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should be engaged in putting in place the right institutional framework, which 
would forge its creation.9
Coleman understands social capital from a rational actor perspective, as 
possessing three different forms: Expectations and obligations depending on trust 
relations, social norms accompanied by effective sanctions, and finally a social 
structure, which enables information flows. It is then that individuals may discover 
that it is in their joint interest to cooperate.
More fundamentally, for all three conditions for co-operation to emerge one 
pre-condition m ust be established: Social relationships m ust exhibit closure. Coleman 
argues that networks with closure (networks who tie their members together) are a 
source of social capital as then, for example, access to information is made easier.
To exemplify this he refers to the diam onds wholesale m arket in New York, 
where Jewish traders (with strong family ties) would hand diam onds for inspection 
to the potential buyer with no formal insurance required, as an example of a case 
where a norm  constitutes an effective regulator, as sanctions are guaranteed.
Against this background, social capital is a concept concerned with the 
quality and structure of social relations. The quality element of relations (closure)
9 For a different view, see Fukuyama who argues that it is wrong to consider social capital as a public 
good. Since cooperation is necessary to all individuals as a means of achieving their selfish ends, 
there is no reason why they should not produce it as a private good. Therefore, social capital is 
clearly spontaneously generated all the time. Furthermore, Fukuyama (as Coleman does) points to 
that social capital is a private good that is nonetheless pervaded by externalities, both positive and 
negative. An example of a negative externality is to treat only members of the family, for example, 
morally, Fukuyama, F. (1995) Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (London: Flamish 
Hamilton); Fukuyama, F. (1999) The Great Disruption. Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social 
Order (London: Profile Books).
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reminds us that when it does not exist, neither reputation nor effective sanctions can 
arise.
A second strand of writing on social capital embraces the Durkheimian vision 
of values and moral imperatives as prevailing over utilitarian instrumental action. 
For example, a gift to a child is not given to attain a certain benefit, bu t is a gesture 
underlined by values such as love or friendship. Norms of this kind underpin the 
choice of goals and how and whether people seek to attain them. In other words, 
norms are not exogenously given, but are internalised.
Hirschman's work echoes this position, as for him  moral resources underline 
non-instrumental action on behalf of values, entailing no cost-benefit analysis. 
Striving for values entails a person's feelings of belonging to a group, and group ties 
are sustained for this reason .10
Robert Putnam 's work on social capital borrows from Coleman to explain 
social capital as a public good, stressing that it tends to be undervalued and 
undersupplied by private agents.11 However, Putnam 's work is also anchored in the
10 Hirschman, A. O. (1984) Getting Ahead Collectively: Grass-Roots Organizations in Latin America (New 
York: Pergamon Press); Hirschman, A. O. (1986) Rival Views of Market Society and Other Recent Essays 
(New York: Viking Penguin); Hirschman, A. O. (1984) 'Against parsimony: Three ways of 
complicating some categories of economic discourse' 74 Journal of Political Economy 89-95.
11 Putnam, R. D. (2000) Bowling Alone. The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: 
Simon and Schuster); Leonardi, R., Putnam, R. D. (ed) (2002) Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of 
Social Capital in Contemporary Society (New York: Oxford University Press); Leonardi, R., Nanetti, P. 
and Putnam, R. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modem Italy (Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press); Putnam, R. D. (1993) "The prosperous community: Social capital and 
public life' 4 American Prospect 13-19; Putnam, R. D. (1996) "The strange disappearance of civic 
America' 7 American Prospect 24-38.
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intellectual tradition shared by American communitarians and functionalist 
conceptions of social integration from the 1950s and early 1960s.12
Putnam 's thesis is that high stocks of social capital result in successful 
political and economic systems, while many social problems may occur due to the 
decline of social capital. In particular, he observes that the American society is 
suffering exactly because social capital has been reduced.
This is because this form of capital nurtures not only relations of reciprocity 
and trust in the micro level, but also, as a non-intended consequence, trust on the 
political and economic system. In this way individuals integrate in society, as social 
consensus is created.
This is built around networks of trust created, for example, in families or 
voluntary organisations.13 W hat is more, it is by means of these organisations that a 
shared value system is developed. Therefore, in Putnam 's framework, on the one 
hand, trust creates reciprocity and voluntary associations, and on the other hand, 
reciprocity and associations produce trust.14
12 This proposition is supported by Siisiainen, see Siisiainen, M. (2000) Two concepts of social capital: 
Bourdieu vs. Putnam' Paper presented at the Information Society for Third Sector Research (ISTR) Fourth 
International Conference 'The Third Sector: For What and for Whom?' Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland. In 
this perspective, Putnam's approach is also influenced by Jacob's famous work on the role of 
communities in big American cities in driving economic development, see Jacob, J. (1963) The Death 
and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Random House). Her main argument was that it is 
communities and not world markets that the science of economics should study, as truly 
entrepreneurial spirit is developed in flexible urban networks. Jacob adopted a hostile view to central 
planning, which was seen as a parasite exploiting the fruits of labour generated in small regions, 
potentially destroying the self-organisation ability of neighbourhoods and regions, see Jacobs, J. 
(1984) Cities and the Wealth of Nations (New York: Random House).
13 Leonardi, Nanetti and Putnam note 11 above.
14 ibid, at p. 163-185.
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In simple words, individuals pursue membership in voluntary associations 
because they trust that it is better to try to achieve individual goals through 
collective action. Hence, by virtue of generalised trust in the effectiveness of 
collective action, the institution of voluntary association, for example, is 
strengthened.
2. Bourdieu and social capital
In Coleman's framework, social capital is a public good and the pursuit of 
rational agents who realise that they stand stronger chances of achieving individual 
goals through collective action. According to Hirschman social capital presents the 
moral resources of the society. Finally, Putnam  thinks that social capital is the 
cement of society in view of the integrationist operation it performs by means of 
producing generalised trust in the political and economic institutions.
Similar to all of these approaches, Bourdieu's line of thinking is that social 
capital represents a resource available to agents. But, contrary to them, for one thing, 
social capital has to be appreciated through individual schemas of perception and 
appreciation (habitus) being, most of the time, maximised or preserved by means of 
non-strategic action. For another, it always encapsulates power relations. I will here 
consider these two propositions.
In Bourdieu's framework social capital does not emerge after a cost benefit 
calculation by rational actors base their calculations upon the opportunities offered 
in an environment exhibiting closure. Social capital is not a resource exogenously
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given, bu t has to be appreciated through minds, as these are socially constructed, 
bearing a social memory structured in cognitive schemas attributing meaning to the 
social milieu.
Still, these cognitive schemas of perception and appreciation are not 
possessed by rational agents acting in the name of a normative claim, as in 
Hirschman.15 Contrary to this, Bourdieu argues that social capital is crystallised in 
taken for granted practices making the social world seem so evident that agents 
think it has always been functioning this way, forgetting that they themselves 
reproduce it.
To illustrate this, if we take Coleman's example of the Jewish diamond 
wholesale community to view it from a Bourdieusian perspective, then social capital 
is m eant to emerge by means of being maximised by agents, neither because they 
consciously engage in a cost-benefit analysis, nor because they rationally embrace a 
value system organising relationships in a community, bu t because agents do w hat 
they have always been doing without questioning the belief system underlying the 
formation of practices reproducing the existence of such networks.
Therefore, understanding the formation of these requires looking at cognitive 
schemas allowing the reproduction of the particular social relations, as nurtured in 
hierarchical relations in families structuring sentiments, such as respect and 
obedience, or at structural patterns owing their existence to religiosity. The above 
are reproduced in everyday practices, which are so 'normal' that are beyond question
15 Hirschman Getting Ahead Collectively note 10 above.
266
Social Capital: The Construction of Intellectual Property Protection
or rational computation, as people act like a 'fish in the water' to use Bourdieu's 
words.
Having said this, I totally agree w ith Coleman on one very basic point: For 
social capital to emerge, social closure has to exist and I think that this is a point not 
developed by Bourdieu himself. I nonetheless wish to depart from Coleman's 
position that agents rationally make calculations on the basis of information they 
receive once in an environment exhibiting closure, as w hat this view does not take 
into account is that the environment itself is a powerful regulator.
It does not only form the basis for calculations favouring the maximisation of 
social capital, but the process of communication inside a particular environment 
becomes a powerful cognitive lens regulating life inside a network. And, w hat is 
more, the ways life is regulated in a particular setting, is crystallised in cognitive 
schemas such as the insider/outside one, which has further effect on how 
individuality/collectivity, personality, uniqueness, distinctiveness and reputation 
are constructed beyond the conscious level being reproduced in practices, as 
Chapter III of this thesis sought to show.
Despite the above, the relevant patterns of praxis may emerge at the 
conscious level, as Bourdieu asserts that, in times of crises, habitus and the 
taxonomies it encapsulates are challenged. We saw in chapter IV that the challengers 
were groups who dem anded their inclusion in the decision-making process, 
challenging the powerful insider/outsider taxonomy. Once habitus is challenged
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then, from being a strategy devoid of strategic calculation, it becomes a conscious 
strategy on the part of the European Commission: Accumulate social capital.
According to Bourdieu, social capital involves power relations and the 
strategy of maximising it points to the possession of a durable network of 
relationships of collegiality and recognition. Therefore, it is a resource that points to 
group membership with the aim to create and sustain social networks, while 'the 
volume of social capital possessed by a given agent, depends on the size of the network of 
connections that he can effectively mobilise.'16
This implies that membership in groups m ay result in improving the social 
position of actors in many different fields. Moreover, differences in the control of 
social capital may lead to the same amount of economic and cultural capital giving 
different degrees of profit and power of influence to actors.
This is because group membership has a 'multiplication effect' on other forms 
of capital.17 Therefore, differences in the control of social capital may explain why 
the same am ount of economic and cultural capital can be more or less effectively 
maximised.
From this perspective, the formation of a voluntary association can (also) be 
seen as a strategy of investment aimed at the creation of perm anent networks of
16 Bourdieu, P. (1986) "The forms of capital' in Richardson, J. G. (ed) (1986) Handbook of Theory and 
Research for the Sociology of Education (N ew  York: Greenwood Press), at p. 241-258; Bourdieu, P. (1972) 
Esquisse d'une Theorie de la Pratique. Precede de Trois Etudes d'Ethnologie Kabyle (Geneve: Droz); 
Bourdieu, P. (1984) Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, orig. 1979); Bourdieu, P. (1980) 'Le capital social' 32 Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 2-21.
17 The forms of capital, ibid.
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relations that will make possible the accumulation of social capital.18 The creation of 
a forum or a working party by the European Commission and the participation in 
committees may also aim at doing this.
I will come back to the notion of social capital as developed by Bourdieu later 
in this chapter. But, first it is im portant to anchor the discussion in the context of 
empirical studies on European governance.
18 ibid.
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B. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND NETWORKS IN EUROPEAN 
GOVERNANCE
1. The European Union as a new system of governance
At the empirical level, studies on European governance have used the notion 
of policy networks to offer an alternative explanation to the state-centred and 
market-driven model.19
In this framework the European system is often described as governance 
without government. This is because it is understood as organised around the 
interaction of various levels of the formal institutions of the EU and interest 
groups,20 moving away from an understanding of governance around national 
governments21 and European institutions such as the European Commission.22
Such non-hierarchical co-ordination results in the formation of policy 
networks, which are comprised of a num ber of actors who share common interests 
and therefore exchange resources to pursue these, acknowledging that co-operation
19 A view strongly reminiscent of Granovetter, for more on networks see note 5 above.
20 Ruggie, J. G. (1993) Territoriality and beyond: Problematising modernity in international relations' 
47 International Organization 139-174; Jachtenfuchs, M. (1995) 'Theoretical perspectives on European 
governance' 1 European Law Journal 115-133; Kohler-Kock, B. (1996) 'Catching up with change: The 
transformation of governance in the European Union' 3 Journal of European Public Policy 359-380 
(Supplement).
21 This is an argument supported by intergovemmentalists, see for example Moravcsik, A. (1991) 
'Negotiating the Single European Act: National interests and conventional statecraft in the European 
Community' 45 International Organization 19-56; Moravcsik, A. (1993) 'Preferences and power in the 
European Community' 31 Journal of Common Market Studies 473-524.
22 For an argument supporting the centrality of formal institutions see for example Sandholtz, W. and 
Zysman, J. (1989) '1992: Recasting the European bargain' 42 World European Politics 95-128.
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is the best way to achieve common goals,23 a position strongly reminiscent of 
Coleman's thesis.
There are many empirical works whose assumptions are based on the above 
understandings. In the field of telecommunications for example, Dang-Nguyen, 
Schneider and Werle found that policy formation and implementation processes at 
the European level demonstrate the im portant role of transnational policy networks.
According to the authors, in these networks the European Commission 
should be seen as actively promoting its self-interests trying to strengthen EC 
policies as a whole, and not being 'just another actor/2* To this effect, the European 
Commission explicitly sought the formation of such networks, mainly due to the 
way political power is dispersed in the European political system resulting in 
rendering difficult hierarchical intervention.25
23 Putnam, R. (1988) 'Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level-games' 42 International 
Organisation 427-460; Knoke, D. (1990) Political Networks. The Structural Perspective (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press); Rosenau, J. N. and Czempiel E. O. (eds) (1992) Governance Without 
Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Kenis, P. 
and Schneider, V. (1991) 'Policy networks and policy analysis: Scrutinising a new analytical toolbox' 
in Marin, B. and Mayntz, R. (eds) (1991) Policy Networks - Empirical Evidence and Theoretical 
Considerations (Frankfurt/M.: Campus); Haas, P. M. (1992) 'Introduction: Epistemic communities and 
international policy co-ordination' 46 International Organisation 1-35; Marsh, D. and Rhodes, R.A.W. 
(eds) (1992) Policy Networks in British Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press); Ruggie, J. G. (1993) 
'Territoriality and beyond: Problematizing modernity in international relations' 47 International 
Organisation 139-174; Mazey, S. and Richardson, J. (eds) (1993) Lobbying in the European Union 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press); Kassim, H. (1994) 'Policy networks, networks and European 
Union policy-making: A sceptical view' 17 West European Politics 15-27; Heritier, A., Knill, C. and 
Mingers, S. (1996) Ringing the Changes in Europe: Regulatory Competition and the Redefining of the State: 
Britain, France, Germany (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter); Borzel, T. A. (1997) 'What's so special about 
policy networks? -  An exploration of the concept and its usefulness in studying European 
governance' European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) No 16, Florence: European University Institute.
24 Dang-Nguyen, G., Schneider, V. and Werle, R. (1993) 'Corporate actor networks in European 
policy making: Harmonizing telecommunications policy' Max-Planck-Institut fur Gesellschaftsforschung 
(MPIFG) Discussion Paper 93/4.
25 This is the institutional argument, which draws attention to that power is dispersed in the EU. 
Therefore, it should be seen as bearing affinities to a 'separation of powers' political system (like the US
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As for the actors who participate in these networks, the authors' research 
shows that in the early liberalisation days actors such as the Social Democrats (SPD), 
the Green Party (Grime) or the Postal W orkers' Unions (DPG, DPV), were in strong 
opposition to liberalisation, whereas actors such as the Association of German 
Machinery Manufacturers (VDMA), the Association of (large) Telecommunications 
Users (DTeV), the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) or the Federation of German 
Industry (BDI), strongly dem anded more liberalisation.26
To mobilise a policy network the European Commission set up a special task 
force active between 1983 and 1986. The DGs involved were DG 
Telecommunications, DG Competition, DG Industry and DG Research, which 
launched a series of studies undertaken by external consultants. The results of these 
studies were that Europe was well behind America and Japan and thus action at the 
EU level was required. These studies were presented in open fora, where 
representatives of industry and users participated.
For example, the International Telecommunications Users group (INTUG) 
and the Union of Industrial and Employers Confederations (UNICE) were active in
system) and not to a parliamentary democracy. In a nutshell the argument is that, since in the EU the 
Council and the European Commission are separate powers, then for one thing, questions as regards 
accountability emerge, and for another, the political constituencies lobbying the Council may be 
overridden in the implementation stage. Therefore, the system should be more open to interest 
groups due to structural reasons, see Bignami, M. (1999) "The administrative state in a separation of 
powers Constitution: Lessons for European community rule making from the US' Harvard Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 5/1999. Moreover, commentators argue that that although the EC legal order is 
superior to national Constitutions, MS have some degree of discretion as to how a Directive will be 
implemented, and even though the European Commission can take a Member State to the Court of 
Justice for failure to implement, national legislators often delay or hinder implementation.
26 Dang-Nguyen, Schneider and Werle note 24 above.
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such fora. At the same time, several committees were created with the aim to bring 
together the industry, MS and the European Commission.
To this effect, the Senior Official Group for Telecommunications (SOGT) was 
established by the Council as an advisory body to the European Commission in 
telecommunications issues in November 1983, where high-ranking civil servants 
from MS and PTTs would sit. The result was the development of action lines for the 
prom otion of a telecommunications policy.27
Then, the European Commission launched a consultation and invited telecom 
operators, producers and users. This way it would get direct feedback from, for 
example, PTTs, which had already been consulted in the national political arena, 
and from privatised operators such as the BT and Swedish Televert. Furthermore, 
the Roundtable of European Industrialists served as a direct link w ith the industry.28 
The conclusions of the consultation were published, leading to an implementation 
plan, then to a Council Resolution in 1988, which in turn  led to the Liberalisation 
Directives.29
27 Dang-Nguyen, G., Schneider, V. and Werle, R. '(1994) 'Corporate network actors in European 
policy-making: Harmonising telecommunications policy' 32 Journal of Common Market Studies 473-498, 
at p. 485; Braithwaite, J. and Drahos, P. (2000) Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press).
28 Lawton, T. C. (2000) 'Uniting European industrial policy: A Commission agenda for integration' in 
Nugent, N. (ed) (second ed 2000) A t the Heart of the Union: Studies of the European Commission 
(Macmillan; St Martins). The corporate members were: ICL, GEC, Plessey, AEG, Nixdorf, Siemens, 
Thomson, Bull, CGE, Olivetti, STET and Philips
29 Schneider, Goderfou and Werle note 27 above. The authors also argue that alliances between the 
European Commission and telecommunication users were built by means of putting in place the 
Roundtable on Open Network Provision (ONP) under the auspices of the European Council of 
Telecommunication User's Association (ECTUA), and the creation of the Open Network Provision 
(ONP) Forum as a further consultative body. The European Commission used these bodies as a 
reverse lobbying mechanism for the dissemination of ideas in national arenas in view of the 
possibility that ONP related issues would be hotly debated in the Council, ibid, at p. 490.
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In a nutshell, potential conflicts in the implementation phase are prevented 
by means of early bargaining and interest accommodation. To this effect, after a 
problem  is identified, a task force is pu t in place, then studies are launched, which 
are m eant to bring in external expertise and subsequently an open forum  for 
discussion is created.
Finally, a draft proposal is prepared, which is followed by consultation to 
lead to the drafting of a Green Paper. We see that the process of crystallisation of 
intentions is a long one, bu t it is only after this takes place that an Action Plan and a 
proposal for a Directive are drafted.30 Networks are also created by means of 
participation in institutionalised committees. The following will further elaborate on 
this point.
2. An example of social capital nurtured in committees
In many cases, actors' position in networks is based upon membership into 
advisory committees or expert groups.31 The previous chapter looked at the different 
committees feeding into the collection of expert knowledge required to the 
identification of a regulatory problem and the implementation of a legal measure in
30 Interview with an A4 official at DG Internal Market, conducted on 24 January 2002. The same 
argument is made by Cini, see Cini, M. (1996) The European Commission: Leadership, Organisation, and 
Culture in the EU Administration (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press; New York: st 
Martins Press).
31 Peterson, J. and Sharp, M. (1998) Technology Policy in the European Union (Basingstoke: Macmillan); 
Peterson, J. (1991) Technology policy in Europe: Explaining the Framework program and Eureka in 
theory and practice' XXIX Journal of Common Market Studies 269-290; Van Schendelen, M. P. C. M (ed) 
(1998) EU Committees as Influential Policy Makers (Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate).
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the context of the Framework Programme, which aims at providing funding for 
research at the EU level.
We then saw that the expertise is remarkable and the num ber of committees 
proves this. I here concentrate on identifying who the members of such committees 
are, by looking at the Information Society Technologies Programme (1ST) in 
particular.
The 1ST is one of the main themes covered by the European Union's Fifth 
Research and Technological Development (RTD) Framework Programme (1998- 
2002) funding European projects. 1ST is a research program m e aiming at fostering 
the convergence of information processing, communications and media technologies 
in Europe and has a budget of 3600 million Euro. It is m anaged by DG Information 
Society of the European Commission.32
32 The budgetary politics of RTD are quite complicated. The Maastricht Treaty requires that the 
Framework Programme's budget is subject to a unanimous vote on the Council. Then the broad 
outline of programmes and decision-making on multi-annual budgets would be subject to qualified 
majority voting (QMV) and co-decision, with the European Parliament (EP) involved in the decision 
process. Moreover, a double legislative procedure was retained, making certain programmes subject 
to Council adoption by QMV with the EP only consulted. This implies an extremely time-consuming 
process. For example, the key actions of the 1ST programme, agreed after EP's second reading, 
include: (I) Systems and services for the citizen, ii) New methods of work and electronic commerce 
iii)Multimedia content and tools (iv) Essential technologies and infrastructures v)Cross-programme 
themes.
The negotiations of the Fourth Framework Programme (1994-98) prove that the existing framework 
was problematic. They took one year and finally the broad content of the Programme changed 
marginally from what the European Commission initially proposed, proving the minor impact of the 
EP. The major problem was getting the Council to agree on the budget, since some research ministers 
tried to promote national interests. Similarly, the Fifth Framework (1998-2002) took a long time to 
agree with the Research Council endorsing a budget of 14 billion Euro on its common position, which 
was less than in the Fourth Framework. What characterised the process was fierce intergovernmental 
rivalries in the Council as again research ministers were keen on pushing programmes that touched 
upon national priorities, resulting in huge delays until reaching agreement. For these issues see, 
Bomberg, E and Peterson, J. (1999) "The development of RTD policy. Making history and setting 
budgets' in Peterson J. and Bomberg, E. (1999) Decision Making in the European Union (New York: St. 
Martin's Press), at p 213.
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Programme Committees operating under the comitology procedures33 assist 
the European Commission with its implementation powers. Members of these 
committees are representatives of MS. For the whole of the Fifth Framework 
Programme, there are nine programme committees and one committee on the rules 
for participation and dissemination of results. They m et more than 40 times in 2000 
and were consulted approximately 100 times, principally on the draft decisions on 
the selection of proposals and the update of the work.
All the opinions given were favourable to the proposals of the European 
Commission. The European Commission also consulted the Programme Committees 
informally on 300 or so occasions for exchanges of views or for information. The 
result of all these consultations was the adoption by the European Commission of 
over 200 acts to implement the specific programmes.34
The implementation of the programme35 is done by means of periodic calls of 
proposals. Proposals are invited for submission within a defined timeframe, with 
certain specific activities being subject to a continuous submission procedure 
w ithout fixed deadlines.
As for the 1ST Programme in particular, the 1ST action line is implemented by 
annual work-programmes. Advice for these is provided by the 1ST Advisory Group
33 For a discussion on the types of committees and procedures operating in the EU system in general 
see http://wwwdb.europarl.eu.int/dors/oeil/en/inter51.htm. (web page visited on 19 May 2003). 
For a list with the names of the members of the 1ST Programme Committee see Appendix Three of 
this chapter.
34 http: /  /europa.eu.int/comm/research/pdf/annualreport2001 en.pdf. (web page visited on 19 May 
2003).
35 http: /  / www.cordis.lu/ist/overv-l.htm#objective, (web page visited on 19 May 2003).
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and the Programme Committee,36 defining priorities, which, w ith further 
specifications and consultations, result in the Action Lines described in the annual 
work-programme. The consultation for the 2002 work-programme comprised also 
meetings and workshops that involved more than 400 1ST experts from the industry 
and academia.37
Members of the 1ST Programme Committee are representatives of Member 
and Associated States, while the 25 members of the 1ST Advisory Group are 
considered to be experts in the field and provide independent advice concerning the 
content of the 1ST work-programme. The following from the 1ST website explains 
their role and membership:
On 20 November 1998, the Commission appointed 278 experts to provide independent 
advice on the Fifth Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development, 
whose budget for 1999-2002 was agreed last week at ECU 14960 million. Selected from 
nearly 5000 candidates, they will serve for two years on 17 advisory groups.
Despite the fact that only around 10% of candidates were women, their high level of expertise 
enabled the Commission to increase the overall percentage in the advisory groups to 27%, 
with nearly half the groups (7 out of 17) being chaired by women. Half the group members 
have a research background; this expertise is complemented by a strong industrial component
36 For this procedures see note 33 above.
37 See the 2002 work programme in http:/  / www.cordis.lu/ist/bwp en.htm. (web page visited on 19 
May 2003). Reports of these meetings are in www.cordis.lu, (web page visited on 19 May 2003).
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(32%), and a significant proportion of research users and regulators (18%). Each group will 
hold several meetings to review the draft work programmes over the next few weeks.38
External Advisory Groups are also im portant as they provide the European 
Commission with independent advice concerning the content and direction of 
research work to be carried out under the key actions of the Fifth Framework 
Programme. This involves proposing guidelines for work-programmes, including 
the timetable of calls for proposals, criteria to be used for evaluating project 
proposals and verifiable objectives for achieving the aims of the key actions.
The groups also comment on the strategic nature and exploitation of the work 
to be carried out and on the analysis of results, w ith a view to a possible revision or 
reorientation of the work-programmes.39
Each group has about 16 members chosen from the MS of the European 
Union. Members from countries associated w ith the Framework Programme -  
Iceland, Israel, Liechtenstein and Norway -  will be added soon, and the groups will 
later be enlarged to include members from other countries such as countries that are 
candidates for accession to the EU. Members of the External Advisory Groups are 
appointed for a period of two years, and in a personal capacity, meaning they are 
independent of their organisation or country.40
Moreover, since the 15 of June 2000, following a Council Resolution on the 
Future of European Research, MS can have their voice heard through more channels,
38 http: /  /europa.eu.int/comm/research/fp57eag.html, (web page visited on 19 May 2003).
39 http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/press/1998/pr2411en.htmI, press release Brussels, 24 
November 1998, (web page visited on 19 May 2003).
40 ibid.
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since Busquin, (Research Commissioner) set up two High-Level Groups m ade up  of 
representatives of the MS appointed by the Research Ministers.
Figure 1
Fifth Framework Programme 
External Advisory Groups / Ad Hoc Expert Groups
Chairperson
AIRAGHI (ANGELO ftalian (FINMECCANICA
Members
BOYANOV KIRIL Bulgarian BULGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
BRAVO ALAIN French ALCATEL
COCHRANE PETER British BT LABORATORIES
CRONBERG TARJA Finnish UNIVERSITY OSLO
DE KEMP ARNOUD Dutch SPRINGER-VERLAG GMBH & CO KG
FENEYROL MICHEL French FRANCE TELECOM
GALUZZI PAOLO Italian FLORENCE SCIENCE MUSEUM
HALKIAS CHRISTOS Greek INTRASOFT S.A.
HEALY MICHAEL Irish ASHLING MICROSYSTEMS LTD
HORWOOD ROSEMARY British BARCLAYCARD
KUUSI JUHANI Finnish NOKIA
LAGASSE PAUL Belgian UNIVERSITY OF GENT
LARROUTUROU BERNARD French
ERCIM - EUROPEAN RESEARCH 
CONSORTIUM FOR INFORMATICS AND 
MATHEMATICS
MERKER WOLFGANG German DAIMLER BENZ A.G.
MOGENSEN GREGERS Danish IT UNIVERSITY
MOSSOTTO CESARE Italian CSELT S.P.A.
NILSSON ANN-MARIE Swedish THE SWEDISH IT COMPANIES ORGANISATION
PACHL URSULA Austrian BEUC
PURVES IAN British NEWCASTLE GENERAL HOSPITAL
SCHUURMANS MARTIN Dutch PHILIPS
UCEDA JAVIER Spanish UNIVERSITY OF MADRID
VORTMAN JACOB Israeli ELBIT MEDICAL LTD
WAGNER LUC Luxem-bourgish CLT-UFA S.A. LUXEMBOURG
WERTHNER HANNES Austrian UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA
WIERZBICKI ANDRZEJ PIOTR Polish WARSAW UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/fp5/eag.html L ast update: 5 June 2000.
Finally, the European Research Advisory Board (EURAB) also provides 
advice to the European Commission. It is made up of senior representatives from
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industry and science, who met for the first time on 26 September 2001. URAB has 45 
members, 20 of which have been proposed by the European Science Foundation 
(ESF), to represent the world of science and academia, and 20 proposed by the 
Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE), 
representing business and the industry. Five members have been appointed directly 
by the European Commission.41
3. The feasibility of strengthening the civil society by reinforcing 
trust and achieving consensus
We have seen how the industry, NGOs and MS participate in networks in the 
process of forming policies and implementing laws. Is Putnam 's perspective of civil 
society embraced by the European Commission and realised in the context of 
forming regulatory laws in the EU? To answer this, the following will take the 
example of initiatives undertaken by the European Commission to create a 
sustainable information society in Europe.
The European Commission understands its role in this process as in putting 
in place relatively neutral rules to create a global information society in the form of a 
sustainable society adequately balancing economic, social and cultural concerns.42
41 For the names of its members see Appendix One of this chapter.
42 Van Dijk, J. A. G. M., Pestel, R. and Rademacher, F. J. (2003) 'A European way into the global 
information society' paper for the Information Society Forum (ISF). The ISF is the key advisory body 
to the European Commission concerning all questions of Europe's transition into a Worldwide 
Information and Knowledge Society, http://w w w l.faw.uni-ulm.de/asis/html/f-background.html. (web 
page visited on 19 May 2003). Also see the Progress Report on Information Society For All COM 
(2000) 130 final, prepared for the Special European Council on Employment, Economic reforms and
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Thus, the European vision of promoting fairness, protecting work and welfare is 
incorporated in the European way of promoting it.
To this effect, the European way towards an information society 
may require intervention to correct, if required the 'design' of the Information Society 
and to maintain network interconnection and open standards. Moreover, the notion of social 
sustainability requires that the European Commission prevents the exclusion of a large part 
of the population from participation in the Information Society, and the gradual deterioration 
of social cohesion of our societies by increasing gaps of development between social classes, 
sexes, ages, countries and regions and by a complete fragmentation and privatization of 
information and communication.
This is because,
A  continuation of this process would jeopardize democracy and many of our social 
and cultural values. Europe, with its old tradition of a social welfare state, a social market 
economy and consensus building society is in a good position to build a socially sustainable 
Information Society, as long as world market forces do not undermine its efforts. Overall, the 
European approach is based upon public-private co-operation and consensus building. In 
practice it means great attention of the EC, the national governments and the social 
partnerships on 1. New job opportunities. 2. Education, training and lifelong learning. 3. 
Public services in information supply. ... 43
Social Cohesion -  Towards a Europe based on Innovation and Knowledge Lisbon, 23 and 24 March 
2000 .
43 ibid.
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One example of relevant efforts is the Alliance for a Sustainable Information 
Society (ASIS), an initiative financed by the European Commission, which aims at 
bringing together members of industry, business, governments, NGOs, research 
institutions, citizen/consum er organisations, and individual citizens. They are 
expected to work together towards achieving worldwide sustainability, both by 
setting the agenda for action and providing the critical mass needed to achieve 
consensus building.44
The Strategic Alliance is divided in a num ber of Action Groups on 
sustainable communities, dematerialisation of industrial and business processes, 
social inclusion, homes and workplaces of the future, mobility and transport, and 
climate change. Members of these Action Groups contribute to the creation of 
specific M emoranda of Understanding (MoU), benchmarks and guidelines w ithin 
their specific areas of expertise.45
Another example of a successful engagement of the civil society in discussion 
is presented by the consultation concerning issues emerging from the Safer Internet 
Action Plan, on which the previous chapter touched. A Cyber Crime Forum46 has 
been established, and one of the issues discussed concerned data retention.
44 http://www.jrc.es/iptsreport/vol32/english/ISS2E326.htm, (web page visited on 19 May 2003).
45 ibid. It is important to note that the objective of sustainable development is supported by the Fifth 
Framework Programme, and in particular by the key activities of the Programme concerning social 
well being, economic competitiveness in Europe and reduced consumption of natural resources.
46 European Commission Communication to the Council the European Parliament the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM (2000) 890 Final of 1 January 1998, 
Creating a Safer Information Society by Improving the Security of Information Infrastructures and 
Combating Computer-Related Crime.
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There were two meetings so far, one at the level of experts and a second open 
meeting where 400 people joined. Law enforcement agencies, ISPs, 
telecommunications operators, civil liberties organisations, consumer 
representatives, data protection authorities and other interested parties took part in 
the discussions launched.
The aim of the discussions was to .'. seek to raise public awareness of the risks 
posed by criminals on the Internet, to promote best practice for security, to identify effective 
counter-crime tools... and to encourage further development of early warning and crisis 
management mechanisms. It also encourages the sharing of knowledge, the creation of 
networks, and co-operation between interested parties.'47
4. A Bourdieusian perspective: Criticism and shortcomings
As the previous chapter sought to show, developing software filters to 
combat illegal and harmful content in the Internet, as prom oted in the context of the 
Safer Internet Action Plan, is a good example of happy co-operation amongst 
different levels of society. This is also a good example of an instance when the 
European Commission successfully engages in the maximisation of its social capital, 
as it needs the industry to furnish information to combat illegal content on the 
Internet.48
47 http:/  /  cybercrime-forum.jrc.it/default/page.gx? app.page=about.html.
48 http://europa.eu.int/information society/programmes/iap/index en.htm, (web page visited on 
19 May 2003). On similar issues see Castells, M. (2001) The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, 
Business and Society (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press), at p. 181.
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Having said this, not all attempts to build consensus are successful, as it was 
the case w ith the proposal by the European Commission to introduce patent 
protection in software-implemented inventions. This proved to be quite 
controversial despite the consultation launched. The question then is, why does co­
operation fail in such instances?
Rational actor based theories would say that since rational agents conduct a 
cost-benefit analysis, if they see that it is for their benefit to co-operate, they will do 
so, if not they will choose to loosen or cut ties. Alternatively, Durkheimians would 
address the problem in the language of cultural conflicts inherent in diverse value 
systems.
A Bourdieusian approach would come to grips w ith the problem in a 
different way. Social capital has a multiplication effect on other forms of capital. 
Hence, for the European Commission forging social networks is m eant to assist the 
maximisation of informational capital and juridical capital, as to form laws 
information is required, in order to come up with concrete proposals in highly 
perplex matters, and this can only be furnished by interested parties.
Moreover, since the stock of juridical capital of the European Commission is 
not high due to the new forms of decentralised regulation and due to the structural 
organisation of the EU political system, which is characterised by the dispersion of 
political power amongst many institutions and agents,49 the European Commission 
can avoid potential conflicts in the implementation phase by means of early
49 Bignami note 25 above.
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bargaining and dialogue. In this way, social capital is converted into juridical and 
informational capital.
Nevertheless, not all interests have the same resources. Commentators noted 
that in the process of liberalising telecommunication markets in Europe, small 
equipm ent manufacturers and installers had little influence in the debate during the 
early days of deregulation, especially in the early stages before the Green Paper.50
Against this background, the thesis advanced in this chapter is that theories 
of social capital concentrate on the underpinnings of co-operation and fail to discuss 
conflicts. These conflicts are amongst the interest groups active in a forum of 
discussion, and most of the time are best depicted in cases w hen groups support 
views thought to be radical, challenging the established system of thought or 
practice.51
Such a view stands in sharp contrast w ith the very underpinnings of the 
notion of trust. Trust is the precondition of social capital, bu t it appears that in issues 
relating to Internet regulation it is distrust that leads the way. Castells put it nicely 
when he argued that recent developments such as the Convention against 
Cybercrime show that governments do not trust their people and this is why they 
spy on them and people do not trust their governments this is why they develop 
encryption technologies.52
50 Dang-Nguyen Schneider and Werle note 24 above. Especially see the conclusions, discussing the 
problem of structural asymmetries due to the fact that business interests tend to be better organised 
and have great economic resources.
51 Similar thoughts are expressed by Siisiainen note 12 above.
52 Castells note 49 above, at p. 185.
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In this case, the im portant thing to understand is that m ost of the time, 
difference of opinion occurs not as a result of rational choices bu t as a result of 
reproducing the common way of doing things, the taken for granted views of the 
world. And when conflicts emerge because of this, which 'common way of doing 
things' prevails is subject to the resources asymmetrically distributed to agents 
inhabiting a forum  of discussion. The following will follow this intuition in the 
context of the debate, which surrounded the proposal to introduce patents 
protection in computer-implemented inventions in the EU.
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C. SOFTWARE PATENTS 
1. Basics of software copyright and patent protection in the EU
Generally, copyright is protected in the EU by a Directive on the 
Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Information Society adopted in May 2001.53 The EU Directive implements a num ber 
of obligations imposed by international treaties, such as the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. In the EU, software has 
traditionally been protected under copyright law,54 but this is not the case in the US 
and Japan where it can also be protected under patent law.55
Nevertheless, the European Commission adopted a Proposal for a Directive 
on the Protection by Patents of Computer-Implemented Inventions in February 2002, 
at present read by the Council and the European Parliament, in view of the fact that 
inventions using software can already be patented through the European Patent 
Office (EPO) or national patent offices, which has resulted in considerable legal
53 Directive of European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2001 /29/EC of 22 May 
2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information 
Society OJ LI67/10, 22 May 2001. The law relating to copyright, as it applies to computer programs, 
was first harmonised at Community level with the introduction of Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 
14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs OJ L 122,14 May 1991, at p. 42. Also see 
Commission Report on the Implementation and Effects of Directive 91/250/EEC, COM (2000) 199 
final of 10 April 2000.
54 As copyright covers the expression of an idea, it is thought to be suitable to cover software, Bently, 
L. and Sherman, B. (2001) Intellectual Property Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Generally see 
Sherman, B. (1991) 'Patentability of computer-related inventions' 13 European intellectual Property 
Review 85-112; Arnold, G. R. and Carr, H. (second ed 1992) Computer Software: Legal Protection in the 
United Kingdom (London: Sweet & Maxwell); Beresford K. (2000) Patenting Software Under the European 
Patent Convention (London: Sweet & Maxwell).
55 Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that patents shall be available for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step 
and are capable of industrial application,' http://ecommerce.wipo.int/survey/html/# ftn366, (web 
page visited on 19 May 2003).
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uncertainty. The EPO is the executive body of the European Patent Organisation 
established by the European Patent Convention (EPC), which is a non-EU agreement 
signed by all MS and other countries. Against this background, the Directive is 
meant to harmonise the way in which national patent laws deal w ith software 
inventions.
However, the proposal has generated considerable disquiet amongst interest 
groups. Looking at the legal background of patent protection in the EU will serve as 
a starting point to discuss the reasons underpinning the debate. Patents are 
protected by the Paris Convention and the Trade Related Intellectual Property 
(TRIPs) agreement. For a patent to be granted, an invention m ust be new, involve an 
inventive step and be capable of industrial application.56
Moreover, TRIPS article 27 (1) provides that patent protection can be granted 
to products and processes as long as they belong to a 'field of technology,' and in the 
same spirit Art. 52(1) of the EPC provides that patents can only be granted for 
inventions, which have a technical character. Technical character can be interpreted as 
requiring, first, that an invention belongs to afield of technology and that, second, the 
invention makes a technical contribution to the technological state of the art.57
Therefore in Art. 52(2) and (3) of the European Patent Convention (EPC) 
computer programs 'as such' are defined as not being inventions and thus fall outside
56 ibid.
57 Commission of the European Communities, DG Internal Market, "The Patentability of Computer 
Implemented Inventions' Consultation Paper by the Services of the Directorate General for the 
Internal Market of 19 October 2000 available at
http: /  /europa.eu.int/comm/intemal market/en/ indprop/comp/softpaten.htm, at p. 14 (Annex II).
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patentable subject matter. This is because a computer programme is considered as 
being a solution to a mathematical problem, not having a technical character. For the 
same reasons, 'methods for doing business/  'presentations of information/  or 'aesthetic 
creations' are not patentable.
This is where problems begin as definitions as to what constitutes a technical 
contribution and a field of technology diverge, while at the heart of the debate is 
whether computer-implemented inventions should be treated differently than computer 
program s as such, and thus be patentable.
The approach endorsed by the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent 
Office (EPO)58 is that, although Art. 52(2) of the EPC provides that computer 
program s 'as such' are excluded from patentability,59 'computer-implemented 
inventions' are intended to be covered.
According to the recent case law of the EPO Boards of Appeal, a technical 
contribution is performed when an invention 'solve[s] an objective technical problem' 
For example, 'ensuring optimum exposure with sufficient protection against overloading of 
the X-ray tube by an X-ray apparatus incorporating a data processing unit' can be 
patented. Moreover, 'the co-ordination and control by software of the internal 
communication between programs and data files held at different processors in a data 
processing system' has also been patented.60
58 http://www.european-patent-office.org/. (web page visited on 16 may 2003).
59 Consultation Paper note 57 above.
60 Consultation paper note 57 above, citing EPO Board of Appeal T6/83, [1990] OJ EPO 5.
289
Social Capital: The Construction of Intellectual Property Protection
This approach has been criticised heavily, as commentators have noted that 
there is hardly a computer program, which cannot be patented, thus in practice this 
interpretation brings Europe close to the US position, which allows software patents, 
as the rather simple test of 'usefulness' is applied.61 Business methods, algorithms, 
methods for doing business, can be patented as long as they have a 'useful, concrete 
and tangible result.'
In particular, Aigrain argues that 'as of now, there remain some microscopic 
differences in scope of patentability, mostly linked to the difference between "usefulness" in 
the US patentability framework and "susceptibility of industrial application" in the 
European one. But the practical implementation of these differences does not give rise to any 
real disagreement on technicity/62
61 Aigrain P. (2001) T1 questions on software patentability in Europe and the US' paper prepared for 
the Software and Business Method Patents: Policy Development in the US and Europe Meeting, 
organised by The Center for Information Policy, University of Maryland on 10 December 2001, 
available at http: /  /cip.umd.edu/Aigrain.htm. (web page visited on 19 May 2003), citing Dr. Roland 
Grossenbacher's statement after the representatives of governments in the Munich Diplomatic 
Conference decided to postpone revision of article 52(2), declared on 29 November 2000. Dr. Roland 
Grossenbacher's statement is available at http: /  /www.european-patent- 
office.org/news/pressrel/2000 11 29 e.htm, (web page visited on 19 May 2003). Dr Philippe Aigrain 
is Head of Sector 'Software Technologies' in the Unit 'Technologies and Engineering for Software, 
Systems and Services' of the European Commission DG Information Society. He is in charge of 
actions in support to free/open source software and related innovation. He was trained as a 
mathematician and theoretical computer scientist. From 1972 to 1981, he worked in software 
engineering research groups of software companies and as a research fellow at Berkeley in 1982. He 
joined the European Commission in 1996; Also see Aigrain, P. (2002) 'Domaine et espace publics' in 
Le Pre aux Ceres (ed) (2002) Dictionnaire Critique de la Mondialisation (Le Pre aux Clercs).
62 ibid. Aigrain notes that in 1998 the EPO started allowing direct patent claims to information objects 
i.e. claims such as 'computer program on disk characterised by th a t ... upon loading into computer memory a 
"further technical effect" X is achieved.'
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2. Problems: What is a technical problem?
The EPO seems to suggest that ideas can be patented, provided that they are 
repeatable independently of participating persons and achieve a determined effect 
in the material world. Therefore, purely mathematical solutions are acceptable if the 
claims are tied to practical applications.
Nevertheless, this is not the only definition, which can potentially be given to 
w hat constitutes a technical problem. Others argue that this should be 
conceptualised according to a particular 'technical field.' The technical field at issue is 
the field of engineering and applied natural science. However, as an invention m ust 
teach a new way of using natural forces to directly achieve a tangible result, 
'computational or organisational rules' designed to solve problems posed by 
mathematical models are not technical in this sense, no m atter whether the model in 
question can be m apped onto a physical structure or not.63
This approach is endorsed by interest groups opposing the draft Directive. 
This is why, according to the proponents of this argument, the dichotomy between 
computer programs per se, which are never patentable, and computer-implemented
63 This approach is supported by NGOs against the introduction of patent protection in computer 
implemented inventions, see the Consultation Paper note 57 above and the FFII web page 
http: /  /swpat.ffii.org/ stidi/ korcu/ index.en.html, (web page visited on 19 May 2003). The FFII is a 
non-profit association established under German law with the aim to promote a sustainable 
development of public information goods based on copyright, free competition and open standards. 
This doctrine was developed mainly by German courts up to the 1980s, and it can be found in law 
commentaries, examination guidelines and court decisions up to the year 2000, see Bernhardt, V. and 
Krafier, R. (1986) Lehrbuch des Patentrechts Recht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Europdisches und 
Internationales Patentrecht ( Munchen, Beck); Kolle, G. (1977) Technik, Datenverarbeitung und 
Patentrecht. Bemerkungen zur Dispositionsprogramm- Entscheidung des Bundesgerichtshofs GRUR 
S58 ff. A similar approach is endorsed by Aigrain note 61 above.
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inventions, which are patentable, is vague enough to allow almost anything to be 
patented, w ith the help of a smart lawyer basing the patent claim on some technical 
considerations.64
In the light of the above, an alliance of software developers opposing 
software patents in Europe, the EuroLinux Alliance, proposed to the European 
Commission that publishing original computer software on a physical media and 
using computer software on a generic multimedia computer environment should 
never be considered as patent infringement.65
This is because, an invention should provide for the non-obvious 'technical 
solution of a technical problem/  w ith the problem being 'how to cause a transformation of 
matter' and the solution consisting in 'a teaching on how to use natural forces to solve the 
problem/  For example, chemical processes controlled by computer programs can be 
inventions, as long as they are distinguishable from the computer program  not only 
at a conceptual but also at a practical level, as then the solution of the problem lies in 
a field of technology and interferes w ith 'the use of natural forces to directly cause a 
transformation of matter without intervening operations of mental deliberation.'66
The argument then is that computer program s are not inventions. Computer 
programs are 'a plan and an instruction, a literary work and a virtual machine, an interface
64 http: /  / www.esr-pollmeier.de/swpat/statement en.html, (web page visited on 19 May 2003).
65 PbT Consultants, 'The Results of the European Commission Exercise on the Patentability of 
Computer Implemented Inventions' (2000) available at
http: /  /  europa .eu.int /  comm /  internal market / en /  indprop /  comp /  softanalvse.pdf. in particular see 
section 2.3.2, which contains the EuroLinux Alliance submission.
66 ibid.
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and an implementation, a problem and a solution, a process and a product, all in one.'67 This 
is why a 'computer program with a further technical effect' in a general computer 
multimedia environment cannot be distinguished from a 'computer program as such.'
Moving beyond the exposed contest of definitions, what is really the problem 
with software patents? Why do interest groups strongly oppose them? Copyright 
protection allows using features of a computer program  in order to come up w ith an 
original work. This is because software is classified as a literary work, where w hat is 
protected is the meaningful combination of ideas expressed in a particular way in 
software, and not the ideas themselves. Copyright holders are then protected against 
acts restricted by copyright in a work in relation to the whole or a substantial part of 
it.
However, under patent law, a patent protects the ideas and functions 
implemented by a program  and to use the claims of a patent, one will have to obtain 
a licence. The problem in this case is that 'in software a patent covers many dissimilar 
programs and even an innovative program is likely to infringe many patents. That's because 
a substantial program must combine a large number of different techniques, and implement 
many features. Even if a few are new inventions, that still leaves plenty, which are not. Each 
technique or feature less than two decades old is likely to be patented already by someone else. 
Whether it is actually patented is a matter of luck.'68
67 ibid.
68 Richard Stallman's Testimony to the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) Hearings 1994. 
Richard Stallman is a leading activist based in the US, and the inventor of the GNU free software. For 
more information, see his personal web page at http://www.stallman.org/.
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However, legal taxonomies and definitions doe not do justice to the issue of 
software patents. Different conceptions of innovation, competition and property 
underline the debate. The following will take up this point.
3. The Consultation
The European Commission launched an independent study on the scope of 
harmonisation.69 I here seek to show the divergent views of the groups, which 
participated in the consultation.
a Groups' propositions
Following the European Commission's Green Paper on the Community 
Patent and the Patent System in Europe and the subsequent Communication,70 
considerable debate took place in Europe in respect to the possibility of allowing 
patents in computer-implemented inventions.
Organisations representing European businesses, lawyers, established 
industry players and government agencies asked the European Commission to take 
a legislative initiative on the issue of software patents in view of the ambiguity and 
legal uncertainty surrounding the patentability of software related inventions.
The arguments exposed supported such an initiative in view of concerns with 
regard to that European competitiveness would be seriously under threat if rapid
69Analysis of the consultation note 65 above.
70 The need for a European Commission initiative came after the Green Paper COM (97) 688 final of 
24 June 1997 on the Community Patent and the Patent System in Europe.
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action was not undertaken, as the respective market would be dom inated by 
Europe's m ain trading partners, in particular Japan and the USA. Moreover, other 
arguments included the need to protect investment, promote legal certainty (for 
example by a one-stop European Patent Office) and open up global markets.71
Amongst the major players who supported this view is the Association 
Internationale pour la Protection de la Propriete Intellectuelle (AIPPI). AIPPI is an 
association of patent lawyers, patent owners and other users of the institutions of 
industrial property.72
Other business associations in favour of software patents include, but are not 
restricted to, the Federation Internationale des Conseillers en Propriete Industrielle, 
the European Union of Industrial Property Professionals, the Deutsche 
Patentanwaltskammer and the UK Patent Family and Software Patents.73 As for the 
European Institutions, DG Internal Market supported the patentability of computer- 
implemented inventions, with the aim to harmonise markets and create a 
Community Patent.
The same view was supported by the national delegations of the Council of 
the European Union (where national patent office representatives sit), w ith the 
exception of the French and the Belgian delegation. As for the European Parliament,
71 Analysis of the consultation note 65 above, at p. 12
72 http://swpat.ffii.org/players/index.en.html, (web page visited on 19 May 2003). According to 
FFII, in Vienna in 1997 the AIPPI passed a resolution demanding the legalisation of software patents 
in Europe. In 2001 in Melbourne there was an AIPPI resolution proposal for worldwide patentability 
of business methods. In 2002 an AIPPI paper submitted to WIPO demands worldwide patentability 
of software and business methods.
73 The FFII considers that this group was amongst the most influential ones in supporting software 
patents.
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the Legal Affairs Committee (JURI) is in charge of the file, and the rapporteur is 
Arlene McCarthy, a British labour MEP, strongly in support of the EPO's 
approach.74
Nevertheless, both EuroLinux and the Economic and Social Council of the 
European Community (ESC) have expressed concerns that software patents m ight 
impede the progress of innovation in the software field.75 The latter produced in 
2002 a report criticising software patentability and proposed taking into 
consideration the interests of small and m edium  enterprises (SMEs) and free 
software companies.
As for the EuroLinux Alliance for a Free Information Infrastructure, this is an 
'open coalition of commercial companies (over 200) and non-profit associations united to 
promote a European software culture based on copyright, open standards, open competition 
and open source software such as Linux. Corporate members or sponsors of EuroLinux 
develop or sell software under free, semi-free and non-free licenses for operating systems such 
as GNU/Linux, MacOS or MS Windows.'76
To this effect the Eurolinux Alliance organised a petition against software 
patents in Europe, which had an overwhelming response, as 1161 valid responses
74 Some delegations, such as the French and Belgians, have been critical of software patentability, see 
http://swpat.ffii.org/players/index.en.html, (web page visited on 19 May 2003).
75 The ESC is a consultative organ, which unites experts and scientists from various fields and drafts 
working papers or opinions for the co-deciding organs of the European Union, like the European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union.
76 http://www.eurolinux.org/about/index.en.html, (web page visited on 19 May 2003). Open source 
software is open to modification but its re-distribution may be subject to a licence and a fee.
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were forwarded to DG Internal market. Eurolinux argued that interoperability77 is 
the prerequisite of competition in fast evolving markets and drew attention to the 
fact that software patents have caused a lot of problems, as developers find it 
difficult to create an innovative product w ithout infringing some patent, due to the 
number of features required to be implemented.
Hence, the argum ent is that due to the peculiarities of software, it is as if the 
letters of the English language have been patented.78 This results in more and more 
software patent litigation cases and many software companies and software 
developers being threatened outside courts to informally settle, as they cannot 
afford litigation costs.79
Moreover, start-up costs increase, as new firms have to take into account that 
they need an in house lawyer or constant co-ordination with a law yer/law  firm,
77 Interoperability was supported as a fair defence in the Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 
1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs OJ L 122, 14 May 1991. Commentators have 
noted that in the 1990s the European Commission was oriented towards an approach incorporating 
the dual cultural and economic nature of copyright and related rights, emphasising the need for a 
harmonisation of laws, to help open the way to creativity and development and to a proper balance 
between the information society and the European culture, see Dutilh, P., Ide, N. and Strowel, B. 
(1997) 'What really happened in Geneva: An inside look at the WIPO treaties' paper presented in the 
World Computer Law Congress and 1997 Computer and Telecommunications Law Update. To this effect, the 
Software Directive classified computer programmes as literary works, did not offer a definition of 
'computer program/ and set criteria along which to determine whether or not a computer program will 
be protected. To qualify as a literary work, the only requirement to be satisfied is that the program 
must be the author's own original intellectual creation.
78 http: /  / www.esr-pollmeier.de/swpat/statement en.html, (web page visited on 19 May 2003).
79 The problem of litigation costs is acknowledged by the European Commission in DG Enterprise 
(2003) Enforcing Small Firms' Patent Rights. A  Publication from the Innovation/SMEs Programme Part of the 
Fifth Research Programme (Luxemburg: Office for Official Publications of the European Union). 
Analysis of the consultation note 65 above; For a view from the other side of the Atlantic see Gallini, 
N. (2001) 'How well is the US patent system working? Working Paper University of Toronto 3/2001.
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who would be able to find out whether a computer program with a technical effect 
is already patented.80
Commentators have also argued that big companies build large portfolios of 
software patents, which in fact serve the purposes of maximising their bargaining 
power when striking deals.81 Finally, the findings of economic studies suggest that 
the impact of patents for computer-implemented inventions on the economy is 
ambiguous,82 while Konqueror and iCab (which are shareware companies) and 
Opera (which is an open source company) are the only competitors of Microsoft in 
the market for browsers.83
b Some statistics
The consultation showed that the group opposing software patents (91 per 
cent) was numerically dominant. Nevertheless, the report prepared for the European 
Commission analysing the results of the consultation referred to the nine per cent, 
who supported software patents, as an economic majority,84
80 ibid.
81 Shapiro, C. (2001) 'Navigating the patent thicket: Cross licences, patent tools and standard setting' 
in Jaffe, A., Lemer, J. and Stem, S. (2001) Innovation Policy and the Economy (National Bureau of 
Economic Research); Bessen, J. (2002) 'Patent thickets: Strategic patenting of complex technologies' 
Research on Innovation Working Paper 8, available at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/, (web 
page visited on 19 May 2003).
82 Bessen, J. and Maskin, E. (2000) 'Sequential innovation, patents and imitation' MIT and Harvard 
Working Paper Series 00-01, available at http:/  / www.researchoninnovation.org/patent.pdf, which is 
considered to be the leading analysis on the effects of patents; Analysis of the consultation note 65 
above.
83 ibid, at section 3.2.2.
84 ibid, at p. 14
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In particular, the report refers to the European Information and 
Communications Technology Industry Association (EICTA), whose members are 23 
national ICT associations and 31 large ICT corporations, the Union of Industrial and 
Employer's Confederations of Europe (UNICE), whose members are the 34 principal 
business federations from 27 European countries, the International Federation of 
Intellectual Property Attorneys (FICPI), representative of the legal profession in 
private practice in more than 70 countries and the European IT Services Association, 
representing the computing services and software sector.
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Figure 2
O pponents and supporters of software patents: Some statistics
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Figure 3 (cont.)
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Source: PbT C onsultants, 'The R esults o f the European C om m ission Exercise on the Patentability  
of Com puter Im plem ented Inventions' (2000) available at
http://europa.eu.int/com m /intem al m arket/en/indprop/com p/softanalvse.pdf, section  4, 
particularly see section  4 .1  at p. 35.
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3. Different cognitive schemas and power asymmetries
Distrust is a notion running against happy co-operation and civil 
engagement, as it implies that there is not always trust in governments to provide 
the objective framework or scientific feedback to facilitate the inclusion of interest 
groups and create the conditions for consensus to emerge.
If one accepts that open source software developers have a different way of 
understanding authorship and innovation than the conventional definitions 
employed in legal texts, then a network of relations (social capital) is maximised not 
to achieve happy co-operation, but to succeed in having definitions pushed forward. 
Thus, Bourdieu reminds us that power relations are at the heart of any relevant 
analysis, as a contest of definitions may take place.
Moreover, maximising capital is subject to cognitive schemas. In other words, 
the concept of capital reminds us that there is no universal principle according to 
which people act following calculations as to their self-interest. And habitus, as in 
cognitive schemas, reminds us that 'interests' are inscribed in structures in a given 
society in a certain socio-historical conjunction.
This means that the European Commission does not simply engage in 
struggles to maximise its juridical capital, but maximises its capital by virtue of 
attaching certain meaning as to how a legal text is to be interpreted. Interest groups 
do not just try to maximise their power to have a say in policy formation and 
implementation of legal rules, but such efforts acquire meaning in the light of
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assumptions taken for granted, which attach meaning to concepts such as public 
domain, property and innovation.
Minds are socially constructed and they (we) tend to reproduce ideas we 
have not thought about so often or deeply, because we comfortably accepted them 
as being so obvious to the extent of being trivial, forgetting that these are the 
product of history.
Against this background, it is due to structural patterns of thinking about 
intellectual property, innovation and information that there are such differences in 
views between interest parties and the European Commission,85 feeding into the 
emergence of distrust, a view that implies that most of the time people reproduce 
practices and as such their action goes beyond the conscious level, beyond 
preferences and beyond the attainment of public good.
a Patterns of thinking about intellectual property: The European Commission
Hobbes and Locke in the 17th century asserted that people have a 'natural 
right' to own their creation. In the same spirit, intellectual property rights are 
premised on the romantic notion of inventor and author, who has a moral right on 
her works. Alternatively, economic theory offers a utilitarian perspective by 
drawing attention to the economic incentives that should be provided to inventors.86
85 This view is dose to Boyle's position, see Boyle, J. (1996) Shamans, Software, and Spleens. Law and the 
Construction of Information Society (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press); Boyle, J. (1997) 'A 
politics of intellectual property: Environmentalism for the net' 47 Duke Law Journal 87-106.
86 Landes, W. M. and Posner, R. A. (1989) 'An economic analysis of copyright law' 18 Journal of Legal 
Studies 325-363; Palmer, T. G. (1989) 'Intellectual property: A non-Posnerian law and economics
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I here do not seek to engage in a discussion of the contingent character of 
notions such as author and creator. I am concerned with the ways in which cultural 
understandings about the role of information, innovation and regulatory law 
influence action.87
In the European context, intellectual property rights and innovation are 
understood through the lenses of harmonisation and market integration. Experts, 
the DG Internal Market in our case, focus on the 'knowledge-based' aspects of the 
economy in Europe, and is concerned with
traditional instruments regulating the market, such as harmonising the laws of the 
Member States relating to industrial property rights to avoid barriers to trade. The aim is 
also to create unitary systems for the protection of such rights with Community-wide effect 
through the filing of one single application for protection (Community trade marks, designs 
and patents). The Internal Market DG is also increasingly concerned with ensuring that the
approach' Hamline Law Review 261-304; Netanel, N. W. (1996) 'Copyright and a democratic civil 
society' 106 Yale Law Journal 308-324; Hettingerm E. C. (1989) 'Justifying intellectual property' 18 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 31-52; Croskery, P. (1993) 'Institutional utilitarianism and intellectual 
property' 68 Chicago-Kent Law Review 631-664; Bettig, R. V. (1996) Copyrighting Culture: The Political 
Economy of Intellectual Property (Westview Press), Chapter 4. Drahos, P. (ed) (1999) Intellectual Property 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth/Ashgate); Boyle Shamans, Software, and Spleens ibid, especially see 
Chapters 1-6. For the notion of authorship in general see Foucault, M. (1986) 'What is an author?' in 
Rabinow, P. (ed) (1986) The Foucault Reader (Harmondsworth: Penguin). For anthropological work on 
the construction of IP rights see Bom, G. (1996) '(Im) materiality and sociality: The dynamics of 
intellectual property in a computer software research culture' (1996) 4 Social Anthropology 101-115. 
The author conducted fieldwork in the Institut de Recherche et de Coordination 
Acoustique/Musique, a prestigious computer music research institute in Paris, France to argue that 
the informal ethos regulating life in the institute was collaboration, knowledge sharing and free 
exchange of information, which was nevertheless restricted by security imperatives, informal 
rivalries and researchers' desire for privacy.
87 For works studying the contingency of intellectual property law, for example see Lury, C. (1993) 
Cultural Rights: Technology, Legality Personality (London; New York: Routledge); Rose, M. (1993) 
Authors and Owners. The invention of Copyright (Cambridge: Harvard University Press); Sherman, B. 
and Strowel, A. (eds) (1994) Of Authors and Origins: Essays on Copyright Law (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press); Frow, J. (1998) 'Repetition and limitation: Computer software and copyright law' 29 Screen 4- 
20.
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Single Market functions properly in the Information Society and the fight against 
counterfeiting.88
This is a discourse characterised by the assumption that neutral legal 
expertise is required to pu t the market to work by harmonising national laws, codify 
and objectify practices by means of textual analysis and reliance on a precedent w ith 
a view to promote legal certainty and the rational prediction of outcomes.
Then a set of assumptions is reproduced, which is taken for granted. N ot only 
the concept of romantic inventor, not only the utilitarian logic of economic analysis, 
but also other basic assumptions such as, 'innovation is a good thing,'89 'in high 
evolving markets, firms invest heavily and need to have a return as they undertake 
considerable risks,' 'size matters to make investments.' 'Multinationals, need uniform 
standards, as otherwise the return made to their investment is threatened.'90 'The system has 
become increasingly international and firms have to exploit their rights in a global scale.'91
All these statements are underlined by one basic understanding: The 
commodification of information. As Boyle puts it, 'consciously and unconsciously we
88 http://europa.eu.int/comin/intemal market/en/indprop/overview.htm, (web page visited on 19 
May 2003).
89 Between 1987 and 1997 the American copyright and patent industries increased their output at the 
rate of 5.8 per cent a year compared to 2.8 per cent a year for other industries, and increased the 
number of jobs at 4.0 per cent a year compared to 1.6 per cent in the ordinary economy. Through the 
1990s knowledge-based industry grew twice as fast as service industries overall and four times as fast 
as manufacturing, see Maskus, K. E. (2000) Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy 
(Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics), especially see the Introduction 'The issue is 
bigger than American movies'; Bettig note 86 above.
90 For the role of the firm in modem economies see Hayward, J. E. C. (ed) (1995) Industrial Enterprise 
and European Integration: From National to International Champions in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press).
91 ibid.
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are already developing the language of entitlement for a world in which information—genetic, 
electronic, proprietary—is one of the main sources and forms of wealth.'92
It is interesting to note that interest groups against software patents 
complained that officials at DG Internal Market do not understand their views, as 
they are ill informed with regard to technical matters and tend to substantiate their 
counter-arguments by dwelling onto legal texts while failing to see the political 
implications of w hat they propose.93 Conversely, one official from DG Internal 
Market complained to me that interest groups do not understand legal texts, and 
thus came up with poor proposals.94
Yet, not all services embrace the same assumptions underlying intellectual 
property. In DG Information Society for example, the mission of Unit E2 is to foster 
the deployment of Open Source software aiming at improving competition and providing 
flexibility in the choice of software tools.'95 To this effect, a working group on libre 
software96 was created in 1998.97 Moreover, fostering the development and use of
92 Boyle Shamans, Software, and Spleens note 85 above, Preface. Generally, for the commodification of 
information see Chapters 11-13; Castells, M. (first ed 1996) The Rise of the Network Society (Oxford: 
Blackwell), especially see Chapter 2 "The Informational economy and globalisation.'
93 http://  www.ffii.org/index.en.html, (web page visited on 19 May 2003).
94 Interview with an A5 official DG Internal Market, conducted on 25 January 2002. The same view is 
echoed in the report note 65 above.
95 http://www.cordis.lu/ist/ka4/tesss/home.html, (web page visited on 10 May 2003). As 
mentioned, note 61 above, Aigrain is the Head of Sector.
96 Libre software or free software refers to the freedom to 'redistribute copies, either with or without 
modifications, either gratis or charging a fee for distribution, to anyone anywhere. Being free to do these things 
means (among other things) that you do not have to ask or pay for permission/  
http: /  /  www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html, http: /  /  www.gnu.org/philosophy/ free-software- 
for-freedom.html (web pages visited on 19 May 2003). With open source software, although the 
source code is open it may be that it includes programmes that one can redistribute and copy only for 
non-profit purposes (semi-free software) or can even be prohibited is prohibited from doing so 
without permission (proprietary).
97 http://eu.conecta.it/. (web page visited on 10 May 2003).
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open source software may attract funding under the Information Society 
Technologies Programme (1ST).
Research and technology development projects aiming at free/open source 
software can be submitted to any action line of the 1ST programme. In Chapter III 
we saw that DG Information Society is predom inantly staffed with people who 
worked for the industry. Hence, it appears that this is an interesting example of an 
instance when different patterns of cognition owing their existence to professional 
training prior to joining the European Commission, result in a different appreciation 
of a legal problem.98
It seems that different assumptions underline the approach supporting libre 
software. Innovation is build on top of past innovations. Knowledge is built on top of 
past knowledge. Hence, by means of promoting the creator/inventor dom inant 
conceptualisation we may undervalue the public domain. And by giving monopoly 
rights to established powerful firms, we do not necessarily benefit innovation, 
especially in fast evolving industries.99
98 For the professional persona of DG Information Society, which leads to a different understanding of 
the same legal problem, see Chapter III Section C of this thesis.
99 For this argument see, Boyle Shamans, Software, and Spleens note 85 above. For the problem of 
striking the right balance between access to information and private property see, Netanel, N. W. 
(1996) 'Copyright and a democratic civil society' 106 Yale Law Journal 283-387; Koren, N. E. (1996) 
'Cyberlaw and social change: A democratic approach to copyright' 215 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment 
Law Journal 272-293. A very interesting conference on Public Domain was held by the Duke Law 
School resulting in a series of sceptical articles being published in (2003) 66 Law and Contemporary 
Problems Volumes 1 and 2.
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b Eurolinux alliance
Understanding why interest groups support non-proprietary standards 
entails coming to grips with the history of the development of the Internet. This is 
because one should not forget that the Internet was created by public funds,100 as 
was the first operating system, UNIX, which was m ade available for the cost of 
distribution, having no proprietary settings.
The new technology was acknowledged as providing vast opportunities for 
research and not only the Defence Department bu t also the National Science 
Foundation, research universities and technological think tanks were all fascinated 
by the new technology.101
However, it would be a mistake to believe that the Internet solely grew out of 
the concerted efforts of the above-mentioned institutions. In the US, there were 
groups of individuals who were equally fascinated by the new m edium  and 
therefore worked towards its improvement.
They were called 'hackers' and were to represent a counter-culture, since they 
explored new technologies, shared information and considered the new m edium  as 
a public space that everybody should have access to it. An example of the latter is 
the invention of the modem, created by two Chicago students, Christensen and
100 For an account of the origins of the Internet see Castells, M. (second ed 2000) The Rise of the Network 
Society (Oxford: Blackwell), at p. 351-4; Also see Castells note 49 above. Here the author gives an 
account of the military and scientific underpinnings of the project called APRANET. A network was 
formed that would be decentralised, which in essence meant that in the event of one computer being 
destroyed, data could be still processed by the others.
101 Castells note 49 above, at p. 353.
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Suess, who wanted to find a way to transfer microcomputer programs directly 
through their computers so that they would not travel long distances.
In 1979, the technology was in use and available to everybody at no cost since 
the purpose was to communicate w ith as many people as possible. The modem 
presented a window of opportunity to the computer networks excluded from the 
APRANET, since the latter was only reserved for a few universities.
This was the beginning of the Internet as we know it today, as in 1979, three 
students created a new version of the UNIX protocol, which allowed linking 
computers over the telephone line. USENET was then created, and became the first 
online chat system.
Internet communities were formed and were self-regulated since the 'bad 
electronic citizen' would be punished by the community by sending for example 
hostile messages or bringing his system in standstill. Equally, commercialisation was 
considered unacceptable as the Internet was conceived as a forum  for discussion. 
Finally, the modified Linux operating system software was freely circulated to users, 
since the new software was understood to enhance communication and formed the 
basis for further innovation.102
In the above instances, innovation is not only conceived as being the product 
of scientific research produced in laboratories, bu t also as the result of minor 
modifications introduced in the course of everyday activity, w ith collaboration, 
exchange and experimentation being crucial to this effect.
102 ibid, at p. 353-354.
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Openness and communication are the foundations of the Internet, which 
inherited the rationale that underlined the efforts by the military to create a 
decentralised network, the ethos of academic research and the counter-culture of 
hackers that view it as a unique m edium  of expression and technological 
innovation.103
Claiming that understanding hackers' habitus is im portant for the purposes 
of the present chapter may seem to exaggerate their role in today's mainstream 
Internet culture. Answering this requires looking at ICANN's open elections. This is 
because the person who received the biggest num ber of votes was Andy Mueller- 
M aguhn from Berlin's famed Chaos Computer Club.
In an interview he gave to the Wired Magazine,104 when asked why he 
thought he gathered so many votes, he replied that he believes that it is simply 
because his ideas appeal to Internet communities. According to these, the Internet 
should be conceived as a public space representing a diversity of cultures, since the 
Internet is all about presenting different viewpoints. In the light of the above, points 
to be raised for discussion during ICANN's meetings concerned freedom of speech, 
trademarks, governmental registries such as the fr  name, and freedom of 
information.
Mueller-Maguhn defended hackers, as he claimed that a hacker is 'someone 
who is driven by the motivation to learn and support freedom of information' and as such
103 ibid.
104 Ketmann, S. (2000) 'Proud to represent hackers' Wired News available at www.wired.com, (web 
page visited on 19 May 2003), story published on 19 October 2000.
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should be distinguished from someone who uses technology to engage in actions 
violating law, as for example in the case of online theft. He thus argued that
In Germany, the Chaos Computer Club has quite a long history of exploring 
technologies and showing the risks and possibilities of these technologies to the public. Our 
main emphasis really is freedom of information. After that our main goal is to look at how 
technology affects society, and how the development of technology changes society. We are 
concerned about issues like security, electronic networks, and the promotion and provision of 
freeflows of information.105
4. Regulatory law and the promotion of a culture of discussion
The previous engaged in showing that regulatory law initiated by the 
European Commission should be conceived as a discipline and as a profession, as in 
the conceptions that professionals have of their own activity and as the in ways in 
which these conceptions are reproduced. To this effect, it is im portant to take into 
account the possibility that there may be various different patterns of perception 
operating inside the same field, and that these may be challenged by agents outside 
the field, who, although they inhabit different fields of activity, seek to influence the 
content of regulation.
However, how deep does the challenge go? The European Commission 
emerges as a neutral mediator furnishing the truth of science. Regulatory law and 
policy should be decentralised, procedural and respectful of difference, it should
105 ibid.
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facilitate the inclusion of interest groups, help create a thriving civil society, sustain 
social capital by means of promoting networks and forums for discussion. A culture 
of discussion based on the ethos of consensus building is emerging and is being 
assisted by neutral mediation and expertise provision.
Yet, why is it normal to require the building of consensus? Even interest 
groups complaining about their voice not being heard or not even being included 
and denying the possibility of procedures and expertise being neutral, do not 
question the merits of discussion and consensus building.106
The belief that seems to go unchallenged is the one that sustains confidence in 
the idea that regulatory law produced by the European administration should be 
concerned with efficiency and not w ith what is right and w hat is wrong, promoting 
order and harmony by means of promoting discussion.107
Regulatory law seems to be performing its tasks by promoting harmonious 
co-existence in a society by bringing together interest groups in a forum of 
discussion, it being a sign of civilisation.108 Nevertheless, how civilised can a
106 Habermas supports the argument that the debate surrounding the problem of legitimacy of the EU 
is anchored in a conceptualisation of politics organised around the state. However, if one does away 
with such an understanding of political participation to understand it around the direct participation 
of associations, then the interesting question would concern the creation of conditions for genuine 
political discussion and engagement. For a simple elaboration of his position see Habermas, J. (1995) 
'Remarks on Dieter Grimm's "Does Europe need a Constitution?"' 1 European Law Journal 301-307. 
Also see Habermas, J. (1989) The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge: Polity).
107 The same thoughts are expressed by Nader discussing conflict resolution, see Nader, L. (2002) 
'Controlling processes. Tracing the dynamic components of power' in M. Mundy (ed), Law and 
Anthropology (Aldershot, Burlington, USA: Ashgate/Dartmouth), at p. 161-162. Also see Nader, L. 
(1990) Harmony Ideology (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
108 ibid 'Controlling processes' at p. 163, making the argument that there is a social and legal 
evolution taking place shifting the focus from courts and justice to harmony and dispute resolution 
processes, which is thought to be a sign of civilisation. The author makes reference to anthropological
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discussion be? How much unuttered by power relations? And why is it to the 
interest of everybody to find an acceptable solution to a problem?
Still, it appears it is to the 'interest' of everybody to create a harmonious civil 
society, w ith interest groups trying to redefine the content of regulatory law and the 
European Commission maximising its role as a major think tank.109 Hence, the 
process is also characterised by the merits of consensus: The tacit recognition to play 
the game is that discussion provides the way out of, for example, technological 
dystopia, and helps build a progressive new society.
Efforts to create a global information society, in the form of a sustainable 
society adequately balancing economic, social and cultural concerns by means of 
promoting public-private co-operation and consensus building, reflect this 
approach.
Still, employing regulatory law to neutrally mediate and maximise social 
capital, is a process that does tell right from wrong as it promotes the vision of socio­
political harmony, the avoidance of conflict, the taming of individual pathos 
(cracking software codes?) on the basis of the existing corpus of legal doctrine and 
practice, w ith a view to ultimately build the perfect polis accommodating 
everybody's interests.110
Very importantly, it is a system promoting the virtues of belonging to groups 
and networks and adhering to their codes of practice, as it then that your voice as a
work in negotiation by Gulliver, see Gulliver, P. H. (1979) Disputes and Negotiations: A  Cross-Cultural 
Perspective (New York: Academic Press).
^  See for example http://www.irc.es/iptsreport/vol32/english/ISS2E326.htm. (web page visited on 19 May 2003).
110 On similar thoughts concerning the ethos of dispute resolution see Nader note 107 above.
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citizen is heard. In these instances regulatory procedures facilitate belonging to a 
group as a means of promoting our selves and our political being.
How did consensus become the cornerstone of our social and political 
thinking? What are the problems of the requirement to belong to groups and 
networks in order to have our voice heard? Although action based on it is important, 
as the opposite would result in oppressive action, can we discard the possibility that 
it results in political normalisation, as Foucault pointed out?111 This is why the 
im portant thing is to invent modes for political participation, safeguarding 
difference.112 Yet, is this really the case in the attem pt to create a sustainable 
information society in Europe?
111 Foucault, M. (1997) 'Interview with M. Foucault: Problems, politics and problematisations' in 
Rabinow, P. (ed) (1997) Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Volume I 
(New York: New Press).
112 Haber, H. F. (1994) Beyond Post-Modern Politics: Lyotard, Rortry, Foucault (New York: Routledge), at 
p. 82; Foucault ibid.
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D. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter concentrated on the ways in which social capital may be 
maximised. The notion of social capital denotes that its maximisation is a strategy 
amongst others, aiming at creating networks to advance common purposes, but also 
provides the theoretical tools to explore problems of structural asymmetries in such 
networks and differences in patterns of cognition amongst groups who participate 
in the creation of a sustainable civil society. Against this background, Bourdieu can 
provide the theoretical tools to explain distrust resulting in problematic consensus 
building.
This chapter followed this intuition in the context of the proposal to introduce 
patent protection in computer-implemented inventions in the EU. In a nutshell, the 
proposition is that m inds are socially constructed and social capital has to be 
appreciated through them. Having said this, there is not a single pattern of 
perception for all agents in the European Commission. Structural patterns of 
thinking about the social world may be derived from 'lawyer thinking' and as such 
promote harmonisation, legal certainty and continuity.
Alternatively, they may be based on professional background, and as such 
reproduce different understandings with regard to the legal/illegal taxonomy, 
closer to the needs of the industry. Moreover, it can be that minds coincide w ith 
structures and reproduce its basic operating principle, neutrality and objectivity for 
the sake of impartially. Or it may be that minds accept the merits of discussion and 
consensus building.
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Finally, habitus may emerge at the conscious level and become a strategy. 
This is what happened in the case of the habitus of dependency and compromise 
when the insider/outsider taxonomy was challenged by interest groups, which 
demanded their views to be taken into account when decisions are taken.
Nevertheless, insiders neither have the same am ounts of power (capital) nor 
the same way of perceiving and appreciating social problems. As for the problem of 
diverse structural patterns, the focus of the previous analysis was on showing that 
interest groups were very active in forming an alliance, which supported a vision of 
free information and non-proprietary standards. This vision can be understood if 
reference is made to the first steps of the development of the Internet to see that it 
was actually built on the need to have free flows of information and speech, hence 
the different structural patterns challenging the orthodoxy in the field.
The social capital of these interest groups lies on that there is a new approach 
in the EU, which supports the effective engagement of NGOs in the policy process in 
order to create a European civil society. Moreover, the expert knowledge that these 
groups have adds weight to their opinion, since they have been so far able to 
circumvent controls opposing the Internet culture,113 and come up with proposals 
due to their ability to understand technical issues and identify problems.
Conflicts for them involve maximising the existing capital, and pushing for 
new definitions as to the proper role of information and property. In a nutshell,
113 See Chapter IV Section C on architectural solutions introduced by the industry in DVDs.
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conflicts are generated by differences in views between their position and 
orthodoxy.
In the case of business interests, the European Commission, government 
officials and patent lawyers, they represent the orthodoxy in the field, endorsing 
assumptions locating the innovator at the centre of the innovation process and 
market integration. As for the European Commission in particular, structural 
patterns of cognition are underlined by practices pointing to harmonisation, 
codification and successful market integration, while the proprietary understanding 
of information is viewed as driving markets and m arket integration.
The taken for granted assumptions being reproduced by means of the above 
practices include the understanding that firms, in other words the innovator, are 
central in the course of innovation (as opposed to assumptions that situate the 
exchange of information at the heart of the innovation process).
As for the resources available to interest groups in the alliance supporting 
software patents, they have im portant social, economic and symbolic capital. Social 
capital has a multiplication effect on other forms of capital, while economic capital is 
being converted to symbolic, by means of sustaining the orthodox definitions of 
property and innovation.
As for political and economic capital, patent experts working at the EPO or in 
the legal departments of large IT companies come from a group with im portant
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economic resources. Moreover, firms lobbying for software patents include IBM, 
Siemens, Nokia, Thomson and Alcatel and powerful professional associations.114
On this basis, the nine per cent of the respondents to the consultation who 
supported the patentability of software, were thought to be an 'economic majority/  
despite the fact that critics have noted that the European Commission should take 
into account the fact that the most innovative software in Europe competing w ith 
Microsoft is being developed outside these large companies. Economic capital is 
converted into organisational, social and symbolic capital, the latter maintaining the 
belief in the role of big businesses in sustaining global competitiveness.
In view of the above, power asymmetries and conflicts between orthodox and 
heterodox cognitive schemas characterise the maximisation of social capital. Since 
this is the form of capital at the heart of any attem pt to build a sustainable 
information society, it seems that the process of creating a true forum for discussion 
is not spread with roses.
114 On these issues see Aigrain note 61 above, especially see the section Who controls and what drives the 
European Patent Office? In this section, Aigrain asks: 'Now where does the EPO (like most patent offices) get 
its money from? Not at all from public funding. A  predominant part of its resources are generated by 
maintenance fees on patents in force, and most of the rest from application fees. The European Patent Office is 
an incredibly profitable organisation. Its operating surplus in 2000 is 284 million DEM, 20% of its operating 
income. This is almost Microsoft-level performance, and allows the EPO to have a staff growth of 10% per year, 
no doubt opening the way to further growth.'
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Appendix 1
FFII European Software Patent Company Statistics
Rank Company Number of Patents Rank Company
Number of 
Patents
1 IBM (US) 1842 25
PIONEER
ELECTRONIC CORP 
(JP)
161
2 CANON KK (JP) 1364 26 THOMSON CSF (FR) 154
3 SIEMENS AG (DE) 1104 27 MINNESOTA MINING & MFG (US) 152
4 SONY CORP (JP) 1069 28
KONINKL PHILIPS 
ELECTRONICS NV 
(NL)
144
5 NIPPON ELECTRIC CO (JP) 874 29 BOSCH GMBH ROBERT (DE) 138
6 FUJITSU LTD (JP) 742 30
SGSTHOMSON
MICROELECTRONICS
(FR)
137
7 TOKYO SHIBAURA ELECTRIC CO (JP) 706 31 GEN ELECTRIC (US) 128
S MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC IND CO LTD (JP) 626 32 FANUC LTD (JP) 127
9 HEWLETT PACKARD CO (US) 504 33 ERICSSON TELEFON AB L M (SE) 119
10 HITACHI LTD (JP) 495 34 GRUNDIG EMV (DE) 117
11 AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH (US) 474 35 NCR CO (US) 113
12 SHARP KK (JP) 375 36 OKI ELECTRIC IND CO LTD (JP) 113
13 EASTMAN KODAK CO (US) 351 37 ALCATEL NV (NL) 112
14 XEROX CORP (US) 342 38 HONEYWELL INC (US) 112
15 MITSUBISHI ELECTRIC CORP (JP) 340 46
THOMSON BRANDT 
GMBH (DE) 97
16 DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORP (US) 330 47 TEKTRONIX INC (US) 95
17 PHILIPS NV (NL) 316 48 CASIO COMPUTER CO LTD (JP) 94
18 PHILIPS CORP (US) 299 49 SANYO ELECTRIC CO (JP) 94
19 MOTOROLA INC (US) 298 50
ANT
NACHRICHTENTECH
(DE)
90
20 ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES INC (US) 252
Total in
Top50:
16513
21 HONDA MOTOR CO LTD (JP) 217
22 FUJI PHOTO FILM CO LTD (JP) 201
23 HUGHES AIRCRAFT CO (US) 198
24 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC (US) 174
Note: Although it is difficult to estimate exactly from published figures, the FFII produced figures 
based on patent databases, which show that 50 companies hold 43 per cent of 38852 EPO software- 
related patents, and the top-10 companies hold 24 per cent.
Source: http://swpat.1Tii.org/vreii/pikta/perled/app s ta t.h tm l.
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Appendix 2
European Research Advisory Board (EURAB) Members
AMANCIO Lfgia Prof.
Associate Professor of Social Psychology
Instituto Superior de Ciencias do Trabalho e de Emresa Portugal
ARNON Ruth Prof. Professor of Immunology, Weizmann Institute of Science Israel
BANDA Enric Prof. Secretary General of the European Science Foundation (ESF) France 
BLASI Paolo Prof. Professor of Physics, University of Florence Italy
BREDAS Jean-Luc Prof.
Professor of Chemistry, University of Arizona (USA) & University of Mons (Belgium)
BUYS Charles Prof.
Professor of Human Genetics & Chairman of the Dept, of Medical Genetics,
University of Groningen
Head of Dept, of Clinical Genetics, Academic Hospital Groningen The Netherlands 
BYRNE Gerry Prof.
Head of Department of Mechanical Engineering, University College Dublin 
Ireland
CESARSKY Catherine Dr. Director General of the European Southern Observatory (ESO) Germany
DAVIES Graham Prof. Head of International Relations, BT Exact Technologies United Kingdom
DEN BERG Ellen Dr. Director of R&D and Technology, DSM Fine Chemicals The Netherlands
DEKKER Jan Alexander Mr President, Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO)
The Netherlands
GRIMSON Jane Prof. Dean of Engineering & System Science and Co-chair of the Center for Health Informatics, 
Trinity College Dublin Ireland
HAEMERS Guy Dr. Corporate Vice-President, Bekaert Advanced Materials Belgium
HALLIDAY Ian Prof. Chief Executive of the Particle Physics & Astronomy Research Council United Kingdom
HATZOPOULOS Miltiades Prof. Director of the Research Center for Greek & Roman Antiquity 
National Hellenic Foundation
ILLNEROVA Helena Prof. President of the Czech Academy of Sciences Associate Professor in Dept, of 
Evolutionary Biology & Comparative Physiology, Charles University Czech Republic
JASKULKE Elizabeth Ms. Responsable de la "Cellule lie de France" - Eau et Force, filiale de la 
Lyonnaise des Eaux France
JEPSEN Maria Kristina Ms. Senior Researcher, European Trade Union Institute Belgium
KORADECKA Danuta Prof. Professor of Medical Sciences Director, Central Institute for Labour Protection 
Poland
KROO Norbert Prof. Secretary General of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Hungary 
KUUSI Eino Juhani Prof. Dr. Senior Vice President, Nokia Corporation Finland 
LIST Helmut Mr. Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, AVL List GmbH Austria
MAjO CRUZAT Joan Dr. Former Minister of Industry and Energy Chairman of the European Institute for the 
Media (Diisseldorf) Vice Chairman, La Seda de Barcelona, S.A. Spain
MEGIE Gerard Prof. President of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) Professor at the
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Universite Pierre et Marie-Curie (Paris) France
MIRDAL Gretty Prof. Professor of Transcultural Clinical Psychology, University of Copenhagen Denmark
MORAIS Carlos Campos Prof. President of the National Institute for Engineering and Industrial Technology 
Portugal
MULET Juan Prof. Director General, Cotec Foundation for Technological Innovation Spain
NEHER Erwin Prof.Director of the Membrane Biophysics Dept. Max-Planck-Institut fur Biophysikalische 
Chemie Germany
NEUMANN Rainer Dr. Head of Trade Promotion Department Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks 
Germany
NOWOTNY Helga Prof. Professor of Philosophy and Social Studies of Science Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology Director Collegium Helveticum Switzerland
OQUIST Gunnar Prof. Professor of Plant Physiology, University of Umei Sweden
OTTOLINI Enrico Dr. Director Manager, Associazione Piccole e Medie Industrie (Varese) Italy
ROSTRUP-NIELSEN Jens Dr. Director of Research & Development Division Member of Executive Board, Haldor 
Topsoe A/S Denmark
RUBS AMEN-WAIGMANN Helga Prof. Dr. Director, Antiviral Research, Bayer AG Germany SAMUELS Gill Dr. 
Senior Director, Science Policy & Scientific Affairs -  Europe Pfizer Global Research & Development United 
Kingdom
SCHLEICH Amo Mr. former President, Deloitte and Touche (Luxembourg) Luxembourg
SCHMIDT Arnold Prof. President of the Austrian Science Research Fund Chairman of the Institut fur Photonik, 
Technical University Vienna Austria
SERREAULT Brigitte Ms. Senior Coordinator, Industrial, Research & Technology Directorate, European 
Aeronautics, Space and Defence Company (EADS) France
SOBOLL Horst Dr. Director, Research Policy, DaimlerChrysler AG Germany
TARRACH Rolf Prof. President of the Spanish Council for Scientific Research Professor of Theoretical Physics, 
University of Barcelona Spain
TZAVARAS Yannis V. Dr. General Manager for Research & Development, Intracom Greece
UGGERI Fulvio Dr. Director, Milano Research Centre, Bracco S.p.A. Italy
VIHKO Reijo Prof. President & Director General of the Academy of Finland, Finland
WALL0E Lars Prof. President of the Norwegian Academy of Sciences & Letters Professor of Physiology, Faculty 
of Medicine, University of Oslo Research Director at the Institute of Marine Research (Bergen) Norway
W1TTLOV Ame Dr. Executive Vice President, AB Volvo Sweden_________________________________________
Source: European Commission - Research Directorate-General. L ast update: 25 September 2001.
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Appendix 3
1ST Programme Committee ISTC -Information Society Technologies
AUSTRIA BELGIUM BULGARIA CYPRUS CZECH
Mr Reinhard Ms Claudine Mr Ivan TAUSHANOV Mr Marios D. REPUBLIC
GOEBL BELLEFLAMME Committee of Posts and DIKAIAKOS Professor Jiri
Bundesministeriu SSTC T elecommunications, Dept, of Computer ZLATUSKA
m fur 6 Gurko Str., Science, Masaryk
Wissenschaft und Mr Karel GOOSSENS University of Cyprus, University CE
Verkehr IWT Mr Kiril BOYANOV Rector,
Helsinki University of Mr Sophocles Zerotinovo nam.
Mr Otto Dr. Baudouin JAMBE Technology HADJSOPHOCLEOUS Dr. Jiri KADLEC
PEPERNA Minist£re de la Region Telecommunications Cyprus The Institute of
Bundesministeriu Wallone, Software and Multi- T elecommunica tions Information
m fur Directeur Generale des Media Authority, Theory and
wirtschaftliche Technologies, de la Automation
Angelegenheiten Recherche et de
Abt. l™Energie,
IX/B/12
Stubenring 1
DENMARK UNITED KINGDOM FINLAND FRANCE NETHERLANDS
Mr Holger Mr Patrick MC DONALD Mr Kari TILLI Mr Alain BRENAC Mr Wim VAN
RASMUSSEN Department of Trade and Director Ministry of Research T'HOF
Ministry of Industry (DTI) (Telecommunications alain.brenac@technolog Ministry of
Research and I Mr Alun and ies.go Economic Affairs
Bredgade 43 GERMANDepartment of Electronics), TEKES, uv.fr Mr Gijs VAN
Trade and National Technology Mr Patrick DERSTARRE
Mr Jimmy Industry (DTI) Agency, SCHOULLER Ministry of
ROSENBERG Mr Martin BOYLE Kari.Tilli@tekes.fi Minist&re de Education,
National Telecom Department of Trade and Ms. Annu JYLHA- l™Economie, des Culture &
Agency Industry (DTI) PYYKONEN Finances et de Science,
Mr David ALLEN Senior Advisor, l™Industrie
Mr Kristian Department of Trade and Department for
STUBKJAER Industry (DTI) Education &
Technical Mr Christopher Science Policy,
University of MATTEWS Ministry for Education,
Denmark Department of Trade and
Research Industry (DTI)
Centre Committee Ms Margaret DENNIS 
Department of Trade and
Ms. Anu Industry (DTI)
LAMBERG
Technology
Counsellor,
TEKES, National
Technology
Agency,
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GERMANY Mr Gunther FREY Mr Ralf FRANKE GREECE NORWAY
Mr Klaus Hessisches Ministerium Federal Ministry of Mr Pavlo SPIRAKIS Mr. Tron
SCHUTZ fur Economics and University of Patras, ESPELLI
DLR; PT-IT Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Technology Dep. of Comp. Science Advisor,
Linder Hohe Landesentwicklung SWEDEN and Engineering Industry and
Mr. Friedhelm Dr.DirkPETRAT Mr Olof SANDBERG Mr E. SPITHAS Energy Division,
GILLESSEN C/o der Senator fiir Desk Officer, General Secretariat for The Research
DLRe.V./PT of Wirtschaft und Haefen Ministry of Industry, Research and Council of
BMBF Zweite Schlachtpforte 3 Employment and Technology Norway,
Linder Hohe ISRAEL Communications, ITALY Mr. PSl
DCE 51147 Koln Mr Myer MORRON S-10333 Stockholm Mr Franco DENOTH GRETLAND
Mr R. ISERD Istituto per le Ministry of Trade
HOCHREITER Mr Dan Mr Karl-EINAR Applicazioni and
Federal Ministry SHKLARSKYNational SJODIN Telematiche, Industry
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0  Voltaire! O humaneness! O nonsense!
There is something about 'truth,' about the search for truth; 
and when a human being is too human about it -  
'il ne cherche le vrai que pourfaire le bien -
1 bet he finds nothing.
Friedrich Nietzsche Beyond Good an Evil: 35.
Information travels freely. It is a valuable commodity. It empowers people. 
Such rhetoric underlined the effort to create the information society in Europe by 
means of opening up and integrating markets, and harmonising laws. Fostering 
innovation is at the heart of relevant efforts, as it results in better transmitting and 
manipulating information, while the Internet in particular bears w ith it the promise 
of profitable business, technological experimentation, political emancipation and 
communication amongst global networks.
This thesis concentrated on information society regulation initiated by the 
European Commission, w ith special emphasis on Internet regulation. The latter, due 
to its decentralised character, presents an example of efforts to adopt reflexive 
regulatory instruments allowing for heterarchical, decentred regulation, respectful of
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difference, inscribed in the codes of conduct of interest groups and networks of 
actors, and sympathetic to building forums of discussion.
Having focused on the processes of forming legislative proposals and 
implementing laws, the question addressed in this thesis was: What is the role of 
regulatory law in the process? An analysis inspired by systems theory would say 
that regulatory law is neutral and objective. Institutionalists would argue that 
regulatory law is a structure constraining action, co-existing w ith other multiple 
norms regulating life.
An internal to law analysis would consider regulatory law as being initiated 
by a regulator detached from the social milieu, working in the name of a public 
good. A market failure perspective would come to grips w ith regulatory law as 
being engaged in the efficient management of markets, while functionalists would 
think of it as serving a European ideology.
Contrary to all of the above approaches, the purpose of this thesis was to look 
at the role of regulatory law with a view to question the feasibility of designing 
forums for discussion by means of flexible instruments and the possibility of putting 
in place neutral procedures in the course of initiating proposals and implementing 
laws relating to the regulation of information society in Europe.
To this effect, I injected agency in my analysis, but I did away with the limits 
of intentionality. I looked at the operating parameters particular to a field with a 
juridical character, thus giving an 'internal' to the legal system account, while 
simultaneously took into account the specific 'interests' of agents striving to
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influence the content of regulation. Finally, I placed the notion of power at the heart 
of my analysis, hence the focus on the ways the exercise of power is reconfigured. 
The following will consolidate the basic points that emerged in the discussion of this 
thesis.
1. Agents, civil servants working fo r the European Commission are not profit
maximising agents engaged in a problem-solving exercise, but strive to reproduce 
forms o f power, capital, characteristic o f a particular field  at a particular time and 
place.
I employed Bourdieu's framework to conceptualise the formation of 
regulatory proposals and implementation of laws as a process in the course of which 
various DGs of the European Commission strive to maximise their position as a 
major think tank, continuity, power, status, in a way compatible to institutionalised 
practices an d /o r individual cognitive understandings, while caught in interaction 
with other agents inhabiting different fields of activity. This is a process requiring 
the maximisation of juridical, informational/technocratic, social and symbolic capital.
Juridical capital signifies the power to tell right from wrong by means of 
fitting the social world in legal categories. Forming a legislative proposal is an 
exercise predominantly concerned with this kind of power, as it requires the ability 
to be able to translate information in meaningful legal agreements, which further 
involves mastering the art of arranging a social problem in such a way that it is
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incorporated in the body of existing legal texts, so as to preserve the continuity of 
legal arguments deriving their basis from legal codes and cases.
Informational/technocratic capital signifies the power to collect and treat 
information according to classifications inscribed in law, such as age and sex, and 
through bureaucratic procedures. The concentration of this form of capital is crucial 
so that juridical capital effectively fits the social world in legal categories and 
ultimately imposes common forms of division, forms of thinking and forms of 
classification.
The latter point links to symbolic capital: Accumulating and preserving 
symbolic capital, consisting of the power to shape mainstream understandings, is of 
major importance in a field w ith a juridical element such as the field of the EU 
administration, since then the faith in the neutrality and objectivity of law is 
preserved, the latter being an operating principle.
Forging social networks is meant to assist the maximisation of informational 
capital and juridical capital, as, to form laws, information is required in order to 
come up with concrete proposals, and this can only be furnished by interested 
parties.
This is especially true in the case of the European Commission, since the 
stocks of juridical capital of the European Commission are not high due to the new 
forms of decentralised regulation and due to the structural organisation of the EU 
political system characterised by the dispersion of political power amongst many 
institutions and agents. Therefore, the European Commission can avoid potential
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conflicts in the implementation phase by means of early bargaining and dialogue, 
and in this instance social capital is converted into juridical and informational capital.
To illustrate the above process, in the case of the proposal to introduce patent 
protection in computer-implemented inventions, the European Commission 
preserved/accum ulated juridical capital by means of forming a legislative proposal, 
which sought to include certain types of software, computer-implemented 
inventions, in the subject matter of patent law. By categorising such inventions as 
subject to patent protection, a social problem, innovation and how it should be 
promoted, is being fit in existing legal categories and requirements.
Computer-implemented inventions are not thought to be literary works 
anymore, but, shifting the focus of the analysis from the notion of author to the 
notion of invention, different rules apply as to w hat constitutes fair use and illegal 
copying. The decision to propose a change of legal regime governing such 
inventions is based on the translation in legal language of how software works by 
means of employing terms, such as technical field and field of technology, which 
acquire meaning in the light of legal precedent and existing interpretations of legal 
codes, a process aiming at guaranteeing continuity and legal certainty.
Therefore, a retranslation of meaning is taking place when a person trained in 
law tries to understand the function of software in order to fit it in legal categories. 
In this instance, technocratic/informational capital is crucial and consists of 
collecting information, (number of software patents granted by the EPO, innovation 
indexes in European countries and the USA, studies on the effects of patents), since,
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by means of accumulating it, the European Commission is in a position to form 
informed proposals.
Collecting information can also be done by means of consulting interested 
parties, thus gathering a wide array of views and arguments coming from the 
everyday experience of software developers. The latter can also be seen in the 
context of maximising social capital. Forging networks and creating forums of 
discussion is im portant, as interests can be accommodated at an early stage and thus 
conflicts can be avoided when the Directive is read by the Council and the 
Parliament.
This was especially im portant in the case of the proposal to introduce patents 
in computer-implemented inventions in the EU, not only because of the contentious 
nature of the proposal, bu t also because of the fact that software developers are well 
organised in professional associations, and of the symbolic character of the Internet 
as a place for technological experimentation.
The maximisation of symbolic capital underlines all the above instances, since 
the European Commission is viewed as furnishing the truth of scientific information 
and a framework of objective legal rules neutrally aiming at harmonising national 
laws and integrating markets in Europe, losing sight of the assumptions 
encapsulating in rules and data, them being the product of history.
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2. Although it would be within agents’ intention to design neutral rules and within 
regulatory law’s original function to promote participation and deliberation, law 
encapsulates a vision that outruns its function and agents perceive the social world in 
a way that outruns perception.
This argum ent here was that common, often unspoken, ways of thinking 
about the social world are always encapsulated in legal texts, binding or not. How 
value neutral are software filters and w hat is harmful material? Some interest 
groups believe that communication on the net should not be monitored, bu t the 
Safer Internet Action plan in Europe does not embrace this approach. Thus, the mere 
choice to promote filters and steer activity to this direction, even by means of soft 
law, is loaded with options as to the form our communication on the net should 
take, and excludes alternative visions.
Be it in the promotion of filters, in the context of implementing the 
Framework Programme funding European projects, or in the drafting of the 
proposal introducing patent protection in computer-implemented inventions, the 
European Commission maximises its capital. However, capital only presents 
potentialities, which have to be appreciated through minds, through cognitive 
taxonomies developed in the course of upbringing and interacting in particular 
settings.
These modes of perception and appreciation are termed by Bourdieu as 
habitus. Action then is understood as being both in bodies, (habitus, dispositions)
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and in institutions (fields, spaces of positions), overcoming the dichotomy of action 
and structure.
In other words, maximising and preserving capital is not an automatic 
process. It has to be first appreciated by agents' minds. Professionals in the field 
possess cognitive schemas through which the potentialities inscribed in the forms of 
capital identified in the field have to be appreciated. Such classificatory schemes 
may owe their existence to professional background and nationality for example. 
They may also become institutionalised in whole Units or DGs.
Hence the differences in view amongst DGs, leading to a hierarchical system 
within the field w ith different approaches competing with each other. Therefore, the 
initiation of regulation by the EU administration is the outcome of the competition 
amongst the various DGs of the European Commission for the monopoly of the 
right to form legislative proposals and implement laws.
Professional habitus
To illustrate the above, in the case of competition law enforcement, DGs 
seemed to have a different view as to w hat is the 'correct' and 'authorised' 
interpretation of legal texts, thus revealing a picture different than the one 
propagated by the principle of collegiality. A confrontation occurs amongst these 
actors, with regard to the technical competence to interpret a corpus of legal texts 
and collect the information necessary to conduct reliable assessments, as to w hat
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kind of legislation is required and w hat would be the efficient execution of the 
m andate of a law.
For example, DG Information Society and DG Research are viewed as being 
the most collusive with big business, in contrast to DG Competition, which is 
considered a 'liberal' DG.
This may be attributed to that a big num ber of the officials of DG Information 
Society has a scientific background, as they have been trained as electronic or 
telecommunication engineers. Moreover, many of them have worked both in the 
industry and in national administrative systems. Therefore, they feel that they are 
close to lobbyists, as they speak the same 'scientific language' w ith national groups 
affected by the Research and Development policies of the European Commission. 
Hence, these officials regard themselves as mediators.
As for DG Competition, it is overpopulated by lawyers and had many 
German Director Generals. Moreover, DG Competition appeared to be of particular 
importance to the German Government. One reason to explain this may be that 
competition law has always been viewed by the Germans as being of prime 
importance to the functioning of open markets, as it was thought to safeguard 
against the abuses of both private and public power.
To this effect, many Germans were influential during the early steps of the 
European Union in laying the foundations of competition law, although the latter 
was not thought to have its own raison d’etre, bu t would collapse in the realm of
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industrial policy in other countries participating in the creation of a common market 
in Europe.
In view of the above, differences in approach were revealed between DG 
Competition and DG Information Society, when the latter strongly favoured a 
proposed joint venture (JV), the MSG Media Services GmbH, as it considered it to be 
a player capable of competing internationally, while DG Competition sought to 
prohibit it.
The same kind of tensions was manifested in the course of negotiating the 
content of the file 'Attacks against Information Systems.' While DG Information Society 
argued that it was im portant to compromise the needs of interested parties with the 
requirements to enforce law in an environment often described as a Virtual Wild 
West, DG Justice and Home Affairs adopted a purely internal to law analysis.
The legal habitus
What is more natural for someone with legal training than the belief that the 
legal system and legal institutions are effective? Or that social problems can 
effectively, neutrally and objectively be solved by recourse to legal texts and 
precedent? However, in this instance agents lose sight of the set of assumptions 
reproduced in such documents, such as the importance of innovation.
Tracing the history of the information society in Europe is im portant in order 
to come to grips w ith the contingency of understandings such as neutral procedures, 
innovation and market integration, as these are thought to emerge as a result of
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specific socio-historical conditions. For example, the experience of the industrial 
revolution fed into various theoretical frameworks, which understood innovation as 
going hand in hand w ith socio-economic prosperity.
The foundational days of the EU understood the role of the European 
Commission as in interest intermediation and expertise provision. The ordoliberal 
framework provided an understanding of law as being neutral, indirectly 
intervening to balance private and public power, and placed competition law at the 
heart of the effort to regulate markets.
These understandings are carried over to the present days in the 
conceptualisation of regulatory law as indirectly intervening in open markets and as 
protecting against the abuse of private power, and of the European Commission as a 
neutral regulator promoting the merits of discussion in forums. The legal form 
disguises the effects of power, as it gives neutrality, objectivity and universality in 
the assumptions reproduced in a legal text, and a civil servant forming legal 
arguments loses sight of his central role in reproducing the social world.
Multiple habitus
We saw so far that there is not a single pattern for appreciating the social 
world. Agents have many roles available to them, multiple classificatory schemes. In 
addition to the ones already mentioned, another pattern of perception emerges in 
the context of the habitus of dependency and compromise. This is a classificatory scheme 
pointing to the powerful insider/outsider taxonomy and cohesion in a group.
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As for cohesion, this was understood by means of uncovering practices which 
'tie' members of a group together, by means of creating relations where the one is 
dependent on the other in order to do a job, create a good reputation, maintain social 
face, acquire recognition. To this effect, I looked at practices, such as promotion, 
working on shared files and participating in committees, in order to argue that 
people working for the European Commission have to take others into account, and 
this is why they are a distinctive group, not because they serve some common ideals.
This means that building networks of people is im portant inside the 
European Commission, as the arguments in a legal file are the result of the complex 
interaction amongst many persons. Such interaction may be successful, or less 
successful, depending on how contentious a legal file is, bu t is underlined by certain 
understandings, particular norms of conduct, as to how things are get done inside 
the European Commission. These norms regulate life inside DGs and further give 
meaning as to how an insider is expected to act in order to be successful.
3. Habitus is subject to experience: Challenging patterns o f praxis
The notion of capital presents us w ith potentialities inscribed in formal 
structures, in the sense that it has to be appreciated by hum an minds before being 
actualised. In this way, power is analysed as in the way it is communicated and 
manifested in social relations, and not as a component of structures.
In this sense, Bourdieu's conceptualisation of capital and power follows 
Nietzsche's understanding that any relevant analysis should never concentrate on
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power in potentia, bu t should be concerned with w hat power can do when exercised. 
The crucial question then is not who has power, bu t how, how much and why 
power is exercised, as it is then that the possibility is always left open that power 
relations can be subjected to critique.
Challenging the insider/outside taxonomy
Interest groups dem anding their inclusion in the decision-making process 
have challenged the powerful insider/outsider taxonomy encapsulated in the habitus 
of dependency and compromise. Dependency and compromise denotes that people 
working for the European Commission have to co-exist. It occurs as a result of the 
need to collect information, identify social problems, draft legal proposals offering 
solutions and efficiently implementing laws. This is w hat underlines the workings of 
every administration and manifests itself as a basic operating practice.
However, it acquires particular meaning in the context of dependency and 
compromise, in other words in the context of the meaning attributed to who is an 
insider and who is an outsider, and this is why there is a 'European administration' or 
a 'European way of doing things/  in other words a European way of identifying 
problems, collecting information and categorising.
The meaning attributed to the insider /outsider taxonomy is characterised by 
the inclusion of interest groups and the creation of forums of discussion. The 
European Commission is being directly approached by interest groups and 
commentators have noted that it acts as a 'broker' seeking access to specialised
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knowledge. The European Round Table of Industrialists and the CyberCrime Forum 
are a good examples of the above trends, as forums of discussion are organised with 
a view to create a sustainable information society promoting an ethos of consensus 
and intermediation.
Challenging the juridico-administrative habitus
The juridico-administrative element of the field implies that the assumptions 
encapsulated in a legal text acquire universality and neutrality, as if the logic of their 
production is purely internal to a body of legal doctrine. However, to take the 
example of intellectual property, the very assumptions underpinning it concern, for 
a start, the role of property. It is assumed to be one of the cornerstones of liberal 
markets and the law is meant to protect it.
Intellectual property is further assumed to prom ote the importance of the 
innovator in the proper functioning of the economy. However, this does not mean 
that there are no alternative conceptualisations of how the economy in general and a 
liberal economy in particular could function. And there is certainly not one way to 
'design' the information society in Europe.
This is why the process of building a sustainable information society is hotly 
debated, as the dominant taxonomies inscribed in power relations inside the field 
are challenged by interest groups willing to influence the content of regulation. 
These groups bring with them social capital, as the new EU approach to governance
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supports the effective engagement of NGOs in the policy process in order to create a 
European civil society.
Moreover, the expert knowledge that these groups have adds weight to their 
opinion, since they have been so far able to circumvent controls opposing the 
Internet culture, and come up with concrete technical proposals, on the basis of 
which they try to influence regulation.
Capital and objective potentialities are subject to the common way of doing 
things, the taken for granted views of the world. Interest groups bring with them 
new definitions as to notions such as public domain, property, innovation and 
information. Open source and libre software developers believe that innovation and 
information should be shared, allowing for technological experimentation and 
public discussion, especially in the case of technologies running as fast as software. 
They promote a vision of knowledge as being built on top of past knowledge, hence, 
sharing is the prerequisite for truly innovative projects.
4. Such an approach implies an analysis that focuses on the becoming of the construction of 
visions o f the social world that legitimise change and the role o f objective positions and 
agents ’ dispositions in this process. Hence, regulatory law can never be neutral, but 
encapsulates a vision. It can never be static, but is constantly subject to transformation 
manifesting a temporary crystallisation of power relations. It is neither the product o f a 
regulator detached from the social milieu nor the creation o f knowledgeable agents 
rationally pursuing their interests, as most o f the time agents reproduce their taken for 
granted vision owing its existence to cognitive schemas making action meaningful.
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Striving to influence definitions and challenge established values is an 
expression of an increase in power and always implies the antagonism amongst 
different loci of power, different conceptualisations of what is w orth pursuing. There 
are no eternal values, bu t context dependent struggles to create according to desires 
anchored in our perception of how our lives should be.
Against this background, I have offered an analysis of regulatory law 
initiated by the European administration that is concerned with uncovering forms of 
domination and how these seek to replace old ones and impose new varieties of 
classification embraced by law. Albeit the struggles involved in redefinitions, there 
are always unchallenged beliefs presenting us w ith the doxic element of the field, as 
is the belief that discussion should be the way out of technological dystopia.
Nevertheless, action and hum an m inds may always challenge dom inant 
classifications, and as such a static conceptualisation of regulatory law as involving 
the engulfment of dom inant taxonomies, simultaneously implies the possibility of 
struggles to redefine it according to alternative heretic visions. Therefore, the study 
of regulatory law should neither be on structures nor on minds, bu t on the 
continuous processes of communications amongst these.
We saw that the Internet is a model for the study of such processes, due to its 
decentralised character supporting participation and neutral intermediation. But 
how unuttered by power relations is a forum of discussion? And how neutral is 
procedural law?
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The argum ent supported was that alternative regulation reproduces 
historically contingent assumptions, such as the belief in scientific objectivity, in the 
responsible emancipated rational agent able to regulate itself, in law 's impartiality 
and neutrality and in the potential of consensus building amongst agents w ith a free 
will.
However, in the future, it is always possible that we challenge the common 
way of doing things by promoting novel understandings. Simultaneously, these 
new, revolutionary visions will always present us w ith new attempts to control 
conduct and impose the 'right' way to conceptualise regulation.
If one accepts that power is at the heart of relations, then we do aw ay with a 
view of society and law as moving towards a refined 'good' society unuttered by 
vulgar antagonisms. And if one accepts that power is a modus vivendi, then the focus 
of analysis should be on the transformation of tools of domination and loci of power. 
The study of law should then be prepared to come to grips w ith social phenomena 
by means of flexible concepts and frameworks of analysis, as truth is making and 
unmaking itself all the time on the basis of an ongoing reorganisation of power 
relations.
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX
A. Library, online resources, legal material, databases
This thesis used library m aterial (such as theoretical m aterial, legal 
analysis and ethnographic works) legal material (reports, decisions, green papers, 
consultations) available on the website of the European Com m ission and legal 
databases such as Westlaw.
B. Qualitative research (ethnographic fieldwork, interviews, 
textual analysis, discourse analysis)
For the purposes of this thesis, several m ethods of data collection were 
deployed in the context of qualitative research, such as participant observation, 
interviewing and  textual analysis.
Ethnography, (participant observation, textual analysis, discourse analysis).
Ethnographic research consists of understanding the experience and 
activities of people in a given field1 and requires the participation of the observer. 
M y observations are based on a four-m onth period of tim e I spent at the 
European Com m ission as a trainee (September-December 1998). By means of 
participating in everyday work w ith the people I w as observing, I effectively 
gained m em bership and leam t the codes of conduct governing life inside the 
European Commission.
1 Brewer, J. D. (2000) Ethnography (Buckingham, Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press).
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M y role as an observer is understood as being part of m y observations. My 
account of the life inside the European Commission does not seek to apply  the 
m odel of natural sciences in social science. The observer is not thought to be 
detached describing the object under observation 'as it is /  as realists w ould 
assert.
Therefore, the m ethod I used to collect data w as unstructured and  open 
ended, as too m uch structure m ay result in losing sight of real life and  im pose 
presuppositions not so well thought. In fact, I sought to present life inside the 
European Com m ission as a story, hence I presented it in m any parts as a first 
person account. Therefore, m y account should be considered as autobiographical 
(autoethnography).
This w ay to approach ethnography has been criticised as unscientific, 
since, w hen ethnography is autobiographical and a story telling, data cannot be 
verified and tru th  claims cannot be generalised. This is true and presents us w ith 
the weakness of this approach. However, autobiographical reflexivity requires 
that an ethnographic account is presented in such a w ay to rem ind the reader 
that it bears w ith it the 'deficiency' and  necessary limitations of interpretation, 
challenging the authority  of texts in general.2
This account is m eant to show that there are different stories to be told, as 
there are no objective accounts. In fact, this m ethodology rem inds us that there
2 Clifford, J. (1986) 'On ethnographic allegory' in Clifford, S. and Marcus, G. (eds) (1986) Writing 
Culture: The Poets and Politics of Ethnography (Berkley, CA: University of California).
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m ay be 'voices' suppressed as, for example, in the case the ethnographer neglects 
to take on board the views of groups challenging deeply em bedded values.3
However, the extreme version of postm odern reflexive ethnography is not 
unproblem atic.4 The fact that the ethnographer is part of her ethnography means 
that it is impossible to describe 'reality.'5 The m ore a researcher becomes part of 
the setting she is describing, the m ore she experiences a personal journey of 
individual developm ent together w ith  the subjects she is observing.6
A different approach is supported by Brunner w ho argues that 
autoethnography conveys meanings understandable no t only to the researcher 
b u t also to others, as interpretations are m ade by  means of com m on 
understandings crystallised in the structural setting in which an organisation 
operates.7 In the sam e spirit Chia argues for a conceptualisation of reality in 
ethnographic research as 'becoming realism/  w here reality is being reinterpreted 
all the time, hence the focus on processes, in other w ords not on structures per se 
bu t on the com m unication between structures and agents.8
In m y thesis the latter view is embraced. I have already argued that 
Bourdieu's account allows for a conceptualisation of social reality as being in 
itself and in agents' m inds, providing for coming to grips w ith  the process of
3 Travers, M. (2001) Qualitative Research Through Case Studies (London: SAGE).
4 Atkinson, P. and Hammersley, M. (second ed 1995) Ethnography: Principles in Practice (London- 
New York: Routledge). The authors promote a view of 'subtle realism.'
5 On postmodernism see Lyotard, F. (1984) The Postmodern Condition. A Report on Knowledge 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, orig. 1979).
6 Coffey, A. (1999) The Ethnographic Self: Fieldwork and the Representation of Identity (London: 
SAGE).
7 Brunner, J. (1990) Acts of Meaning (USA, Harvard University Press).
8 Chia, R. (1996) 'The problem of reflexivity in organisational research: Towards a postmodern 
science of organisation' 3 Organisation 31-60; also see Hammersley and Atkinson note 4 above. An 
online text embracing this position is by Cupchik, G. (2001) 'Constructivist realism: An ontology 
that encompasses positivist and constructivist approaches to the social sciences' 2 Forum: 
Qualitative Research 1, at http: /  / www.qualitative-research.net/fqs-texte/1-01 /l-01cupchik-e.htm.
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com m unication am ongst them. I argued that the tru th  of the object under 
observation is not impossible. It m ay be context dependent and fluid, b u t can be 
attained.
In m y research, the data I used involve details as regards the architectural 
setting (such as the shape of buildings), photos and  maps. I also used statistics, 
referred to particular characteristics of spatial and numerical concentration that I 
found 'appropriate' to be m entioned for the purposes of ethnographic research, 
discussed elements of the jargon used by  civil servants (discourse analysis) 
followed the life of particular files, which I thought were controversial in order to 
depict battles am ongst DGs and the conditions under which people cooperate, 
and finally analysed the tone and character of internal notes (textual analysis).
There is certainly a tale to be told in this sense. However, the European 
Commission, its hierarchies, the m ultilingual setting, the Franco-German 
influence, are all a 'reality' experienced by civil servants. M oreover, there are 
certain shared assum ptions, com m on sense knowledge, habitus, w hich result in 
m aking life inside the European Com m ission reasonable for everybody. These I 
tried to uncover, following the autobiographical m ethodology of flexible and 
open-ended data collection, while accepting (as ethnom ethodologists and 
symbolic interactionists do) that it is not impossible to depict com m on sense 
assum ptions, although the researcher is w itnessing and experiencing an instance 
of social interaction constantly subject to change and redefinition.9
9 Goffman's dramaturgical method (symbolic interactionism) and Garfinkers ethnomethodology 
both show how people construct and interpret the social world rejecting the natural science 
model, Goffman, E. (1959) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Doubleday; London: 
Mayflower), also see Blumer, H. (1986) Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method (Berkley:
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Interviews
It w as im portant that I have been at the European Com m ission as a trainee 
prior to conducting interviews, as it w as easy to gain the trust of m y 
interviewees. I could also use the nam es of the people I w orked w ith  as a trainee 
(having first asked for their permission) before contacting m y interviewees. I first 
sent a two-page letter show ing very generally w hat kind of topics I w ould  like to 
discuss.
I w as quite provocative in these letters, in the sense that I raised in a 
straightforw ard w ay contested issues, b u t this always w orked. People were 
delighted to talk to someone w ho had  some experience of how  things are done 
inside the European Commission, and w ith  w hom  they w ould  feel that the 
discussion could go off the beaten track. The interviews were unstructured and 
relaxed, often w ent on during lunch and  drinks, w here I gave m y interviewees 
the opportunity  to test m y views, thus having interviews like conversations.
I conducted 15 interviews. I w as careful to choose people from  all stages in 
the hierarchy. The interviews w ere not recorded w ith  a tape recorder. A lthough I 
had  one w ith  me, I realised during  the first interview that m y interviewee was 
feeling very uncom fortable w ith  its presence in the room. I thus decided not to 
use it, and  instead took notes.
University of California Press). Garfinkel's ethnomethodological study of courts sough to show 
how people decide and that there is a difference between the rule one has to follow and what she 
actually decides in the light of common sense knowledge. In this sense ethnomethodology went 
further than symbolic interactionism in showing how social reality can be interpreted and re­
interpreted according to common sense knowledge, but retained the idea that interactions can be 
described by the researcher, who is herself part of an unfolding social reality, see Garfinkel, H. 
(1967) Studies in Ethnomethodology (Cambridge: Polity); Garfinkel, H. (1996) 'Ethnomethodology's 
programme' 59 Social Psychology Quarterly 5-21.
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M ost of the time, m y interviewees w anted m e to assure them  that I w ould 
not give their names, thus called for confidential treatm ent of the inform ation 
they w ould give me. It is characteristic of this that m ost of m y interviewees 
preferred to give an interview in the conference room  (where w e could close the 
doors) instead of having it in their office.
Overall, once m y interviewees had  m y assurance that their nam es w ould 
not be disclosed, they w ere delighted to engage in a thorough conversation of the 
issues I raised. Of course, I had  interviewees w ho w ere not receptive, bu t they 
w ere the exception. Generally I think that interview ing is an art and there are no 
exact rules of w hat a good interview  is, b u t in the case of this research a decisive 
factor w as m y enthusiasm  and true adm iration for the rem arkable w ork of the 
people w orking for an organisation such as the European Commission.
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